Dist. 9, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 9
Articulus II. De ipsa latria secundum illud quod est.
Consequenter quaeritur de secundo principali, videlicet de ipsa latria secundum illud quod est. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.
Primo quaeritur, utrum latria sit in genere virtutis.
Secundo, utrum sit virtus generalis, vel specialis.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum latria sit virtus cardinalis, vel theologica.
Quarto quaeritur, utrum sit virtus diversa a dulia.
Quaestio I. Utrum latria sit in genere virtutis.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum latria sit in genere virtutis. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Reddere homini quod suum est, est actus virtutis (Fundamenta)1: ergo si maioris vel aequalis dignitatis est Deo reddere quod suum est, erit igitur actus virtutis. Sed per latriam reddimus Deo quod suum est, scilicet reverentiam et honorem: ergo latria virtus est.
2. Item, circa opera laudabilia et difficilia maxime consistit virtus2: sed colere Deum est actus huiusmodi, et hoc est ipsius latriae: ergo latria est virtus.
3. Item, virtus maxime necessaria est circa opera meritoria vitae aeternae3; sed Deum colere et adorare est meritorium vitae aeternae, et hoc est ipsius latriae: ergo etc.
4. Item, circa opera praecepti maxime habet esse virtus; sed Deum colere et adorare est in praecepto4: ergo circa hoc maxime habet esse virtus; et hoc est ipsius latriae: ergo etc.
Sed contra (Ad oppositum): 1. Augustinus, decimo de Civitate Dei5: « Latria semper, aut frequenter dicitur servitus, quae pertinet ad colendum Deum »; sed omnis virtus, ut virtus est, consistit in libera voluntate: ergo nulla virtus est servitus. Sed latria est servitus: ergo latria non est virtus.
2. Item, latria communiter definitur: « Latria est cultus soli Deo debitus et exhibitus », et accipitur ex verbis Augustini, ibidem6; sed cultus non est habitus, sed usus: si ergo latria est cultus, non est virtus sive habitus, sed motus.
3. Item, latria est idem quod pietas, ut dicit Augustinus in decimo de Civitate Dei7: « Pietas proprie cultus Dei dici solet, quam Graeci theosebiam vocant »; sed pietas continetur inter habitus donorum: ergo videtur, quod latria potius sit donum quam virtutis habitus.
4. Item, latriae est Deum revereri; sed donum timoris facit nos revereri Deum — est enim timor reverentiae8 — ergo videtur, quod aut latria superfluit, aut est idem quod timor: ergo latria non est virtus.
### Conclusio. Latria, intellecta pro habitu, est habitus virtutis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod latria, ut vult Augustinus9, nominat illud quo colitur Deus; quo autem colitur Deus, hoc potest intelligi dupliciter (Cultus Dei intelligitur dupliciter): aut sicut actu, aut sicut habitu. Ideo nomen latriae aequivoce dicitur et aliquando stat pro habitu, aliquando pro actu. Secundum autem quod stat pro habitu ipsius animae, habilitante ipsam ad cultum Dei, sic est habitus virtutis, in quantum est circa bonum et difficile et meritorium et ad salutem necessarium; et circa huiusmodi opera praecipue consistit virtutis habitus (Conclusio). — Et ideo sunt concedendae rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.
