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Dist. 25, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 25

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio IV. Utrum liberum arbitrium sit nomen habitus, vel potentiae.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium complectatur rationem et voluntatem per modum potentiae, an per modum habitus. Et quod per modum potentiae, videtur:

I. Primo per Anselmum in libro de Libero Arbitrio1, ubi ait sic: « Liberum arbitrium est potestas servandi rectitudinem »; sed potestas est in genere potentiae: ergo etc.

2. Item, Bernardus de Libero Arbitrio2: « Tolle liberum arbitrium; iam non erit quod salvetur »; sed salvari non dicitur nisi substantia, vel potentia ratione substantiae; ergo liberum arbitrium vel est nomen substantiae, vel potentiae; sed non est substantiae: ergo est potentiae.

3. Item, in nobis est ponere aliquam potentiam, quae semper inclinat ad bonum simpliciter, utpote synderesim, et aliquam, quae semper inclinat ad bonum ut nunc, quantum est de se, utpote sensualitatem: ergo est ponere potentiam medio modo se habentem; hanc autem dicimus liberum arbitrium: ergo etc.

4. Item, omne quod est susceptibile habitus, est potentia; sed liberum arbitrium est susceptibile habitus, utpote gratiae: ergo est potentia. Media patet per Augustinum3, qui dicit, quod « gratia se habet ad liberum arbitrium, sicut sessor ad equum ».

Sed contra: 1. Augustinus in Enchiridio4: « Libero arbitrio male utens, homo et se perdidit et ipsum »; sed nulla potentia peccando perditur: ergo liberum arbitrium non est potentia.

2. Item, liberum arbitrium sic definitur ab Augustino, cuius definitio posita est distinctione praecedenti5: « Liberum arbitrium est facultas voluntatis et rationis »; sed facultas est illud, quo potentia efficitur facilis: ergo cum omne illud quod reddit potentiam facilem ad opus, reddat eam habilem, et tale sit habitus; videtur etc.

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3. Item, Bernardus de Libero Arbitrio6: « Liberum arbitrium est habitus animi liber sui »; sed si haec definitio recte est assignata, videtur, quod liberum arbitrium essentialiter sit habitus; sed non nisi rationis et voluntatis: ergo etc.

4. Item, liberum arbitrium non est aliud, sicut Magister dicit in littera7, et philosophi definiunt, quam liberum iudicium; sed iudicium non est potentia, sed actus vel habitus: ergo etc.

5. Item, potentiae non est potentia8, nec potentia dicitur esse in potentia; sed liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, et est in ratione et voluntate: ergo non videtur, quod sit potentia aliqua; et est potentia vel habitus: ergo etc.

6. Item, omne quod habet diminui et augeri, potius habet rationem habitus quam potentiae; sed liberum arbitrium est huiusmodi, sicut Magister dicit in littera9, quod maior libertas est in Beatis quam in confirmatis: ergo etc.

Conclusio.

Liberum arbitrium principaliter dicit habitum et complectitur rationem et voluntatem, non tanquam una potentia ex eis constituta, sed tanquam unus habitus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium sit nomen habitus an potentiae, hoc dupliciter potest quaeri: aut ita, quod quaeratur, utrum praecise nominet habitum, vel praecise nominet potentiam; et talis quaestio parum habet difficultatis, pro eo quod fere omnia nomina potentiarum animae aliquando accipiuntur pro potentiis, aliquando pro habitibus, aliquando pro actibus. Sicut enim vult Philosophus10, intellectus vocatur aliquando potentia intellectiva, aliquando habitus intelligendi, aliquando actus. Et Anselmus11 dicit, quod « voluntas aliquando dicitur instrumentum, aliquando affectus, aliquando usus ». Et ideo hoc in proposita quaestione non intenditur.

Alio modo potest intelligi praedicta quaestio, ut hoc innuatur, cui videlicet primo et principaliter nomen liberi arbitrii imponatur, secundum quod de eo sacri doctores loquuntur. Et ad istam quaestionem triplex est modus respondendi secundum12 diversos.

