Dist. 25, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 6
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 25
Quaestio VI. Utrum liberi arbitrii facultas insit principalius rationi, an voluntati.
Sexto et ultimo est quaestio, cum liberum arbitrium sit habitus1 sive facultas residens penes rationem et voluntatem coniunctim; penes quam istarum potentiarum principalius nobis insit. Et quod principalius insit penes rationem, videtur:
Ad oppositum.
1. Primo per ipsam nominationem, qua dicitur esse liberum arbitrium. Si enim adiectivum ponit rem suam circa suum substantivum, et principalius dicitur aliquid de aliquo, quod dicitur secundum abstractionem, quam quod dicitur secundum concretionem2; et habitus ille nominatur arbitrium liberum, non libertas arbitraria, arbitrium vero se tenet ex parte rationis: videtur ergo etc.
2. Item, Philosophus3 dicit, quod « ratio nata est regere irascibilem et concupiscibilem »; sed voluntas consistit in illis duabus viribus, scilicet concupiscibili et irascibili: ergo ratio nata est regere voluntatem; sed liberum arbitrium est magis regens quam rectum: ergo magis se tenet ex parte rationis quam voluntatis. Si tu dicas, quod Philosophus intelligit de irascibili et concupiscibili brutali, non de illa, in qua consistit voluntas; contra hoc est ipsa littera. Dicitur enim, quod liberum arbitrium « est liberum de voluntate iudicium »4: si ergo iudicantis est regere iudicatum, patet etc.
3. Item, facto ultimo iudicio rationis, semper voluntas movetur secundum illud: ergo si hoc praeit tanquam iudicans, et illud sequitur tanquam iudicatum, cum libertas magis resideat penes illud quod praeit et imperat, quam penes illud quod sequitur et obedit: videtur, quod liberum arbitrium plus se tenet ex parte rationis quam voluntatis.
4. Item, liberum arbitrium eo ipso liberum est, quo potest se ipsum restringere et reprimere; sed repressio actus voliti non est nisi per iudicium rationis, quia, nisi examen rationis interveniat, semper voluntas sequitur impetum affectionis: ergo libertas magis est penes rationem quam voluntatem5.
Sed contra:
1. Liberum arbitrium eo ipso dicitur liberum, quia immune est a coactione6: ergo penes illud maxime est liberum arbitrium, quod magis elongatur a natura coactionis; et talis potentia est ipsa voluntas, non ratio; in multis enim contingit rationem cogi, non sic voluntatem: ergo etc.
2. Item, liberum arbitrium est illud quod est in nobis maxime7 imperativum; sed magis est imperativa in nobis voluntas quam ratio, quidquid enim ratio dictet, semper illud fiet, quod voluntas praeoptat: ergo etc.
3. Item, liberum arbitrium est illud, ex quo principaliter consistit in nobis meritum, vel demeritum8; sed meritum, vel demeritum principaliter consistit penes voluntatem: ergo etc.
4. Item, liberum arbitrium est in nobis potentissimum, sicut dicit Bernardus9, et plures auctoritates hoc sonant; sed « nihil adeo est in potestate nostra, sicut est voluntas et actus volendi »: ergo videtur, quod maxime penes voluntatem residet in nobis libertas.
Conclusio.
Liberum arbitrium inchoatur in ratione et consummatur in voluntate; ideo libertas arbitrii principaliter consistit in voluntate.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum liberum arbitrium sit facultas sive dominium, ex qua dicitur potentia facilis, non solum ad movendum alia, sed etiam ad movendum se ipsam; sicut ratio movendi se inchoatur in ratione et consummatur in voluntate10, sic et arbitrii libertas residet penes rationem et voluntatem, ita quod in una illarum potentiarum inchoatur et in alia consummatur. — Ideo autem dico, motum inchoari in ratione, quia non movetur appetitus nisi praeambulo cogitatu; nequaquam enim amare possumus quod non cognoscimus11; et ideo ad hoc, quod motus fiat, praeit cognitio disponens, et subsequitur voluntas perficiens. Quantumcumque enim praecedat cogitatus, nunquam motus sequitur, nisi ipsum imperet voluntatis affectio. — Et sicut voluntas non habet moveri ad obiectum, amplectendo vel refugiendo illud, nisi praeambulo cogitatu, sic etiam non habet approbare vel respuere, sive elicere12 et refrenare actum proprium, nisi rationis actus praecedat, qui dictet, ipsum esse bonum vel malum, perficiendum vel refrenandum. Ex tali enim actu praeambulo voluntas in actu suo incipit complacere vel displicere. — Et sic patet, quod libertas arbitrii sive facultas, quae dicitur liberum arbitrium, in ratione inchoatur et in voluntate consummatur. Et quoniam penes illud principaliter residet, penes quod consummatur, ideo principaliter libertas arbitrii et dominium in voluntate consistit. — Et iterum, quia illud, in quo res inchoatur, se habet per modum materialis; illud, in quo consummatur, se habet per modum formalis; et adiectivum respectu substantivi se habet per modum informantis: ideo in nominatione illius potestatis nomen respondens rationi significatur substantive; nomen vero respondens voluntati significatur adiective; et propterea magis vocatur ista facultas liberum arbitrium quam arbitraria libertas.
