Bonaventure

Quaestio V. Utrum liberum arbitrium addat aliquid supra rationem et voluntatem.

Quinto quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium aliquid addat supra rationem et voluntatem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Omnis habitus addit aliquid supra potentiam; sed liberum arbitrium est habitus, sicut probatum est¹: ergo aliquid addit supra potentiam; sed est habitus rationis et voluntatis: ergo etc.

2. Item, sicut se habet potentia ad substantiam, sic se habet facultas ad potentiam — sicut enim substantia per potentiam dicitur potens, sic potentia per facultatem dicitur facilis² — sed potentia addit aliquid supra substantiam: ergo et facultas supra potentiam, cuius est facultas. Sed liberum arbitrium est facultas voluntatis et rationis: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne quod contrahit aliquid, addit aliquid supra illud; sed liberum arbitrium non complectitur omnem actum rationis nec omnem actum voluntatis³; et si hoc, ergo aliquo modo contrahit. Si ergo omne contrahens aliquo modo addit, videtur, quod liberum arbitrium super rationem et voluntatem aliquid addat.

4. Item, intellecto, quod aliquis haberet rationem praeter voluntatem, non haberet liberum arbitrium; similiter, si haberet appetitum praeter rationem, non haberet liberum arbitrium: si ergo non salvatur in ratione per se nec in voluntate, videtur, quod aliquid addat supra utramque.

Sed contra: 1. Omnis habitus, qui addit aliquid supra potentiam, determinat potentiam ad aliquem actum⁴; sed liberum arbitrium potius ampliat potentiam, in qua est respectu actuum, quam addat: ergo etc.

2. Item, liberum arbitrium, quantum est de se, respicit actum moris; sed nullus habitus moralis, qui addit aliquid supra potentiam, est indifferens ad bonum et malum; liberum arbitrium est p. 603ad bonum et ad malum indifferens: ergo supra rationem et voluntatem nihil addit.

3. Praeterea⁵, possibile est intelligere potentiam, circumscripto omni habitu, qui addit aliquid supra ipsam; sed impossibile est esse vel intelligi aliquem habere rationem et voluntatem, qui non intelligatur habere liberum arbitrium: ergo liberum arbitrium super rationem et voluntatem nihil addit novum.

4. Item, aeque essentiale est animae habere libertatem arbitrii⁶, sicut esse ad imaginem Dei; sed cum dico, animam esse ad imaginem Dei, non dico aliquid additum substantiae et potentiis: ergo pari ratione nihil superaddo rationi et voluntati, cum dico, animam habere liberum arbitrium.

5. Item, si liberum arbitrium adderet aliquid supra rationem et voluntatem, aut ergo illud haberet ortum ab eis, aut non. Si non: ergo esset habitus infusus, vel acquisitus, quod absurdum est dicere. Si sic: ergo cum illud quod addit supra alterum et ortum habet ab eo, dependentiam habeat ab illo; et quod dependet et ortum habet ab altero, potius habeat ab illo regi quam ipsum regere, potius habeat subiici quam dominari: ideo liberum arbitrium in homine non imperaret.

6. Item, si liberum arbitrium diceret habitum, qui adderet supra rationem et voluntatem; cum unum accidens non possit esse in duobus subiectis⁷: videtur, quod ille habitus haberet tunc plurificari propter plurificationem subiecti primi, et quod plura arbitria essent in uno homine; quod omnino deviat a recta ratione.

Conclusio

Liberum arbitrium secundum essentiam nihil addit supra rationem et voluntatem, addit tamen aliquo modo secundum esse sive secundum relationem.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod cum habitus reddat potentiam facilem, et tribus modis potentia habeat esse facilis, tribus modis habet habitus ad potentiam comparari.

Quaedam namque potentia respectu alicuius actus est facilis per se ipsam, ut patet, cum dicitur mens esse nata ad meminendum sui ipsius, vel intelligendum se⁸; et tunc talis habitus non differt a potentia secundum rem, sed secundum rationem et modum dicendi; et tunc non addit aliquid secundum essentiam, sed solum secundum rationem. — Quaedam est potentia, quae respectu alicuius actus est habilis per aliquid sui, sicut potentia intellectiva ad cognitionem figurarum geometricarum non est habilis per se ipsam, sed potius per aliquod accidens⁹, quod habet esse in ea; et tunc habitus talis addit supra potentiam non solum secundum rationem, sed etiam secundum essentiam et rem. — Aliqua vero potentia facilis est ad aliquem actum per se ipsam, non tamen sola, sed cum alia; et sic potentia rationalis sine aliquo habitu superaddito ex sola coniunctione sui cum appetitu nata est in actum consentiendi et eligendi exire. Et hoc modo habitus vel facultas non addit aliquid diversum secundum essentiam, nec addit solum secundum rationem intelligendi, sed medio modo addit, secundum esse¹⁰, quia non addit aliquid absolutum, sed respectivum; sicut patet: cum dico rationem per se et rationem associatam sive adiunctam voluntati, non addo aliquid novum supra ipsam rationem secundum se, sed solum coniunctionem sui ad alterum, quantum ad aliquem consequentem actum. Unde sicut, quando plures concurrunt ad trahendam navem vel ferendum lapidem, potentia unius reddit potentiam alterius facilem, ita quod nulla nova virtus vel habilitas advenit potentiae alicuius trahentis in se; sic et in proposito intelligendum est se habere.