Quidam enim senserunt, quod liberum arbitrium nomen est potentiae, quae se habet per modum universalis ad rationem et voluntatem, et comprehendit eas, sicut totum universale comprehendit partes. Unde sicut potentia rationalis rationi et voluntati dicitur esse communis, sic et libertas arbitrii, secundum istum modum dicendi. — Sed istud supra13 improbatum est. Si enim nominaret potentiam universalem ad rationem et voluntatem, iam, cum ratio et voluntas sint duae potentiae rationales, iam essent in eis duae libertates, et duo libera arbitria essent in quolibet homine.

Et ideo est alia positio, quod liberum arbitrium nominat potentiam ex voluntate et ratione constitutam ad aliquid faciendum, ad14 quod neutra illarum per se poterat. Et quia una iuncta alteri non tantummodo reddit potentiam potentem, immo etiam facilem; hinc est, quod liberum arbitrium non tantummodo nominat potentiam, sed etiam nominat facilem potentiam et habilitatem. Et propterea nomen illud, quamvis sit nomen impositum potentiae, videtur tamen esse nomen habitus.

Sed quoniam difficile est intelligere, qualiter ex duabus potentiis una constituatur, vel quomodo liberum arbitrium, loquendo formaliter et proprie, sit duae potentiae, maxime cum non dicatur esse ratio et voluntas, sed facultas rationis et voluntatis: ideo est tertius modus dicendi, quod liberum arbitrium est nomen principaliter impositum habitui. — Et hoc plane manifestat ipsa nominis impositio. Arbitrium enim non dicit potentiam, sed habitum. Manifestat etiam ipsa notificatio. Non enim dicitur liberum arbitrium esse potentia facilis, sed facultas potentiarum. Quemadmodum autem, cum dico potentiam facilem15, dico potentiam habilitatam, sic, cum dico facultatem potentiae, dico habitum eiusdem. Quoniam igitur liberum arbitrium secundum propriam suam assignationem facultas rationis et voluntatis recte esse dicitur; hinc est, quod liberum arbitrium principaliter dicit habitum et complectitur rationem et voluntatem, non tanquam una potentia ex eis constituta, sed tanquam unus

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habitus, qui quidem recte dicitur facultas et dominium; qui consurgit ex coniunctione utriusque16 et potens est super actus utriusque potentiae, per se et in se consideratae, sicut arbitraria potestas in duabus personis regimen habet super actus utriusque in se consideratae.

Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod liberum arbitrium nominat habitum17; verum enim concludunt, quia habitui principaliter imponitur. Unde essentialiter loquendo, haec est vera: liberum arbitrium est habitus animae sive facultas voluntatis et rationis.

Ad ea vero quae in contrarium obiiciuntur, de facili respondetur. Concedo enim, quod liberum arbitrium aliquando supponit potentiam et accipitur pro potentia; sed hoc non est de sua principali significatione, sed sicut nomen potentiae18 trahitur ad nomen habitus, sic nomen habitus frequenter ad nomen potentiae. Et sic patent ad utramque partem obiecta.

Scholion

I. Opinio secunda, hic relata, est Alexandri (S. p. II. q. 72. m. 2. a. 1.), qui dicit, quod « liberum arbitrium est potentia habitualis, pro libitu eligentis, et ex hoc, quod habitualis est, habet, quod facile exeat in actum ». Consentit B. Albert. (S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 91. m. 1.); « Revera liberum arbitrium est potentia perfecta per habitum naturalem, et habitus ille libertas est » (cfr. idem II. Sent. d. 24. a. 11.). — Sed cum Scoto, Richardo, Aegidio aliisque docet S. Thom. (II. Sent. d. 24. q. 1. a. 1; S. 1. q. 84. a. 2; de Verit. q. 24. a. 4.), quod illud nullatenus sit habitus. — E contrario S. Bonav., secutus verba S. Bernardi, docuit, quod « principaliter dicit habitum et complectitur rationem et voluntatem, non tanquam una potentia ex eis constituta, sed tanquam unus habitus » etc. Favet autem eidem opinioni Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 24. q. 2. a. 1.

