Bonaventure

Articulus II. De divisione potentiarum animae.

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo, videlicet de divisione potentiarum animae; et circa hoc possunt quatuor quaeri.

Primo enim quaeritur de illa divisione potentiarum animae, quae est per cognitivam et affectivam, sive per rationem et voluntatem.

Secundo quaeritur de illa quae est per portionem superiorem et inferiorem.

Tertio quaeritur de illa quae est per deliberativum et naturale.

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur ad pleniorem explanationem de illa divisione, quae est per possibilem et agentem.

Quaestio I. Utrum intellectus et affectus, sive ratio et voluntas, essentialiter differant.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum intellectus et affectus, sive ratio et voluntas, sint potentiae diversae per essentiam. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Augustinus decimo de Trinitate¹ dicit, quod « haec tria, scilicet memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una mens, una intelligentia, una vita »; sed hoc non esset, si essent diversae per essentiam: ergo etc.

2. Item, Philosophus in tertio de Anima² dicit, quod « intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus »; sed extensio non variat potentiam per essentiam: ergo eadem est per essentiam intelligentia speculativa et practica: ergo et cognitiva et motiva.

3. Item, « potentiae distinguuntur per obiecta », sicut dicit Philosophus³: si ergo prima ratio distinguendi est ex parte obiectorum, non est maior distinctio in potentiis quam in obiectis: sed verum sub ratione veri est obiectum intellectus, bonum sub ratione boni est obiectum affectus: cum igitur eadem sit per essentiam bonitas et veritas substantialis creaturae, ergo eadem erit per essentiam ratio et voluntas.

4. Item, magis conformatur imago summae Trinitati, quam conformetur vestigium; sed in summa Trinitate nulla est differentia essentialis; sed solum secundum relationem: si ergo unitas et veritas et bonitas sola relatione differunt in creatura, et non essentialiter, multo fortius videtur, quod ratio et voluntas sola relatione habeant distingui.

5. Item, ad omnem delectationem necessario concurrit sensus — « delectatio enim est coniunctio convenientis cum convenienti et sensus eiusdem⁴ » — sed constans est, quod voluntas habet delectari: ergo habet delectabile cognoscere et sentire: ergo ipsa erit potentia sensitiva.

6. Item, ad omnem habitum virtutis necessario concurrit amor et medii inspectio. Sicut enim vult Augustinus, de Moribus Ecclesiae⁵, « omnis virtus est amor »; et sicut vult Philosophus, virtus est inspectrix medii. Si ergo virtutes sunt in voluntate, ergo actus voluntatis est medium inspicere et amare. Sed primum pertinet ad vim cognitivam, secundum ad affectivam: ergo eadem est potentia cognitiva et affectiva.

7. Item, lumini et calori in corporibus correspondet cognitio et amor in spiritibus; sed sol per eandem virtutem illuminat et calefacit — calefactio enim generatur ex radiorum multiplicatione — ergo multo fortius videtur, si substantia spiritualis potentior est, quod per eandem virtutem cognoscat et diligat: ergo etc.

8. Item, optimum uniuscuiusque rei non potest esse nisi unum⁶; sed optimum in anima est illud, secundum quod immediate coniungitur Deo, hoc autem est intellectus et affectus, sive ratio et voluntas: ergo non sunt diversae potentiae, sed una. Si tu dicas, quod inter omnes potentias principatum tenet voluntas, et illa est quae intimius adhaeret; obiicitur contra hoc: quia « virtus unita plus potest quam multiplicata⁷ »; si igitur anima una potentia sola tenderet in Deum, perfectius ei uniretur, quam si tendat pluribus: ergo si optimo modo facta est ad perveniendum in finem, videtur, quod una sola potentia sit ratio et voluntas secundum essentiam.

Sed contra: 1. Augustinus in decimo de Trinitate⁸ dicit, animam esse ad imaginem quoad unitatem essentiae et trinitatem potentiarum: ergo si vera est ibi trinitas, vera est ibi potentiarum distinctio: ergo non solummodo distinguuntur relatione, sed etiam secundum id quod sunt absolute.

2. Item, si eadem potentia per essentiam esset ratio et voluntas, sicut una essentia est in Patre et Filio: ergo sicut Pater non per Filium dicitur intelligere, sed etiam per se ipsum; sic voluntas non solum intelligeret per intelligentiam, sed etiam per se ipsam. Falsum igitur diceret Augustinus decimo quinto de Trinitate, cum dicit, quod « nihil volumus nisi per voluntatem, nihil intelligimus nisi per intelligentiam ».

3. Item, expressius Augustinus nono de Trinitate, capitulo quarto⁹, loquens de ratione et voluntate, sive de notitia et amore, ait sic: « Admonemur, si utcumque videre possumus, haec in anima existere et tanquam involuta evolvi, ut sentiantur et numerentur substantialiter, vel ut ita dicam, essentialiter ».

