Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 20

Textus Latinus

p. 424

Quaestio IV. Utrum aliquis, adiutus gratia, potuisset satisfacere pro se ipso.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum aliquis, adiutus gratia, potuisset satisfacere pro se ipso. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia tres sunt partes poenitentiae: contritio, confessio et satisfactio^p424-1; sed homo, adiutus gratia, potest de peccato suo conteri et ipsum confiteri: ergo potest satisfacere pro se ipso. Si tu dicas, quod potest de actuali, sed non de originali; contra: maius est actuale quam originale, quia maior est ibi improbitas voluntatis, et gravius etiam quis punitur pro actuali quam pro originali^p424-2: si ergo per adiutorium gratiae potest satisfacere pro suo actuali, multo fortius videtur, quod pro suo originali.

2. Item, « satisfacere, secundum quod dicit Anselmus^p424-3, est honorem debitum Deo impendere »; sed quilibet homo, adiutus gratia, potest honorem debitum Deo impendere: ergo quilibet potest Deo pro peccato suo satisfacere. Si tu dicas, quod non potest impendere honorem, quem debet pro iniuria prius facta; contra: nulla iusta potestas exigit ab homine plus, quam potest — « anathema enim sit, qui dicit, Deum praecepisse impossibile^p424-4 » — ergo nullum honorem debet Deo reddere, quem non possit.

3. Item, homo existens in gratia potest mereri summum bonum, quod Deus est^p424-5: ergo si multo maius est mereri summum bonum quam reconciliari sibi et confoederari, videtur, quod multo magis pro quolibet peccato suo possit satisfacere, non solum actuali, sed etiam originali.

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4. Item, existens in gratia aut non erat^p425-1 dignus aliqua poena, aut temporali sola: si ergo debitor poenae temporalis potest illam poenam solvere, videtur, quod homo pro quolibet peccato, quod habet, possit satisfacere: ergo pro originali.

5. Item, gratia adveniens in animam aeque bene delet culpam originalem, sicut actualem; sed sicut se habet gratia secundum essentiam ad culpae deletionem, ita se habet secundum opera ad satisfactionem; sed gratia, adveniens in animam, liberat eam ab omni culpa, tam originali quam actuali: ergo movens animam^p425-2 potest satisfacere pro omni culpa prius deleta: ergo quilibet homo potest satisfacere pro se ipso.

Sed contra: 1. Si quilibet homo posset satisfacere pro se ipso, ergo Christus gratis mortuus esset^p425-3: si ergo hoc est inconveniens et absurdum, restat, quod et illud, ex quo sequitur.

2. Item, sicut iniuria peccati totius generis humani est infinita ratione eius, contra quem est, sic et illa quae est in quolibet peccato singulari: ergo si aliquis purus homo non potuit satisfacere pro toto genere humano^p425-4, pari etiam ratione videtur, quod non possit satisfacere pro se ipso.

3. Item, impossibile est, quod aliquis satisfaciat pro culpa, quamdiu manet in eo radix et causa culpae — « satisfacere enim est, sicut dicit Augustinus^p425-5, causas peccatorum excidere » — sed vitium humanae originis nunquam separatur a carne peccati: ergo videtur, quod nullus homo, qui originale peccatum habuit, possit satisfacere pro originali. Maior manifesta est per Augustinum, sed minor manifestatur per hoc, quod quilibet generat filium habentem originale peccatum.

4. Item, ad hoc, quod fiat satisfactio, necessarium est, quod fiat damni recompensatio; sed propter peccatum originale quilibet habet necessitatem moriendi, et corpus mortuum est propter peccatum, sicut dicit Apostolus^p425-6: ergo si quis debet satisfacere pro originali peccato, tenetur reddere animam pro anima. Sed quilibet est mortis debitor pro originali peccato: ergo non videtur, quod aliquis, qui originale peccatum contraxit, possit unquam satisfacere pro illo.

5. Item, quod originale peccatum sit culpa, hoc habet, quia processit a voluntate Adae: si ergo requiritur satisfactio de ipso^p425-7, secundum quod culpa, nullus potest pro originali satisfacere, nisi satisfaciat pro culpa Adae. Sed pro culpa Adae nullus potest satisfacere, secundum quod originalis est, nisi satisfaciat pro toto genere humano: ergo a primo, nullus potest satisfacere pro peccato originali alicuius hominis, nisi satisfaciat pro toto genere humano. Sed hoc non potest aliquis purus homo: ergo nullus potest satisfacere pro originali suo.