II. Sed observandum, quod S. Bonav. termino habitus utitur non in stricto sensu, ut S. Thom., quod patet ex seq. (5.) quaestione, ubi distinguit triplicem modum, quo habitus inesse possit potentiae. S. Thom. vero loquitur de habitu potentiae realiter superaddito; tamen verbum S. Bernardi admittit in sensu largo « pro habitudine quadam » (II. Sent. loc. cit. ad 1; Sum. loc. cit. ad 2; de Verit. loc. cit. ad 8.). Hinc nobis videtur, differentiam inter utrumque Doctorem esse potius de modo loquendi, praesertim de usu termini habitus, quam de reali sententiarum oppositione.

III. De seq. quaestione alii explicite non tractant; cuius solutio aliquantulum luminis affert ad intelligendam sententiam S. Doctoris. Non in verbis, sed in sensu cum Seraphico convenire videtur Durand. (II. Sent. d. 24. q. 1.) dicens: « Quod liberum arbitrium nominat proprietatem potentiae vel potentiam sub proprietate », pro quo hanc rationem affert, quia scilicet in utraque potentia specialem habitudinem importat. Praeter laudatos: Scot., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 4. n. 21, et hic. q. unica, n. 6. — Aegid. Rom., II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. q. 1. a. 1.

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English Translation

Question IV. Whether free choice is the name of a habit or of a power.

Fourthly it is asked whether free choice embraces reason and will after the manner of a power, or after the manner of a habit. And that it does so after the manner of a power is shown:

I. First, through Anselm in the book On Free Choice1, where he says thus: "Free choice is the power of preserving rectitude"; but power belongs to the genus of potency: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Bernard On Free Choice2: "Take away free choice; there will then be nothing that is saved"; but only a substance, or a power by reason of a substance, is said to be saved; therefore free choice is either the name of a substance or of a power; but it is not [the name] of a substance: therefore it is [the name] of a power.

3. Likewise, in us there is to be posited some power that always inclines toward the good simply, namely synderesis, and another that always inclines toward the good as-of-now, so far as it depends on itself, namely sensuality: therefore there is to be posited a power standing in a middle way; but this we call free choice: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, everything that is receptive of a habit is a power; but free choice is receptive of a habit, namely of grace: therefore it is a power. The middle [premise] is clear through Augustine3, who says that "grace stands to free choice as a rider to a horse."

On the contrary: 1. Augustine in the Enchiridion4: "By using free choice badly, man destroyed both himself and it"; but no power is destroyed by sinning: therefore free choice is not a power.

2. Likewise, free choice is thus defined by Augustine, whose definition was set down in the preceding distinction5: "Free choice is the faculty of will and reason"; but a faculty is that by which a power is made facile: therefore since everything that renders a power facile for the work renders it apt, and such a thing is a habit; it seems etc.

3. Likewise, Bernard On Free Choice6: "Free choice is a habit of the mind free over itself"; but if this definition has been rightly assigned, it seems that free choice is essentially a habit; but [it is a habit] only of reason and will: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, free choice is nothing else, as the Master says in the text7, and the philosophers define, than free judgment; but judgment is not a power, but an act or a habit: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, of a power there is no power8, nor is a power said to be in a power; but free choice is the faculty of reason and will, and is in reason and will: therefore it does not seem that it is any power; and it is either a power or a habit: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, everything that can be diminished and increased has rather the character of a habit than of a power; but free choice is of this kind, as the Master says in the text9, that there is greater freedom in the Blessed than in those confirmed [in grace]: therefore etc.

Conclusion.