Ad obiecta:
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod latria est servitus; dicendum, quod est servitus, qua servitur homini, et est servitus, qua servitur Deo (Solutio oppositorum. Quadruplex servitus); et iterum, est servitus necessitatis, et est servitus, quae est ex mera voluntate. Dicendum ergo, quod servitus illa, quae fit homini ex necessitate (Notandum), aliquo modo derogat hominis libertati; et ideo non habet in se excellentiam virtutis. Servitus, quae ex mera voluntate fit Deo, ponit hominem in statu altiori, et tanto magis facit hominem liberum, quanto magis elongat hominem a peccato10. Et talis est servitus latriae. Et ideo nihil impedit talis servitus, latriam habere rationem virtutis completae.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod latria est cultus soli Deo debitus (Notandum); dicendum, quod habitus saepe definiuntur per actus et notificantur11; sed hoc non est praedicatione essentiali, sed causali; et ideo non sequitur, quod latria, si sit cultus, quod non sit habitus. — Posset tamen dici, ut prius, quod latria aliquando accipitur pro actu, aliquando pro habitu (Alia solutio), sicut hoc frequenter reperitur in habitibus et actibus animae, quae habent unum nomen commune. Unde Philosophus12 aliquando accipit nomen intellectus pro habitu, aliquando pro potentia; similiter Anselmus, voluntatem; eodem modo Augustinus et alii doctores utuntur nomine latriae.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod latria idem est quod pietas; dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus decimo de Civitate Dei13, pietas dicitur tripliciter (Pietas dicitur tripliciter). Uno modo pietas idem est quod theosebia, et sic idem est quod cultus Dei; alio modo dicitur pietas officium parentibus exhibitum; tertio modo dicitur pietas misericordia, quae proximis in operibus exhibetur. De his autem dicitur secundum prius et posterius et secundum quandam rationem analogiae, secundum quod dicitur ibidem, quia in omnibus est cultus Dei; principaliter tamen dicitur de cultu divino, id est de illa virtute, qua colitur Deus. Et sic patet, quod pietas secundum diversas acceptiones potest esse idem quod latria et differre a latria. — Cum autem dicitur, quod pietas est donum, aequivocatur pietatis nomen. Ibi enim non accipitur pietas pro virtute illa, qua colitur Deus14.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod revereri Deum est ipsius timoris; dicendum, quod reverentia reperitur tam in honore quam in timore, quia in timore est resilitio in propriam parvitatem; in honore vero est testificatio vel exhibitio alicuius testificantis et profitentis ipsam maiestatem. Reverentia autem, quae est latriae, potius est honoris quam timoris. — Et sic patet, quomodo differt a timore, et quare etiam latria non est donum, sicut timor (Notandum). Magis enim habet rationem virtutis, cum latria consistat in exhibitione, timor in resilitione; et sic latria plus consistit in actione, timor in passione. Et haec est una differentia donorum ad virtutes, ut inferius15 patefiet.
I. Nomen latria tripliciter intelligitur: primo pro cultu Deo praestito per exteriorem actum sive servitutem (ita in I. arg. ad oppos.), et tunc non est virtus, sed materia virtutis; secundo pro actu interiore, tertio pro habitu, ut exponitur cum sententia communi in corp.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 30. m. I. a. I. § 3. — Scot. tangit plura de hac et seqq. qq. in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. I. a. I. quaestiunc. I; S. II. II. q. 81. a. 2. 3, q. 84. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. I. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. I. — Aegid. R., hic q. I. a. I. — Durand., hic q. I. — Dionys. Carth. et Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.
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Article II. On latria itself according to what it is.
Next there is inquiry concerning the second principal point, namely, concerning latria itself according to what it is. And concerning this, four things are asked.
First it is asked, whether latria is in the genus of virtue.
Second, whether it is a general virtue, or a special one.
Third it is asked, whether latria is a cardinal virtue, or a theological one.
Fourth it is asked, whether it is a virtue distinct from dulia.
Question I. Whether latria is in the genus of virtue.
Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether latria is in the genus of virtue. And that it is, seems [to be the case]:
1. To render to a man what is his own is an act of virtue (Fundamenta)1: therefore, if it is of greater or equal dignity to render to God what is His own, then it will be an act of virtue. But through latria we render to God what is His own, namely reverence and honor: therefore latria is a virtue.
2. Likewise, virtue consists especially about works praiseworthy and difficult2: but to worship God is an act of this kind, and this belongs to latria itself: therefore latria is a virtue.
3. Likewise, virtue is most necessary about works meritorious of eternal life3; but to worship and adore God is meritorious of eternal life, and this belongs to latria itself: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, virtue has its being especially about works of precept; but to worship and adore God is under a precept4: therefore about this virtue most of all has its being; and this belongs to latria itself: therefore, etc.
