Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 20
Quaestio III. Utrum aliqua creatura pura potuerit satisfacere pro toto genere humano.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum aliqua creatura pura potuerit satisfacere pro toto genere humano. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Una creatura pura potuit totum genus humanum inficere per culpam suamp422-4: ergo si gratia est principium satisfaciendi, sicut culpa principium inficiendi; videtur, quod aliqua pura creatura per suam gratiam potuerit satisfacere pro toto genere humano.
2. Item, non plus exigitur in iusta poena, quam commissum fuit in culpa: si ergo genus humanum lapsum fuit per transgressionem purae creaturae, videtur, quod pura creatura potuerit satisfacere pro genere humano.
3. Item, diabolus iuste perdidit genus humanum, quia extendit manum suam in innocentemp422-5: ergo si potuit esse aliqua pura creatura omnino innocens, quae se pro salute generis humani exponeret, et diabolus manum in eam extenderet; videtur, quod aliqua pura creatura redimere potuisset genus humanum de diabolica potestate, et ita satisfacere pro eodem.
4. Item, plus pensat Deus vitam et animam unius iusti quam vitam et animam innumerabilium peccatorump422-6: si ergo aliqua pura creatura innocens et sancta se Deo et Patri obtulisset pro peccatoribus hostiam, facta esset recompensatio iusta, ergo et satisfactio debita.
5. Item, esto quod Christus fuisset pura creatura et mortuus fuisset in cruce, sicut mortuus fuit; quaero tunc: aut fuisset detentus in limbo, aut non. Constat, quod in limbo detentus non fuisset, quia non habuit reatum peccati originalis: ergo apertum fuisset ei caelum: meruisset ergo Christus apertionem ianuae. Si ergo ianua non habuit aperiri nisi per sufficientem satisfactionem, videtur, quod pura creatura satisfacere potuisset pro toto genere humano.
Sed contra: 1. Si pura creatura esset, aut esset homo, aut non-homo. Si esset purus homo, ergo esset peccator et debitor: ergo non potuisset esse mediator et reconciliator, cum ipse indigeret reconciliatione. Si esset non-homo; sed pro homine non debet satisfacere nisi homo, quia ad eum pertinet satisfactio, in quo fuit transgressio: ergo si nec purus homo nec non-homo potuit satisfacere pro toto genere humano, videtur, quod nulla pura creatura potueritp422-7.
2. Item, satisfactio debet proportionari offensae et iniuriae; sed tanta est offensa et iniuria, quantus est ille cui infertur: cum igitur Deus sit infinitus, offensa et iniuria Dei est infinita. Sed nulla creatura nec eius operatio est infinita: ergo nulla pura creatura potest satisfacere pro offensa et iniuria Deo illata. Sed talis fuit iniuria Adae et posteritatis suae, quia Deum contempsitp422-8: ergo etc.
3. Item, nullus satisfacit, nisi restituat tantum et amplius, quantum abstulit; sed nulla pura creatura valet totum genus humanum, quod per peccatum Adae fuit Deo subtractum, restituere: ergo nulla pura creatura potest satisfacere pro ipsop422-9.
4. Item, nullus potest satisfacere pro omni homine, nisi posset influere in omnem hominem iustitiam, sicut primus parens transmisit culpam; sed nulla pura creatura potest aliis influere iustitiam vel dare gratiam, sicut ostensum fuit in primo librop422-10: ergo nulla pura creatura potest satisfacere pro toto genere humano.
5. Item, non minus obligamur Deo pro beneficio recreationis quam pro beneficio creationis: si ergo pura creatura genus humanum redemisset, tantum essemus sibi obligati, quantum nostro Creatori: ergo tantum teneremur diligere creaturam quantum Creatorem. Si ergo impossibile est, nos ad hoc obligarip423-1; impossibile fuit, puram creaturam satisfacere pro toto genere humano.