4. Item, ratione videtur. Cuiuslibet potentiae unius est unum primum actum assignare; sed actus complectens totam intelligentiam est intelligere, actus vero complectens totam affectivam est affici; ergo si actus primi et proprii istarum potentiarum sunt diversi essentialiter, videtur pari ratione, quod similiter et ipsae potentiae¹⁰.

5. Item, sola distinctio relationum in creatura non est distinctio rerum, sed in divinis est vera distinctio personarum; ergo si in anima non est distinctio potentiarum nisi solum secundum relationem, anima non esset illius summae Trinitatis similitudo expressa, et ita nec imago; quodsi hoc est falsum, restat etc.

6. Item, a natura creaturae est, quod cum vigoratur actus unius potentiae, minoratur actus alterius, propter hoc quod potentiae radicantur in eadem substantia¹¹: ergo multo fortius actus unius potentiae intensus remittit alterum actum eiusdem potentiae. Ergo si ratio et voluntas essent eadem potentia, cum intenderetur cognitio, minueretur affectio: ergo quanto clarius Deum videremus, tanto minus amaremus; quod si omnino falsum est, restat etc.

7. Item, ubicumque lux et calor sunt formaliter, differunt essentialiter, sicut patet in igne: ergo pari ratione, ubicumque potentia cognoscendi et amandi formaliter reperiuntur in creatura, essentialiter distinguuntur; sed sic reperiuntur in anima: ergo etc.

Conclusio

Ratio et voluntas, sive intellectus et affectus, sunt diversae potentiae, non tamen diversae essentiae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod etsi praedicta quaestio plus contineat curiositatis quam utilitatis, propter hoc quod, sive una pars teneatur, sive altera, nullum praeiudicium nec fidei nec moribus generatur; verumtamen, quia Sancti et alii, qui tractant de potentiis animae, plurimum loquuntur de potentiarum distinctione; et quia etiam plurium quaestionum terminatio pendet ex praedictae quaestionis terminatione: ideo determinationi eius aliquantulum diligenter oportet insistere.

Notandum igitur, quod istius quaestionis terminatio ex illius quaestionis terminatione¹² pendet, qua quaeritur de comparatione potentiae ad substantiam animae; unde, secundum quod illa varie terminatur a diversis, sic consequenter et ista.

Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod potentia animae non est aliud quam ipsa relatio, vel ipsa anima relata ad actum; et hi ponunt, quod omnes animae potentiae sint unum per essentiam, nec est in eis aliqua differentia nisi solum secundum relationem ad actum alium et alium. Et hoc confirmare nituntur per Augustinum, in libro de Anima et spiritu¹³, ubi videtur hoc expresse dicere et sentire. Et si tu dicas, quod ille liber non est Augustini; per hoc non evaditur, quia hoc ipsum in libro de Trinitate¹⁴ dicit de potentiis animae, quod « sunt una essentia, una vita ».

Alii vero dicere voluerunt, quod potentiae animae non tantum dicunt modum sive relationem, sed etiam dicunt proprietates inhaerentes ipsi animae, quae sunt de genere accidentium, utpote in secunda specie qualitatis, videlicet naturalis potentiae et impotentiae¹⁵. Et isti dicunt, quod potentiae in anima differunt essentialiter, sicut diversae formae accidentales existunt in eodem subiecto; et hoc confirmare nituntur per quoddam verbum Hugonis in quodam libello, quem fecit de Trinitate¹⁶, ubi dicit, quod « notitia et amor non vere sunt quod ipsa mens, sed quasi affectiones quaedam et formae ipsius, quibus non sit hoc aliquid esse, sed adesse tantum ei quod est hoc aliquid ».

Tertii sunt, qui dicunt, quod potentiae animae nec adeo sunt idem ipsi animae, sicut sunt eius principia intrinseca et essentialia, nec adeo diversae, ut cedant in aliud genus, sicut accidentia, sed in genere substantiae sunt per reductionem. Et isti dicunt, quod cum potentiae simpliciter non dicant aliam essentiam quam substantiam animae, quod non sic differunt essentialiter ipsae potentiae, quod sint diversae essentiae. Cum iterum non sint omnino idem cum animae essentia, dicunt, quod non sunt omnino idem per essentiam; et ideo quasi medium tenentes inter utramque opinionem dicunt, quasdam animae potentias sic differre ad invicem, ut nullo modo dici possint una potentia; nec tamen concedunt, eas simpliciter diversificari secundum essentiam, ita ut dicantur diversae essentiae, sed differre essentialiter in genere potentiae, ita ut dicantur diversae potentiae sive diversa instrumenta eiusdem substantiae.