Ad obiecta in contrarium:
1. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum obiectum in contrarium.
2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur secundo, quod ratio regit irascibilem et concupiscibilem; dicendum, quod sive13 vis irascibilis et concupiscibilis intelligatur de appetitu brutali, sive de potentia appetitiva rationali, utramque habet regere ratio per modum disponentis et consulentis, quantum est de se. Quod autem regat per modum imperantis, hoc non est nisi mediante voluntate, quae dat ei auctoritatem. Voluntas autem non dicit aliam potentiam per essentiam a concupiscibili et irascibili14, sed nominat ipsum appetitum ut ratiocinatum sive rationi coniunctum, et sic eius regere est et imperare. Concupiscibilis autem et irascibilis eandem potentiam affectivam nominant, in quantum tamen habet regi; et ita dicuntur inferiores, non quantum ad naturam potentiae, sed quantum ad officium. Et hinc est, quod liberum arbitrium secundum rem comprehendit istas tres potentias, videlicet rationalem, irascibilem et concupiscibilem, sicut dicit Augustinus de Quinque Responsionibus: « Cum de libero arbitrio loquimur, non de parte animae loquimur, sed de tota ». Hinc est etiam, quod cum ceterae virtutes non indocte ponantur in libero arbitrio, non huic obviat illud quod consuevit dici, quod tres virtutes theologicae sunt in rationali et concupiscibili et irascibili. Voluntas enim, ut iam dictum est, non nominat aliam potentiam secundum essentiam et naturam ab irascibili et concupiscibili, licet alio modo nominet.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ratio iudicat et voluntas sequitur; dicendum, quod duplex est iudicium rationis: quoddam est in solo dictamine, et hoc est rationis secundum se; aliud est iudicium definitivum, ut fiat vel non fiat, et illud nunquam est sine voluntate15. Quantumcumque enim ratio deliberet, in eam partem terminatur definitivum iudicium, quam praeoptat voluntas. Et ideo, cum dicitur, quod voluntas sequitur iudicium, si intelligatur de iudicio, quod consistit in solo dictamine, non est semper verum, quod ad illud sequatur voluntas necessario. Si autem intelligatur de iudicio definitivo, ex hoc non sequitur, quod voluntas sequatur principaliter actum alienum; immo potius actum alienum trahit ad proprium.
4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod refrenatio est mediante actu rationis; dicendum, quod verum est, quod actus rationis requiritur, sed nunquam16 ab illo principaliter est refrenatio. Quantumcumque enim ratio dictet actum voluntatis esse malum, nunquam voluntas se retrahit, nisi velit; et ideo, sicut possibilitas scribendi principalius dicitur esse in manu quam in oculo, licet ad eam concurrat et vis oculi et vis manus, sic intelligendum est in proposito.
Epilogus. Ex praedictis igitur patet, quid sit liberum arbitrium secundum rem, et qualiter se habeat ad rationem et voluntatem. Si enim omnia, quae praedeterminata sunt, insimul conferantur in unum, puto satis posse quietari intellectum; si quis autem in aliquo praedictorum quiescere velit, reliqua non pertractans, non ita evidenter innotescet ei, quae sit liberi arbitrii quidditas et essentia.
