Bonaventure

ARTICULUS I.

Utrum sensibilia sive animalia facta sint.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum animae irrationalium sint productae ex aliquo.

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod sensibilium sive irrationalium animae productae sint ex aliquo:

Fundamenta. 1. Primo per textum Scripturae¹, quae dicit: Producant aquae reptile animae viventis etc.; et paulo post: Producat terra animam viventem. Si enim quod creatur a solo Deo est, et terra cum aqua acceperit potestatem producendi reptile animae viventis, non videtur, quod animal secundum aliquod sui principium sit ex nihilo.

2. Item, per auctoritatem Philosophi in libro de Animalibus decimo sexto²: «Solus intellectus intrat ab extrinseco»: sed si animae brutorum productae fuissent ex nihilo, tunc essent a solo Deo et intrarent ab extrinseco.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia ex p. 373 eo res producitur, in quod resolvitur³; sed non est aliquid, quod naturali resolutione resolvatur in nihil: ergo animae brutorum animalium non sunt resolutae in nihil, quando aliqua animalia fuerunt corrupta: ergo non productae fuerunt ex nihilo.

4. Item, ex eodem est anima istius bruti, quod nunc est, et primi bruti, per conformitatem; sed anima istius bruti generati per naturam non est ex nihilo, quia tunc a natura non posset produci, et sic sequeretur, quod natura non posset facere pediculum. Quod cum non videatur probabile, et planum sit, sicut ex praecedentibus⁴ apparuit, quod natura non potest aliquid ex nihilo producere: restat ergo, quod primae animae brutorum animalium non fuerunt ex nihilo productae.

5. Item, anima rationalis, quia per creationem educitur in esse, est immortalis et incorruptibilis⁵ — eius enim productio non pendet ex corpore, sed ex principio effectivo — sed animae brutorum per naturam sunt corruptibiles: ergo non sunt ex nihilo productae.

6. Item, opus ornatus praesupponit opus distinctionis, et opus distinctionis praesupponit opus creationis: si igitur in distinctione corporum non fuit nova creatio, sed productio ex aliquo, multo fortius videtur, quod in ornatu. Ergo si corpora animalium et animae ad ornatum spectant, videtur, quod non sint productae ex nihilo, sed ex aliquo.

Ad oppositum. Contra: 1. Si ex aliquo productae sunt sensibilium animae in primordio, quaero de illo, ex quo productae sunt, utrum illud productum sit ex aliquo, vel ex nihilo. Et si ex aliquo, similiter quaeram de illo, et ita vel erit abire in infinitum, vel erit ponere, quod illud ex quo producta est anima sensibilis, ab initio productum fuerit ex nihilo. Sed qua ratione illud productum fuit ex nihilo, eadem ratione et anima sensibilis: ergo videtur etc.

2. Item, si animae illae productae sint de aliquo, illud aut erat spirituale quid, aut corporale. Si corporale; contra: ex corpore nunquam potest fieri spiritus, sicut dicit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram⁶. Si spirituale; tunc quaeritur de illo: aut vivebat, aut non vivebat, et quem usum habebat? Et iterum, si spirituale; quare ex illo non poterat fieri anima rationalis? Si igitur ad hoc non contingit rationabiliter respondere, sicut innuit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram⁷, ad haec inconvenientia ducens, sequitur ex hoc, quod primae animae sensibilium ex nihilo sint productae.

3. Item, si fuissent productae ex aliquo, cum talis modus producendi competat virtuti naturali, videtur tunc, quod cum iam essent corpora supercaelestia agentia et moventia et ad mixtionem operantia, quod animalia virtute naturae possent producere: ergo primaria opera non essent propria divinae potentiae, quod est inconveniens, cum ipse sit solus universi conditor⁸ et perfector.

4. Item, videmus, nunc quaedam animalia ignobilia per putrefactionem generari; quaero igitur, a quo educatur eorum anima; et videtur, quod non possit a natura, cum «natura sit vis insita rebus ex similibus similia procreans»⁹: videtur etiam, quod non possit a virtute corporis caelestis, quia minus nobile non potest educere magis nobile: «substantia autem spiritualis, ut dicit Augustinus, nobilior est omni corpore»: ergo oportet, quod educatur a Creatore immediate. Sed quod sic educitur habet educi ex nihilo: ergo illorum animalium, quae per putrefactionem generantur, animae creantur: ergo multo fortius animalium primo factorum.

5. Item, nos videmus in animalibus annulosis, quod ad divisionem corporis remanet anima in partibus diversis¹⁰; sed illa non potest esse anima prima, quia erat una sola, nec a natura producta, cum statim sit in qualibet parte, operatio autem naturae sit cum successione: ergo videtur, quod illae partes animentur a Creatore, ergo multo fortius et sensibilia in primaria productione.