Conclusio. Nullus, quantumvis gratia adiutus, potuit pro culpa originali satisfacere, ne semiplene quidem; nec pro suo proprio peccato plene, sed tantum semiplene.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est satisfactio plena^p425-8, et est satisfactio semiplena. Satisfactio plena est, quando simul fit satisfactio de iniuria et de damno; satisfactio vero semiplena est, quando, remissa offensa, satisfactio fit pro damno. Intelligendum igitur est, quod pro nullo peccato, in quo fit aversio a Deo, potest satisfacere aliquis purus homo satisfactione plenaria, nec pro se ipso nec pro aliis, propter hoc quod offensa et iniuria illa superexcedit puram creaturam. — Si vero loquamur de satisfactione semiplena, illa videlicet, in qua, remissa offensa, requiritur emenda de damno; sic dicendum, quod homo potest satisfacere pro suo actuali^p425-9, sed non pro originali.

Ratio autem huius est, quia peccatum actuale dicit depravationem voluntatis, sed originale dicit depravationem naturae. In hoc autem differt depravatio naturae a depravatione voluntatis, quod corruptio voluntatis respicit ipsam personam, ut est individuum, sed corruptio naturae, ut est alterius principium. — Item, quia voluntas est vertibilis, et corruptio in ea existens est facile mobilis; quia vero natura uno modo movetur^p425-10, corruptio in ea existens est difficile mobilis. Quoniam igitur deordinatio voluntatis, introducta per actuale, est personae singularis et facile mobilis, recompensari potest per usum gratiae gratum facientis, quae respicit personam singularem; quia vero depravatio naturae est respiciens propagationem, et ita naturam communem, et ulterius eradicari non potest omnino: ideo pro damno illato^p425-11 nemo potest satisfacere per gra-

p. 426

tiam singularis personae. Illa enim non tollit omnino originalis peccati radicem [ab eo in quo est, nec per se nec per] usum suum; et ideo non potest omnino tollere reatum et obligationem. Impossibile igitur fuit, quod aliquis pro peccato originali alicuius hominis^p426-1 satisfaceret, nisi omnino a peccato originali mundus esset, nisi etiam haberet gratiam communem, hoc est gratiam capitis, cuius plenitudo nata est in alios redundare. Talis autem non potuit esse nisi homo et Deus, qui esset aliorum caput, sicut in praecedentibus^p426-2 fuit ostensum, quia nullus nisi Deus potest influere aliis motum et sensum.

Et sic patet, quod pro minimo peccato originali, nec quantum ad satisfactionem plenariam nec quantum ad satisfactionem semiplenam, potuit satisfacere nisi Christus, id est homo et Deus. De actuali vero potest quidem purus homo, adiutus gratia, satisfacere, sed satisfactione semiplena, quae suppletionem et complementum recipit a passione Christi. Christus enim satisfaciens pro omni offensa, omnibus impetravit gratiam quantum ad sufficientiam: et merito illius satisfactionis homo suscipiens gratiam satisfacit postea Deo pro laesione, quam intulit sibi actualis culpa.