Quaelibet autem dictarum positionum suos habet defensores; nec est facile rationibus cogentibus earum aliquam improbare. — Quia tamen haec positio ultimo dicta plus¹⁷ concordat viae communi et auctoritatibus tractatorum et magis sobria est et rationi consona; ideo iuxta hanc tertiam positionem ad propositam quaestionem respondendum est, quod intellectus et affectus, sive ratio et voluntas, non sunt una potentia, sed diversae. — Et hoc senserunt praedecessores nostri¹⁸; sensisse etiam videtur Augustinus, sicut expresse apparet in auctoritatibus supra dictis. Omnes etiam, quotquot dividunt animae potentias, prima divisione dividunt in cognitivam et affectivam sive motivam¹⁹. — Rursus, cum quis ad semetipsum redit, volens quasi quodam experimento discere potentiarum quas habet in se convenientiam et differentiam; inveniet, se in cognoscendo et amando recurrere ad diversa instrumenta. Unde intuenti²⁰ usum potentiarum manifesto iudicio apparebit, quod maior est differentia intelligentiae ad voluntatem, quam sit intelligentiae ad memoriam, vel etiam irascibilis ad concupiscibilem. Memoria enim et intelligentia negotiantur circa idem, ita²¹ quod ista acquirit et illa conservat, vel illa offert et ista diiudicat. Similiter concupiscibilis et irascibilis ita se habent, quod concupiscibilis acquirit et irascibilis defendit²²; et quia utrumque horum necessarium est ad perfectionem actus cognitionis et affectionis; ideo memoria et intelligentia potius dicuntur diversae vires quam diversae potentiae; similiter irascibilis et concupiscibilis. — Et est exemplum: sicut si aliquis haberet diversa instrumenta ad diversos

actus principales, ut securim ad scindendum, et martellum ad fabricandum; posset tamen nihilominus ipsa securi uti ex una parte ad scindendum, utpote ex parte aciei, et ex alia parte ad alium actum illi consonum. Iuxta hoc materiale exemplum, quod non est per omnia simile, intelligi potest in potentiis spiritualibus.

Concedendae sunt igitur rationes et auctoritates ostendentes, rationem et voluntatem diversas esse potentias.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de Augustino, quod sunt una essentia et una vita; respondendum est, quod ideo dicuntur esse una essentia propter hoc, quod in una essentia radicantur et adeo adhaerent illi intrinsecus, ut non cedant in aliud genus; et ideo ad illius expressionem utitur beatus Augustinus tali praedicatione. Et quod ista non sit expositio ab intellectu et sensu illius verbi distorta, colligitur hoc ex ipsis verbis beati Augustini in decimo quinto de Trinitate²³, ubi dicit, quod ipse Deus est tres personae, sed in creatura habens tres potentias non est ipsae potentiae; et haec est dissimilitudo quaedam trinitatis creatae et Trinitatis increatae. Cum igitur ibidem explanet verba prius posita, qualiter sunt intelligenda; ex ipso verbo beati Augustini colligitur, quod cum dixit, memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem unam esse essentiam, non dixit per omnimodam identitatem, sed per quandam intrinsecam adhaerentiam. Et hunc modum loquendi credendum est habuisse auctorem libri de Anima et spiritu, sive fuerit Augustinus, sive alius; quoniam, si aliter intelligeretur, valde improbabiliter videretur fuisse locutus. Sequeretur enim ex verbis suis, quod unum et idem esset ratio interior et exterior sensus; quod adeo contra rationem est, ut etiam refugiat ipse auditus.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus; dicendum, quod Philosophus, sicut in capitulo De movente patet, tertio de Anima²⁴, differentiam assignat inter practicum intellectum et appetitum, nec unquam dicit, intellectum fieri appetitum; sed bene dicit, intellectum speculativum fieri practicum, quia ille idem intellectus et illa eadem potentia, quae dirigit in considerando, postmodum regulat in operando. Voluntas autem non est intellectus practicus, sed est appetitus ratiocinativus; et ideo non sequitur ex hoc, quod sola extensione ratio fiat voluntas, vel quod intellectus fiat affectus.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentiae differunt per obiecta; dicendum, quod immediatius distinguuntur potentiae per actus quam per obiecta²⁵. Ad differentiam autem potentiarum essentialem sufficit diversitas obiectorum secundum rationem; et ideo, quamvis verum et bonum non differant essentialiter, nihilominus tamen, quia cognoscere et amare absque dubio sunt actus differentes, potentiae, quae sunt ad hos actus, per se ipsas diversitatem habent.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de vestigio, dicendum, quod illa ratio potius est ad oppositum, si quis recte intelligat, quam ad propositum. Quia enim magis repraesentat ipsa imago illam summam Trinitatem quam vestigium, cum in illa summa Trinitate sit vera distinctio in hypostasibus et personis; si anima est expressa Dei imago, debet in se habere trinitatem, in qua sit vera distinctio; alioquin non erit expressa similitudo. Illa autem differentia, quae est in creatura pure secundum habitudinem et relationem, non dicit distinctionem nisi solum quantum ad modum. Ideo etsi talis distinctio sufficiat in ratione vestigii, amplior debet esse in ratione imaginis; et ideo illa ratio non concludit.

