Bonaventure

Quaestio II. Utrum mulier formata fuerit de costa viri secundum rationem seminalem.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum mulier formata sit de costa viri secundum rationem seminalem. Et quod sic, videtur:

Ad oppositum.

1. Primo per textum¹: Consummavit Deus die sexto omne opus suum. Si ergo formatio mulieris fuit post diem sextum, sicut Scriptura innuit, ergo aliquo modo in illis operibus sex dierum mulier condita fuit; sed non erat nisi in costa: ergo in costa erat unde fieret mulier. Sed quod sic est in aliquo dicitur esse in eo secundum rationem seminalem: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus sexto super Genesim ad litteram²: « Omnia quae consequentibus erant evolvenda temporibus, primitus Deus creavit simul, cum faceret mundum; consummata quidem, quoniam nihil habent illa in naturis propriis, quibus suorum temporum cursus agunt, quod non in istis causaliter factum sit; inchoata autem, quoniam quaedam erant semina futurorum ». Ergo si mulier postea producenda erat, semen mulieris praeexistebat; sed non nisi in costa: ergo etc.

3. Item, vir dicitur esse imago Dei, quia ex ipso fiunt omnes homines, sicut omnia sunt ex Deo³; sed nulla creatura est ex Deo materialiter: ergo si recta est assimilatio, necesse est, quod vir respectu mulieris non solum habeat habitudinem principii materialis, sed etiam activi. Sed quod est ex aliquo sicut ex materiali et activo principio est secundum rationem seminalem: ergo etc.

4. Item, vir productus est ex limo, et mulier de viro; aut ergo est maior habitudo et convenientior costae ad mulierem quam viri ad limum, aut non. Si non, ergo non magis attinet mulier viro quam vir limo. Si sic, ergo ultra rationem possibilis⁴ fuit ibi aliquo modo ratio activi. Si igitur haec est ratio seminalis, apparet, quod secundum rationem seminalem ex costa formatum fuit corpus mulieris.

5. Item, quia Deus produxit corpus mulieris de costa, aut hoc fuit secundum naturam, aut contra. Si secundum naturam; cum natura quidquid facit, faciat secundum rationes seminales, videtur, quod seminaliter mulier de costa producta sit. Si contra naturam; contra: « Conditor naturae, ut dicit Augustinus⁵, non facit contra naturam »; et idem super Genesim ad litteram: « Tam non facit Deus contra causas, quas bonas constituit, quam contra voluntatem suam non facit ». Ergo si formatio Evae non potuit esse contra naturam, fuit ergo secundum naturam; et si hoc, fuit ergo secundum rationem seminalem.

6. Item, si productio illa fuit contra naturam, ergo formatio mulieris fuit miraculum; sed Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram⁶ dicit, quod Deus in rerum conditione non utitur rebus ad miraculum suae potentiae, sed secundum quod proprie competit ipsarum rerum naturae: ergo si miraculum non faciebat, sed operabatur, secundum quod natura exigebat; videtur, quod mulierem produxerit secundum seminalem rationem, si eam produxit secundum exigentiam naturae.

Contra:

Fundamenta.

1. Magister dicit in littera⁷, et est auctoritas Augustini: « Illa quae secundum causam seminalem fiunt, dicuntur naturaliter fieri, quia ita cursus naturae hominibus innotuit »: si ergo productio mulieris de costa non est secundum naturae cursum, ergo non erit secundum rationem seminalem.

2. Item, Magister in littera⁸: « Corpus mulieris de costa factum dicitur eo sane miraculo, quo de quinque panibus quinque millia hominum saturata sunt »; sed illud non fuit secundum rationem seminalem: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Semen dicit principium activum et intrinsecum⁹, unde non dicitur semen hominis humor quicumque, sed ille qui decisus est a lumbis paternis; sed in costa non erat vis activa ad mulieris productionem: ergo nec ratio seminalis.

4. Item, semen habet in se rationem totius et partium eius rei, quae ex ipso producitur. Unde Augustinus quinto super Genesim ad litteram¹⁰: « In semine omnia producta sunt et fuerant primitus non mole magnitudinis, sed in potentia causali ». Sed in costa illa non erat virtus ad singula membra formanda: ergo non erat ibi mulier secundum rationem seminalem.