Et ex hoc patet, quomodo passio Christi influit in Sacramenta, et quare amplius influit in Sacramentum baptismi, quod est remedium contra originale, quam in Sacramentum poenitentiae. Et hoc est fundamentum multorum, quae in quarto libro^p426-3 determinantur et supponuntur ab hoc libro. — Concedendum est igitur, quod nullus, adiutus gratia, satisfacere potuit pro se ipso. Concedendae sunt etiam rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur, quod satisfactio est pars poenitentiae; dicendum, quod ipsa poenitentia, sicut ostensum est, efficaciam habet a passione Christi, non solum post passionem, sed etiam ante; quia^p426-4 Christus per passionem suam omnibus impetravit gratiam poenitentialem, et Deus praecedentibus Patribus dedit gratiam propter satisfactionem passionis promissam, sequentibus vero propter solutam. Et sicut nos iustificamur in fide passionis praeteritae, ita ipsi iustificabantur in fide passionis futurae. Unde et qui praeibant, et qui sequebantur clamabant: Hosanna filio David^p426-5. Unde ex hoc non habetur, quod aliquis sufficienter possit satisfacere pro se. — Praeterea, ratio illa non concludit de originali, sed solum de actuali. Poenitentia enim non est contra originale, sed contra actuale. — Nec valet quod obiicit, quod gravius est actuale quam originale; dicendum enim, quod etsi originale in posteris sit minus quam actuale, tamen quantum ad suam originem peccatum originale valde fuit grave, cum totam naturam humanam infecerit. Satisfactio autem peccati originalis respicit ipsam originem; et ideo dico, quod difficilius fuit satisfacere pro originali quam pro actuali, quia non potest fieri satisfactio pro uno originali, quin fiat pro omnibus; non sic autem est in peccatis actualibus^p426-6.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod satisfacere est honorem debitum Deo reddere; dicendum, quod est debitum, quo tenemur Deo iure conditionis, et est debitum, quo obligamur Deo reatu praevaricationis. Dico ergo, quod debitum, quod cadit in notificatione satisfactionis, est debitum secundo modo dictum, et hoc quidem non potest solvere per se ipsum; ipse enim se reddidit impotentem, et ideo, nisi succurreret ei divina misericordia, salvari non posset. Et ideo non obligatur ad impossibile; quamvis enim sit ei impossibile per se, est tamen ei possibile per divinum adiutorium^p426-7.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo existens in gratia potest mereri summum bonum; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia gratia singularis^p426-8 bene habet ordinationem ad hoc, quod faciat hominem mereri summam beatitudinem, sed non ad hoc, quod faciat hominem satisfacere pro culpa originali, sicut prius ostensum fuit.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod existens in gratia non mereretur nisi poenam temporalem; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen nulli peccatori datur gratia nisi merito satisfactionis et passionis Christi. Unde gratiae collatio satisfactionem originalis non facit, sed praesupponit; ideo non sequitur, quod aliquis per gratiam possit satisfacere pro originali culpa.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia aequaliter delet omnem culpam, ergo aequaliter satisfacit pro omni culpa deleta; dicendum, quod non est simile propter hoc, quod deletio culpae attenditur in imaginis reformatione et conversione ad Deum; et quia per conversionem ad Deum^p426-9 deletur omnis aversio, una gratia delet omnem culpam; satisfactio vero respicit obligationem ad poenam, et possibile est, quod una obligatio ad poenam solvatur, altera remanente. Ideo non sic indifferenter comparatur gratia ad satisfaciendum pro omni culpa, sicut ad delendum omnem culpam^p426-10.

English Translation

Question IV. Whether anyone, aided by grace, could have satisfied for himself.

Fourthly it is asked whether anyone, aided by grace, could have satisfied for himself. And that he could, it seems:

1. Because there are three parts of penance: contrition, confession, and satisfaction^p424-1; but a man, aided by grace, can be contrite for his sin and confess it: therefore he can satisfy for himself. If you say that he can for actual [sin] but not for original; on the contrary: the actual is greater than the original, because there the wickedness of the will is greater, and one is also punished more gravely for the actual than for the original^p424-2: if therefore by the help of grace he can satisfy for his actual [sin], much more strongly does it seem that he can for his original.

2. Likewise, "to satisfy, according to what Anselm says^p424-3, is to render to God the honor owed"; but every man, aided by grace, can render to God the honor owed: therefore everyone can satisfy God for his sin. If you say that he cannot render the honor which he owes for the injury previously done; on the contrary: no just authority demands of a man more than he can [do] — "for let him be anathema who says that God has commanded the impossible^p424-4" — therefore he owes God no honor that he cannot [render].

3. Likewise, a man existing in grace can merit the highest good, which is God^p424-5: therefore, since it is much greater to merit the highest good than to be reconciled to him and joined in covenant with him, it seems that much more can he satisfy for any sin of his, not only actual but also original.

4. Likewise, one existing in grace was either^p425-1 not deserving of any punishment, or only of temporal [punishment]: if therefore one who is a debtor of temporal punishment can pay that punishment, it seems that a man can satisfy for any sin he has: therefore for the original.

5. Likewise, grace coming into the soul blots out original guilt just as well as actual; but as grace stands according to its essence in relation to the blotting out of guilt, so it stands according to its works in relation to satisfaction; but grace, coming into the soul, frees it from all guilt, both original and actual: therefore, moving the soul^p425-2, it can satisfy for every guilt previously blotted out: therefore every man can satisfy for himself.

On the contrary: 1. If every man could satisfy for himself, then Christ would have died in vain^p425-3: if therefore this is unfitting and absurd, it remains that so too is that from which it follows.

2. Likewise, just as the injury of the sin of the whole human race is infinite by reason of him against whom it is, so too is that which is in any single sin: therefore if some mere man could not satisfy for the whole human race^p425-4, by like reasoning too it seems that he cannot satisfy for himself.