Potest etiam aliter dici, quod ratio vestigii sumitur ex comparatione creaturae ad Creatorem, quae attenditur secundum relationem effectus ad causam. Et quia illa comparatio, scilicet quae est creaturae ad Creatorem secundum triplex genus causae, est omnimode ipsi creaturae essentialis; ideo non differunt in ipsa creatura veritas et bonitas essentialiter. — Sed ratio imaginis attenditur in creatura, secundum quod ipsa comparatur ad Deum in ratione obiecti. « Eo enim imago Dei est, quo capax eius et particeps esse potest²⁶ ». Et quia secundum easdem potentias habet anima ferri in Deum et etiam in res alias cognoscendas; ideo non sunt adeo essentiales ipsi animae ratio et voluntas, sicut praedicta; et ideo non oportet, quod tanta sit convenientia inter intelligentiam et voluntatem, quanta est inter veritatem substantialem et bonitatem.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ad delectationem concurrit sensus; dicendum, quod verum est; sed non oportet, quod ille sensus sit ipsius voluntatis, quae delectatur, sed sufficit, quod sit rationis associantis. Sicut enim oculus videt sibi et pedi, et tamen est aliud organum quam pes; sic ratio sibi videt et voluntati, et voluntas sibi appetit et rationi. Et quod illud sit verum, patet per auctoritatem

Augustini prius inductam, qua dicit, quod « nihil intelligimus nisi per intellectum, nihil volumus nisi per voluntatem ».

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis virtus est amor et inspectrix medii; dicendum, quod inspicere medium, hoc est dupliciter: aut per modum considerationis, aut per modum inclinationis. Primo modo inspicere medium non est cuiuslibet virtutis secundum se, sed per concomitantiam, quia, sicut ratio videt sibi et aliis potentiis, sic prudentia et fides discernunt sibi et aliis virtutibus. Si autem secundo modo dicatur inspectrix medii, quia per inclinationem ad illud tendit, sicut lapis tendit deorsum, et medicina una dicitur habere aspectum ad talem humorem purgandum; sic non solum est cognitionis, immo etiam affectionis; et ideo ex hoc non concluditur, quod eadem sit potentia affectiva et cognitiva.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur de comparatione luminis et caloris, iam patet responsio per rationem adductam in contrarium²⁷, quia hoc non habet veritatem, cum sunt in aliquo informative; sed si habet veritatem, hoc est solum, cum sunt in aliquo effective. — Praeterea, hoc plures negant, quod sol per eandem virtutem, qua illuminat, calefaciat; et potest esse, quod verum dicant, sicut ostensum est supra distinctione decima quarta²⁸.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur de optimo animae, dicendum, quod est optimum quantum ad esse primum, et optimum quantum ad esse secundum. Etsi optimum quantum ad esse primum unum sit, utpote forma ultimo completiva; tamen quantum ad esse secundum non oportet, quod sit unum, nisi intelligatur esse unum, quod²⁹ ex multis est collectum, sicut ad aliquod bene esse multa concurrunt. Et sic, quoniam potentia creaturae arctata est, non potuit creatura habere posse perfectum, nisi esset in ea multitudo potentiarum, ex quarum collectione sive adunatione, una supplente defectum alterius, resultaret unum posse completum; sicut manifeste animadverti potest in organis humani corporis, quorum unumquodque indiget a virtute alterius adiuvari.

Et si obiiciatur, quod potentior esset anima, si virtus eius esset una, quia tunc esset magis unita; dicendum, quod quamvis illud veritatem habeat ex comparatione potentiae ad unum actum, non tamen habet in comparatione ad diversos; aut certe, si veritatem habet comparando potentiam ad idem, non tamen est verum comparando ad diversa. Verum est enim, quod si homo haberet unum oculum, virtuosius videret ille, quam modo videat, dum habet socium; nunquam tamen ita bene videret solus, sicut videret ipse et socius eius. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est se habere; et ideo magis est completum posse animae ex multis potentiis collectum, quam si esset simpliciter unicum, quia una potentiarum alteram non diminuit, sed adiuvat. Et propter mutuum adiutorium et quodam modo sociale obsequium, aliquando dicitur posse animae esse unum, aut etiam habitus existentes in anima esse unum, non quia hoc dictum sit secundum ipsarum potentiarum et habituum propriam rationem et specialem naturam, sed quia hoc dictum est per quandam collectionem. Ad perfectum enim posse animae concurrunt omnes potentiae, et ad perfectam habilitationem omnes virtutum habilitates.