I. Praepositivus extremam de hac re opinionem profert in sua inedita Summa (p. II.). Nam ad quaestionem, utrum liberum arbitrium sit ratio, an facultas rationis et voluntatis; respondet: « Ad hoc, ut nobis videtur, dicendum, quod liberum arbitrium sit ratio, licet magistris nostris aliter visum fuerit ». Idem ad obiectionem, quod rationis non sit velle; respondet: « Concedendum esse, quod rationis est velle; sed aliter voluntatis est velle, et aliter rationis. Voluntatis enim est velle, quia motus ille surgit ex voluntate tanquam ex radice; rationis autem dicitur velle, quia ratio impellit voluntatem ad hoc ». — E contrario S. Bonav. hic tenet, quod liberum arbitrium inchoatur in ratione et in voluntate consummatur, et alibi (III. d. 33. a. I. q. 3. in corp.) vult, quod liberum arbitrium « dicitur voluntas, secundum quod coniuncta est rationi ». Quod approbant S. Thom., Scot., Richardus aliique, immo hi dicunt, quod est in sola voluntate, formaliter loquendo; quem eundem modum loquendi, in fine corp. etiam S. Bonav. satis approbat, cum rationem per modum materialis, voluntatem per modum formalis se habere dicat. Ex quo iterum patet, S. Doctorem parum vel nihil in re distare a posterioribus magistris, licet ipse (supra q. 1. et passim) libertatem ponat in quodam habitu sive facultate utriusque potentiae cfr. etiam III. d. 23. a. I. q. 2.
II. In determinanda accuratius relatione, quam ratio habet ad libertatem, Scotus saltem verbis non concordat cum S. Thoma (de Verit. q. 24. a. 2. in corp.), qui ait: « Unde totius libertatis radix est in ratione constituta »; et alibi (S. I. II. q. 17. a. 1. ad 2.): « Radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subiectum, sed sicut causa est ratio » (cfr. hic q. 1. a 2; S. I. q. 83. a. 1; I. II. q. 9. a. 1.). Unde in schola S. Thomae communiter docetur, indifferentiam iudicii circa aliquod obiectum aut aliquem actum esse radicem libertatis. — Sed Scotus (hic q. unica, n. 22. seqq. et Report. hic q. unica) negat, primam radicem libertatis nostrae esse indifferentiam iudicii, scilicet effective, concedit autem, esse radicem dispositive, cum eam consideret tanquam puram et simplicem conditionem sine qua non (Report. ibid. n. 13.). Hinc affirmat, quod « nihil creatum aliud a voluntate est causa totalis actus volendi in voluntate » (ibid. n. 20; cfr. Sum. Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. q. 83. a. 1.). Non autem negat, quod obiectum cognitum sit causa partialis volitionis, et quod aliquo modo intellectus moveat voluntatem, praesertim quoad specificationem actus, sicut etiam voluntas movet intellectum quoad exercitium actus. — Henr. Gand. (Quodl. I. q. 26.), a quo tamen Scot. (locis citt.) in multis discedit, censet: « Dicendum absolute, quod bono et meliori proposito, potest eligere minus bonum voluntas ». Quoad sententiam S. Bonav. cfr. hic solut. ad 3. 4. Videtur autem, quod praedicta solutio Scoti cohaereat cum opinione, quod voluntas sit potentia simpliciter nobilior quam intellectus, quam sententiam diffuse defendunt Scot. (IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 4. quaest. lateral.), nec non Richard. (II. Sent. d. 24. a. 1. q. 5.). Consentiunt iisdem Alex. in tractatu de oratione, S. p. IV. q. 26. m. 3. a. 5. § 2. quaest. incid. (secund. ed. Venet. et Colon.; in ed. Koberg. q. 92. m. 2.); B. Albert. (I. Sent. d. 1. a. 12.); Henr. Gand. (Quodl. I. q. 14.) aliique. Aliter de hoc sentit S. Thom. (S. I. q. 82. a. 3; de Verit. q. 22. a. 11.), cum doceat, quod « secundum se et simpliciter intellectus sit altior et nobilior voluntate », quae tantum « secundum quid et per comparationem ad alterum invenitur interdum altior intellectu ». Quod attinet S. Bonaventuram, in favorem sententiae primae afferri potest, quod ipse supra d. 16. a. 2. q. 3. in solut. ad 3, non reprobat propositionem in dicto arg. prolatam, quod « voluntas est nobilissimum, quod est in anima ». Idem insinuare videntur verba ibid. in corp. dicta, quod « qualitas, in qua principaliter assimilatur Deo, est in voluntate ». Hanc (6.) quaestionem alii antiqui Scholastici tangunt in praecedentibus quaest., sed explicite non tractant.