### Conclusio. Nulla pura creatura potuit satisfacere pro toto genere humano, nec respectu iniuriae nec respectu damni; nec decuisset, alterius generis creaturam ad hoc a Deo assumi.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod de duobus consuevit fieri satisfactio et requiri, videlicet de iniuria et de damno. Si igitur Deus requirit satisfactionem ab humano genere; aut requirit pro utroque, aut pro altero horum. Si pro utroque, planum est, quod impossibile est, aliquam puram creaturam Deo satisfacere pro humano genere, pro eo quod tam gravis est iniuria, quae infertur Deo ob excellentissimam eius dignitatem, quod nulla pura creatura potest recompensare aliquid illi aequale. Si vero exigat satisfactionem de solo damno, condonando iniuriam; nec sic potest pro toto genere humano satisfacere aliqua pura creatura. Aut enim illa creatura esset homo, aut non esset homo. Si esset homo, cum unus purus homo non possit aequivalere toti generi humano, talis homo, offerendo se ipsum Deo, nunquam recompensaret damnum, quod Adam intulit, corrumpendo totum genus humanum. Si esset non-homo; nec sic adhuc posset damnum recompensare, si pura creatura esset; aut si posset, non tamen satisfaceret, quia ad illud genus spectat satisfactio, ad quod spectavit transgressiop423-2. Aut si hoc posset, non tamen deceret, quia naturam humanam in statum pristinum non revocaret; esset enim ex hoc subiecta alii generi creaturae.
Et ex hoc habetur, quod non solum pura creatura non posset Deo satisfacere, si esset alterius generis, sed etiam, nec si esset a Deo assumta, conveniret, ut pro humano genere satisfaceret. — Et ideo, cum pura creatura non posset pro toto genere humano satisfacere, nec alterius generis creaturam deceret ad hoc assumi; oportuit, ut persona satisfacientis esset Deus et homop423-3. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod nulla pura creatura posset satisfacere pro toto genere humano.
Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:
1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod pura creatura potuit totum genus humanum inficere; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia aliqua pura creatura potuit esse principium totius generis humani secundum propagationem carnalem, per quam genus humanum corrumpitur et inficitur; sed nulla pura creatura potuit esse principium totius generis humani secundum regenerationem spiritualemp423-4.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non plus exigitur in iusta poena, quam commissum est in culpa; dicendum, quod culpa non solum aggravatur ex parte conditionis peccantisp423-5, sed etiam ex parte eius, in quem peccatur; et licet peccans fuerit pura creatura, ille tamen, in quem peccavit, fuit Creator. Ideo, cum exigitur, quod satisfaciens non sit pura creatura, hoc non est supra id quod commissum est in culpa; oportet enim, quod persona satisfaciens pro peccati gravitate satisfaciat secundum omnes conditiones, secundum quas habet aggravari.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diabolus iuste amisit genus humanum, quia extendit manum in eum, in quem non habebat ius; dicendum, quod in hoc non exprimitur sufficiens ratio satisfactionis, sed modus vincendi diabolum. Et bene verum est, quod aliqua pura creatura innocens potuisset diabolum vincerep423-6; sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod posset Deo satisfacere. Longe enim plus est recompensare Deo illatam iniuriam quam vincere diabolicam fraudem.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod plus pensat Deus animam iustip423-7 quam animas innumerabilium peccatorum; dicendum, quod Deus in satisfactione non quaerit recompensationem de genere humano, secundum quod est in statu peccati, sed secundum quod fuisset, si non peccasset; et hoc modo nullius puri hominis vitam Deus tantum appretiatur, sicut totam generationem humanam.
5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, si Christus fuisset pura creatura, utrum moriens introisset in caelum; dicendum, quod sic; ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quodp423-8 meruisset ianuae apertionem, quia caelum nunquam fuerat sibi clausum, hoc posito, quod non habuisset peccati originalis reatum. Alii vero, qui reatum peccati originalis habebant, propter hoc non fuissent in caelum introducti; et ita adhuc remansisset ianua clausa, pro eo quod non fuisset sufficiens satisfactio persoluta.