3. Likewise, it is impossible that anyone satisfy for guilt so long as the root and cause of the guilt remains in him — "for to satisfy, as Augustine says^p425-5, is to cut off the causes of sins" — but the vice of human origin is never separated from the flesh of sin: therefore it seems that no man who has had original sin can satisfy for the original. The major is manifest through Augustine, but the minor is made manifest through the fact that everyone begets a son having original sin.

4. Likewise, for satisfaction to be made, it is necessary that a recompense for the loss be made; but on account of original sin everyone has the necessity of dying, and the body is dead on account of sin, as the Apostle says^p425-6: therefore if anyone is to satisfy for original sin, he is bound to render soul for soul. But everyone is a debtor of death for original sin: therefore it does not seem that anyone who has contracted original sin can ever satisfy for it.

5. Likewise, that original sin is guilt, it has this because it proceeded from the will of Adam: if therefore satisfaction for it^p425-7 is required, insofar as it is guilt, no one can satisfy for the original unless he satisfies for the guilt of Adam. But for the guilt of Adam no one can satisfy, insofar as it is original, unless he satisfies for the whole human race: therefore, from the first, no one can satisfy for the original sin of any man unless he satisfies for the whole human race. But this no mere man can do: therefore no one can satisfy for his own original [sin].

Conclusion. No one, however much aided by grace, could satisfy for original guilt, not even half-fully; nor for his own proper sin fully, but only half-fully.

I respond: It must be said that there is full satisfaction^p425-8, and there is half-full satisfaction. Full satisfaction is when satisfaction is made at once both for the injury and for the loss; but half-full satisfaction is when, the offense having been remitted, satisfaction is made for the loss. It is to be understood, then, that for no sin in which there is an aversion from God can any mere man satisfy with full satisfaction, neither for himself nor for others, because that offense and injury exceeds a mere creature. — But if we speak of half-full satisfaction, namely that in which, the offense having been remitted, amends for the loss is required; thus it must be said that a man can satisfy for his actual [sin]^p425-9, but not for the original.

Now the reason for this is that actual sin denotes a depravity of the will, but original denotes a depravity of nature. And in this the depravity of nature differs from the depravity of the will, that the corruption of the will regards the person itself, as it is an individual, but the corruption of nature, as it is the principle of another. — Likewise, because the will is changeable, and the corruption existing in it is easily moved; but because nature is moved in one way^p425-10, the corruption existing in it is moved with difficulty. Since therefore the disorder of the will, introduced through the actual [sin], is of a single person and easily moved, it can be recompensed through the use of grace that makes pleasing, which regards the single person; but because the depravity of nature is one that regards propagation, and so the common nature, and further cannot be eradicated altogether: therefore for the loss inflicted^p425-11 no one can satisfy through the grace

of a single person. For it does not altogether remove the root of original sin [from him in whom it is, neither by itself nor by] its use; and therefore it cannot altogether remove the liability and the obligation. It was therefore impossible that anyone should satisfy for the original sin of any man^p426-1 unless he were altogether clean of original sin, unless he also had common grace, that is, the grace of the head, whose fullness is born to overflow into others. But such a one could not be except one who was man and God, who should be the head of others, as was shown in the preceding [questions]^p426-2, because no one but God can flow into others motion and sense.

And thus it is clear that for the least original sin, neither as to full satisfaction nor as to half-full satisfaction, none could satisfy except Christ, that is, man and God. But for the actual a mere man, aided by grace, can indeed satisfy, but with half-full satisfaction, which receives its supplement and completion from the passion of Christ. For Christ, satisfying for every offense, obtained for all grace as to its sufficiency: and by the merit of that satisfaction a man receiving grace afterward satisfies God for the injury which actual guilt inflicted upon him.

And from this it is clear how the passion of Christ flows into the Sacraments, and why it flows more into the Sacrament of baptism, which is the remedy against original [sin], than into the Sacrament of penance. And this is the foundation of many things which are determined in the fourth book^p426-3 and are presupposed by this book. — It is therefore to be conceded that no one, aided by grace, could satisfy for himself. The reasons too which show this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected first, that satisfaction is a part of penance; it must be said that penance itself, as has been shown, has its efficacy from the passion of Christ, not only after the passion but even before; because^p426-4 Christ through his passion obtained for all penitential grace, and God gave to the preceding Fathers grace on account of the satisfaction of the passion promised, but to those following on account of the satisfaction paid. And just as we are justified in faith in the past passion, so they were justified in faith in the future passion. Hence both those who went before and those who followed cried: Hosanna to the son of David^p426-5. Hence from this it is not had that anyone can sufficiently satisfy for himself. — Moreover, that reasoning does not conclude concerning the original, but only concerning the actual. For penance is not against the original, but against the actual. — Nor is that valid which objects that the actual is graver than the original; for it must be said that, although the original in descendants is less than the actual, nevertheless as to its own origin original sin was very grave, since it infected the whole human nature. But the satisfaction of original sin regards the very origin; and therefore I say that it was more difficult to satisfy for the original than for the actual, because satisfaction cannot be made for one original [sin] without its being made for all; but it is not so in actual sins^p426-6.

