← Back to Distinction 15

Dist. 15, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 15

Textus Latinus
p. 361

Articulus I. De modo satisfaciendi in generali.

Quaestio I. Quid sit satisfactio.

Circa primum sic proceditur.

Augustinus definit, et habetur in littera1: « Satisfacere est peccatorum causas excidere et earum suggestionibus aditum non indulgere ».

1. Videtur primo ista definitio sive notificatio superflua, quia idem est prorsus peccatorum causas excidere et non consentire suggestionibus.

2. Item, videtur diminuta, quia hoc totum vere dicitur de eo qui a peccato cessat: ergo secundum hoc cessare a peccato habet completam rationem satisfactionis: ergo non oportet amplius facere2.

3. Item, videtur falsa, cum dicit: « peccatorum causas excidere », quia hoc est solius Dei; ipse enim est qui delet peccata3.

4. Item, videtur falsi implicativa, cum dicit peccatorum causas; « peccatum enim nihil est4 »: ergo non habet causas, quia « causa est cuius esse

p. 362

sequitur aliud ». Si dicas, quod non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem5; sed tunc, cum talis non sit nisi nostra voluntas, videtur, quod oportet excidere voluntatem; sed non voluntatem-potentiam, quia hoc est impossibile; non voluntatem-affectionem, quia hoc est per Dei gratiam; non voluntatem-actum, quia illa est ipsum peccatum. Si dicas, quod causas idem est quod occasiones; contra: non est in nostra potestate vitare occasiones; et iterum, esto quod eas non vitet, dum tamen non peccet, satisfacit.

Item, Anselmus6 definit: « Satisfacere est honorem debitum Deo impendere ». — Quaeritur ergo, quomodo differant hae definitiones.

Conclusio. Augustini definitio explicatur eo sensu, quod tangat emendam praesentem pro culpa praeterita et propositum vitandi futuram.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum evidentiam notandum, quod haec notificatio tripliciter exponitur:

uno modo, ut sequens pars sit expositio praecedentis, ut sit sensus: satisfacere est peccatorum causas excidere, id est motiva et occasiones; et hoc quidem est earum suggestionibus aditum non indulgere; tunc enim exciduntur, quando nullo modo admittuntur. — Aliter exponitur, quod motiva ad peccatum sunt duplicia: quaedam intra nos, et illa sunt excidenda, sicut pronitas ad malum et difficultas ad bonum, vel etiam radices peccatorum; quaedam extra, et illa non sunt introducenda; et quantum ad haec duo genera duas ponit differentias.

Sed tamen primae expositioni repugnat nugatio; secundae7 repugnat relatio eius quod est earum. — Et ideo tertio modo dicitur, quod ad satisfactionem completam duo requiruntur, scilicet emenda praesens pro culpa praeterita et propositum firmum in vitando futuram; et ista duo tangit in hac notificatione. Quantum ad emendam pro culpa perpetrata dicit: peccatorum causas excidere. Non enim potest pro culpa melius emenda fieri, quam ea a se cum dolore et poena praecidendo removere, quae cum amore sequendo peccavit. Quantum ad firmum propositum de futuro dicit: et suggestionibus aditum non indulgere.

1. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiectum primo, quia non est nugatio; et ulterius, quae sit differentia definitionum: quia haec definitio tangit recessum a malo, illa Anselmi accessum ad bonum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod hoc totum convenit a peccato cessare; dicendum, quod peccatorum causas excidere dupliciter est: uno modo per declinationem solam, alio modo per pugnam et violentiam. Primo modo opponit8, secundo modo accipit hic excidere causas peccatorum per poenalitates assumtas illis contrarias, per quas violenter illae exciduntur.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus solus excidit; dicendum, quod est excisio quaedam per cautelam et praeventionem, et est excisio per ablationem causae in effectu. Prima potest fieri ab homine, secunda non nisi a Deo9.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum non habet causam etc.; dicendum, quod causas hic vocat occasiones. Occasiones autem duplices sunt: quaedam proximae, ut coena splendida est occasio edacitatis; quaedam remotae, ut invitatio ad bonam coenam. Et qui bene vult satisfacere necesse habet occasiones propinquas excidere; et tales sunt in nostra potestate, remotae autem non.