I. In hac et seq. (4.) quaestione S. Bonav. cum Alexandro Hal. et Richardo sequitur modum dicendi S. Anselmi, cuius argumenta Scot. (hic q. unica n. 3. seqq.) restringere vel evertere nititur; qui insuper contendit, quod purus homo i. e. non unitus hypostatice Deo, at plenitudine gratiae repletus, satisfacere potuerit pro genere humano, et quidem de condigno. Tamen Scot. explicite loquitur non de potentia ordinaria, quae respicit leges et decreta in praesenti providentia stabilita, sed de potentia absoluta, qua Deus secundum ipsum potest facere quidquid in se non implicat contradictionem. Concorditer igitur doctores tenent, quod secundum praesentem divinam dispositionem incarnatio fuit necessaria, supposito quod Deus voluerit habere satisfactionem perfectam (de condigno), sive quae est ad aequalitatem iustitiae. De potentia absoluta loquendo, vulgo distinguitur inter satisfactionem imperfectam, quae, licet non sit condigna, acceptatur tamen ab eo cui illa debetur (cfr. hic q. 4.), et satisfactionem perfectam sive condignam. Respectu satisfactionis imperfectae facile conceditur, creaturam, Deo adiuvante, eam praestare, Deumque, si vellet, eam acceptare posse ut sibi sufficientem. Quod eadem autem posset acceptari etiam ut perfecta et condigna, docent Scot., Durand. et Nominales, refragantibus schola S. Thomae aliisque multis.
S. Bonav. in hac quaestione solvenda non loquitur de potentia Dei absoluta, sed arguit ex principiis, quae in praesenti providentia rata sunt. Hoc iam observavit Brulifer (ad hanc quaest.), unde concludit, S. Bonaventuram non contradicere Scoto. Haec interpretatio confirmatur infra quaestione 6, ubi in fine auctor dicit, se quoad redemptionem alio modo possibilem nihil velle determinare, scilicet « quia temerarium est, cum de divina potentia agitur, terminum praefigere ». — Nihilominus auctor hic plura dicit, quae a Scoto non probantur (cfr. etiam IV. Sent. d. 13. p. I. q. I. seqq.).
II. In 2. fundam. arguitur ex quadam infinita gravitate et malitia peccati, de qua infinitate scholae non eodem loquendi modo utuntur. Plurimi enim discipuli S. Thomae defendunt, peccatum in ratione moralis offensae esse simpliciter et intrinsecus infinitum, dum Scotus cum suis multisque aliis non admittit nisi infinitatem obiectivam et extrinsecam. Sed in ipsa schola S. Thomae non desunt, qui S. Thomam pro secunda sententia stare asserant, ut P. Nicolai O. Pr., qui in sua editione Commentarii S. Thomae in Sententias (hic a. 2, nota marginal.) annotat: « Ubi ergo praetexta simplex et intrinseca infinitas, quam praeter perpetuam et uniformem S. Thomae doctrinam gratis aliqui fingunt et affingere illi non dubitant, pro extrinseca tantum et respectiva, ex obiecto sumta et vocabulo diminuto [scil. quandam] significata, quam agnoscit »? In hoc altero sensu etiam S. Bonav. debet intelligi, cum ipse duplex distinguat infinitum, scilicet absolute in se et in comparatione ad aliud (I. Sent. d. 43; q. I, III. Sent. d. 13. a. I. q. 2.), et pluries, ut in scholio ad II. Sent. d. 35. a. I. q. 3. iam notatum est, peccato infinitatem tribuat in comparatione, scilicet ad bonum divinum in se infinitum. — Aliud principium, quod Scot. pro sua opinione hic urget, respicit ipsum valorem meriti Christi, quatenus dependeat ab acceptatione divina, de quo cfr. infra q. 5, scholion.
III. De hac 3. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. I. m. 6. a. 1.2. — Scot., loc. cit. et Report. q. unica. — S. Thom., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 2. et d. I. q. I. a. 2. ad 9; S. III. q. I. a. 2. ad 2. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 6. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., III. Sent. d. 1. q. 1.