6. Item, quando brutum generat brutum, aut transfundit animam, aut non. Si transfundit; cum anima non sit divisibilis, dabit animam suam totam: ergo in generatione morietur. Si non transfundit; cum cesset eius operatio in seminis decisione, necesse est ponere aliud agens, per quod anima educatur. Hoc autem non potest esse femina, cum sit magis principium passivum quam activum, sicut vult Philosophus¹¹, nec aliud principium activum creatum: ergo immediate producitur a Deo, et ita ex nihilo: multo ergo fortius videtur, quod sic productae fuerint in primordio.

Conclusio.

Animae sensibiles in primordio productae sunt ex aliquo, non quidem materialiter, sed seminaliter, sicut nunc fiunt ex potentia materiae activa, quae ab agente excitatur.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa productionem animarum animalium brutalium diversi diversa opinati sunt.

Opinio 1. Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod animae brutorum productae fuerunt ex nihilo, quia non ex aliquo materialiter nec ex aliquo seminaliter. Non ex aliquo materialiter, quia sunt formae purae; non ex aliquo seminaliter, quia non habuerunt aliquid praeexistens. Et ideo dicunt, in prima productione eas simpliciter fuisse creatas; sed deinceps in propagatione non dicunt eas creari, sed potius traduci, non per decisionem et separationem partis animae, sed per multiplicationem. Sicut enim candela, ex quo accensa est, potest se multiplicare sine sui luminis diminutione, sic, immo multo fortius, dicunt substantiam spiritualem posse.

Opinio 2. Secunda positio est huic directe opposita, quod animae brutorum productae sunt ex aliquo materialiter et seminaliter. Materialiter, inquam, quia sunt hoc aliquid¹², cum quaelibet earum sit motor sufficiens, et ideo ex materia et forma dicunt eas constare; illam autem materiam dicunt esse spiritualem, inseparabiliter iunctam corporali naturae; unde sicut ex corporali natura producuntur corpora animalium, sic ex materia spirituali sibi annexa, ut dicunt, fit productio animarum. Et sic fecit Deus a primordio, et sic etiam facit nunc natura. Illa enim materia, cum praeexistat formae, seminarium est ipsius; et sic dicunt, animas illas produci, non tantum materialiter, sed etiam seminaliter, cum eis praeexistat spiritualis¹³ materia et habeat in se aliquam potentiam activam ad hoc, quod ex ea fiat anima, sicut et corporalis natura ad hoc, quod ex ea fiant corpora.

Opinio 3. Tertia positio est, quod animae brutorum productae sunt ex aliquo materialiter, sed non seminaliter. Materialiter, inquam, quia constant ex materia et forma; non autem seminaliter, quia materia illa non praeexistit formae tanquam semen ei quod ex ipso producendum est, sed cum illa concreatur et cum illa destruitur. Et hi dicunt, omnes animas sensibiles non solum a primordio, sed etiam nunc esse a Creatore; nec tamen incorruptibiles, quia ipse Creator dat unicuique durationem, secundum quod competit eius naturae.

Non approbantur. Sed quoniam omnes hae positiones aliquid dicunt improbabile — nam prima dicit, quod anima se ipsam multiplicat et transfundit, ita tamen, quod anima non habeat aliquid, ex quo fiat; et hoc est ponere, quod forma naturalis possit aliam formam consimilem ex nihilo producere, quod est improbabile et supra improbatum est distinctione septima¹⁴. Secunda vero opinio ponit, aliquam materiam spiritualem animae praeexistere, ex qua educatur anima virtute naturae; et hoc satis male est intelligibile, quomodo sit aliqua spiritualis materia, quae non vivat nec usum habeat; quomodo etiam sit aliqua spiritualis materia, et ex illa anima rationalis fieri non valeat. Et iterum, ubi est illa materia spiritualis? quia non videtur esse in se; si autem est cum materia corporali, tunc videtur, quod materia educatur de materia; quod nihil videtur esse dictum. Similiter tertia positio ponit, quod materia animae sensibilis sibi concreetur et quod simul cum ea destruatur; hoc autem ponere est contrarium auctoritati Philosophi¹⁵ et rationi, materiam scilicet alicuius creaturae in nihil omnino cedere. Si enim materia corporalis est ingenita et incorruptibilis, multo fortius videtur, quod spiritualis, quae dignior est et nobilior, secundum quod est sub tali esse.