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Question VI. Whether the faculty of free choice resides principally in reason or in will.
Sixth and last is the question: since free choice is a habit1 or faculty residing in reason and will conjointly, in which of these powers it principally resides in us. And that it resides principally in reason is shown:
On the opposite side.
1. First, by the very naming whereby it is called liberum arbitrium ("free choice"). For if an adjective sets its [own] reality about its substantive, and something is more principally said of something which is said by abstraction than what is said by concretion2; and that habit is named arbitrium liberum ("free judgment"), not libertas arbitraria ("arbitrary freedom"), and arbitrium ("judgment") holds on the side of reason: therefore it seems, etc.
2. Likewise, the Philosopher3 says that "reason is born to rule the irascible and the concupiscible"; but will consists in those two powers, namely the concupiscible and the irascible: therefore reason is born to rule the will; but free choice is more a ruling than a ruled [thing]: therefore it holds rather on the side of reason than of will. If you say that the Philosopher understands [this] of the brute irascible and concupiscible, not of that in which will consists; against this is the letter [of the text] itself. For it is said that free choice "is a free judgment concerning the will"4: if therefore it belongs to the one judging to rule the thing judged, it is plain, etc.
3. Likewise, when the last judgment of reason has been made, the will is always moved according to it: therefore if this goes before as the one judging, and that follows as the thing judged, since freedom resides rather in that which goes before and commands than in that which follows and obeys: it seems that free choice holds rather on the side of reason than of will.
4. Likewise, free choice is free by the very fact that it can restrain and repress itself; but the repression of a willed act is only through the judgment of reason, since, unless the examination of reason intervenes, the will always follows the impulse of affection: therefore freedom is rather in reason than in will5.
On the contrary:
1. Free choice is called free by the very fact that it is immune from coercion6: therefore free choice is most of all in that which is more removed from the nature of coercion; and such a power is will itself, not reason; for in many cases reason happens to be coerced, but not so the will: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, free choice is that which is most of all7 commanding in us; but the will is more commanding in us than reason, for whatever reason may dictate, that will always be done which the will prefers: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, free choice is that from which merit or demerit8 principally consists in us; but merit or demerit consists principally in the will: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, free choice is the most powerful [thing] in us, as Bernard says9, and many authorities sound this; but "nothing is so much in our power as the will and the act of willing": therefore it seems that freedom resides in us most of all in the will.
Conclusion.
Free choice is begun in reason and is completed in will; therefore the freedom of choice consists principally in will.
I respond: It must be said that, since free choice is a faculty or dominion, from which it is called a power apt not only for moving other things, but also for moving itself; just as the way of moving oneself is begun in reason and completed in will10, so too the freedom of choice resides in reason and will, in such a way that it is begun in one of those powers and completed in the other. — Now I say that the motion is begun in reason, because the appetite is not moved except by a preceding cogitation; for we can in no way love what we do not know11; and therefore, in order that the motion come about, a disposing cognition goes before, and a perfecting will follows after. For however much cogitation precede, motion never follows unless the affection of will command it. — And just as the will cannot be moved to an object, embracing or fleeing it, except by a preceding cogitation, so likewise it cannot approve or reject, or elicit12 and restrain its own act, unless an act of reason precede, which dictates it to be good or bad, to be carried out or to be restrained. For from such a preceding act the will, in its own act, begins to be pleased or displeased. — And thus it is plain that the freedom of choice, or the faculty which is called free choice, is begun in reason and completed in will. And since it principally resides in that in which it is completed, therefore the freedom and dominion of choice consists principally in will. — And again, since that in which a thing is begun stands after the manner of the material; that in which it is completed stands after the manner of the formal; and the adjective with respect to the substantive stands after the manner of that which informs: therefore in the naming of that power the name corresponding to reason is signified substantively; but the name corresponding to will is signified adjectivally; and on this account this faculty is called rather liberum arbitrium ("free choice") than arbitraria libertas ("arbitrary freedom").