On the contrary (Ad oppositum): 1. Augustine, in the tenth book of the City of God5: « Latria, always, or frequently, is called the service which pertains to the worship of God »; but every virtue, insofar as it is a virtue, consists in free will: therefore no virtue is a service. But latria is a service: therefore latria is not a virtue.
2. Likewise, latria is commonly defined: « Latria is the worship owed and rendered to God alone », and it is taken from the words of Augustine, in the same place6; but worship is not a habit, but a use: if therefore latria is worship, it is not a virtue or a habit, but a motion.
3. Likewise, latria is the same as piety, as Augustine says in the tenth book of the City of God7: « Piety is properly wont to be called the worship of God, which the Greeks call theosebia »; but piety is contained among the habits of the gifts: therefore it seems that latria is rather a gift than a habit of virtue.
4. Likewise, it belongs to latria to revere God; but the gift of fear makes us revere God — for fear is [the fear] of reverence8 — therefore it seems that either latria is superfluous, or it is the same as fear: therefore latria is not a virtue.
### Conclusion. Latria, understood as a habit, is a habit of virtue.
I respond: It must be said that latria, as Augustine holds9, names that by which God is worshipped; and that by which God is worshipped can be understood in two ways (Worship of God is understood in two ways): either as in act, or as in habit. Therefore the name latria is said equivocally and sometimes stands for the habit, sometimes for the act. But according as it stands for the habit of the soul itself, disposing it to the worship of God, it is thus a habit of virtue, inasmuch as it is concerned with the good and the difficult and the meritorious and the necessary for salvation; and it is about works of this kind that the habit of virtue especially consists (Conclusion). — And therefore the reasons which show this are to be conceded.
To the objections:
1. To that, then, which is objected, that latria is a service; it must be said that there is a service by which one serves a man, and there is a service by which one serves God (Solution of the opposing arguments. Fourfold service); and again, there is a service of necessity, and there is a service which is from mere will. It must be said, therefore, that that service which is rendered to a man out of necessity (Note) in some way derogates from man's liberty; and therefore it does not have in itself the excellence of virtue. The service which is rendered to God out of mere will places man in a higher state, and makes man so much the more free as it removes man further from sin10. And such is the service of latria. And therefore such a service in no way prevents latria from having the character of a complete virtue.
2. To that which is objected, that latria is the worship owed to God alone (Note); it must be said that habits are often defined and made known through acts11; but this is not by essential predication, but by causal; and therefore it does not follow that latria, if it be worship, is not a habit. — Yet it could be said, as before, that latria is taken sometimes for the act, sometimes for the habit (Another solution), as this is frequently found in the habits and acts of the soul, which have one common name. Hence the Philosopher12 sometimes takes the name intellect for the habit, sometimes for the potency; similarly Anselm [takes] the will; in the same way Augustine and other doctors use the name latria.
3. To that which is objected, that latria is the same as piety; it must be said that, as Augustine says in the tenth book of the City of God13, piety is said in three ways (Piety is said in three ways). In one way piety is the same as theosebia, and thus it is the same as the worship of God; in another way piety is called the office shown to parents; in a third way piety is called the mercy which is shown to one's neighbors in works. And of these it is said according to prior and posterior and according to a certain account of analogy, according as it is said in the same place, because in all of them there is the worship of God; yet it is said principally of the divine worship, that is, of that virtue by which God is worshipped. And thus it is plain that piety, according to its diverse acceptations, can be the same as latria and can differ from latria. — But when it is said that piety is a gift, the name of piety is used equivocally. For there piety is not taken for that virtue by which God is worshipped14.
4. To that which is objected, that to revere God belongs to fear; it must be said that reverence is found both in honor and in fear, because in fear there is a recoiling into one's own smallness; but in honor there is a testifying or exhibiting on the part of one who testifies to and professes that majesty. But the reverence which belongs to latria is rather of honor than of fear. — And thus it is plain how it differs from fear, and why also latria is not a gift, as fear is (Note). For it has rather the character of a virtue, since latria consists in exhibition, fear in recoiling; and thus latria consists more in action, fear in passion. And this is one difference of the gifts from the virtues, as will be made plain below15.