Scholion

I. Vocabulum satisfactionis, novatoribus saeculi XVI. quam maxime odiosum, in genere ad mentem nostri Doctoris sic definiri potest: est redditio voluntaria aequivalentis alius indebiti ad compensandam iniuriam. Prout autem specialiter sumitur ut satisfactio sacramentalis, est actio aliqua poenalis, consistens in bonis operibus, a sacerdote in Sacramento poenitentiae impositis, ad compensandam aliquatenus solutione poenae temporalis iniuriam Deo per peccatum illatam. Hinc Concil. Trident. (Sess. XIV. c. 8.) monet confessarios, « ut satisfactio, quam imponunt, non sit tantum ad novae vitae custodiam et infirmitatis medicamentum, sed etiam ad praeteritorum peccatorum vindictam et castigationem; nam claves sacerdotum non ad solvendum duntaxat, sed et ad ligandum concessas, etiam antiqui et credunt et docent ». — Scholastici communiter descriptionem satisfactionis non ita strictam, quae legitur apud S. Augustinum vel potius Gennadium, alteramque Anselmi praedicto sensu interpretari nituntur. Diffuse de utraque definitione disputat Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 24. m. 3; cfr. etiam Scot., in p. 363 utroque Scripto hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3; Suppl. q. 12. a. 3. — B. Albert, hic a. 12. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. n. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

II. In seq. (2.) quaestione magis explicatur conclusio quaestionis I. in p. I. Haec autem explicatio magni momenti est pro stabilienda orthodoxa de indulgentiis doctrina (cfr. infra d. 20. p. II.) Alex. Hal. rem tractat loc. cit. ante finem, ubi discutit praedictam descriptionem Anselmi. Alii commentatores Lombardi hanc quaestionem omittunt, vel potius coniungunt cum quaestione I. partis I.

---

English Translation

Article I. On the manner of satisfying in general.

Question I. What satisfaction is.

Concerning the first [matter] one proceeds thus.

Augustine defines [it], and it is had in the text1: "To satisfy is to cut away the causes of sins and not to grant entry to their suggestions."

1. First, this definition or description seems superfluous, because to cut away the causes of sins and not to consent to the suggestions are absolutely the same.

2. Likewise, it seems deficient, because this whole is truly said of one who ceases from sin: therefore according to this, ceasing from sin has the complete account of satisfaction: therefore it is not necessary to do anything further2.

3. Likewise, it seems false, when it says: "to cut away the causes of sins," because this belongs to God alone; for he it is who blots out sins3.

4. Likewise, it seems implicative of falsehood, when it says "the causes of sins"; for "sin is nothing4": therefore it has no causes, because "a cause is that whose being

p. 362

another follows." If you say that it does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one5; but then, since such a [cause] is nothing but our will, it seems that the will must be cut away; but not the will-as-power, because this is impossible; not the will-as-affection, because this is by the grace of God; not the will-as-act, because that is the very sin. If you say that the causes are the same as the occasions; on the contrary: it is not in our power to avoid the occasions; and again, granted that one does not avoid them, yet so long as one does not sin, one satisfies.

Likewise, Anselm6 defines [it]: "To satisfy is to render to God the honor due." — It is asked, therefore, how these definitions differ.

Conclusion. Augustine's definition is explained in this sense, that it touches present amendment for past fault and the purpose of avoiding future [fault].

I respond: For the clarity of the aforesaid it must be noted that this description is expounded in a threefold way:

in one way, so that the following part be an exposition of the preceding, so that the sense be: to satisfy is to cut away the causes of sins, that is the motives and occasions; and this indeed is not to grant entry to their suggestions; for then they are cut away, when they are in no way admitted. — In another way it is expounded, that the motives to sin are twofold: some within us, and these are to be cut away, such as proneness to evil and difficulty toward good, or also the roots of sins; some without, and these are not to be introduced; and as to these two kinds he sets down two differences.

