Bonaventure

QUAESTIO V.

Utrum Deus debuerit modum satisfaciendi per passionem Christi acceptare.

Quinto quaeritur, utrum Deus debuerit modum satisfaciendi per passionem Christi acceptare. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Debitum mortis nullo modo melius solvitur quam per mortem gratuitam; sed omnes eramus debitores mortis: ergo optime satisfactum est Deo per mortem illius qui non erat debitor mortis^p427-1.

2. Item, nullo modo melius emendatur peccatum, quod commissum est per suavitatem, quam per supplicii acerbitatem: si ergo peccatum humani generis commissum fuit per gustum et suavitatem ligni vetiti, videtur, quod decentissimus modus satisfaciendi fuit per supplicium crucis^p427-2.

3. Item, convenientissimus modus satisfaciendi est per difficultatem pro peccato, quod quis commisit multa facilitate; sed facillimum fuit primo homini abstinere a peccato: ergo difficillimus modus satisfaciendi fuit illi peccato convenientissimus. Sed hoc est sustinendo mala usque ad mortem: ergo et hoc modo satisfecit Christus^p427-3: ergo etc.

4. Item, decentissimus modus satisfaciendi de elatione est per abiectionem et vilificationem; sed nulla maior vilificatio fuit, quam quae fuit in sustinentia opprobrii crucis^p427-4: ergo talis modus satisfaciendi maxime conveniebat nostrae infirmitati: ergo decuit, ipsum a summo medico acceptari.

Sed contra: 1. Maximae crudelitatis est hominem iustissimum morti tradere; sed Christus fuit iustissimus: ergo crudelissimum fuit ex quacumque causa tradere ipsum morti: ergo talis modus satisfaciendi nullatenus debuit a Deo acceptari. Si tu dicas, quod non tradidit ipsum morti; contra hoc est quod dicitur ad Philippenses secundo^p427-5: Factus est obediens usque ad mortem; et in multis aliis locis dicitur illud idem.

2. Item, maximae perversitatis et iniustitiae est damnare innocentem, ut absolvatur nocens; sed nos omnes sicut oves erravimus, ipse vero peccatum non fecit: ergo videtur, quod iniuste fecerit Dominus, cum in eo posuit iniquitates omnium nostrum^p427-6.

3. Item, Deus mortem non fecit nec delectatur in perditione vivorum^p427-7: si ergo Deus delectatur in satisfactione et non delectatur in alicuius morte; non videtur, quod debuerit acceptare mortem Christi pro satisfactione.

4. Item, multo melior est vita Christi, quam esset mors: ergo si mors Christi potuit Deo satisfacere pro nobis, multo magis vita eius debuit satisfacere: ergo magis debuit acceptare vitam ad satisfaciendum quam mortem.

5. Item, non est modus ordinatus satisfaciendi, in quo additur peccatum super peccatum^p427-8; sed Christus occidi non poterat sine gravissimo peccato: ergo inordinatus modus satisfaciendi videtur esse per mortem Christi.

6. Item, gravius fuit peccatum occidentium Christum, quam esset peccatum Adae: ergo si non potuit fieri satisfactio pro peccato Adae, nisi Christus semel moreretur; videtur, quod non potuerit satisfactio fieri pro peccato occidentium Christum, nisi Christus secundo occideretur; pari ratione nec de occisione illa, nisi occideretur tertio, et sic in infinitum: ergo non videtur, quod talis modus satisfaciendi sit completus nec a Deo acceptandus^p427-9.

CONCLUSIO.

Modus nostrae satisfactionis, factae per Christum, fuit congruentissimus et maxime a Deo acceptandus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod modum istum ultra ceteros debuit Deus acceptare, quia nobilissimus est inter omnes, qui possent esse vel excogitari. Fuit enim acceptabilissimus ad placandum Deum, congruentissimus ad curandum morbum, p. 428 efficacissimus ad attrahendum genus humanum, prudentissimus ad expugnandum generis humani inimicum.

Primum quidem fuit acceptabilissimus ad placandum Deum; propter quod dicit Anselmus secundo Cur Deus homo, capitulo undecimo: « Nihil asperius et difficilius potest homo pati ad honorem Dei sponte et non ex debito quam mortem. Et nullatenus magis potest se ipsum dare homo Deo, quam cum se morti tradit ad honorem ipsius ». Et hoc est quod dicitur ad Ephesios quinto^p428-1: Tradidit semetipsum oblationem et hostiam Deo in odorem suavitatis.