I. The name latria is understood in three ways: first for the worship rendered to God through an exterior act or service (so in the first argument to the contrary), and then it is not a virtue, but the matter of virtue; second for the interior act; third for the habit, as is expounded with the common opinion in the body [of the response].
II. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 30, m. I, a. I, § 3. — Scotus treats many things concerning this and the following questions in both Writings, here in a single question. — St. Thomas, here q. I, a. I, quaestiuncula I; S. II–II, q. 81, a. 2, 3, q. 84, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I, a. I, quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. I. — Giles of Rome, here q. I, a. I. — Durandus, here q. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian and Biel, concerning this and the following questions, here in a single question.
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- Scil. iustitiae. Cfr. infra q. 3. et d. 33. q. 4.Namely, of justice. Cf. below, q. 3, and d. 33, q. 4.
- Ut insinuat Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 3. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 572, nota 2.As Aristotle suggests, Ethics II, c. 3. Cf. vol. II, p. 572, note 2.
- Nam, ut in Augusl., XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 21. n. 3. habetur, virtutes sunt artes bene vivendi et ad immortalem felicitatem perveniendi. Cfr. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 12 seq.For, as is held in Augustine, City of God XXII, c. 21, n. 3, the virtues are arts of living well and of attaining to immortal happiness. Cf. Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 12 ff.
- Exod. 31, 14; Deuter. 5, 9. — Maior, in qua pro habet esse cod. bb substituit se habet, convenit cum illo Aristot., II. Ethic. c. I: Legum latores enim cives assuefaciendo bonos reddunt; haecque est uniuscuiusque legum latoris voluntas. — Pro adorare cod. K honorare.Exod. 31:14; Deut. 5:9. — The major, in which codex bb substitutes se habet for habet esse, agrees with that [saying] of Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 1: For lawgivers make the citizens good by habituating them; and this is the will of every lawgiver. — For adorare codex K reads honorare.
- Cap. 1. n. 2: Λατρεία vero... aut semper, aut tam frequenter, ut pene semper, ea dicitur servitus etc. — De minori cfr. infra d. 23. a. I. q. 2. in corp.Chapter 1, n. 2: « Latreia, indeed... either always, or so frequently as to be almost always, is called that service, etc. » — On the minor, cf. below, d. 23, a. I, q. 2, in the body.
- Libr. X. de Civ. Dei, c. I. n. 2. seq.; cfr. V. c. 15; VI. c. I; VII. c. 32; XIX. c. 17. — Quod virtus sit habitus, docet Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 5. — De conclusione cfr. Avicenna, Metaph. tr. 10. c. 3, ubi agitur de cultu Dei et ubi inter alia haec proferuntur: Hae autem actiones sunt quasi divina obsequia, quae iniunguntur hominibus; omnino enim oportet hic esse aliqua, quibus excitentur homines; excitantia autem sunt vel motus vel privationes motuum ducentes ad motus. Motus vero sunt ut orationes, privationes vero motuum sunt ut ieiunium etc.Book X of the City of God, c. 1, n. 2 ff.; cf. V, c. 15; VI, c. 1; VII, c. 32; XIX, c. 17. — That virtue is a habit, Aristotle teaches, Ethics II, c. 5. — On the conclusion, cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics tr. 10, c. 3, where he treats of the worship of God and where among other things these things are set forth: But these actions are, as it were, divine services, which are enjoined upon men; for there must by all means be here certain things by which men are roused; and the things that rouse are either motions or privations of motions leading to motions. Motions are, as it were, prayers; privations of motions are, as it were, fasting, etc.