— Et hinc est, quod liberum arbitrium, etsi accidens esse videatur, in quantum sonat in rationem habitus, secundum rem tamen non est accidens potentiae superadditum. Et iterum, licet sit habitus, quia tamen non dicit habitum unius potentiae absolute, sed cum relatione unius ad alteram¹¹; in duabus potentiis sive respectu duarum potentiarum potest esse unus. Non enim est habitus superadditus per gratiae infusionem, vel per innatam dispositionem, sed potius dicitur esse habitus, quo ratio et voluntas suis actibus dominantur; qui quidem est in eis ex sua naturali origine, pro eo quod naturaliter istae duae potentiae in eadem substantia sunt radicatae, nec contingit, unam ab altera separari¹². — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod liberum arbitrium secundum essentiam nihil addit supra rationem et voluntatem; addit tamen aliquo modo secundum esse sive secundum relationem, quae quidem non ponit, aliquam novam qualitatem esse in ratione vel voluntate, sed ponit, rationem et voluntatem ad unum actum concurrere secundum naturalem aptitudinem.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa: p. 604 Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis habitus addit aliquid supra potentiam; dicendum, quod illud non est verum, intelligendo de additione essentiali, maxime ubi potentia est habilis¹³ per se ipsam.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis potentia addit supra substantiam: ergo etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod facultas essentialior potest esse potentiae, quam sit potentia substantiae; nihilominus tamen aliqua potentia est, quae ad idem genus habet reduci cum substantia, sicut habitum fuit supra¹⁴.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium aliquo modo contrahit rationem et voluntatem; dicendum, quod hoc non est per additionem alicuius absoluti, sed propter concomitantiam rationis et voluntatis, quae simul concurrunt ad dominium liberi arbitrii; non tamen se concomitantur in productione cuiuslibet actus proprii. Aliquid enim appetit appetitus, circa quod non est deliberatio, et aliquid novimus et credimus esse verum, sive voluntas velit credere, sive non.

Ad 4. Ad ultimum iam patet responsio, quoniam illud non concludit additionem alicuius qualitatis novae super rationem, sed solum concomitantiam voluntatis, quoniam sine voluntate ratio libera non esset, nec etiam e converso. Si autem istae duae potentiae ponantur in aliquo quantumcumque nudae, necesse est in eo ponere arbitrii libertatem; et sic planum est, quod liberum arbitrium, etsi dicat habitum complectentem rationem et voluntatem, non tamen dicit habitum accidentalem, sicut gratia vel virtus, immo potius dicit illarum duarum potentiarum dominium naturale respectu eius actus, qui est eligere sive consentire. Et propterea Sancti magis vocant liberum arbitrium facultatem vel potestatem, quam vocent habilitatem¹⁵, ostendentes differentiam eius ad alios habitus animae.

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Question V. Whether free choice adds anything over reason and will.

In the fifth place it is asked whether free choice adds anything over reason and will. And that it does seems [to be the case].

1. Every habit adds something over a power; but free choice is a habit, as has been proved¹: therefore it adds something over a power; but it is a habit of reason and will: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, as a power is related to a substance, so a faculty is related to a power — for just as a substance is said to be potent through a power, so a power is said to be facile through a faculty² — but a power adds something over a substance: therefore a faculty too [adds something] over the power whose faculty it is. But free choice is a faculty of will and reason: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, everything that contracts something adds something to it; but free choice does not embrace every act of reason nor every act of will³; and if so, then it contracts in some way. If therefore everything that contracts adds in some way, it seems that free choice adds something over reason and will.

4. Likewise, granting that someone had reason apart from will, he would not have free choice; likewise, if he had appetite apart from reason, he would not have free choice: if therefore it is preserved neither in reason by itself nor in will, it seems that it adds something over both.

On the contrary: 1. Every habit that adds something over a power determines the power to some act⁴; but free choice rather enlarges the power in which it is, with respect to acts, than adds [to it]: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, free choice, so far as it is of itself, regards a moral act; but no moral habit that adds something over a power is indifferent to good and evil; free choice is indifferent to good and to evil: therefore it adds nothing over reason and will.