But nevertheless the first exposition is opposed by [the charge of] triviality; the second7 is opposed by the reference of [the word] their. — And therefore in a third way it is said that for complete satisfaction two things are required, namely present amendment for past fault and a firm purpose in avoiding future [fault]; and these two he touches in this description. As to amendment for the fault perpetrated he says: to cut away the causes of sins. For amendment cannot better be made for a fault than by cutting away from oneself with sorrow and pain those things by which one sinned in following [them] with love. As to the firm purpose concerning the future he says: and not to grant entry to the suggestions.

1. And by this the response to the first objection is clear, [namely] that it is not triviality; and further, what the difference of the definitions is: because this definition touches withdrawal from evil, that of Anselm approach toward good.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that this whole agrees [with] ceasing from sin; it must be said that to cut away the causes of sins is in two ways: in one way by declination alone, in another way by struggle and violence. In the first way he opposes [it]8, in the second way he here takes cutting away the causes of sins through penalties assumed contrary to them, by which they are violently cut away.

3. To that which is objected, that God alone cuts away; it must be said that there is a certain cutting away by caution and prevention, and there is a cutting away by removal of the cause in [its] effect. The first can be done by man, the second only by God9.

4. To that which is objected, that sin does not have a cause etc.; it must be said that he here calls the causes occasions. Now the occasions are twofold: some proximate, as a splendid supper is the occasion of gluttony; some remote, as the invitation to a good supper. And whoever wishes to satisfy well must needs cut away the proximate occasions; and such are in our power, but the remote ones are not.

Scholion

I. The word satisfaction, most hateful to the innovators of the sixteenth century, can in general be defined according to the mind of our Doctor thus: it is the voluntary rendering of an equivalent of another thing owed, to compensate for an injury. But insofar as it is taken specially as sacramental satisfaction, it is some penal action, consisting in good works imposed by the priest in the Sacrament of penance, to compensate in some measure, by the payment of temporal punishment, for the injury inflicted upon God through sin. Hence the Council of Trent (Sess. XIV. c. 8) admonishes confessors, "that the satisfaction which they impose be not only for the safeguarding of the new life and a medicine of infirmity, but also for the avenging and chastising of past sins; for the keys of the priests were granted not for loosing only, but also for binding, as even the ancients both believe and teach." — The Scholastics commonly strive to interpret the description of satisfaction, not so strict, which is read in St. Augustine, or rather Gennadius, and the other [description] of Anselm in the aforesaid sense. Alexander of Hales disputes diffusely concerning both definitions, Summa p. IV. q. 24. m. 3; cf. also Scotus, in p. 363 each Scriptum here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 1. subq. 3; Suppl. q. 12. a. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 12. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 1. subq. 3. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. n. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