IV. Etiam quoad seq. (4.) quaestionem Scot. cum suis et Nominalibus a S. Bonav. et ceteris antiquis doctoribus discedit, ita tamen, ut loquatur non de potentia Dei ordinaria, sed absoluta. Quidam autem Nominales, ulterius progressi, dicunt, satisfactionem purae creaturae et viribus pure naturalibus factam ex acceptatione Dei extrinseca, si Deus velit, posse esse sufficientem. Scotus autem (IV. Sent. d. 15. q. I. n. 7.) explicite requirit ad talem satisfactionem auxilium et statum gratiae.
De hac 4. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 5. a. I. 2. — Scot., loc. cit. — Richard., hic q. 5.
Question III. Whether any mere creature could have made satisfaction for the whole human race.
Thirdly it is asked whether any mere creature could have made satisfaction for the whole human race. And that it could, is shown thus.
1. One mere creature was able to infect the whole human race through its own faultp422-4: therefore if grace is the principle of making satisfaction, just as fault is the principle of infecting; it seems that some mere creature could, through its own grace, make satisfaction for the whole human race.
2. Likewise, no more is required in a just penalty than was committed in the fault: if therefore the human race fell through the transgression of a mere creature, it seems that a mere creature could make satisfaction for the human race.
3. Likewise, the devil justly lost the human race, because he stretched out his hand against an innocent onep422-5: therefore if there could be some mere creature wholly innocent, who would expose itself for the salvation of the human race, and the devil should stretch out his hand against it; it seems that some mere creature could have redeemed the human race from the devil's power, and thus made satisfaction for it.
4. Likewise, God weighs the life and soul of one just man more than the life and soul of innumerable sinnersp422-6: if therefore some mere creature, innocent and holy, should offer itself to God and the Father as a sacrifice for sinners, a just recompense would be made, and therefore a due satisfaction.
5. Likewise, suppose that Christ had been a mere creature and had died on the cross, as he did die; I ask then: either he would have been detained in limbo, or not. It is established that he would not have been detained in limbo, because he had no guilt of original sin: therefore heaven would have been opened to him: Christ would therefore have merited the opening of the gate. If then the gate could not be opened except through sufficient satisfaction, it seems that a mere creature could have made satisfaction for the whole human race.
On the contrary: 1. If it were a mere creature, it would be either a man or a non-man. If it were a mere man, then it would be a sinner and a debtor: therefore it could not be mediator and reconciler, since it itself would need reconciliation. If it were a non-man; but for man none ought to make satisfaction except a man, because satisfaction pertains to him in whom there was the transgression: therefore if neither a mere man nor a non-man could make satisfaction for the whole human race, it seems that no mere creature couldp422-7.
2. Likewise, satisfaction ought to be proportioned to the offense and the injury; but the offense and injury is as great as is the one to whom it is done: since therefore God is infinite, the offense and injury done to God is infinite. But no creature, nor its operation, is infinite: therefore no mere creature can make satisfaction for the offense and injury done to God. But such was the injury of Adam and his posterity, because he despised Godp422-8: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, no one makes satisfaction unless he restores as much and more than he took away; but no mere creature is able to restore the whole human race, which through the sin of Adam was taken away from God: therefore no mere creature can make satisfaction for itp422-9.
4. Likewise, no one can make satisfaction for every man, unless he could pour justice into every man, just as the first parent transmitted fault; but no mere creature can pour justice into others or give grace, as was shown in the first bookp422-10: therefore no mere creature can make satisfaction for the whole human race.
5. Likewise, we are obligated to God no less for the benefit of re-creation than for the benefit of creation: if therefore a mere creature had redeemed the human race, we would be as obligated to it as to our Creator: therefore we would be bound to love a creature as much as the Creator. If then it is impossible that we be obligated to thisp423-1; it was impossible for a mere creature to make satisfaction for the whole human race.
### Conclusion. No mere creature could make satisfaction for the whole human race, neither with respect to the injury nor with respect to the damage; nor would it have been fitting that a creature of another kind be assumed by God for this.