Free choice principally signifies a habit and embraces reason and will, not as one power constituted out of them, but as one habit.

I respond: It must be said that when it is asked whether free choice is the name of a habit or of a power, this can be asked in two ways: either so that it is asked whether it names precisely a habit, or precisely a power; and such a question has little difficulty, since nearly all the names of the powers of the soul are sometimes taken for powers, sometimes for habits, sometimes for acts. For as the Philosopher holds10, the intellect is called sometimes the intellective power, sometimes the habit of understanding, sometimes the act. And Anselm11 says that "the will is sometimes called an instrument, sometimes an affection, sometimes a use." And therefore this is not intended in the proposed question.

In another way the aforesaid question can be understood, so that this is intimated: namely, to what the name of free choice is first and principally imposed, according as the holy doctors speak of it. And to this question there is a threefold manner of responding according to12 different [authors].

For some held that free choice is the name of a power that stands as a universal to reason and will, and comprehends them, as a universal whole comprehends its parts. Hence, as the rational power is said to be common to reason and to will, so also is the freedom of choice, according to this manner of speaking. — But this was disproved above13. For if it named a universal power [extending] to reason and will, then, since reason and will are two rational powers, there would now be in them two freedoms, and there would be two free choices in any one man.

And therefore there is another position: that free choice names a power constituted out of will and reason for doing something to14 which neither of them by itself was able. And because one joined to the other does not only render the power potent, but also facile; hence it is that free choice does not only name a power, but also names a facile power and an aptitude. And on that account that name, although it is a name imposed on a power, nevertheless seems to be the name of a habit.

But since it is difficult to understand how out of two powers one is constituted, or how free choice, speaking formally and properly, is two powers — especially since it is not said to be reason and will, but the faculty of reason and will — therefore there is a third manner of speaking: that free choice is a name principally imposed on a habit. — And the very imposition of the name plainly manifests this. For "arbitrium" (choice) does not signify a power, but a habit. The very notification also manifests it. For free choice is not said to be a facile power, but the faculty of the powers. Now just as, when I say a facile power15, I say a power made apt, so, when I say the faculty of a power, I say the habit of the same. Since therefore free choice is rightly said, according to its proper assignation, to be the faculty of reason and will; hence it is that free choice principally signifies a habit and embraces reason and will, not as one power constituted out of them, but as one

habit, which indeed is rightly called a faculty and a dominion; which arises from the conjunction of both16 and is powerful over the acts of both powers, considered in themselves and by themselves, just as arbitral authority has rule, in two persons, over the acts of each considered in itself.

The reasonings that show that free choice names a habit17 are therefore to be conceded; for they conclude truly, since [the name] is principally imposed on the habit. Hence, speaking essentially, this is true: free choice is a habit of the soul, or the faculty of will and reason.

But to the things urged on the contrary, the reply is easy. For I concede that free choice sometimes supposes a power and is taken for a power; but this is not of its principal signification, but just as the name of a power18 is drawn over to the name of a habit, so the name of a habit is frequently [drawn over] to the name of a power. And thus the objections on both sides are clear.

Scholion

I. The second opinion, related here, is that of Alexander (Summa, pt. II, q. 72, m. 2, a. 1), who says that "free choice is a habitual power, at the pleasure of the one choosing, and from the fact that it is habitual it has that it readily issues into act." B. Albert agrees (Summa, pt. II, tr. 14, q. 91, m. 1): "Truly free choice is a power perfected by a natural habit, and that habit is freedom" (cf. the same, II Sent., d. 24, a. 11). — But with Scotus, Richard, Giles, and others, St. Thomas teaches (II Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 1; Summa I, q. 84, a. 2; de Veritate q. 24, a. 4) that it is in no way a habit. — On the contrary, St. Bonaventure, following the words of St. Bernard, taught that "it principally signifies a habit and embraces reason and will, not as one power constituted out of them, but as one habit," etc. Peter of Tarentaise favors the same opinion (II Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 1).