To the objections on the contrary:
1. And by this the reply to the first objection on the contrary is plain.
2. To that which is objected secondly, that reason rules the irascible and the concupiscible; it must be said that whether13 the irascible and concupiscible power be understood of the brute appetite, or of the rational appetitive power, reason has to rule each after the manner of one disposing and counseling, as far as is in its own power. But that it rules after the manner of one commanding, this is only by the mediation of the will, which gives it authority. Now the will does not name a power other in essence from the concupiscible and irascible14, but names the appetite itself as reasoned-upon or joined to reason, and thus its ruling is also a commanding. But the concupiscible and irascible name the same affective power, insofar however as it has to be ruled; and so they are called inferior, not as to the nature of the power, but as to office. And hence it is that free choice in reality comprehends those three powers, namely the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible, as Augustine says On the Five Responses: "When we speak of free choice, we are not speaking of a part of the soul, but of the whole." Hence it is also that, since the other virtues are not unlearnedly placed in free choice, that does not stand against this which is wont to be said, that the three theological virtues are in the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible. For the will, as has now been said, does not name a power other in essence and nature from the irascible and concupiscible, although it names [it] in another way.
3. To that which is objected, that reason judges and the will follows; it must be said that the judgment of reason is twofold: one is in mere dictate, and this is of reason in itself; the other is the definitive judgment, that [a thing] be done or not be done, and that is never without the will15. For however much reason deliberate, the definitive judgment is terminated to that side which the will prefers. And therefore, when it is said that the will follows the judgment, if it be understood of the judgment which consists in mere dictate, it is not always true that the will necessarily follows it. But if it be understood of the definitive judgment, from this it does not follow that the will principally follows another's act; but rather it draws another's act to its own.
4. To that which is objected lastly, that the restraint is by the mediation of an act of reason; it must be said that it is true that an act of reason is required, but the restraint is never principally from it16. For however much reason dictate the act of will to be bad, the will never withdraws itself unless it wills [to]; and therefore, just as the possibility of writing is said to be more principally in the hand than in the eye, although both the power of the eye and the power of the hand concur to it, so it must be understood in the matter at hand.
Epilogue. From what has been said, therefore, it is plain what free choice is in reality, and how it is related to reason and will. For if all the things which have been predetermined be conferred together into one, I think the intellect can be sufficiently set at rest; but if anyone should wish to rest in any one of the aforesaid, not treating through the rest, it will not become so evidently known to him what is the quiddity and essence of free choice.
I. Praepositinus brings forward the extreme opinion on this matter in his unedited Summa (p. II.). For to the question whether free choice is reason, or a faculty of reason and will, he responds: "To this, as it seems to us, it must be said that free choice is reason, although it seemed otherwise to our masters." Likewise, to the objection that to will does not belong to reason, he responds: "It must be conceded that to will belongs to reason; but it belongs to will to will in one way, and to reason in another. For it belongs to will to will because that motion arises from will as from a root; but reason is said to will because reason impels the will to this." — On the contrary, St. Bonaventure here holds that free choice is begun in reason and completed in will, and elsewhere (III, d. 33, a. 1, q. 3, in the body) he holds that free choice "is called will, inasmuch as it is joined to reason." This St. Thomas, Scotus, Richard, and others approve; indeed, these say that it is in will alone, speaking formally; which same manner of speaking St. Bonaventure too, at the end of the body, sufficiently approves, when he says that reason stands after the manner of the material, will after the manner of the formal. From which it is again plain that the Holy Doctor differs little or nothing in fact from the later masters, although he himself (above, q. 1, and throughout) places freedom in a certain habit or faculty of both powers — cf. also III, d. 23, a. 1, q. 2.