Opinio 4. Et ideo est quartus modus dicendi, quod animae, quae sunt pure sensibiles, productae sunt ex aliquo seminaliter, sed non materialiter. Seminaliter, inquam, quia formae sunt generabiles et corruptibiles per naturam; et ideo, sicut aliae formae naturales non ex nihilo producuntur, sed est aliqua potentia activa in materia, ex qua fiunt tanquam ex seminario¹⁶; sic etiam intelligendum est in animabus sensibilibus, quae sunt formae tantum, cuiusmodi sunt in brutis animalibus. Et ideo Conclusio. concedendum est, animas sensibiles sive animas brutorum esse ex aliquo, non inquam materialiter, sed seminaliter; quia, cum anima sensibilis sit forma, non habet materiam partem sui, sed solum fit ex potentia materiae activa, quae ab agente excitatur; et sic proficit, quousque fiat anima, sicut globus proficiendo fit rosa.

Corollarium 1. Aliter tamen nunc producuntur ex illo seminario, et aliter in primordio, quia nunc producuntur ex seminario praeexistente secundum sufficientem actualitatem; in primordio vero productae sunt simul cum illo seminario; vel si seminarium illud aliquo modo praeexistit¹⁷ ante diem quintum, in quo facta est productio animalium, in die quinto est ad completam rationem eductum, ita quod data est virtus activa naturae, ut posset deinceps animalia quantum ad corpus et quantum ad animam propa-

p. 375 Corollarium 2. gare et multiplicare. — Et quia quaedam sunt animalia maioris perfectionis et organizationis, quaedam vero minoris; ideo divina dispositio rectissime ordinavit, ut quaedam animalia producerentur ex suo principio sementivo¹⁸ secundum maiorem actualitatem, utpote sunt illa quae generantur per propagationem, ita quod simile ex simili, et ista sunt animalia perfectiora; quaedam vero secundum minorem, utpote illa quae generantur per putrefactionem; quia enim imperfectiora sunt, minori indigent adiutorio et virtute, ut producantur ad esse.

Ratio ex Augustino et Philosopho. Haec autem positio rationabilior est et firmior, quia concordant in hoc tam Augustinus quam Philosophus. Ait enim Augustinus ad Orosium¹⁹ sic: «Sicut semen cuiuslibet arboris habet quandam vim, ut, cum corruptum fuerit in terra, oriatur, et virgultum producatur, deinde ramis nihilominus constipata dilatetur et frondibus, deinde eisdem floribus decorata fructificet; ita est in corpore, ut ita dicam, quoddam seminarium, unde suo tempore, curante providentia Dei, aliqua genera animalium oriantur». Et hoc idem habetur super Genesim ad litteram, libro tertio²⁰ plane et diffuse. — Hoc etiam vult Philosophus in decimo sexto Animalium, ubi ostendit, quod vegetabilis et sensibilis prius sunt in semine in potentia, quam educantur in esse; et ibi videtur innuere, quod illud quod format membra, non est aliud quam ipsa anima; et illam animam vocat potentiam activam, intrinsecam ipsi semini, quae, cum corpus ex semine productum est et organizatum, ut possit ab eadem perfici, prodit in actum et efficitur perfectio corporis physici organici. Aut certe illud quod format membra, potius est virtus animae patris et matris, ex cuius operatione in brutis animalibus educitur in esse anima prolis; secus autem est in hominibus, ut infra videbitur²¹. Et hoc probat ibidem Philosophus ex multis coniecturis et argumentis, et ibidem dicit, quod res corporales plenae sunt virtute animae: et hoc multum concordat verbis Augustini²², qui dicit: «Terra praegnans est seminibus, non tantum respectu arborum, sed etiam respectu animalium». — Hanc igitur positionem sustinendo Conclusio 2. dicendum est, animas sensibilium animalium in primordio non esse creatas ex nihilo, sicut rationes ad hoc inductae ostendunt; habuerunt enim sementivum principium, ex quo productae sunt et nunc producuntur.

Solutio oppositorum. 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod si animae sensibilium productae sunt ex alio aliquo, illud similiter productum est ex alio; dicendum, quod non oportet. Notandum. Seminalis enim ratio sive potentia activa ipsius materiae est ipsi materiae concreata, non ex aliquo producta; illa vero, quae ex illo semine oriuntur, proprie non debent dici creari.

2. Ad illud quod quaeritur, quod si est ex aliquo, quod illud est aut spirituale, aut corporale; dicendum, Notandum. quod nec est materia spiritualis, nec est materia corporalis, sed est quaedam potentia spiritualis, indita a Creatore materiae corporali et ei innitens et ab ea dependens. Et propterea anima sensibilis in brutis generatur et corrumpitur per transmutationem corporalis naturae. Et si tu obiicias, quod anima sensibilis est motor sufficiens, et ita est hoc aliquid et habet materiam et formam; dicendum, quod anima sensibilis non dicitur esse motor sufficiens, quia ipsa primo moveat corpus, quod perficit; sed quia corpus totum, quod habet²³ est hoc aliquid et virtute animae, quae est forma eius, movet partem, et movendo partem suam movet totum, sicut patet in gradientibus. Et quod illud verum sit, apparet, quia si anima sensibilis poneretur in corpore, quod non haberet partem mobilem nisi motu totius, sicut in lapide, nunquam illud moveret.