II. But it must be observed that St. Bonaventure uses the term "habit" not in the strict sense, as St. Thomas does, which is clear from the following (5th) question, where he distinguishes a threefold manner in which a habit can inhere in a power. St. Thomas, however, speaks of a habit really superadded to a power; yet he admits St. Bernard's word in the broad sense "for a certain habitude" (II Sent., loc. cit., ad 1; Summa, loc. cit., ad 2; de Veritate, loc. cit., ad 8). Hence it seems to us that the difference between the two Doctors is rather one of manner of speaking, especially of the use of the term "habit," than a real opposition of opinions.

III. Concerning the following question, others do not treat explicitly; its solution brings some little light for understanding the opinion of the holy Doctor. Not in words, but in sense, Durandus seems to agree with the Seraphic [Doctor] (II Sent., d. 24, q. 1), saying that "free choice names a property of a power or a power under a property," for which he brings forward this reason: namely, that it imports a special habitude in each power. Besides those praised: Scotus, I Sent., Prologue, q. 4, n. 21, and here, q. unica, n. 6. — Giles of Rome, II Sent., d. 24, p. I, q. 1, a. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 3: Illa libertas arbitrii est potestas servandi rectitudinem.
    Ch. 3: "That freedom of choice is the power of preserving rectitude."
  2. Cap. 1. n. 2, ubi textus original. et pro iam. — Paulo inferius pro ratione substantiae Vat. ratione potentiae, refragantibus codd. E F H M T Y aa bb ee, quos nos secuti sumus.
    Ch. 1, n. 2, where the original text reads et for iam. — A little below, for by reason of substance (ratione substantiae) the Vatican edition reads by reason of power (ratione potentiae), against codices E F H M T Y aa bb ee, which we have followed.
  3. Hypognosticon (inter opera August.), libr. III. c. 11: Recte namque arbitror comparari liberum arbitrium iumento; unde et dictum est: Velut iumentum factus sum apud te (Ps. 72, 23.): gratiam vero sessori. Cfr. etiam Sermo 30. (alias de Verbis Apostoli, sermo 12.) c. 8. n. 10: Tollite iugum meum super vos (Matth. 11, 29.). Tulisti hoc iugum? Tulisti? Sentis te habere sessorem? — Pro Media Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 Quod autem liberum arbitrium sit susceptibile gratiae.
    Hypognosticon (among the works of Augustine), bk. III, c. 11: "For rightly, I think, free choice is compared to a beast of burden; whence also it has been said: 'I am become as a beast before thee' (Ps. 72:23); and grace [is compared] to the rider." Cf. also Sermon 30 (otherwise On the Words of the Apostle, sermon 12), c. 8, n. 10: "Take my yoke upon you (Matt. 11:29). Have you taken this yoke? Have you taken it? Do you feel that you have a rider?" — For Media ("The middle [premise]"), the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads Quod autem liberum arbitrium sit susceptibile gratiae ("But that free choice is receptive of grace").
  4. Cap. 30. n. 9.
    Ch. 30, n. 9.
  5. Lit. Magistri, c. 3. Cfr. supra pag. 392, nota 6. — Quoad seq. propos. delegamus lectorem ad illud Ciceron. I. Rhetor. c. 26: « Facultates sunt aut quibus facilius fit, aut sine quibus aliquid confici non potest ». In hac nec non in seqq. quaest. pluries respicitur illa sententia, quae ex F. M. Victorini expositione in I. Rhetor. c. 2. et 23, et II. c. 56. sumta ac formata est, quamque attulimus tom. I. pag. 31, nota 2, illa nimirum: Natura habilem facit, ars facilem, usus potentem, vel iuxta prolationem B. Alberti: Natura habilem facit, ars potentem, usus facilem.