Unde si aliqua auctoritas inveniatur, quae videatur ponere unitatem potentiarum animae et virtutum; intelligenda est secundum modum praescriptum, videlicet secundum quandam collectionem. Si iterum inveniatur, quae dicat, potentiam animae esse animae essentiam, intelligenda est per reductionem ad idem genus.

Sunt enim quaedam, quae sunt in genere per se; aliqua per reductionem³⁰. Illa per se sunt in genere, quae participant essentiam completam illius generis, ut species et individua; illa vero per reductionem, quae non dicunt completam essentiam, et haec sub quinque membris continentur. Quaedam reducuntur sicut principia, quaedam sicut complementa, quaedam sicut viae, quaedam sicut similitudines, quaedam sicut privationes. — Sicut principia dupliciter: aut essentiantia³¹, aut integrantia; ut principia essentiantia, sic sunt materia et forma in genere substantiae; ut principia integrantia, sic partes substantiae sunt in genere substantiae per reductionem. — Si autem reducuntur ut complementa, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut enim est complementum per modum actus, et sic est actus primus, qui reducitur ad idem genus cum substantia, cuius est actus, ut vivere et esse substantiae ad genus substantiae; aut per modum aptitudinis, et sic differentiae completivae ad idem genus reducuntur cum specie. — Si autem reducuntur sicut viae, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut sicut viae ad res, et sic motus et mutationes, ut generatio reducitur³² ad substantiam; aut sicut viae a rebus, et sic habent reduci potentiae ad genus substantiae. Prima enim agendi potentia, quae egressum dicitur habere ab ipsa substantia, ad idem genus reducitur, quae non

adeo elongatur ab ipsa substantia, ut dicat aliam essentiam completam. — Si autem sunt similitudines, sic sunt in genere per reductionem et reducuntur ad idem genus, sub quo continentur illa quorum sunt similitudines, ut patet in similitudine albedinis et coloris, quae quidem non est albedo, sed ut albedo; non est color, sed ut color. — Postremo, quia privationes non habent essentiam aliquam nisi per habitum, in eodem genere esse habent, in quo et habitus, per reductionem. — Et sic patet responsio ad omnia quaesita.

Article II. On the division of the powers of the soul.

Next there is inquiry concerning the second point, namely concerning the division of the powers of the soul; and concerning this four things can be asked.

First, then, there is inquiry concerning that division of the powers of the soul which is by way of the cognitive and the affective, or by way of reason and will.

Second, there is inquiry concerning that which is by way of the superior and the inferior portion.

Third, there is inquiry concerning that which is by way of the deliberative and the natural.

Fourth and last, there is inquiry, for a fuller explanation, concerning that division which is by way of the possible and the agent.

Question I. Whether the intellect and the affect, or reason and will, differ essentially.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether the intellect and the affect, or reason and will, are diverse powers by essence. And that they are not, seems [to be the case].

1. Augustine, in the tenth book On the Trinity¹, says that « these three, namely memory, understanding, and will, are one mind, one understanding, one life »; but this would not be so, if they were diverse by essence: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the third book On the Soul² says that « the speculative intellect by extension becomes practical »; but extension does not vary a power by essence: therefore by essence the speculative and the practical understanding are the same: therefore also the cognitive and the motive [power].

3. Likewise, « powers are distinguished by their objects », as the Philosopher says³: if therefore the first ground of distinguishing is on the side of the objects, there is no greater distinction in the powers than in the objects: but the true under the aspect of the true is the object of the intellect, the good under the aspect of the good is the object of the affect: since therefore the substantial goodness and truth of a creature are by essence the same, therefore reason and will will be by essence the same.

4. Likewise, the image is more conformed to the supreme Trinity than the vestige is conformed; but in the supreme Trinity there is no essential difference, but only one according to relation: if therefore unity and truth and goodness differ in the creature only by relation, and not essentially, much more does it seem that reason and will are to be distinguished only by relation.

5. Likewise, to every delight sense necessarily concurs — « for delight is the conjunction of what is fitting with what is fitting and the sense of the same⁴ » — but it is constant that the will has [the capacity] to be delighted: therefore it has [the capacity] to know and sense the delightful: therefore it will itself be a sensitive power.

6. Likewise, to every habit of virtue love and the inspection of the mean necessarily concur. For as Augustine maintains, On the Morals of the Church⁵, « every virtue is love »; and as the Philosopher maintains, virtue is the inspector of the mean. If therefore the virtues are in the will, then the act of the will is to inspect the mean and to love. But the first pertains to the cognitive power, the second to the affective: therefore the cognitive and the affective power are the same.

7. Likewise, to light and heat in bodies there correspond knowledge and love in spirits; but the sun by the same power illuminates and heats — for heating is generated from the multiplication of rays — therefore much more does it seem, if a spiritual substance is more powerful, that by the same power it knows and loves: therefore etc.