II. In determining more accurately the relation which reason has to freedom, Scotus, at least in words, does not agree with St. Thomas (de Verit., q. 24, a. 2, in the body), who says: "Whence the root of all freedom is established in reason"; and elsewhere (S. I-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad 2): "The root of freedom is will as subject, but as cause it is reason" (cf. here q. 1, a. 2; S. I, q. 83, a. 1; I-II, q. 9, a. 1). Whence in the school of St. Thomas it is commonly taught that the indifference of judgment concerning some object or some act is the root of freedom. — But Scotus (here, q. unica, n. 22 sqq., and Report. here, q. unica) denies that the first root of our freedom is the indifference of judgment, namely effectively, but concedes that it is the root dispositively, since he considers it as a pure and simple condition without which not (Report. ibid., n. 13). Hence he affirms that "nothing created other than the will is the total cause of the act of willing in the will" (ibid., n. 20; cf. Sum. Hier. de Montefortino, t. II, q. 83, a. 1). But he does not deny that the known object is a partial cause of volition, and that in some way the intellect moves the will, especially as to the specification of the act, just as the will too moves the intellect as to the exercise of the act. — Henry of Ghent (Quodl. I, q. 26), from whom however Scotus (at the cited places) departs in many things, holds: "It must be said absolutely that, with a good and better resolve, the will can choose the lesser good." As to the opinion of St. Bonaventure, cf. here the solution ad 3, 4. Now it seems that the aforesaid solution of Scotus coheres with the opinion that the will is a power simply nobler than the intellect, which opinion Scotus diffusely defends (IV Sent., d. 49, q. 4, lateral quaest.), as also Richard (II Sent., d. 24, a. 1, q. 5). The same is agreed to by Alexander in the treatise on prayer, S. p. IV, q. 26, m. 3, a. 5, § 2, incidental quaest. (according to the Venice and Cologne edd.; in the Koberger ed., q. 92, m. 2); Bl. Albert (I Sent., d. 1, a. 12); Henry of Ghent (Quodl. I, q. 14), and others. St. Thomas thinks otherwise about this (S. I, q. 82, a. 3; de Verit., q. 22, a. 11), since he teaches that "in itself and simply the intellect is higher and nobler than the will," which is found "only in a certain respect and by comparison to something else sometimes higher than the intellect." As regards St. Bonaventure, in favor of the first opinion it can be adduced that he himself, above, d. 16, a. 2, q. 3, in the solution ad 3, does not reprove the proposition put forward in the said argument, that "the will is the noblest thing that is in the soul." The same the words said in the body there seem to insinuate, that "the quality in which [the soul] is principally assimilated to God is in the will." This (sixth) question other ancient Scholastics touch upon in the preceding questions, but do not treat explicitly.
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- Edd. cum non paucis codd. habitualis, nostram lectionem defendunt codd. A (a secunda manu) D E F I K M N P Y aa.The editions, with not a few codices, [read] habitualis ("habitual"); our reading is defended by codices A (by a second hand) D E F I K M N P Y aa.
- Cfr. supra pag. 472, nota 6.Cf. above, p. 472, note 6.
- Libr. V. Topic. c. 1: Rationalis proprium [est] principare ad concupiscibile et irascibile, eo quod illud quidem imperat, haec autem parent. Libr. I. Ethic. c. ult. et III. c. ult. Aristot. docet, partem concupiscibilem debere obedire et imperio rationis obtemperare; et ibid. X. c. 7, intellectum esse id, « quod sane secundum naturam videtur principatum obtinere et praesidere notionemque habere de honestis et divinis rebus ». — Libr. I. Polit. c. 3. (c. 2.) ait: Nam animus quidem in corpus dominicum [herile] habet imperium; mens vero in appetitum civile et regium; in quibus clarum est secundum naturam et utilitatem imperari ab animo corpori, et ab ea parte, quae habet rationem, ei parti, quae subiacet perturbationi. Cfr. etiam II. Moral. Eudem. c. 2. (c. 1.). — Paulo inferius post voluntatem Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 addunt et rationem.Book V, Topics, c. 1: "It is proper to the rational [part] to have rule over the concupiscible and irascible, because the one commands, while the others obey." In Book I, Ethics, last chapter, and Book III, last chapter, Aristotle teaches that the concupiscible part ought to obey and submit to the command of reason; and ibid., Book X, c. 7, that the intellect is that "which indeed, according to nature, seems to obtain the principate and to preside, and to have the notion of honorable and divine things." — Book I, Politics, c. 3 (c. 2), says: "For the soul indeed has over the body a despotic [lordly] rule; but the mind over the appetite a civil and royal [rule]; in which it is clear that, according to nature and utility, the body is ruled by the soul, and the part subject to disturbance by that part which has reason." Cf. also II, Eudemian Ethics, c. 2 (c. 1). — A little below, after voluntatem ("will"), the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 add et rationem ("and reason").
- Magistri, hic c. 1, ubi haec Boethii definitio affertur, de qua cfr. etiam supra pag. 393, nota 3.Of the Master, here c. 1, where this definition of Boethius is adduced, concerning which cf. also above, p. 393, note 3.