Alia solutio. Vel aliter dici potest, quod ad hoc, quod aliquid sit motor sufficiens, non oportet, quod distet a mobili, ita quod sit substantia altera differens per p. 376 materiam et formam; sed sufficit, quod illa sit forma in genere substantiae, carens extensione per se et per accidens. Et haec forma sic est in una parte tota, quod tota est in alia; et ideo sic unitur isti parti, quam movet, quod etiam ab ea distat. Et haec distantia sufficit ad hoc, quod possit movere eam, nec requiritur, quod habeat aliam materiam. Et sic est in anima sensitiva in his animalibus, quae huic operationi habent organa apta.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura possit Notandum. eam educere; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia, antequam Dominus praeciperet aquis et diceret: Producant aquae etc., aut seminarium illud animarum sensibilium producendarum non erat, aut si erat, non erat in tanta virtute, quod posset ad perfectionem venire; non enim potest quidquam creatura²⁴ nisi secundum statutum et praeceptum sibi datum a Creatore. Unde cum prius esset unde fieri posset, post factum est divino imperio, ut esset unde fieret.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de animalibus, quae generantur per putrefactionem; dicendum, De generatione aequivoca. quod etsi sint varii modi solvendi, quia quidam dicunt, quod est a caeli motore, quidam, quod a Creatore²⁵; potest tamen secundum physicam positionem plane responderi, quod sicut humor fit semen per potentiam generativam, et postmodum fit corpus organicum in matrice, ita quod anima illa sensibilis, quae erat in potentia, educitur ad actum per virtutem agentis particularis et per adiutorium corporis caelestis; sic etiam in proposito intelligendum est, quod cum in terra ista esset seminarium illud, aliquo modo concurrentibus elementis, et adiuvante corpore caelesti, ut aggeneretur calor vivificus, fit quoddam semen, ita quod potentia illa activa, quae prius latebat, adiuta ex actione caelestis corporis, proficit et venit ad perfectionem et complementum, ita quod nec caelum nec motor caeli dat sibi formam ultimam, sed solum adiuvat et excitat, ut potentia illa proficiendo ad speciem completam perveniat. Et per hunc modum intelligendum est etiam in aliis terrae nascentibus.

Obiectio solvitur. Et si tu obiicias, quod anima, quae est in potentia, non habet speciem nec actum completum a se, nec potest habere ab aliquo, quod non sit ita nobile, sicut ipsa, et nullum tale est corporale; dicendum, Notandum. quod essentia talis speciei²⁶ est in materia, sed in potentia; et illa essentia est ita determinata ad formam talis speciei producendam, quod non potest ex illa essentia sive ratione seminali alia educi, et cum in actum educta est, habet esse et habet tale esse. Quod autem sit in actu, hoc habet ab extrinseco agente, quod erat ens in actu, et quantum ad hoc nobilius est ipsa, quae erat in potentia. Quod autem sit talis speciei, hoc habet ab eo qui primo huius formae essentiam indidit materiae; alioquin nunquam natura ipsam ad esse produceret, nisi Deus ipsam materiae indidisset, sicut supra ostensum fuit distinctione octava²⁷. Et ideo non oportet, quod educens illam formam in actum sit nobilius illa forma educta. Et huius exemplum in multis potest poni, sicut in mineralibus et in multis terrae nascentibus.

5. Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo sequentia. Nam quod obiicitur de divisione corporis annulosi, iam apertum est; quia enim corpus annulosum est modicae organizationis et quasi consimilis in partibus et in toto; ideo in qualibet sui parte est anima in proxima dispositione ad hoc quod sit actu; et ideo, facta divisione, virtute prioris formae et beneficio corporis caelestis, subito inducitur forma.

Solutio aliorum non probatur. Plures autem sunt alii modi dicendi circa hoc. Quidam enim dicunt, quod anima multiplicatur, cum sit spiritualis, sicut punctus ad divisionem lineae, et species ad divisionem speculi; verumtamen in neutro horum intelligendum est, quod illud idem, quod fuit unum, fiat plura²⁸; et ideo praecedens via est magis plana.

6. Ad ultimum similiter patet responsio, quia²⁹, cum animal generetur ab animali per propagationem, etsi non decidatur anima ab anima, sicut corpus deciditur a corpore, quia non est anima divisibilis, ut corpus, deciduntur tamen cum ipso corpore spiritus et calores et virtus etiam animalis, quae adiuvat cum virtute matricis continentis, ut illa potentia activa, quae erat in humore seminario, ad actum completum perveniat. Et ex hoc non sequitur, quod anima producat aliam animam ex nihilo, nec quod producat ex materia, nec etiam quod producat ex se ipsa.