8. Likewise, the best of any single thing can only be one⁶; but the best in the soul is that whereby it is immediately joined to God, and this is the intellect and the affect, or reason and will: therefore they are not diverse powers, but one. If you say that among all the powers the will holds the principate, and it is the one that adheres most intimately; this is objected against: because « a united power can do more than a multiplied one⁷ »; if therefore the soul tended toward God by one power alone, it would be more perfectly united to him than if it tended by several: therefore if it was made in the best way for arriving at its end, it seems that reason and will are one single power according to essence.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine in the tenth book On the Trinity⁸ says that the soul is to the image with respect to the unity of essence and the trinity of powers: therefore if there is a true trinity there, there is a true distinction of powers there: therefore they are distinguished not only by relation, but also according to that which they are absolutely.

2. Likewise, if reason and will were by essence the same power, as one essence is in the Father and the Son: then just as the Father is said to understand not through the Son but also through himself; so the will would not only understand through the understanding, but also through itself. Augustine, then, would speak falsely in the fifteenth book On the Trinity, when he says that « we will nothing except through the will, we understand nothing except through the understanding ».

3. Likewise, more expressly Augustine in the ninth book On the Trinity, chapter four⁹, speaking of reason and will, or of knowledge and love, says thus: « We are admonished, if we can in any way see, that these exist in the soul and are as it were unfolded out of their enfolded state, so that they may be sensed and numbered substantially, or so to speak, essentially ».

4. Likewise, by reason it seems [so]. For any one power it belongs to assign one first act; but the act embracing the whole understanding is to understand, while the act embracing the whole affective [power] is to be affected; therefore if the first and proper acts of these powers are essentially diverse, it seems by parity of reasoning that the powers themselves are too¹⁰.

5. Likewise, in a creature the mere distinction of relations is not a distinction of things, but in the divine [persons] there is a true distinction of persons; therefore if in the soul there is no distinction of powers except only according to relation, the soul would not be an express likeness of that supreme Trinity, and so neither an image; but if this is false, the conclusion stands etc.

6. Likewise, it belongs to the nature of a creature that when the act of one power is strengthened, the act of another is lessened, on account of the fact that the powers are rooted in the same substance¹¹: therefore much more does the intense act of one power slacken another act of the same power. Therefore if reason and will were the same power, when knowledge was intensified, affection would be diminished: therefore the more clearly we saw God, the less we would love him; but if this is altogether false, the conclusion stands etc.

7. Likewise, wherever light and heat are formally, they differ essentially, as is clear in fire: therefore by parity of reasoning, wherever the power of knowing and of loving are found formally in a creature, they are distinguished essentially; but they are so found in the soul: therefore etc.

Conclusion

Reason and will, or the intellect and the affect, are diverse powers, yet not diverse essences.

I respond: It must be said that, although the aforesaid question contains more of curiosity than of utility, on the ground that, whether one part be held or the other, no prejudice is generated either to faith or to morals; nevertheless, because the Saints and others who treat of the powers of the soul speak much of the distinction of the powers; and because also the settling of many questions depends on the settling of the aforesaid question: therefore it is fitting to apply oneself somewhat diligently to its determination.

It must be noted, then, that the determination of this question depends on the determination of that question¹² in which inquiry is made concerning the comparison of the power to the substance of the soul; whence, according as that is variously settled by various [authors], so consequently is this one too.

For some have wished to say that a power of the soul is nothing other than the relation itself, or the soul itself as related to act; and these hold that all the powers of the soul are one by essence, nor is there any difference in them except only according to the relation to one act and another. And they strive to confirm this from Augustine, in the book On the Soul and the Spirit¹³, where he seems expressly to say and hold this. And if you say that that book is not Augustine's, by this one does not escape, because he says this same thing in the book On the Trinity¹⁴ concerning the powers of the soul, that « they are one essence, one life ».

But others have wished to say that the powers of the soul do not only signify a mode or relation, but also signify properties inhering in the soul itself, which are of the genus of accidents, namely in the second species of quality, that is, natural potency and impotency¹⁵. And these say that the powers in the soul differ essentially, just as diverse accidental forms exist in the same subject; and they strive to confirm this by a certain saying of Hugh in a certain little book which he wrote On the Trinity¹⁶, where he says that « knowledge and love are not truly what the mind itself is, but as it were certain affections and forms of it, by which it does not belong to it to be this something, but only to be present to what is this something ».

There is a third group, who say that the powers of the soul are neither so much the same as the soul itself, since they are its intrinsic and essential principles, nor so diverse as to pass over into another genus, like accidents, but are in the genus of substance by reduction. And these say that, since the powers do not simply signify another essence than the substance of the soul, the powers themselves do not differ essentially in such a way that they are diverse essences. Again, since they are not altogether the same as the essence of the soul, they say that they are not altogether the same by essence; and therefore, as it were holding a middle position between the two opinions, they say that some powers of the soul differ from one another in such a way that they can in no way be called one power; yet they do not concede that they are simply diversified according to essence, so as to be called diverse essences, but [say] that they differ essentially within the genus of power, so as to be called diverse powers or diverse instruments of the same substance.