I respond: It must be said that satisfaction is wont to be made and required for two things, namely for the injury and for the damage. If therefore God requires satisfaction from the human race; either he requires it for both, or for one of these. If for both, it is plain that it is impossible for any mere creature to make satisfaction to God for the human race, for the reason that the injury which is done to God on account of his most excellent dignity is so grave that no mere creature can recompense anything equal to it. But if he should require satisfaction only for the damage, condoning the injury; not even thus can any mere creature make satisfaction for the whole human race. For either that creature would be a man, or it would not be a man. If it were a man, since one mere man cannot be equivalent to the whole human race, such a man, by offering himself to God, would never recompense the damage which Adam inflicted by corrupting the whole human race. If it were a non-man; not even thus could it yet recompense the damage, if it were a mere creature; or if it could, it would still not make satisfaction, because satisfaction belongs to that kind to which the transgression belongedp423-2. Or if it could do this, it still would not be fitting, because it would not restore human nature to its former state; for it would by this be made subject to another kind of creature.
And from this it is held that not only could a mere creature not make satisfaction to God, if it were of another kind, but also, even if it were assumed by God, it would not be fitting that it make satisfaction for the human race. — And therefore, since a mere creature could not make satisfaction for the whole human race, nor would it be fitting that a creature of another kind be assumed for this; it was necessary that the person of the one making satisfaction be God and manp423-3. — Therefore the reasons showing that no mere creature could make satisfaction for the whole human race must be granted.
To the arguments for the affirmative side:
Ad 1. To that which is objected first to the contrary, that a mere creature was able to infect the whole human race; it must be said that it is not similar: because some mere creature was able to be the principle of the whole human race according to carnal propagation, through which the human race is corrupted and infected; but no mere creature was able to be the principle of the whole human race according to spiritual regenerationp423-4.
Ad 2. To that which is objected, that no more is required in a just penalty than was committed in the fault; it must be said that the fault is aggravated not only on the part of the condition of the one sinningp423-5, but also on the part of him against whom the sin is committed; and although the one sinning was a mere creature, yet he against whom he sinned was the Creator. Therefore, when it is required that the one making satisfaction not be a mere creature, this is not beyond that which was committed in the fault; for it is necessary that the person making satisfaction make satisfaction for the gravity of the sin according to all the conditions according to which it has to be aggravated.
Ad 3. To that which is objected, that the devil justly lost the human race, because he stretched out his hand against one over whom he had no right; it must be said that in this is not expressed the sufficient ground of satisfaction, but the mode of conquering the devil. And it is quite true that some mere innocent creature could have conquered the devilp423-6; but nevertheless from this it does not follow that it could make satisfaction to God. For it is far more to recompense to God the injury done than to conquer the devil's fraud.
Ad 4. To that which is objected, that God weighs the soul of a just manp423-7 more than the souls of innumerable sinners; it must be said that God in satisfaction does not seek recompense for the human race according as it is in the state of sin, but according as it would have been if it had not sinned; and in this manner God does not value the life of any mere man as much as the whole human generation.
Ad 5. To that which is asked, if Christ had been a mere creature, whether dying he would have entered into heaven; it must be said that he would; yet from this it does not follow thatp423-8 he would have merited the opening of the gate, because heaven had never been closed to him, on this supposition, that he had no guilt of original sin. But the others, who had the guilt of original sin, on account of this would not have been led into heaven; and so the gate would still have remained closed, for the reason that no sufficient satisfaction had been paid.
I. In this and the following (4th) question St. Bonaventure, with Alexander of Hales and Richard, follows St. Anselm's mode of speaking, whose arguments Scotus (here, the single question, n. 3 ff.) strives to restrict or overthrow; who moreover contends that a mere man — i.e. one not hypostatically united to God, but filled with the fullness of grace — could have made satisfaction for the human race, and indeed condignly. Yet Scotus speaks explicitly not of the ordinary power, which regards the laws and decrees established in the present providence, but of the absolute power, by which, according to him, God can do whatever does not imply a contradiction in itself. In agreement, therefore, the doctors hold that, according to the present divine disposition, the incarnation was necessary, supposing that God willed to have a perfect satisfaction (condign), or one that is to the equality of justice. Speaking of the absolute power, a distinction is commonly made between an imperfect satisfaction, which, although it is not condign, is nevertheless accepted by him to whom it is due (cf. here q. 4), and a perfect or condign satisfaction. With respect to imperfect satisfaction it is readily granted that a creature, with God's help, can render it, and that God, if he willed, could accept it as sufficient for himself. But that the same could also be accepted as perfect and condign, Scotus, Durandus, and the Nominalists teach, the school of St. Thomas and many others resisting.