    The text of the Master, c. 3. Cf. above p. 392, note 6. — As to the following proposition, we refer the reader to that [saying] of Cicero, Rhetoric I, c. 26: "Faculties are either those by which a thing is more easily done, or those without which something cannot be accomplished." In this and in the following questions that maxim is repeatedly had in view which was taken and formed from the exposition of F. M. Victorinus on the Rhetoric I, cc. 2 and 23, and II, c. 56, and which we adduced in vol. I, p. 31, note 2, namely this: "Nature makes [one] apt, art [makes one] facile, use [makes one] potent," or, according to the wording of B. Albert: "Nature makes [one] apt, art [makes one] potent, use [makes one] facile."
  6. Cap. 1. n. 2.
    Ch. 1, n. 2.
  7. Hic c. 1. Cfr. supra pag. 593, nota 3. — In minori pro sed iudicium Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 sed liberum iudicium.
    Here, c. 1. Cf. above p. 593, note 3. — In the minor [premise], for but judgment (sed iudicium) the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 reads but free judgment (sed liberum iudicium).
  8. Cfr. supra pag. 33, nota 6.
    Cf. above p. 33, note 6.
  9. Hic c. 1. — Pro confirmatis, scil. in gratia, cod. Q damnatis.
    Here, c. 1. — For confirmatis (those confirmed), namely in grace, codex Q reads damnatis (the damned).
  10. Libr. II. de Anima, text. 21. (c. 2.) et III. text. 2. seqq., text. 18. seqq., text. 39. et text. 46. seqq. (c. 4. seq. c. 8. seqq.).
    On the Soul, bk. II, text 21 (c. 2) and bk. III, text 2 ff., text 18 ff., text 39, and text 46 ff. (c. 4 f., c. 8 ff.).
  11. De Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 3. c. 11: Voluntas itaque dici videtur aequivoce tripliciter. Aliud enim est instrumentum volendi, aliud affectio instrumenti, aliud usus eiusdem instrumenti... Dicitur autem voluntas et instrumentum volendi et affectio eius et usus eius.
    On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice, q. 3, c. 11: "The will, then, seems to be said equivocally in three ways. For one thing is the instrument of willing, another the affection of the instrument, another the use of the same instrument... Now the will is called both the instrument of willing and its affection and its use."
  12. Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 per.
    The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 reads per ("through").
  13. Quaest. praeced. in solut. ad 6. — Mox Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 bis diversae pro duae.
    The preceding question, in the solution to [objection] 6. — Soon after, the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 reads, twice, diversae (diverse) for duae (two).
  14. Vat. et aliqui codd. omittunt ad. Post pauca pro immo etiam facilem Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 substituit sed etiam habilem et facilem, et deinde habilem potentiam et facilem pro facilem potentiam et habilitatem. Cod. aa pro habilitatem bene habilitatam.
    The Vatican edition and some codices omit ad ("to"). A little later, for immo etiam facilem ("but also facile") the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 substitutes sed etiam habilem et facilem ("but also apt and facile"), and then habilem potentiam et facilem ("an apt and facile power") for facilem potentiam et habilitatem ("a facile power and an aptitude"). Codex aa, for habilitatem, well [reads] habilitatam (made apt).
  15. Pro facilem, quae lectio invenitur in codd. C F H K L O S T W aa bb ee et in ed. 1, Vat. cum ceteris edd. habilem.
    For facilem (facile), which reading is found in codices C F H K L O S T W aa bb ee and in edition 1, the Vatican edition with the other editions reads habilem (apt).
  16. Cod. aa virtutis utriusque. Paulo inferius pro super [actus] codd. F H W Y cum ed. 2 super actum.
    Codex aa reads virtutis utriusque ("of the power of both"). A little below, for super [actus] ("over the acts"), codices F H W Y with edition 2 read super actum ("over the act").
  17. Cod. cc et ed. 1 adiiciunt verum.
    Codex cc and edition 1 add verum ("truly").
  18. Vat. cum ed. 4 subiungit frequenter.
    The Vatican edition with edition 4 subjoins frequenter ("frequently").
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