5. Item, impossibile est, aliquid crescere per virtutem creatam nisi per rarefactionem, aut appositionem; sed corpus mulieris de illa costa productum est, quod erat ipsa maius, non per costae rarefactionem nec extrinsecae materiae appositionem, sicut dicit Magister in littera¹¹: ergo productio illa ex costa non fuit secundum virtutem creaturae, sed solum creatricis essentiae. Sed seminalis ratio dicit virtutem creatam; non enim dicuntur in Deo res esse seminaliter: ergo haec productio mulieris ex costa non fuit secundum rationes seminales.

6. Item, secundum rationes seminales attenditur rerum propagatio et generatio; sed secundum eductionem corporis de costa non fit propagatio in humana specie: ergo productio alicuius corporis humani ex costa non est secundum rationem seminalem.

Quaestio incidens.

Propter hoc est quaestio: cum Magister¹² dicat, aliqua fieri secundum rationes causales, aliqua secundum rationes seminales, quae sit differentia inter haec duo. Si tu dicas, quod illa fiunt secundum rationes causales, quae fiunt secundum rationes incommutabiles vel aeternas; illa secundum rationes seminales, quae fiunt secundum exigentiam et virtutem potentiarum inditarum ipsis creaturis; obiicitur contra hoc per Augustinum. Dicit enim Augustinus sexto super Genesim ad litteram¹³: « Nihil habent res in naturis propriis, quod non in primis diebus causaliter factum est ». Et iterum: « Causales illae rationes, quas mundo indidit, cum primum simul omnia creavit, quomodo institutae sunt, merito quaeri potest ». Et paulo post: « In illis primis rerum causis, quas mundo primitus Creator inseruit, non tantum posuit, quod de limo formaturus erat hominem, sed quemadmodum producturus ». Ergo rationes causales non dicunt quid increatum, sed creatum. — Item, ipse Augustinus rationes causa-

les, quas dicit inditas primis rebus, distinguit contra incommutabiles rationes, tam in quinto super Genesim ad litteram¹⁴, quam in sexto.

Quaeritur etiam, quae differentia sit inter rationes seminales et naturales; et videtur, quod nulla, quia Augustinus dicit, quod cum arbor germinatur de semine, quotidie est propagatio secundum rationem seminalem, in fine quinti super Genesim ad litteram¹⁵; sed hoc idem est secundum rationem naturalem. — Item, operatio, quae est a vi seminali, aut est naturalis, aut est voluntaria. Cum enim non sit a causa per accidens et sit a causa creata, necesse est, quod sit a natura, vel ab intellectu¹⁶. Sed non est ab intellectu: ergo a natura: ergo omne quod fit seminaliter, fit naturaliter. Pari ratione, cum natura sit vis propagativa, et propagatio fiat mediante semine; omne quod fit naturaliter, videtur fieri seminaliter.

### Conclusio. Corpus mulieris non fuit in costa Adae secundum rationes seminales, nisi large intelligantur; et omnino non est inde factum secundum easdem.

Respondeo:

Praenotandum.

Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum de his rationibus seminalibus egregius doctor Augustinus in quinto et sexto super Genesim ad litteram¹⁷ ambigue loquatur, et ab ipso potissime habeamus horum nominum usum; non est facile inter huiusmodi vocabula recte distinguere. Ipse enim rationes causales modo dicit rebus fuisse insertas, modo dicit, quantum ad aliqua in divina voluntate fuisse servatas. Possumus tamen, quantum est de vi vocabuli, differentiam assignare in hunc modum.

Notiones generales.

Causa enim communis est ad principium intrinsecum et extrinsecum; similiter et ratio causalis, quantum est de vi nominis; semen vero dicit principium intrinsecum. Et ita ratio causalis se extendit ad rationes creatas et increatas; ratio vero seminalis solum ad rationes creatas. Quantum ergo est de vi nominis, unum est commune respectu alterius; in quantum autem ad invicem distinguuntur et connumerantur, sic causa et causalis ratio accipitur quantum ad principium increatum, semen vero et seminalis ratio spectat ad principium creatum. — Differunt autem causa et ratio causalis, quia causa dicit principium productivum, ratio vero causalis dicit regulam dirigentem illud principium in sua operatione. Similiter per hunc modum differt semen et ratio seminalis. Regula autem agentis increati est forma exemplaris sive idealis¹⁸, regula vero agentis creati est forma naturalis: et ita rationes causales sunt formae ideales sive exemplares, rationes vero seminales sunt formae naturales.

Differentia rationum primordialium et causalium.