SCHOLION

I. Non agitur hic de anima sensitiva in homine, de qua infra (d. 31. a. 1. q. 1.) probatur, quod «sensibilis et rationalis in homine eiusdem sunt substantiae et ab eodem prin- p. 377 cipio habent educi in esse, videlicet Creatore»; sed agitur de anima pure sensibili, scil. animalium. Et quaestio praecise est de prima productione animalium, in Genesi narrata, licet etiam quaestio de propagatione posteriore animalium solvatur, ut patet ex verbis in corp.: «Aliter tamen nunc producuntur ex illo seminario, et aliter in primordio». — Inclinat autem S. Doctor in sententiam, quod seminarium illud non sit productum ante quintum diem, quin tamen excludat opinionem, quod aliquo imperfecto modo iam antea productum sit (ibid. et ad 3.). Ex quo patet, quod illud seminarium non debeat confundi cum forma incompleta, sub qua creata fuit materia (cfr. supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 3.).

Fuerunt autem illa aetate qui putarent, nullam animam, nec in plantis, nec in animalibus, produci ex traduce (hoc negat etiam Scotus, II. Sent. d. 18. q. unica, n. 3.), sed semper creari ex nihilo. Hanc sententiam, saltem quoad primordium, probabiliter sustineri posse, docet Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 1.), sed simul asserit, sententiam S. Bonaventurae probabilem esse. Attamen communiter posteriores Scholastici negant, eas proprie tunc creatas esse et nunc creari; quibus consentit S. Bonav. et etiam S. Thom., qui in Sum. (I. q. 71. a. unic.) docet, Deum ut principium activum de materia elementari animalia produxisse (cfr. ibid. q. 113. a. 2.).

Quoad modum autem, quo animae sensibiles nunc per propagationem producantur, non consentiebant Scholastici. S. Bonav. docet, quod ab agente producantur ex «aliqua potentia activa in materia, ex qua fiunt tanquam ex seminario». Haec sententia tota fundata est in doctrina eiusdem de rationibus seminalibus, de quibus cfr. infra d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. 3; d. 30. a. 3. q. 1, et supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1; d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. — S. Thom. (II. Sent. d. 18. q. 2. a. 3; S. 1. q. 118. a. 1; de Potent. q. 3. a. 11.) docet, quod «in actu generationis ex anima generantis derivatur quaedam virtus activa ad ipsum semen animalis vel plantae» (Sum. loc. cit.). Scot. autem (II. Sent. d. 18. in utroque Scripto et de Rerum princip. q. 10. a. 3.) tenet, animas vegetabiles et sensitivas nec proprie creari ex nihilo, nec traduci a generante, sed a solo Deo educi de potentia materiae, quae materia alia non sit quam corpus, naturae viribus perfecte organizatum (cfr. Sum. Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. I. q. 118. a. 1.).

II. Explicite de hac quaestione tractant: Alex. Hal., S. P. II. q. 60. m. 3. a. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1, qui alias opiniones impugnat et singulari modo loquendi utitur. — De opere quinti diei in genere cfr. S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. 1. q. 71. a. unic. — Alii commentatores Lombardi rem tangunt infra d. 18, ubi disputant de rationibus seminalibus.

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Article I.

Whether sensible things, that is, animals, have been made.

Question I.

Whether the souls of irrational animals were produced from something.

Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the souls of sensible, that is, of irrational [animals] were produced from something:

Fundamenta. 1. First, by the text of Scripture¹, which says: Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature of a living soul etc.; and a little after: Let the earth bring forth a living soul. For if that which is created is from God alone, and the earth together with the water received the power of producing the creeping thing of a living soul, it does not seem that an animal, with respect to some principle of itself, is from nothing.

2. Likewise, by the authority of the Philosopher in the sixteenth book of the Animals²: «The intellect alone enters from without»: but if the souls of brutes had been produced from nothing, then they would be from God alone and would enter from without.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems by reason, because a thing is produced from that into which it is resolved³; but there is nothing which by natural resolution is resolved into nothing: therefore the souls of brute animals are not resolved into nothing when certain animals have been corrupted: therefore they were not produced from nothing.

4. Likewise, from the same source is the soul of this brute, which now is, and of the first brute, by conformity; but the soul of this brute generated by nature is not from nothing, since then it could not be produced by nature, and so it would follow that nature could not make a louse. Which, since it does not seem probable, and it is plain, as has appeared from what precedes⁴, that nature cannot produce anything from nothing: it remains therefore that the first souls of brute animals were not produced from nothing.