2. To that which is objected, that to satisfy is to render to God the honor owed; it must be said that there is a debt by which we are bound to God by the right of [our] condition, and there is a debt by which we are obligated to God by the liability of transgression. I say therefore that the debt which falls under the notion of satisfaction is the debt spoken of in the second way, and this indeed [a man] cannot pay by himself; for he himself made himself powerless, and therefore, unless the divine mercy came to his aid, he could not be saved. And therefore he is not obligated to the impossible; for although it is impossible for him by himself, yet it is possible for him through divine help^p426-7.

3. To that which is objected, that a man existing in grace can merit the highest good; it must be said that it is not alike, because singular grace^p426-8 indeed has an ordination toward this, that it make a man merit the highest beatitude, but not toward this, that it make a man satisfy for original guilt, as was shown before.

4. To that which is objected, that one existing in grace would merit only temporal punishment; it must be said that it is true; but nevertheless to no sinner is grace given except by the merit of the satisfaction and passion of Christ. Hence the conferral of grace does not make the satisfaction of the original, but presupposes it; therefore it does not follow that anyone can through grace satisfy for original guilt.

5. To that which is objected, that grace equally blots out every guilt, therefore it equally satisfies for every guilt blotted out; it must be said that it is not alike, because the blotting out of guilt is regarded in the reformation of the image and in conversion to God; and because through conversion to God^p426-9 every aversion is blotted out, one grace blots out every guilt; but satisfaction regards the obligation to punishment, and it is possible that one obligation to punishment be paid while another remains. Therefore grace is not compared indifferently to satisfying for every guilt in the same way as to blotting out every guilt^p426-10.