Et secundum hoc patet, quod rationes causales et primordiales idem sunt re, differentes sola ratione. Primordiales enim dicuntur per privationem prioris, sed causales per positionem posterioris; et primordiales, in quantum respiciunt Deum ut principium primum, causales, in quantum respiciunt Deum ut finem ultimum, qui est causa causarum¹⁹. — Similiter naturales rationes et seminales re idem sunt, ratione vero differunt. Item naturales rationes et seminales. Quia enim semen dicit ut ex quo, et natura dicit ut a quo, ratio seminalis attenditur, in quantum dirigit potentiam naturae, ut ex aliquo fiat aliquid; naturalis vero, ut ab aliquo fiat aliquid. — Aliter. Vel ratio seminalis respicit inchoationem et intrinsecam virtutem, quae movet et operatur ad effectus productionem; naturalis vero concernit producentis ad productum assimilationem et modi agendi assuetudinem. Unde appropriate loquendo, cum magi ex virgis fecerunt serpentes²⁰, hoc fuit secundum rationes seminales; cum vero serpentes, sicut assolent, serpentes generant, hoc fit secundum rationes naturales, licet utraeque et naturales et seminales congrue dici possint.

Applicatio.

Quando ergo quaeritur, utrum aliquis effectus fiat secundum rationes causales aut seminales; respondendum est, quod aut sic est a Deo ille effectus, quod creatura non habet in eo potentiam aliquam, aut si habet, habet solam potentiam obedientiae²¹; utpote cum mundus fit de nihilo, ubi nulla est potentia creaturae; vel cum multi panes multiplicantur ex pane uno, ubi est sola potentia obedientiae; et haec fiunt secundum rationes causales, quas Deus servavit in sua voluntate, quia non fiunt secundum exigentiam creaturae, sed secundum exigentiam dispositionis aeternae. — Si autem sic producitur effectus, quod est in potentia naturae, non solum obediente, sed etiam potente ad actum perducere²²; sic dicitur fieri secundum rationes seminales; sicut patet, cum homo generatur ex homine, vel arbor ex arbore.

Distinguitur potentia propinqua et remota.

Sed attendendum est, quod illa potentia naturae ad effectus istos aut est propinqua et sufficiens, sicut est in semine deciso a lumbis ad generationem humani corporis; et sic dicitur proprie habere in se rationem seminalem; aut est remota et insufficiens, sicut est in pane vel in alimento, ut ex eo fiat homo; et sic minus proprie dicitur esse ibi ratio seminalis. Non enim dicitur in pane esse ratio seminalis respectu hominis producendi, nisi valde large accipiatur. — Applicatio. Quod autem sic est in remota²³ dispositione respectu effectus, aut perducitur ad illum effectum mediantibus illis, ad quae habebat ordinem immediatum, aut immediate. Si mediate, tunc potest dici, quod effectus ille sit secundum rationem seminalem, utpote si panis comedatur et digeratur et convertatur in humorem, et postmodum in lumbis convertatur in semen, deinde in hominem. Si autem immediate perducatur ad effectum, utpote si de pane statim formaretur corpus hominis; sic nullo modo dicitur esse factum secundum rationes seminales, sed secundum rationes causales. Quamvis enim ibi esset aliqua potentia activa ad hoc, quod inde fieret corpus per multa intermedia; tamen quod immediate fieret, hoc habuit in sola potentia obedientiae.

Conclusio 1. In membris.

Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum corpus mulieris fuerit in costa seminaliter: dicendum, quod si proprie accipiatur ratio seminalis, non; si autem accipiatur large pro quacumque potentia activa existente in materia, sic potest dici in costa fuisse ratio seminalis. Conclusio 2. Rursus, si quaeratur, utrum mulier facta sit de costa secundum rationes seminales; respondendum est, quod non; quia costa respectu talis modi producendi et respectu tanti corporis ex ea formandi absque additione non habuit nisi solam potentiam obedientiae. Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

Solutio oppositorum.