Now each of the said positions has its defenders; nor is it easy to disprove any one of them by compelling reasons. — Since, however, this last-stated position accords more¹⁷ with the common way and with the authorities of the writers, and is more sober and more consonant with reason; therefore, in accordance with this third position, it must be answered to the question proposed that the intellect and the affect, or reason and will, are not one power, but diverse. — And this our predecessors held¹⁸; Augustine too seems to have held it, as expressly appears in the authorities cited above. All also, as many as divide the powers of the soul, in the first division divide them into the cognitive and the affective or motive¹⁹. — Again, when someone returns to himself, wishing as it were by a certain experiment to learn the agreement and difference of the powers which he has in himself, he will find that in knowing and loving he has recourse to diverse instruments. Whence to one who attends²⁰ to the use of the powers it will appear by manifest judgment that the difference of understanding to will is greater than that of understanding to memory, or even of the irascible to the concupiscible. For memory and understanding are occupied about the same thing, in such a way²¹ that the one acquires and the other conserves, or the one offers and the other judges. Likewise the concupiscible and the irascible are so related that the concupiscible acquires and the irascible defends²²; and because each of these is necessary for the perfection of the act of cognition and of affection; therefore memory and understanding are rather called diverse forces than diverse powers; likewise the irascible and concupiscible. — And there is an example: just as if someone had diverse instruments for diverse principal acts, such as an axe for cutting and a hammer for fabricating; he could nonetheless use the axe itself on one side for cutting, namely on the side of the edge, and on the other side for another act consonant with it. According to this material example, which is not similar in all respects, the matter can be understood in spiritual powers.

The reasons and authorities, therefore, that show reason and will to be diverse powers, must be granted.

1. To that, then, which is first objected from Augustine, that they are one essence and one life; the answer must be that they are said to be one essence on this account, that they are rooted in one essence and adhere to it so intrinsically that they do not pass over into another genus; and therefore to express this blessed Augustine uses such a predication. And that this is not an exposition distorted from the understanding and sense of that saying, is gathered from the very words of blessed Augustine in the fifteenth book On the Trinity²³, where he says that God himself is three persons, but the creature having three powers is not those powers; and this is a certain dissimilitude between the created trinity and the uncreated Trinity. Since therefore in the same place he explains the words previously set down, as to how they are to be understood; from the very word of blessed Augustine it is gathered that when he said that memory, understanding, and will are one essence, he did not say it by way of complete identity, but by way of a certain intrinsic adherence. And it must be believed that the author of the book On the Soul and the Spirit had this manner of speaking, whether he was Augustine or another; since, if it were understood otherwise, he would seem to have spoken most improbably. For it would follow from his words that interior reason and exterior sense were one and the same thing; which is so contrary to reason that even hearing itself shrinks from it.

2. To that which is objected, that the speculative intellect by extension becomes practical; it must be said that the Philosopher, as is clear in the chapter On the mover, in the third book On the Soul²⁴, assigns a difference between the practical intellect and appetite, nor does he ever say that the intellect becomes appetite; but he rightly says that the speculative intellect becomes practical, because that same intellect and that same power which directs in considering, afterwards regulates in operating. But the will is not the practical intellect, but is the ratiocinative appetite; and therefore it does not follow from this that by extension alone reason becomes will, or that the intellect becomes affect.

3. To that which is objected, that powers differ by their objects; it must be said that powers are more immediately distinguished by their acts than by their objects²⁵. For the essential difference of powers a diversity of objects according to aspect suffices; and therefore, although the true and the good do not differ essentially, nonetheless, because to know and to love are without doubt different acts, the powers which are ordered to these acts have a diversity through themselves.

4. To that which is objected concerning the vestige, it must be said that that reason is rather for the opposite, if one rightly understands, than for the proposal. For since the image represents that supreme Trinity more than the vestige does, since in that supreme Trinity there is a true distinction in hypostases and persons; if the soul is the express image of God, it ought to have within itself a trinity in which there is a true distinction; otherwise it will not be an express likeness. But that difference which is in a creature purely according to disposition and relation does not signify a distinction except only as to mode. Therefore although such a distinction suffices in the character of a vestige, an ampler one ought to be in the character of an image; and therefore that reason does not conclude.

It can also be said otherwise, that the character of a vestige is taken from the comparison of the creature to the Creator, which is regarded according to the relation of the effect to the cause. And because that comparison, namely that of the creature to the Creator according to the threefold genus of cause, is in every way essential to the creature itself; therefore in the creature itself truth and goodness do not differ essentially. — But the character of an image is regarded in the creature insofar as it is compared to God under the aspect of an object. « For it is the image of God in that whereby it can be capable of him and a participant of him²⁶ ». And because by the same powers the soul has [the capacity] to be borne into God and also into other things to be known; therefore reason and will are not so essential to the soul itself as the aforesaid [unity, truth, and goodness]; and therefore there need not be as great an agreement between understanding and will as there is between substantial truth and goodness.