- Cap. I. n. 3. In testimonio allato textus origin. pro theosebiam exhibet εὐσέβειαν. Advertit tamen August. ibid., quod ad significandum cultum Dei etiam Graeci, « ut distinctio certior appareret, non εὐσέβειαν, quod ex bono cultu, sed θεοσέβειαν, quod ex Dei cultu compositum resonat, dicere maluerunt ». — Quoad minorem vide Isai. II, 2, ubi dona Spiritus sancti recensentur.Chapter 1, n. 3. In the testimony cited, the original text gives eusebeian for theosebiam. Augustine notes, however, in the same place, that to signify the worship of God the Greeks also, « that the distinction might appear more certain, preferred to say, not eusebeian, which sounds as composed from 'good worship', but theosebeian, which sounds as composed from 'worship of God' ». — As to the minor, see Isaiah 11:2, where the gifts of the Holy Spirit are enumerated.
- Cfr. infra d. 31. p. II. per totam.Cf. below, d. 31, p. II, throughout.
- Vide hic argg. — De distinctione habitus et actus vide Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 2. 8. et 24. (c. I. seq.). — Mox pro potest intelligi cod. N potest esse.See the arguments here. — On the distinction of habit and act, see Aristotle, On the Soul II, texts 2, 8, and 24 (c. 1 ff.). — Shortly after, for potest intelligi codex N reads potest esse.
- Cfr. Ioan. 8, 32. seqq.; Rom. 6, 18. seqq. — Paulo superius post Servitus codd. U bb subiiciunt autem, pro quo in codd. I N aa a secunda manu substitutum est vero.Cf. John 8:32 ff.; Rom. 6:18 ff. — A little above, after Servitus, codices U bb add autem, for which in codices I N aa, by a second hand, vero has been substituted.
- Aristot., IV. Ethic. c. 2: Habitus operationibus definitur et iis quorum habitus est. — De praedicatione essentiali et causali vide supra d. 7. a. I. q. I.Aristotle, Ethics IV, c. 2: A habit is defined by its operations and by the things of which it is a habit. — On essential and causal predication, see above, d. 7, a. I, q. I.
- Libr. II. de Anima, text. 21. (c. 2.) et III. text. 2. seqq., text. 18. seqq. text. 39. nec non text. 46. seqq. (c. 4. seq., c. 8. seqq.). — De Anselmo, qui mox memoratur, vide tom. II. pag. 601, nota 6.On the Soul, Book II, text 21 (c. 2) and Book III, texts 2 ff., texts 18 ff., text 39, and also texts 46 ff. (c. 4 f., c. 8 ff.). — On Anselm, who is mentioned shortly after, see vol. II, p. 601, note 6.
- Cap. 1. n. 3: « Pietas quoque proprie Dei cultus intelligi solet... Haec tamen et erga parentes officiose haberi dicitur. More autem vulgi hoc nomen etiam in operibus misericordiae frequentatur; quod ideo arbitror evenisse, quia haec fieri praecipua Deus mandat eaque sibi vel pro sacrificiis vel prae sacrificiis placere testatur ».Chapter 1, n. 3: « Piety also is properly wont to be understood as the worship of God... Yet this is also said to be observed dutifully toward parents. But in the usage of the common people this name is frequently applied even to works of mercy; which I judge to have come about because God commands these especially to be done, and testifies that they please Him either in place of sacrifices or in preference to sacrifices ».
- Cfr. infra d. 33. q. 6. — Paulo superius post aequivocatur cod. bb subdit ibi, quam lectionem non pauci alii codd. perperam commutarunt in aequivocatur impietatis; superius etiam pro id est, quod multi codd. omittunt, cod. K scilicet, codd. A U e.l.Cf. below, d. 33, q. 6. — A little above, after aequivocatur, codex bb adds ibi, which reading not a few other codices wrongly changed into aequivocatur impietatis; above, too, for id est, which many codices omit, codex K reads scilicet, [as do] codices A U et alibi.
- Dist. 34. p. I. a. I. q. I. — Pro patefiet codd. K bb patebit. Aliquanto superius pro parvitatem Vat. vilitatem.D. 34, p. I, a. I, q. I. — For patefiet codices K bb read patebit. Somewhat above, for parvitatem the Vatican edition reads vilitatem.