- Cod. cc et ed. 1 quam penes voluntatem. In initio arg. idem cod. cc cum eadem ed. 1 substituit quod potest pro quo potest. Paulo inferius post repressio actus cod. O substituit voluntatis pro voliti.Codex cc and edition 1 [read] quam penes voluntatem ("than in the will"). At the beginning of the argument the same codex cc, with the same edition 1, substitutes quod potest for quo potest. A little below, after repressio actus, codex O substitutes voluntatis ("of the will") for voliti ("of the willed [act]").
- Cfr. infra p. II. huius dist. q. 1. et 3. seq.Cf. below, p. II of this distinction, q. 1 and 3 following.
- Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 omittunt maxime. In fine arg. pro praeoptat codd. A X praecipit.The Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 omit maxime ("most of all"). At the end of the argument, for praeoptat ("prefers") codices A X [read] praecipit ("enjoins").
- Cod. aa addit sicut dicit Augustinus; cfr. August., de Lib. Arb. quasi per totum.Codex aa adds sicut dicit Augustinus ("as Augustine says"); cf. Augustine, On Free Choice, throughout, as it were.
- In libro de Libr. Arb., ex quo iam supra pag. 113, nota 6. verba, quae hic respiciuntur, attulimus. Cfr. etiam dictum August., in nota memorata allatum, nec non Richard. a S. Vict., de Statu interioris hominis, tract. 1. c. 3, ubi ad dignitatem liberi arbitrii monstrandam imprimis praedicatur, quod neque a Deo neque ab ulla creatura possit cogi. — Verba propos. minoris sunt Augustini et inveniuntur I. Retract. c. 9. n. 3. et c. 22. n. 4; l. de Lib. Arb. c. 12. n. 26, et III. c. 3. n. 7.In the book On Free Choice, from which we have already adduced above, p. 113, note 6, the words which are here referred to. Cf. also the saying of Augustine adduced in the note mentioned, as well as Richard of St. Victor, On the State of the Interior Man, tract. 1, c. 3, where, to show the dignity of free choice, it is above all proclaimed that it can be coerced neither by God nor by any creature. — The words of the minor premise are Augustine's and are found in I, Retractations, c. 9, n. 3, and c. 22, n. 4; book On Free Choice, c. 12, n. 26, and III, c. 3, n. 7.
- Sicut supra q. 3. expositum est. — Paulo superius pro dicitur Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 redditur, et codd. F T W aa ee nec non plures alii omittunt alia post ad movendum scil. se ad obiectum, sicut infra dicitur.As was expounded above, q. 3. — A little above, for dicitur ("is called") the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 [reads] redditur ("is rendered"), and codices F T W aa ee as well as several others omit alia ("other things") after ad movendum ("for moving"), namely [for moving] itself to the object, as is said below.
- Cfr. August., X. de Trin. c. 1. seqq. — Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 nisi cognoscamus. Post nunquam Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 subiicit tamen, et dein pro amplectendo substituit acceptando.Cf. Augustine, On the Trinity, X, c. 1 sqq. — The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 [reads] nisi cognoscamus ("unless we know"). After nunquam ("never") the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 adds tamen ("yet"), and then for amplectendo ("embracing") substitutes acceptando ("accepting").
- Edd., excepta 1, eligere.The editions, except 1, [read] eligere ("to choose").
- Multi codd. non bene si, codd. H R V Z cum edd. 2, 3 etsi; in cod. Y legitur quod si vis irascibilis et concupiscibilis non intelligatur de appetitu brutali, sed de potentia etc.Many codices, not well, [read] si ("if"); codices H R V Z with editions 2, 3 [read] etsi ("even if"); in codex Y is read quod si vis irascibilis et concupiscibilis non intelligatur de appetitu brutali, sed de potentia ("for if the irascible and concupiscible power be understood not of the brute appetite, but of the power"), etc.
- Cfr. supra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in fine corp. et q. 3.Cf. above, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, at the end of the body, and q. 3.
- Et hoc communiter vocatur practicum, illud speculativum. — Post aliud est Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 superflue adiiciunt secundum. Paulo inferius pro terminatur eadem Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 determinat.And this is commonly called practical, the other speculative. — After aliud est ("the other is") the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 superfluously add secundum ("second"). A little below, for terminatur ("is terminated") the same Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 [reads] determinat ("determines").
- Vat. et edd. 3, 4 addunt tamen.The Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 add tamen ("yet").