1. 2. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod nihil novum fecit Deus ultra diem sextum; dicendum, quod illud argumentum deficit dupliciter. Primo, quia, etsi formatio mulieris post diem sextum narretur, non est tamen credendum, quod tam longo tempore viri formatio praecesserit, sed quod die sexto de latere viri producta est. Illud autem quod subditur, intelligendum est per recapitulationem: recapitulat enim Scriptura, ut addat²⁴. Deficit etiam in hoc, quod Deus non dicitur facere novum, non solum in hoc, quod omnia producta sint in ratione seminali, sed quia producta sunt in suo simili; et hoc necessarium est dicere propter creationem animae, quae non exit in esse secundum seminalem rationem. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quia formatio mulieris non fuit de consequentibus ad opera sex dierum; vel si fuit, causaliter dicitur fuisse facta, quia praecessit potentia obedientiae in costa, vel etiam aliqua ratio seminalis longinqua, licet secundum illam mulier non sit formata, sed secundum potentiam divinam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vir est imago Dei, quia principium omnium hominum; dicendum, quod non est omnimoda similitudo. Deus enim est principium sufficiens respectu omnium; vir autem non est per se principium sufficiens respectu hominum; aliquo tamen modo tenet rationem principii; et hoc facit ad maiorem expressionem imaginis, ad cuius expressionem aliquo modo amplificandam non solum facit assimilatio perfecta, sed etiam assimilatio modica²⁵.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior erat convenientia costae ad mulierem, quam limi ad virum; dicendum, quod costa dupliciter potest considerari: aut in se, aut in quantum fuit pars viri. In se quidem ita bene distabat a formatione corporis mulieris, sicut limus a formatione corporis viri. Si autem consideretur, in quantum est pars viri; sic, quia vir et mulier sunt personae, in quibus potest esse affinitas et attinentia, talis formatio faciebat quoddam maius vinculum attinentiae esse inter virum et mulierem; quod quidem non poterat esse inter virum et elementum terrae²⁶.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod productio mulieris de costa non fuit contra naturam; dicendum, Natura accipitur dupliciter; item locutio contra naturam. quod dupliciter dicitur natura. Uno modo dicitur natura omne illud quod competit rei a sua naturali origine; et sic competit creaturae, ut ex ea producatur omne quod Deus vult. Opus enim respectu sui artificis habet in se potentiam perfectae obedientiae, cum per omnia subiaceat eius voluntati; propter quod dicitur²⁷, quod spiritus Domini ferebatur super aquas; et contra hanc naturam Deus nunquam facit, immo quidquid facit de creatura, secundum hanc naturam facit. Et secundum hunc modum accipiendi naturam, mulier de costa non est formata contra naturam. — Alio modo dicitur natura proprie vis insita rebus, secundum quam res naturales peragunt cursus suos et motus solitos; et hoc modo accipiendo naturam, aliquando Deus facit contra naturam, aliquando supra naturam. — Distinguitur contra naturam et supra naturam. Tunc facit contra naturam, quando facit aliquid, cuius simile in natura et a natura produci habet, tamen alio modo omnino diverso; ut patet in hoc, quod na-

tura dat alicui visum et successive in primaria generatione, similiter et dat vitam; nunquam tamen caecum reducit ad visum nec mortuum ad vitam. Si ergo Deus sua virtute hoc faciat, ut alicui caeco visum restituat et mortuo vitam, tunc dicitur facere contra naturam, id est contra solitum cursum naturae, et tunc dicitur miraculum. — Quando vero Deus facit aliquid, cuius simile natura facere non potest, et ad quod natura non habet ordinem secundum propriam virtutem, sicut quando Deus factus est homo, vel quando corpus mortale fit gloriosum; tunc facit supra naturam, et illud opus proprie dicitur mirabile, non miraculum²⁸. Quid mirabile, quid miraculum. Quoniam igitur in operibus sex dierum naturae rerum nondum erant conditae, nec cursus earum determinati; ideo tam in productione mulieris ex costa viri, quam in productione aliarum rerum operabatur supra naturam, non contra; et ideo opera illa mirabilia²⁹, non miracula dici debebant.

6. Et per hoc patet responsio ad ultimum obiectum; quia non fuit proprie contra naturam nec est miraculum dicendum.

Question II. Whether the woman was formed from the rib of the man according to a seminal reason.

Secondly it is asked whether the woman was formed from the rib of the man according to a seminal reason. And that she was, it seems:

Ad oppositum.