II. In the following (2nd) question the conclusion of question I of part I is more fully explained. Now this explanation is of great moment for establishing the orthodox doctrine on indulgences (cf. below d. 20. p. II). Alexander of Hales treats the matter in the place cited, before the end, where he discusses the aforesaid description of Anselm. Other commentators on Lombard omit this question, or rather join it with question I of part I.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. 1
    Hic c. 3. circa finem. Plurimi codd., contradicente textu originali, eorum pro earum. Idem recurrit infra in principio corp. quaest. — De proprietatibus definitionis cfr. Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 1. seqq.
    Here c. 3, near the end. Very many codices, against the original text, [read] eorum (of them) for earum (of these). The same recurs below at the beginning of the body of the question. — On the properties of a definition cf. Aristotle, Topics VI. c. 1 ff.
  2. 2
    Edd. satisfacere.
    The editions [read] satisfacere (to satisfy).
  3. 3
    Isai. 43, 25: Ego sum, ego sum ipse, qui deleo iniquitates tuas propter me et peccatorum tuorum non recordabor.
    Isaiah 43, 25: I am, I am he myself, who blots out your iniquities for my own sake, and I will not remember your sins.
  4. 4
    Secundum August., in Ioan. Evang. tr. 1. n. 13. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 640, nota 8. — De seq. definitione causae vide Aristot., II. Poster. c. 17. (c. 14.); Boeth., III. de Differentiis topic., et Avicenna, Metaph. tr. 1. c. 1. Cfr. etiam tom. I. pag. 120, nota 7.
    According to Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John tr. 1. n. 13. Cf. tom. II. p. 640, note 8. — On the following definition of cause see Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] II. c. 17 (c. 14); Boethius, On Topical Differences III, and Avicenna, Metaphysics tr. 1. c. 1. Cf. also tom. I. p. 120, note 7.
  5. 5
    Ut docet August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 20. n. 54, et XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 7, de quo vide tom. II. pag. 805, nota 5. Ibid. pag. 601, nota 6. insinuatur ab Anselmo triplex modus accipiendi voluntatem. — In fine arg. pro ipsum peccatum, quod habent codd. E H L aa, alii codd. et edd. per ipsum peccatum, quibus verbis codd. I K subiungunt: ergo non videtur aliquid esse dictum.
    As Augustine teaches, On Free Will II. c. 20. n. 54, and City of God XII. c. 7, on which see tom. II. p. 805, note 5. Ibid. p. 601, note 6, a threefold manner of taking will is intimated by Anselm. — At the end of the argument, for ipsum peccatum (the very sin), which codices E H L aa have, other codices and the editions [read] per ipsum peccatum (through the very sin), to which words codices I K subjoin: therefore nothing seems to have been said.
  6. 6
    Vide supra pag. 356, nota 1.
    See above p. 356, note 1.
  7. 7
    Non pauci codd. et ed. 1 similiter, Vat. similiter secundae. Circa finem corp. pro peccavit edd. perpetravit.
    Not a few codices and ed. 1 [read] similiter (likewise), the Vatican [edition] similiter secundae (likewise of the second). Toward the end of the body, for peccavit (sinned) the editions [read] perpetravit (perpetrated).
  8. 8
    Pro opponit codd. H P Q convenit ei quod a peccato cessat, ceteri codd. exponit, scil. opponens. Mox post accipit supple: Augustinus, vel substituendum accipitur. In principio solut. pro quod hoc totum convenit a peccato cessare edd. quod totum habet rationem satisfactionis, quae potest a peccato cessare.
    For opponit (he opposes) codices H P Q [read] convenit ei quod a peccato cessat (it agrees with him who ceases from sin), the other codices exponit (he expounds), namely opposing. Soon after accipit (he takes) supply: Augustinus, or accipitur (it is taken) is to be substituted. At the beginning of the solution, for quod hoc totum convenit a peccato cessare the editions [read] quod totum habet rationem satisfactionis, quae potest a peccato cessare (that the whole has the account of satisfaction, which can [be said] of ceasing from sin).
  9. 9
    In codd. et ed. 1 desideratur haec solutio, quam Vat. (male substituens in ipsa absolutionem pro ablationem) sumsit ex Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 24. m. 3; hinc et codd. et ed. 1 in seq. solut. post obiicitur perperam addunt tertio.
    In the codices and ed. 1 this solution is wanting, which the Vatican [edition] (wrongly substituting in it absolutionem for ablationem) took from Alexander of Hales, Summa p. IV. q. 24. m. 3; hence both the codices and ed. 1 in the following solution after obiicitur (is objected) wrongly add tertio (thirdly).
Cited by

2 places in the Opera Omnia citethis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

Whether anyone, aided by grace, could have satisfied for himself
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 20
IV. Sent. d. 15. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.
Whether all adults are bound to confess
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 17
supra d. 15. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.

5 further references address the article or printed page this question belongs to, rather than the question itself.

← Dist. 15, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 6Dist. 15, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2→