5. Likewise, the rational soul, because it is brought forth into being by creation, is immortal and incorruptible⁵ — for its production does not depend on the body, but on its effective principle — but the souls of brutes are by nature corruptible: therefore they were not produced from nothing.

6. Likewise, the work of adornment presupposes the work of distinction, and the work of distinction presupposes the work of creation: if therefore in the distinction of bodies there was no new creation but a production from something, much more does it seem [the same is true] in the adornment. Therefore if the bodies of animals and their souls pertain to the adornment, it seems that they were not produced from nothing, but from something.

To the opposite. On the contrary: 1. If from something the souls of the sensible [animals] were produced in the primordium, I ask concerning that from which they were produced, whether that [thing] was produced from something or from nothing. And if from something, I shall ask likewise concerning that, and thus either there will be a regress to infinity, or it will be necessary to posit that that from which the sensible soul was produced was from the beginning produced from nothing. But by the same reason by which that thing was produced from nothing, by the same reason also the sensible soul: therefore it seems etc.

2. Likewise, if those souls were produced from something, that [something] was either spiritual or corporeal. If corporeal; on the contrary: spirit can never be made from body, as Augustine says on Genesis according to the letter⁶. If spiritual; then it is asked concerning it: did it live, or did it not live, and what use did it have? And again, if spiritual; why could the rational soul not have been made from it? If, therefore, it is not possible to answer reasonably on this point, as Augustine intimates on Genesis according to the letter⁷, reducing it to these absurdities, it follows from this that the first souls of sensible [animals] were produced from nothing.

3. Likewise, if they had been produced from something, since such a manner of producing belongs to natural power, it then seems, since there were already supercelestial bodies acting and moving and operating toward mixture, that animals could have been produced by the power of nature: therefore the primary works would not be proper to the divine power, which is unfitting, since He alone is the founder⁸ and perfector of the universe.

4. Likewise, we see now that certain ignoble animals are generated by putrefaction; I ask therefore by what their soul is brought forth; and it seems that it cannot be by nature, since «nature is a power implanted in things, procreating like from like»⁹: it also seems that it cannot be by the power of a heavenly body, because the less noble cannot bring forth the more noble: «but spiritual substance, as Augustine says, is more noble than every body»: therefore it is necessary that it be brought forth immediately by the Creator. But what is so brought forth must be brought forth from nothing: therefore the souls of those animals which are generated by putrefaction are created: therefore much more so [the souls] of the animals first made.

5. Likewise, we see in segmented animals that upon the division of the body the soul remains in the diverse parts¹⁰; but that [soul] cannot be the first soul, because there was one alone, nor was it produced by nature, since it is at once in every part, while the operation of nature is with succession: therefore it seems that those parts are animated by the Creator, therefore much more so the sensible things in the primary production.

6. Likewise, when a brute generates a brute, it either pours over the soul, or not. If it pours over; since the soul is not divisible, it will give over its whole soul: therefore in generation it will die. If it does not pour over; since its operation ceases at the deposit of the seed, it is necessary to posit another agent through which the soul is brought forth. But this cannot be the female, since she is more a passive than an active principle, as the Philosopher holds¹¹, nor any other created active principle: therefore it is immediately produced by God, and so from nothing: therefore much more does it seem that they were produced in this way in the primordium.

Conclusion.

The sensible souls were produced in the primordium from something, not indeed materially, but seminally, just as now they come to be from the active potency of matter, which is aroused by the agent.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that, concerning the production of the souls of brute animals, different [thinkers] have held different opinions.

Opinion 1. For some have wished to say that the souls of brutes were produced from nothing, because [they came] neither from something materially nor from something seminally. Not from something materially, because they are pure forms; not from something seminally, because they had nothing pre-existing. And therefore they say that in the first production they were simply created; but thereafter in propagation they say they are not created, but rather transmitted, not by a cutting off and separation of part of the soul, but by multiplication. For just as a candle, once it has been kindled, can multiply itself without diminution of its own light, so, indeed much more, they say spiritual substance can [multiply itself].

Opinion 2. The second position is directly opposed to this, that the souls of brutes were produced from something materially and seminally. Materially, I say, because they are this something¹², since each of them is a sufficient mover, and therefore they say that they are constituted of matter and form; and that matter they say is spiritual, inseparably joined to corporeal nature; whence just as from corporeal nature the bodies of animals are produced, so from spiritual matter joined to it, as they say, the production of souls comes about. And so God made [them] from the primordium, and so nature also does now. For that matter, since it pre-exists the form, is its seedbed; and so they say that those souls are produced not only materially, but also seminally, since spiritual¹³ matter pre-exists for them and has in itself some active potency by which the soul comes to be from it, just as corporeal nature [has the potency] for bodies to come to be from it.