1. First by the text¹: God completed on the sixth day all his work. If therefore the formation of the woman was after the sixth day, as Scripture suggests, then in some way she was constituted in those works of the six days; but she was not [present] except in the rib: therefore in the rib was that from which the woman would be made. But what is in something in this way is said to be in it according to a seminal reason: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the sixth book On Genesis to the Letter²: « All those things which were to be unfolded in later times, God created together at first, when he made the world; consummated, indeed, because they have nothing in their proper natures, by which the courses of their times act, which was not causally made in those [first works]; inchoate, however, because certain things were seeds of future things. » Therefore if the woman was afterwards to be produced, the seed of the woman pre-existed; but only in the rib: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the man is said to be the image of God, because from him are all men, as all things are from God³; but no creature is from God materially: therefore if the assimilation is correct, it is necessary that the man with respect to the woman should have not only the relation of a material principle, but also of an active one. But what is from something as from a material and active principle is according to a seminal reason: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the man was produced from the slime, and the woman from the man; either then there is a greater relation and more fitting one of the rib to the woman than of the man to the slime, or not. If not, then the woman does not pertain to the man more than the man to the slime. If yes, then beyond the account of the possible⁴ there was there in some way an account of the active. If therefore this is a seminal reason, it appears that according to a seminal reason from the rib was formed the body of the woman.

5. Likewise, since God produced the body of the woman from the rib, either this was according to nature, or against. If according to nature; since nature, whatever it does, does according to seminal reasons, it seems that seminally the woman was produced from the rib. If against nature; on the contrary: « The Founder of nature, as Augustine says⁵, does not act against nature »; and the same author On Genesis to the Letter: « So far does God not act against the causes which he established as good, as he does not act against his own will. » Therefore if the formation of Eve could not have been against nature, it was therefore according to nature; and if this, it was therefore according to a seminal reason.

6. Likewise, if that production was against nature, then the formation of the woman was a miracle; but Augustine On Genesis to the Letter⁶ says that God in the founding of things does not use things for a miracle of his power, but according to what properly befits the nature of those very things: therefore if he was not working a miracle, but operating according to what nature required; it seems that he produced the woman according to a seminal reason, if he produced her according to the requirement of nature.

On the contrary:

Fundamenta.

1. The Master says in the text⁷, and it is the authority of Augustine: « Those things which happen according to a seminal cause are said to happen naturally, because thus the course of nature has become known to men »: if therefore the production of the woman from the rib is not according to the course of nature, then it will not be according to a seminal reason.

2. Likewise, the Master in the text⁸: « The body of the woman is said to have been made from the rib by that same miracle by which from five loaves five thousand men were satisfied »; but that was not according to a seminal reason: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this seems by reason. Seed denotes an active and intrinsic principle⁹, whence not just any humor of a man is called seed, but that which has been separated from the paternal loins; but in the rib there was no active force for the production of the woman: therefore neither a seminal reason.

4. Likewise, seed has in itself the account of the whole and of the parts of that thing which is produced from it. Whence Augustine in the fifth book On Genesis to the Letter¹⁰: « In the seed all things have been produced and were first not in the mass of magnitude, but in causal potency. » But in that rib there was no power for forming the individual members: therefore the woman was not there according to a seminal reason.

5. Likewise, it is impossible that anything should grow by a created power except by rarefaction, or by addition; but the body of the woman was produced from that rib, which body was greater than the rib itself, not by a rarefaction of the rib nor by the addition of extrinsic matter, as the Master says in the text¹¹: therefore that production from the rib was not according to the power of a creature, but only of the creative essence. But a seminal reason denotes a created power; for things are not said to be in God seminally: therefore this production of the woman from the rib was not according to seminal reasons.

6. Likewise, propagation and generation of things are reckoned according to seminal reasons; but according to the leading-out of a body from the rib there is no propagation in the human species: therefore the production of any human body from the rib is not according to a seminal reason.

Incidental question.

On account of this there is a question: since the Master¹² says that some things happen according to causal reasons, others according to seminal reasons, what the difference is between these two. If you say that those things happen according to causal reasons which happen according to immutable or eternal reasons; those according to seminal reasons which happen according to the requirement and power of the potencies given to the creatures themselves; it is objected against this through Augustine. For Augustine says in the sixth book On Genesis to the Letter¹³: « Things have nothing in their proper natures which was not causally made in the first days. » And again: « Those causal reasons which he put into the world, when he first created all things together, how they were instituted, can rightly be asked. » And a little later: « In those first causes of things which the Creator first inserted into the world, he placed not only that he was going to form man from the slime, but how he was going to produce him. » Therefore causal reasons do not denote something uncreated, but something created. — Likewise, Augustine himself distinguishes causal reasons, which he says were given to the first things, against immutable reasons, both in the fifth book On Genesis to the Letter¹⁴, and in the sixth.