Apparatus Criticus

Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 16. et 17.
Cf. IV Sentences, d. 16 and 17.
Vide II. Sent. d. 33. a. 3. q. 1. seq.
See II Sentences, d. 33, a. 3, q. 1 and following.
Libr. I. Cur Deus homo, c. 11. et 20.
Book I, Why God [Became] Man, c. 11 and 20.
Hoc dictum invenitur in opusculo Hieronymo ascripto, quod inscribitur Symboli explanatio ad Damasum; cfr. II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXXVI. c. 6. — Pro anathema enim sit codd. A K anathema enim est. Mox post debet edd. supplent homo.
This saying is found in a little work ascribed to Jerome, which is titled An Explanation of the Creed, to Damasus; cf. II Sentences, text of the Master, d. XXXVI, c. 6. — For "for let him be anathema" codices A K [read] "for he is anathema." Soon after "owes" the editions supply "[a] man."
Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 3.
Cf. II Sentences, d. 27, a. 2, q. 3.
Vat. est.
The Vatican [edition reads] "is."
Scil. ad operandum sive ad exercenda opera satisfactionis.
Namely, to working, or to carrying out the works of satisfaction.
Gal. 2, 21, ubi Vulg. et etiam edd. est pro esset. — Paulo ante pro posset edd. potest.
Gal. 2:21, where the Vulgate and also the editions [read] "is" for "would be." — A little before, for "could" the editions [read] "can."
Vide quaest. praeced.
See the preceding question.
Verius Gennadius, de Eccles. Dogmat. c. 24. (alias c. 54.). Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 15. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. — De minori, in qua pro carne peccati (Rom. 8, 3.) cod. U substituit carne peccatrice, cfr. II. Sent. d. 32. a. 1. q. 2.
More truly Gennadius, On the Dogmas of the Church, c. 24 (otherwise c. 54). Cf. IV Sentences, d. 15, p. II, a. 1, q. 1. — Concerning the minor, in which for "flesh of sin" (Rom. 8:3) codex U substitutes "sinful flesh," cf. II Sentences, d. 32, a. 1, q. 2.
Rom. 8, 10. Locutio, quae sequitur, reddere animam pro anima, sumta est ex Exod. 21, 23. — Voci peccatum edd. addunt originale.
Rom. 8:10. The expression which follows, "to render soul for soul," is taken from Exod. 21:23. — To the word "sin" the editions add "original."
Cod. R pro ipso. In fine arg. edd. omittunt suo, et addunt peccato.
Codex R [reads] "for it." At the end of the argument the editions omit "his own" and add "sin."
Alii distinguunt perfectam, quae per se et intrinsecus aequivalet debito, et imperfectam sive de se insufficientem.
Others distinguish [satisfaction] perfect, which by itself and intrinsically is equivalent to the debt, and imperfect, or of itself insufficient.
Edd. hic et subinde post originali subdunt peccato. Paulo superius ante illa videlicet codd. L aa inserunt de.
The editions here and thereafter after "original" subjoin "sin." A little above, before "namely that," codices L aa insert "of."
Aristot., Mechanicae, c. 1: Natura etenim eundem semper habet modum. Cfr. IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.). — Paulo ante pro Item codd. G Q Z aa Iterum. Paulo inferius pro per actuale edd. cum uno alteroque cod. pro actuali. Post pauca pro usum gratiae cod. N donum gratiae.
Aristotle, Mechanics, c. 1: "For nature always keeps the same way." Cf. IX Metaphysics, text 3 and 10 (VIII, c. 2 and 5). — A little before, for "Likewise" codices G Q Z aa [read] "Again." A little below, for "through the actual" the editions with one or another codex [read] "for the actual." After a few words, for "use of grace" codex N [reads] "gift of grace."
Codd. A K hic adiungunt pro originali peccato.
Codices A K here add "for original sin."
Dist. 13. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Aliquanto superius pro alicuius hominis cod. W cuiuslibet hominis.
D. 13, a. 2, q. 1 and following. — Somewhat above, for "of any man" codex W [reads] "of every man."
Cfr. supra d. 19. a. 1. q. 2. seqq. et dub. 1. et 2. — Aliquanto superius pro potest quidem codd. B C D G potest quidam, cod. O potest quilibet, et deinde pro omni offensa codd. A K omnium offensa. Inferius pro quomodo passio cod. Q qualiter passio.
Cf. above, d. 19, a. 1, q. 2 and following, and dub. 1 and 2. — Somewhat above, for "can indeed" codices B C D G [read] "can someone," codex O "can anyone," and then for "for every offense" codices A K [read] "of all offense." Below, for "how the passion" codex Q [reads] "in what manner the passion."
Dist. 9. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. — Pro in Sacramentum poenitentiae non pauci codd. in Sacramento poenitentiae, post quae verba cod. O subiungit quod est remedium contra actuale. Deinde post nullus codd. A K interiiciunt etiam.
D. 9, p. I, a. 1, q. 1. — For "into the Sacrament of penance" not a few codices [read] "in the Sacrament of penance," after which words codex O subjoins "which is the remedy against the actual." Then after "no one" codices A K insert "even."
Plurimi codd. tamen quia.
Very many codices [read] "yet because."
Matth. 21, 9. Cfr. supra d. 13. a. 2. q. 3. ad 6.
Matt. 21:9. Cf. above, d. 13, a. 2, q. 3, ad 6.
Vide II. Sent. d. 21. a. 3. q. 3. et d. 33. a. 1. q. 2.
See II Sentences, d. 21, a. 3, q. 3, and d. 33, a. 1, q. 2.
Cfr. Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 20. et 24.
Cf. Anselm, Book I, Why God [Became] Man, c. 20 and 24.
Edd. supplent personae. Mox pro faciat edd. facit.
The editions supply "of the person." Soon after, for "it make" the editions [read] "it makes."
Verba et quia per conversionem ad Deum, quae ab edd. absunt, restituimus ex codd. A F K (L a secunda manu) M O P R S aa bb cc. Mox pro una gratia edd. absque auctoritate codd. exhibent una ergo gratia, et deinde ante possibile est omisso et, post haec verba iterum, codd. obnitentibus, ponunt ergo. Paulo inferius pro comparatur Vat. substituit operatur.
The words "and because through conversion to God," which are absent from the editions, we have restored from codices A F K (L by a second hand) M O P R S aa bb cc. Soon, for "one grace" the editions, without the authority of the codices, present "one grace therefore," and then before "it is possible," with "and" omitted, after these words again, the codices objecting, they put "therefore." A little below, for "is compared" the Vatican [edition] substitutes "operates."
Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
See the scholion to the preceding question.

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