Opinion 3. The third position is that the souls of brutes were produced from something materially, but not seminally. Materially, I say, because they consist of matter and form; not however seminally, because that matter does not pre-exist the form as a seed of that which is to be produced from it, but is concreated with it and destroyed with it. And these say that all sensible souls, not only from the primordium but even now, are from the Creator; nevertheless not incorruptible, because the Creator Himself gives to each one a duration according to what befits its nature.

Not approved. But since all these positions assert something improbable — for the first says that the soul multiplies itself and pours itself over, yet so that the soul has nothing from which it comes to be; and this is to posit that a natural form can produce another similar form from nothing, which is improbable and was disproved above in the seventh distinction¹⁴. The second opinion posits that some spiritual matter pre-exists the soul, from which the soul is brought forth by the power of nature; and this is hardly intelligible, how there could be some spiritual matter which neither lives nor has a use; how also there could be some spiritual matter, and yet the rational soul cannot be made from it. And again, where is that spiritual matter? for it does not seem to be in itself; if however it is with corporeal matter, then it seems that matter is brought forth from matter; which seems to be nothing said. Likewise the third position posits that the matter of the sensible soul is concreated with it and that it is destroyed together with it; but to posit this is contrary to the authority of the Philosopher¹⁵ and to reason, namely that the matter of any creature should pass altogether into nothing. For if corporeal matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, much more does it seem that spiritual [matter] is, since it is worthier and nobler, in accordance with its being under such being.

Opinion 4. And therefore there is a fourth way of speaking, namely that the souls which are purely sensible were produced from something seminally, but not materially. Seminally, I say, because forms are generable and corruptible by nature; and therefore, just as other natural forms are not produced from nothing, but there is some active potency in matter from which they come to be as from a seedbed¹⁶; so also it must be understood in the case of sensible souls, which are forms only, of which kind are those in brute animals. And therefore Conclusion. it must be conceded that the sensible souls, that is, the souls of brutes, are from something, not, I say, materially, but seminally; because, since the sensible soul is a form, it does not have matter as a part of itself, but is made only from the active potency of matter which is aroused by the agent; and so it advances until it becomes the soul, just as the bud by advancing becomes the rose.

Corollary 1. Yet they are now produced from that seedbed otherwise than in the primordium, because now they are produced from a pre-existing seedbed according to sufficient actuality; in the primordium, however, they were produced together with that seedbed; or if that seedbed in some way pre-existed¹⁷ before the fifth day, on which the production of animals was made, on the fifth day it was brought to its complete formal character, so that there was given the active power of nature, that it might thereafter propagate and multiply animals as to body and as to soul.

Corollary 2. — And because some animals are of greater perfection and organization, and some of less; therefore the divine disposition most rightly arranged that some animals would be produced from their seminal principle¹⁸ according to a greater actuality, such as those which are generated by propagation, so that like is from like, and these are the more perfect animals; while others [are produced] according to a lesser [actuality], such as those which are generated by putrefaction; for because they are more imperfect, they need less help and power to be brought forth into being.

Argument from Augustine and the Philosopher. This position, moreover, is more reasonable and more firm, because both Augustine and the Philosopher agree in this. For Augustine to Orosius¹⁹ says thus: «Just as the seed of any tree has a certain power that, when it has been broken open in the earth, [the tree] rises up, and a shoot is produced, then is spread out, packed in with branches and leaves, then adorned with the same flowers bears fruit; so there is in the body, so to speak, a certain seedbed, whence in its time, by the providence of God taking care, certain kinds of animals arise». And the same is found in Genesis according to the letter, in the third book²⁰ plainly and at length. — The Philosopher also wills this in the sixteenth [book] of the Animals, where he shows that the vegetative and the sensitive are first in the seed in potency before they are brought forth into being; and there he seems to intimate that that which forms the members is nothing other than the soul itself; and that soul he calls an active potency, intrinsic to the seed itself, which, when the body has been produced from the seed and organized so that it can be perfected by the same [soul], comes forth into act and is made the perfection of an organic physical body. Or certainly that which forms the members is rather the power of the soul of the father and the mother, by whose operation in brute animals the soul of the offspring is brought forth into being; but otherwise it is in human beings, as will be seen below²¹. And the Philosopher proves this in the same place by many conjectures and arguments, and in the same place he says that corporeal things are full of the power of soul: and this much agrees with the words of Augustine²², who says: «The earth is pregnant with seeds, not only in respect of trees, but also in respect of animals». — Holding therefore this position, Conclusion 2. it must be said that the souls of sensible animals in the primordium were not created from nothing, as the arguments adduced for this show; for they had a seminal principle from which they were produced and now are produced.

Solution of the opposing arguments. 1. To that, then, which is first objected, that if the souls of sensible [animals] were produced from some other thing, that thing likewise was produced from yet another; it must be said that this is not necessary. Note. For the seminal ratio or active potency of matter itself is concreated with the matter, not produced from something; but those things which arise from that seed ought not properly to be said to be created.