5. To that which is objected, that sense concurs to delight; it must be said that it is true; but it is not necessary that that sense be of the will itself, which is delighted, but it suffices that it be of the reason that accompanies [it]. For just as the eye sees for itself and for the foot, and yet is a different organ than the foot; so reason sees for itself and for the will, and the will desires for itself and for the reason. And that this is true is clear from the authority of Augustine adduced earlier, by which he says that « we understand nothing except through the intellect, we will nothing except through the will ».

6. To that which is objected, that every virtue is love and an inspector of the mean; it must be said that to inspect the mean is twofold: either by way of consideration, or by way of inclination. In the first way, to inspect the mean does not belong to every virtue in itself, but by concomitance, because, just as reason sees for itself and for the other powers, so prudence and faith discern for themselves and for the other virtues. But if it is called an inspector of the mean in the second way, because by inclination it tends toward it, just as a stone tends downward, and a medicine is said to have a regard toward purging a particular humor; thus it belongs not only to cognition, but even to affection; and therefore from this it is not concluded that the affective and the cognitive power are the same.

7. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of light and heat, the response is already clear from the reason adduced to the contrary²⁷, because this is not true when they are in something informatively; but if it is true, this is only when they are in something effectively. — Moreover, many deny this, that the sun heats by the same power by which it illuminates; and it can be that they speak truly, as was shown above in the fourteenth distinction²⁸.

8. To that which is objected concerning the best of the soul, it must be said that there is a best with respect to first being, and a best with respect to second being. Although the best with respect to first being is one, namely the ultimately completing form; nevertheless with respect to second being it need not be one, unless it be understood to be one which²⁹ is gathered from many, just as for some well-being many things concur. And thus, since the power of a creature is constricted, a creature could not have a perfect capacity unless there were in it a multitude of powers, from whose collection or union, one supplying the defect of another, there resulted one complete capacity; as can be manifestly observed in the organs of the human body, each of which needs to be helped by the power of another.

And if it be objected that the soul would be more powerful if its power were one, because then it would be more united; it must be said that, although that is true from the comparison of the power to one act, yet it is not true in comparison to diverse [acts]; or certainly, if it is true by comparing the power to the same [act], it is nevertheless not true by comparing it to diverse [acts]. For it is true that, if a man had one eye, he would see more powerfully than he now sees while he has a companion [eye]; yet he would never see as well alone as he and his companion [eye] would see. So too in the matter at hand it must be understood to be; and therefore the capacity of the soul gathered from many powers is more complete than if it were simply single, because one of the powers does not diminish another, but helps it. And on account of the mutual help and in a certain way the social service, the capacity of the soul is sometimes said to be one, or even the habits existing in the soul to be one, not because this is said according to the proper character and special nature of the powers and habits themselves, but because this is said by a certain collection. For to the perfect capacity of the soul all the powers concur, and to perfect aptitude all the aptitudes of the virtues.

Whence if any authority be found which seems to posit a unity of the powers of the soul and of the virtues, it must be understood according to the manner prescribed, namely according to a certain collection. If again one be found which says that a power of the soul is the essence of the soul, it must be understood by reduction to the same genus.

For there are some things which are in a genus per se; and some by reduction³⁰. Those are per se in a genus which participate the complete essence of that genus, like species and individuals; but those are so by reduction which do not signify a complete essence, and these are contained under five members. Some are reduced as principles, some as complements, some as ways, some as likenesses, some as privations. — As principles, in two ways: either essentiating or integrating³¹; as essentiating principles, thus are matter and form in the genus of substance; as integrating principles, thus the parts of a substance are in the genus of substance by reduction. — But if they are reduced as complements, this can be in two ways: for either it is a complement by way of act, and thus it is a first act, which is reduced to the same genus as the substance whose act it is, as to live and to be [are reduced] to the genus of substance; or by way of aptitude, and thus the completive differences are reduced to the same genus along with the species. — But if they are reduced as ways, this can be in two ways: either as ways to things, and thus motions and changes, as generation is reduced³² to substance; or as ways from things, and thus the powers have to be reduced to the genus of substance. For the first power of acting, which is said to have its issuing from the substance itself, is reduced to the same genus, since it is not

so far removed from the substance itself as to signify another complete essence. — But if they are likenesses, thus they are in a genus by reduction and are reduced to the same genus under which are contained those things of which they are likenesses, as is clear in the likeness of whiteness and color, which indeed is not whiteness, but as it were whiteness; is not color, but as it were color. — Finally, since privations have no essence except through a habit, they have being in the same genus in which the habit too [has being], by reduction. — And thus the response to everything asked is clear.