Secundo etiam fuit congruentissimus ad curandum morbum. Primus enim homo peccaverat per superbiam et gulam et inobedientiam, sicut dicit Gregorius^p428-2, et in secundo libro fuit ostensum; voluit enim assimilari Deo per scientiae sublimitatem, gustare ligni suavitatem et transgredi praecepti divini limitem. Et quoniam curatio habet fieri per contrarium; ideo modus satisfaciendi congruentissimus fuit per abiectionem, humiliationem et divinae voluntatis impletionem. Et haec omnia satis relucent in ipsa passione; et de his dicit Apostolus ad Philippenses secundo^p428-3: Humiliavit semetipsum, factus obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis.

Tertio autem fuit efficacissimus ad attrahendum genus humanum. His enim solis passio ad salutem valebat, qui mera voluntate per amorem Deo adhaerebant. Non enim decrevit Deus aliter genus humanum salvare nisi libero^p428-4 voluntatis arbitrio; et nullo alio modo, salvo voluntatis arbitrio, Deus hominem magis potuit attrahere ad amorem suum, quam sustinendo pro eo crucis patibulum: propter quod dicitur Ioannis duodecimo^p428-5: Ego, si exaltatus fuero a terra, omnia traham ad me ipsum. Et Hugo, de Arrha sponsae: « Ut ostenderet tibi, quantum te diligeret, non nisi moriendo a morte te liberavit, ut non tantum pietatis impenderet beneficium, verum etiam caritatis monstraret affectum ».

Quarto etiam fuit ad vincendum adversarium prudentissimus. Decebat enim, ut Christus sua prudentia superaret diabolum, sicut diabolus sua astutia decepit hominem primum. Propter quod dicitur Iob vigesimo sexto^p428-6: Prudentia eius percussit superbum; et quadragesimo: Numquid poteris capere leviathan hamo? Propter quod dicitur distinctione praecedenti, capitulo primo: « Venit Redemptor, et victus est deceptor, tetendit illi muscipulam crucem suam, posuit ei quasi escam sanguinem suum ».

Ex his quatuor rationibus satis apparet, quod modus iste satisfaciendi pro nobis fuit congruentissimus et a Deo maxime acceptandus. Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod magnae crudelitatis fuit hominem iustissimum tradere morti; dicendum, quod Deus eum non tradidit infligendo mortem, vel praecipiendo aliis, quod ipsi eum traderent, sed permittendo et voluntatem ipsius acceptando; et ideo nulla fuit in Deo crudelitas, quia non sanguinem Christi sitivit, sed voluntatem eius optimam acceptavit; haec est summa responsionis Anselmi in libro Cur Deus homo^p428-7. Unde si dicatur aliquando Pater eum tradidisse morti, vel voluntate Patris passus esse, et aliquod consimile, modo praemisso intelligendum est: non quia Pater eum coegerit invitum, sed quia suscepit voluntarium et devotum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod impium est damnare innocentem et nocentem absolvere; dicendum, quod illud verum est, si innocens damnatur invitus; sed si innocens velit se offerre et exponere^p428-8 pro salute nocentis, nihil prohibet, quin oblatio eius debeat acceptari. Et isto modo in proposito intelligendum est fuisse, quia Christus non coacte, sed voluntarie pro salute nostra sustinuit passionem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non delectatur in perditione alicuius; dicendum, quod verum est, quod Deus non delectatur in poena, secundum quod est afflictiva et naturae corruptiva; delectatur tamen, et placet sibi optima voluntas, per quam poena sustinetur et ad honorem Dei ordinatur et ad absolutionem hominis rei.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod melior fuit vita Christi quam mors; dicendum, quod absque dubio verum est; tamen non sequitur, quod non magis debuerit satisfacere per mortem quam per vitam^p428-9, duplici ex causa: primum quidem, quia satisfactio debet esse poenalis, et maxima satisfactio maxime poenalis; secundo vero, quia maioris perfectionis est velle mori ad honorem Dei quam velle vivere, et ex maiori caritate procedit et terminos naturae magis excedit; et ideo ratio illa non cogit. p. 429 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est ordinatus modus satisfaciendi, ubi peccatum additur super peccatum; dicendum, quod verum est, quando peccatum additur super peccatum ex parte eius qui debet satisfacere; sic autem non est in proposito. Nam Christus moriendo non peccavit, sed quantum in se fuit, omnia peccata delevit. Et si tu dicas, quod talem modum eligere debuit, in quo nec ipse nec alius peccaret; dicendum, quod illud non oportet. In hoc enim manifestatur summa sapientia Dei, quod scit de malis non tantum elicere bona, verum etiam optima; quod maxime fecit in morte Christi pretiosissima^p429-1.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod gravius fuit peccatum occidentium Christum etc.; dicendum, quod quidquid sit de gravitate, quia de hoc ad praesens non est quaestio^p429-2; tamen esto, quod gravius fuisset, non oportebat propter hoc secundo Christum pati. Nam unica passio Christi non solum sufficiebat ad satisfaciendum pro peccato Adae, sed etiam pro omni peccatorum multitudine. Unde mors Christi ipsis occidentibus valebat, si vellent ad Christum converti; in infinitum enim fuit maius meritum Christi patientis, quam esset delictum Iudae tradentis, Iudaei instigantis et gentilis crucifigentis, secundum quod Christus plus habebat de bonitate, quam illi haberent de malitia. Praeterea, sicut dicit Anselmus^p429-3, excusabat eos ignorantia aliquo modo, sicut dictum est supra; et ideo non oportebat, pro peccatis eorum Christum iterum pati, sed, sicut dicit Apostolus ad Hebraeos decimo^p429-4: una oblatione consummavit in sempiternum sanctificatos.