2. To that which is asked, if it is from something, that thing is either spiritual or corporeal; it must be said Note. that it is neither spiritual matter nor corporeal matter, but is a certain spiritual potency, placed by the Creator into corporeal matter and resting on it and depending on it. And for this reason the sensible soul in brutes is generated and corrupted through the transmutation of corporeal nature. And if you object that the sensible soul is a sufficient mover, and thus is this something and has matter and form; it must be said that the sensible soul is not called a sufficient mover because it itself first moves the body which it perfects; but because the whole body, which it has²³ is this something and, by virtue of the soul, which is its form, it moves a part, and by moving its part it moves the whole, as is plain in things that walk. And that this is true is apparent, because if a sensible soul were placed in a body which had no movable part except by the motion of the whole, as in a stone, it would never move it.

Another solution. Or it can be said otherwise that for something to be a sufficient mover it is not necessary that it be distinct from the movable, in such a way that it be another substance differing through matter and form; but it suffices that it be a form in the genus of substance, lacking extension per se and per accidens. And this form is in one part wholly in such a way that it is wholly in another; and therefore it is so united with this part which it moves, that it is also distant from it. And this distance suffices that it can move it, nor is it required that it have another matter. And so it is with the sensitive soul in those animals which have organs apt for this operation.

3. To that which is objected, that nature can bring it forth; Note. it must be said that this is false, because, before the Lord commanded the waters and said: Let the waters bring forth etc., either that seedbed of the sensible souls to be produced was not yet, or if it was, it was not in such power that it could come to perfection; for the creature²⁴ can do nothing except according to the appointment and command given to it by the Creator. Whence, when there had previously been [only] that whence it could come to be, afterwards it was made by the divine decree that there should be that whence it might come to be.

4. To that which is objected concerning animals which are generated by putrefaction; it must be said, On equivocal generation. that although there are various ways of resolving [this], because some say that it is from the mover of the heaven, some that it is from the Creator²⁵; nevertheless according to the physical position it can be plainly answered that just as moisture becomes seed through the generative potency, and afterwards becomes an organic body in the womb, so that that sensible soul which was in potency is brought forth to act by the power of the particular agent and by the help of the heavenly body; so also in the present case it must be understood that when there was in that earth that seedbed, with the elements somehow concurring, and with the heavenly body helping, so that a vivifying heat is generated, a certain seed comes to be, so that that active potency, which previously lay hidden, aided by the action of the heavenly body, advances and comes to perfection and completion, so that neither the heaven nor the mover of the heaven gives it its ultimate form, but only helps and arouses it, so that that potency, advancing, may arrive at a complete species. And in this manner it must also be understood with regard to other things growing from the earth.

The objection is solved. And if you object that the soul, which is in potency, does not have species nor complete act from itself, nor can it have it from something which is not as noble as itself, and no such corporeal thing exists; it must be said Note. that the essence of such a species²⁶ is in matter, but in potency; and that essence is so determined to producing the form of such a species that no other [form] can be brought forth from that essence or seminal ratio, and when it has been brought forth into act, it has being and has such a being. That it is in act, this it has from an extrinsic agent which was a being in act, and to this extent it is more noble than [the soul] itself, which was in potency. That it is of such a species, this it has from him who first placed the essence of this form into matter; otherwise nature would never bring it forth to being, unless God had placed it in matter, as was shown above in the eighth distinction²⁷. And therefore it is not necessary that the agent bringing forth that form into act be more noble than the form brought forth. And of this many examples can be set forth, as in minerals and in many things growing from the earth.

5. And by this is plain the answer to the two following [arguments]. For what is objected concerning the division of a segmented body is already apparent; because, since a segmented body is of modest organization and as it were of like character in the parts and in the whole, therefore in any part of it the soul is in proximate disposition to being in act; and therefore, when the division has been made, by the power of the prior form and the help of the heavenly body, the form is suddenly induced.

The solution of others is not approved. But there are several other ways of speaking about this. Some say that the soul is multiplied, since it is spiritual, just as a point at the division of a line, and a species at the division of a mirror; nevertheless in neither of these must it be understood that that same thing which was one becomes many²⁸; and therefore the preceding way is more plain.

6. To the last [argument] the answer is likewise plain, because²⁹, when an animal is generated from an animal by propagation, although the soul is not cut off from the soul as the body is cut off from the body — since the soul is not divisible like the body — nevertheless together with the body itself there are cut off spirits and heats and even the animal power which aids together with the power of the containing womb, so that that active potency, which was in the seminal moisture, may come to complete act. And from this it does not follow that the soul produces another soul from nothing, nor that it produces from matter, nor even that it produces from itself.