It is also asked what the difference is between seminal and natural reasons; and it seems that there is none, because Augustine says that when a tree sprouts from a seed, daily there is propagation according to a seminal reason, at the end of the fifth book On Genesis to the Letter¹⁵; but this same thing is according to a natural reason. — Likewise, an operation which is from a seminal power is either natural, or voluntary. For since it is not from a cause by accident and is from a created cause, it is necessary that it be from nature, or from intellect¹⁶. But it is not from intellect: therefore from nature: therefore everything that happens seminally happens naturally. By like reasoning, since nature is a propagative force, and propagation happens by means of seed; everything that happens naturally seems to happen seminally.

### Conclusion. The body of the woman was not in Adam's rib according to seminal reasons, unless these be understood broadly; and absolutely it was not thence made according to the same.

I respond:

Praenotandum.

For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, since concerning these seminal reasons the eminent doctor Augustine in the fifth and sixth books On Genesis to the Letter¹⁷ speaks ambiguously, and from him chiefly we have the usage of these names; it is not easy to distinguish rightly among such terms. For he himself sometimes says that causal reasons were inserted into things, and sometimes says that, as to some things, they were kept in the divine will. We can nevertheless, as far as the force of the term goes, assign a difference in this way.

General notions.

For cause is common to intrinsic and extrinsic principle; likewise also causal reason, as far as the force of the name goes; but seed denotes an intrinsic principle. And thus causal reason extends to reasons created and uncreated; seminal reason only to reasons created. As far therefore as the force of the name goes, the one is common with respect to the other; but insofar as they are distinguished and counted among each other, thus cause and causal reason are taken with respect to the uncreated principle, while seed and seminal reason refer to the created principle. — But cause and causal reason differ, because cause denotes a productive principle, while causal reason denotes the rule directing that principle in its operation. Similarly, in this way seed and seminal reason differ. But the rule of the uncreated agent is the exemplar or ideal form¹⁸, whereas the rule of the created agent is the natural form: and thus causal reasons are ideal or exemplar forms, while seminal reasons are natural forms.

Difference of primordial and causal reasons.

And according to this it is clear that causal and primordial reasons are the same in reality, differing only in account. For they are called primordial by privation of a prior, but causal by positing of a posterior; and primordial insofar as they regard God as first principle, causal insofar as they regard God as ultimate end, who is the cause of causes¹⁹. — Similarly, natural and seminal reasons are the same in reality, but differ in account. Likewise of natural and seminal reasons. For since seed denotes the as-from-which, and nature denotes the as-by-which, a seminal reason is reckoned insofar as it directs the power of nature so that from something there comes to be something; whereas a natural [reason], so that by something there comes to be something. — Otherwise. Or a seminal reason regards the inception and the intrinsic power which moves and operates toward the production of the effect; whereas a natural [reason] concerns the assimilation of the producer to the produced and the customariness of the mode of acting. Whence speaking appropriately, when the magi made serpents from rods²⁰, this was according to seminal reasons; but when serpents, as they are wont, generate serpents, this happens according to natural reasons, although both can fittingly be called both natural and seminal.

Application.

When therefore it is asked whether some effect happens according to causal or seminal reasons; the answer is that either that effect is so from God that the creature does not have in it any potency, or, if it has, it has only the potency of obedience²¹; as when the world is made from nothing, where there is no potency of the creature; or when many loaves are multiplied from one loaf, where there is only the potency of obedience; and these things happen according to causal reasons, which God has kept in his will, because they do not happen according to the requirement of the creature, but according to the requirement of the eternal disposition. — But if an effect is so produced that it is in the potency of nature, not only obedient, but also able to lead it through to act²²; thus it is said to come about according to seminal reasons; as is clear when a man is generated from a man, or a tree from a tree.

Proximate and remote potency are distinguished.

But it must be observed that this potency of nature toward such effects is either proximate and sufficient, as it is in the seed separated from the loins for the generation of a human body; and thus it is properly said to have in itself a seminal reason; or it is remote and insufficient, as it is in bread or in food, that from it a man may be made; and thus less properly is a seminal reason said to be there. For a seminal reason is not said to be in bread with respect to a man to be produced, unless it be taken very broadly. — Application. But what is thus in a remote²³ disposition with respect to the effect is either led to that effect by means of those things to which it had an immediate ordering, or immediately. If mediately, then it can be said that that effect is according to a seminal reason, as if bread is eaten and digested and turned into humor, and afterwards in the loins is turned into seed, then into man. But if immediately it is led to the effect, as if from bread a human body were straightway formed; so in no way is it said to be made according to seminal reasons, but according to causal reasons. For although there might be there some active potency toward this, that thence a body should come about through many intermediates; nevertheless, that it should come about immediately, this it had only in the potency of obedience.