3. Furthermore⁵, it is possible to understand a power with every habit that adds something over it set aside; but it is impossible that one should be, or be understood to, have reason and will who is not understood to have free choice: therefore free choice adds nothing new over reason and will.

4. Likewise, it is equally essential to the soul to have freedom of choice⁶ as to be in the image of God; but when I say that the soul is in the image of God, I do not say anything added to the substance and the powers: therefore by parity of reasoning I add nothing over reason and will when I say that the soul has free choice.

5. Likewise, if free choice were to add something over reason and will, then either it would have its origin from them, or not. If not: then it would be an infused or an acquired habit, which is absurd to say. If so: then since that which adds [something] over another and has its origin from it would have a dependence on it; and what depends on and has its origin from another should rather be governed by it than govern it, should rather be subjected than dominate: therefore free choice would not command in man.

6. Likewise, if free choice were to name a habit that added [something] over reason and will; since one accident cannot be in two subjects⁷: it seems that this habit would then have to be multiplied on account of the multiplication of its primary subject, and that there would be several [acts of] choice in one man; which entirely departs from right reason.

Conclusion

Free choice according to essence adds nothing over reason and will, yet it adds something in a certain way according to being, or according to relation.

I respond: For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, since a habit renders a power facile, and a power has being-facile in three ways, a habit is related to a power in three ways.

For a certain power is facile with respect to some act by itself, as is clear when the mind is said to be born to remember itself or to understand itself⁸; and then such a habit does not differ from the power in reality, but according to account and the manner of speaking; and then it adds nothing according to essence, but only according to account. — There is a [second kind of] power that, with respect to some act, is apt through something of itself, as the intellective power is not apt for the cognition of geometrical figures by itself, but rather through some accident⁹ that has being in it; and then such a habit adds [something] over the power not only according to account, but also according to essence and reality. — But there is some power facile for some act by itself, yet not alone, but with another; and thus the rational power, without any superadded habit, from the sole conjunction of itself with appetite is born to go forth into the act of consenting and choosing. And in this way a habit or faculty does not add anything diverse according to essence, nor does it add only according to the account of understanding, but in a middle way it adds, according to being¹⁰, because it does not add anything absolute, but [something] relative; as is clear: when I say "reason by itself" and "reason associated with or joined to will," I do not add anything new over reason itself taken in itself, but only the conjunction of itself with another, as regards some consequent act. Hence, just as, when several [men] combine to draw a ship or to carry a stone, the power of one renders the power of the other facile, in such a way that no new virtue or aptness accrues to the power of any of those drawing in itself; so too in the matter at hand it must be understood to be.

— And hence it is that free choice, although it seems to be an accident, in so far as it has the sound of the notion of a habit, nevertheless according to reality is not an accident superadded to the power. And again, although it is a habit, yet because it does not name the habit of one power absolutely, but with a relation of one to the other¹¹; in two powers, or with respect to two powers, it can be one. For it is not a habit superadded through the infusion of grace, or through an innate disposition, but is rather called a habit by which reason and will dominate their acts; which indeed is in them from their natural origin, for the reason that these two powers are naturally rooted in the same substance, nor does it happen that the one is separated from the other¹². — Therefore the reasonings showing that free choice according to essence adds nothing over reason and will are to be conceded; yet it adds something in a certain way according to being, or according to relation, which indeed does not posit any new quality to be in reason or will, but posits that reason and will concur toward one act according to a natural aptitude.

To the arguments for the affirmative side:

To 1. To what is objected, that every habit adds something over a power; it must be said that this is not true, understanding it of an essential addition, especially where the power is apt¹³ by itself.

To 2. To what is objected, that every power adds [something] over a substance: therefore, etc.; it must be said that the case is not the same, for the reason that a faculty can be more essential to a power than a power is to a substance; nevertheless there is some power that has to be reduced to the same genus with a substance, as was held above¹⁴.

To 3. To what is objected, that free choice in some way contracts reason and will; it must be said that this is not through the addition of anything absolute, but on account of the concomitance of reason and will, which concur together toward the dominion of free choice; yet they do not accompany each other in the production of every proper act. For appetite desires something concerning which there is no deliberation, and we know and believe something to be true, whether the will wills to believe or not.

To 4. To the last [argument] the reply is now clear, since it does not conclude to the addition of any new quality over reason, but only to the concomitance of will, since without will reason would not be free, nor conversely either. But if these two powers be posited in something, however bare, it is necessary to posit in it freedom of choice; and thus it is plain that free choice, although it names a habit embracing reason and will, nevertheless does not name an accidental habit, like grace or virtue, but rather names the natural dominion of those two powers with respect to that act which is to choose or to consent. And therefore the Saints rather call free choice a faculty or a power than call it an aptness¹⁵, showing its difference from the other habits of the soul.

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