SCHOLION.

I. Haec quaestio proprie agit de congruentia modi, quo Christus patiendo pro nobis satisfecit; simul autem, praesertim in solut. ad 6, tangitur controversia de valore eiusdem satisfactionis, quae procul dubio fuit non tantum sufficiens, copiosa et condigna, sed etiam superabundans. Sed hoc supposito, adhuc circa tria inter posteriores Scholasticos agitabantur controversiae, quas breviter referre iuvat, ut melius perspiciatur doctrina seraphici Doctoris de Christi gratia (supra d. 13.), de merito (d. 18.) et de satisfactione (hac d. 20.). Dissensus igitur circa valorem satisfactionis Christi (et similiter iudicandum de merito) erat in his: 1. Utrum et quomodo iste valor dependeat ab acceptatione Dei. 2. Utrum et qua ratione sit infinitus. 3. Utrum satisfactio Christi sit secundum rigorem iustitiae commutativae. Ex eadem autem radice illa triplex opinionum differentia ortum habuit. p. 430 II. Respectu 1. quaestionis Nominales et plurimi Scotistae docebant, valorem operum satisfactoriorum dependere solummodo ab acceptatione Dei. Nominales enim generatim proclamabant hoc principium: « Meritum quodcumque tantum et pro tantis potest acceptari passive, quantum et pro quantis vult tota Trinitas active » (ita Gabriel Biel, III. Sent. d. 19. nota 3.). Alii pauci volebant, talem acceptationem nihil conferre ad rationem satisfactionis. Communior autem sententia, media via incedens, tenet, acceptationem hanc non quidem ad essentiam meriti et satisfactionis requiri, sed ad eius complementum, quatenus scilicet in ipsa importetur quaedam obligatio iustitiae, quae sane nullatenus ex parte Dei retribuentis concipi potest, nisi supposita spontanea ipsius promissione. Licet autem Scoto communiter et etiam a discipulis ipsius opinio Nominalium imposita sit; tamen alii eiusdem scholae, ut Mastrius, Hauzeur, Frassenius, Henno, rectius quaedam ipsius verba aequivoca ex aliis locis interpretantur (cfr. III. Sent. d. 19. n. 9.), mentemque eius esse dicunt, quod haec satisfactio antecedenter ad acceptationem divinam iam ex se sit condigna in actu primo, tamen ex acceptatione Dei, ad debitum remittendum promissione se obligantis, fiat condigna in actu secundo. De hac Scoti interpretatione discipulus S. Thomae, Gotti (Theol. scholastico-dogmat. t. III. tr. 1. q. 3. dub. 4. § 3. n. 17.), dicit: « Haec si ita sunt, facile cum Scoto et Scotistis conveniemus ».

S. Bonaventuram communiori sententiae suffragari, colligitur ex eo quod generatim de merito condigni et de acceptatione Dei docet II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 3, et d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. seqq. (cfr. etiam IV. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. in corp.), ubi duplicem distinguit acceptationem divinam, quarum altera (habitualis et intrinseca) fundatur in ipsa gratia adoptionis, dignificante operantem eiusque opus, altera vero (quasi extrinseca) ex promissione divina oritur, et ipsa cadit super ipsum actum meritorium. Haec doctrina quoad substantiam applicari potest etiam ad meritum et satisfactionem Christi respectu utriusque acceptationis. Attamen observandum est, magnopere differre acceptationem in utroque casu. Nam fundamentum acceptationis operum a pura creatura factorum est gratia adoptionis, quae est in persona extranea; in Christo autem est gratia unionis hypostaticae, et ipse etiam ut hic homo est Filius Dei naturalis, verus Deus et accepto Deo minime extraneus (cfr. supra d. 10. a. 2. q. 1. et scholion). Ipsa igitur unio hypostatica eminentissimo modo iam continet acceptationem satisfactionis perfectissimam.