St. Bonaventure, in solving this question, does not speak of the absolute power of God, but argues from principles which are settled in the present providence. Brulifer has already observed this (on this question), whence he concludes that St. Bonaventure does not contradict Scotus. This interpretation is confirmed below in question 6, where at the end the author says that he wishes to determine nothing concerning a redemption possible in another way, namely « because it is rash, when divine power is treated of, to fix a limit ». — Nevertheless the author here says many things which are not approved by Scotus (cf. also IV. Sent. d. 13. p. I. q. I. ff.).
II. In the 2nd fundamentum the argument proceeds from a certain infinite gravity and malice of sin, concerning which infinity the schools do not use the same manner of speaking. For very many disciples of St. Thomas defend that sin, in the character of a moral offense, is simply and intrinsically infinite, while Scotus with his followers and many others admits only an objective and extrinsic infinity. But in the very school of St. Thomas there are not lacking those who assert that St. Thomas stands for the second opinion, as Fr. Nicolai O.P., who in his edition of the Commentary of St. Thomas on the Sentences (here a. 2, marginal note) notes: « Where, therefore, is the pretended simple and intrinsic infinity, which, beyond the perpetual and uniform doctrine of St. Thomas, some gratuitously feign and do not hesitate to attribute to him, instead of the merely extrinsic and respective infinity, taken from the object and signified by a diminished term [namely, "a certain (infinity)"], which he acknowledges »? In this latter sense St. Bonaventure also must be understood, since he himself distinguishes a twofold infinite, namely absolutely in itself and in comparison to another (I. Sent. d. 43; q. I, III. Sent. d. 13. a. I. q. 2), and several times, as has already been noted in the scholion on II. Sent. d. 35. a. I. q. 3, attributes infinity to sin in comparison, namely to the divine good infinite in itself. — Another principle which Scotus here urges for his opinion regards the very value of Christ's merit, inasmuch as it depends on the divine acceptance, concerning which cf. below q. 5, scholion.
III. On this 3rd question: Alex. of Hales, Summa p. III. q. I. m. 6. a. 1.2. — Scotus, loc. cit. and Reportata, the single question. — St. Thomas, on this and the following question, here a. 2 and d. I. q. I. a. 2. ad 9; Summa III. q. I. a. 2. ad 2. — B. Albert, on this and the following question, here a. 6. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 3. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, III. Sent. d. 1. q. 1.
IV. Also concerning the following (4th) question Scotus, with his followers and the Nominalists, departs from St. Bonaventure and the other ancient doctors, yet in such a way that he speaks not of the ordinary power of God, but of the absolute. But certain Nominalists, going further, say that satisfaction made by a mere creature and by purely natural powers, from God's extrinsic acceptance, if God willed, could be sufficient. But Scotus (IV. Sent. d. 15. q. I. n. 7) explicitly requires for such satisfaction the aid and state of grace.
On this 4th question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. m. 5. a. I. 2. — Scotus, loc. cit. — Richard, here q. 5.
- Cfr. II. Sent. d. 30. a. I. q. 2.Cf. II. Sent. d. 30. a. I. q. 2.
- Vide supra d. 19. dub. 3.See above, d. 19. dub. 3.
- Cfr. Gen. 18, 24. seqq.Cf. Genesis 18:24 ff.
- Fulgent., II. ad Trasim. c. 2. probat, hominem nec per solum hominem, nec etiam per Angelum potuisse reparari.Fulgentius, II. To Thrasamund c. 2, proves that man could be repaired neither by a mere man, nor even by an Angel.