Conclusion 1. In the members.

When therefore it is asked whether the body of the woman was in the rib seminally: it must be said that, if a seminal reason is taken properly, no; but if it is taken broadly for any active potency existing in matter, thus it can be said that a seminal reason was in the rib. Conclusion 2. Again, if it is asked whether the woman was made from the rib according to seminal reasons; the answer is that no; because the rib with respect to such a mode of producing and with respect to so great a body to be formed from it without addition had only the potency of obedience. Hence the arguments adduced for this must be granted.

Solution of the opposing arguments.

1. 2. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that God did nothing new beyond the sixth day; it must be said that that argument fails in two ways. First, because, even if the formation of the woman is narrated after the sixth day, it is not to be believed that the formation of the man preceded by so long a time, but that on the sixth day she was produced from the side of the man. But that which is added is to be understood by recapitulation: for Scripture recapitulates, so as to add²⁴. It also fails in this, that God is not said to do something new, not only because all things were produced in a seminal reason, but because they were produced in their own likeness; and this it is necessary to say on account of the creation of the soul, which does not come into being according to a seminal reason. — And through this is clear the response to what follows, because the formation of the woman was not among the things consequent upon the works of the six days; or if it was, it is said to have been made causally, because there preceded a potency of obedience in the rib, or even some remote seminal reason, although the woman was not formed according to it, but according to divine power.

3. To that which is objected, that the man is the image of God because he is the principle of all men; it must be said that the likeness is not in every way. For God is the sufficient principle with respect to all things; but the man is not of himself a sufficient principle with respect to men; in some way, however, he holds the account of a principle; and this contributes to a greater expression of the image, for the amplifying of whose expression in some way not only a perfect assimilation contributes, but even a slight assimilation²⁵.

4. To that which is objected, that there was a greater fittingness of the rib to the woman than of the slime to the man; it must be said that the rib can be considered in two ways: either in itself, or insofar as it was part of the man. In itself, it was as far removed from the formation of the body of the woman as the slime from the formation of the body of the man. But if it is considered insofar as it is part of the man; thus, because the man and the woman are persons in whom affinity and connection can exist, such a formation made a certain greater bond of connection to be between the man and the woman; which indeed could not be between the man and the element of earth²⁶.

5. To that which is objected, that the production of the woman from the rib was not against nature; it must be said, Nature is taken in two ways; likewise the locution against nature. that nature is said in two ways. In one way, that is called nature which befits a thing from its natural origin; and in this sense it befits the creature that from it should be produced whatever God wills. For a work, with respect to its artificer, has in itself the potency of perfect obedience, since in all things it lies subject to his will; on account of which it is said²⁷ that the spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters; and against this nature God never acts, but rather whatever he does of a creature, he does according to this nature. And according to this mode of taking nature, the woman was not formed from the rib against nature. — In another way, nature is properly called the force implanted in things, according to which natural things carry out their accustomed courses and motions; and in this sense of nature, sometimes God acts against nature, sometimes above nature. — Against nature and above nature are distinguished. Then he acts against nature when he does something whose like is wont to be produced in nature and by nature, yet in an altogether different way; as is clear in this, that nature

gives sight to someone, and successively in primary generation gives life as well; yet it never brings back a blind man to sight nor a dead man to life. If therefore God by his power does this, that he restore sight to a blind man and life to a dead man, then he is said to act against nature, that is, against the accustomed course of nature, and then it is called a miracle. — But when God does something whose like nature cannot do, and to which nature has no ordering according to its own power, as when God was made man, or when a mortal body becomes glorious; then he acts above nature, and that work is properly called marvelous, not a miracle²⁸. What is marvelous, what is a miracle. Since therefore in the works of the six days the natures of things were not yet founded, nor their courses determined; therefore both in the production of the woman from the rib of the man, and in the production of other things, he was operating above nature, not against; and therefore those works ought to have been called marvels²⁹, not miracles.

6. And by this is clear the response to the last objection; because it was not properly against nature, nor is it to be called a miracle.