- Vide Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 21. et II. c. 6.See Anselm, I. Cur Deus homo (Why God Became Man) c. 21, and II. c. 6.
- Hoc arg. insinuatur ab Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 23. et II. c. 1-4. Vide supra pag. 265, nota I. — In maiori pro quantum non pauci codd. quam.This argument is suggested by Anselm, I. Cur Deus homo c. 23, and II. cc. 1–4. See above, p. 265, note I. — In the major premise, for quantum not a few codices read quam.
- Dist. 14. a. 2. q. 2. Cfr. Fulgent., II. ad Trasim. c. 3: Inquirendus ergo fuit unus, cuius esset reformanda munere, informanda lumine, confirmanda virtute, ut aequalitas aeterna iustificaret impiam, instrueret insciam veritas, virtus firmaret invalidam etc. — Mox verbo satisfacere cod. K adiicit Deo.Dist. 14. a. 2. q. 2. Cf. Fulgentius, II. To Thrasamund c. 3: "One therefore had to be sought, by whose gift [the human race] was to be reformed, by whose light informed, by whose strength confirmed, so that the eternal equality might justify the impious, truth might instruct the ignorant, strength might steady the weak," etc. — Presently, at the word satisfacere, codex K adds Deo ("to God").
- Cfr. August., de Quant. animae, c. 34. n. 78, ex quo loco unam sententiam allatam invenis tom. II. pag. 28, nota 6. — Paulo ante pro sibi obligati edd. ei obligati.Cf. Augustine, On the Greatness of the Soul, c. 34. n. 78, from which place you will find one sentence quoted in tom. II. p. 28, note 6. — A little before, for sibi obligati the editions read ei obligati.
- Cfr. supra d. 12. a. 1. q. I, ubi videsis et de seq. ratione, quae ex Anselmo delibata est. — Paulo ante pro aut si posset codd. BDGHLTUVXaa ac [codd. IPQ et edd. 1, 2 at, cod. C et] si posset; deinde pro spectavit cod. U spectat.Cf. above, d. 12. a. 1. q. I, where you may also see concerning the following reason, which is drawn from Anselm. — A little before, for aut si posset codices BDGHLTUVXaa [read] ac [codices IPQ and editions 1, 2 at, codex C et] si posset; then for spectavit codex U [reads] spectat.
- Pulcre Basil., in Ps. 48. n. 3, ad verba illa: Frater non redimit, redimit homo, observat: Neque igitur fratrem in redemptionem quaere, sed aliquem, qui tuam excedat naturam; neque hominem nudum, sed hominem-Deum, Iesum Christum, qui solus pro nobis omnibus dare potest placationem etc.Beautifully Basil, on Psalm 48 n. 3, on those words "A brother does not redeem; a man redeems," observes: "Seek not, therefore, a brother for redemption, but someone who exceeds your nature; not a mere man, but the man-God, Jesus Christ, who alone can give propitiation for us all," etc.
- Cfr. II. Sent. d. 33. a. I. q. 2. — In initio solut. pro pura creatura cod. A aliqua pura creatura. Deinde pro quia aliqua cod. K quia licet aliqua, et paulo inferius pro sed idem cod. K tamen.Cf. II. Sent. d. 33. a. I. q. 2. — At the beginning of the solution, for pura creatura codex A [reads] aliqua pura creatura. Then for quia aliqua codex K [reads] quia licet aliqua, and a little lower for sed the same codex K [reads] tamen.
- Cfr. tom. II. pag. 750, nota 5.Cf. tom. II. p. 750, note 5.
- Edd. potuisset.The editions [read] potuisset ("could have").
- Cod. A accuratius unius iusti.Codex A, more accurately, [reads] unius iusti ("of one just man").
- Edd. subiungunt sic, et mox pro posito substituunt supposito. Paulo ante edd. verbis pura creatura praefigunt sola.The editions add sic, and presently for posito substitute supposito. A little before, the editions prefix sola to the words pura creatura.