III. Quoad 2. controversiam Ss. Patres et quaedam decreta Sum. Pontificum (cfr. Constitut. Unigenitus Clementis VI.) satisfactionem Christi praedicant esse infinitam. Hoc Nominales volunt ita explicare, ut meritum Christi secundum se sit finitum simpliciter, acceptum tamen a Deo ut sufficiens pro infinitis Adae filiis, si futuri essent. Similiter Scotistae solent dicere, hoc meritum non fuisse formaliter et intrinsecus infinitum, sed secundum quid et extrinsecus, tum ob sanctitatem personae divinae, tum ob acceptationem divinam. Sed discipuli S. Thomae cum plurimis aliis dicunt, illud fuisse simpliciter et intrinsecus infinitum. Hoc autem intelligunt non respectu entitatis physicae operum meritoriorum, quae procul dubio est creata et finita, nec secundum actuum bonitatem specificam et essentialem, quam sumunt ex obiecto, sed respectu valoris in genere moris, quatenus in se ipsis et intrinsecus infinite dignificantur a persona Verbi. Licet enim actiones meritoriae procedant immediate ab humana Christi natura, ut est principium quo; haec tamen non extrinsecus, sed intrinsecus unita est cum persona infinita, cui, ut est principium quod, actiones illae tribuuntur et a qua intrinsecus contrahunt valorem infinitum. Revera non est paritas, ut quidam dicunt, inter infinitatem obiecticam et extrinsecam, quae communiter tribuitur peccato mortali ratione relationis ad obiectum, contra quod offendit (quod certo est actioni extrinsecum), et infinitatem, de qua sermo est, cum relatio humanae Christi naturae eiusque operationis ad personam Christi sit prorsus singularis et penitus differat ab illa, qua actio peccaminosa refertur ad sive potius contra Deum.

IV. Tertia controversia, quae est de quaestione, utrum Christus secundum totum rigorem iustitiae commutativae satisfecerit, quod Nominales, Scotistae aliique negant, affirmantibus Thomistis cum non paucis, in se minoris est momenti quam praecedentes, cum supponatur ab omnibus, rationem iustitiae commutativae ad Deum non applicari nisi secundum analogiam. Unde in hac controversia incidit aliquatenus lis circa nomen. Facile tamen conceditur, quod haec satisfactio large dici possit rigorosa, licet ei non conveniant in stricto sensu omnes conditiones, quae inter homines in actibus iustitiae commutativae requiruntur ad talem rigorem. In hac re controversa bene conveniunt verba S. Bonaventurae cum doctrina S. Thomae, et etiam sententiam eius ab eadem non discrepare, nobis persuasum est, quidquid dicat Barth. de Barberiis (Cursus theolog. p. III. disp. 10. q. 7.), qui S. Bonav. ad opinionem Scotistarum trahere nititur. Nam S. Doctor non tantum pluries meritum Christi dicit esse infinitum (cfr. hic ad 6, q. 6. ad 4.), sed etiam hanc infinitatem semper repetit ab infinita dignitate personae Verbi (cfr. supra d. 13. a. 1. q. 2, praesertim ad 3.); sed posito, quod dignitas personae operantis concurrat ad dandum valorem operi, et quod maior dignitas det maiorem valorem; sane infinita dignitas etiam valorem augere debet in infinitum. Loci autem, quos urget praefatus auctor in contrarium, loquuntur tantum de gratia creata Christi in se, et de actibus meritoriis Christi secundum eorum physicam, vel specificam entitatem. Eandem sententiam tenet Alex. Hal., cum cuilibet actioni, etiam uni guttae sanguinis Christi, ob dignitatem personae tribuit sufficientiam ad omnem satisfactionem (S. p. III. q. 18. m. 3. a. 2. ad 3, cfr. q. 17. m. 3.). Etiam in schola Scoti sunt nonnulli, ut Hauzeur et Vulpes, qui Scoto diversam, ac ipsius verba sonant, mentem attribuunt, adductis aliis ipsius testimoniis. Praesertim Hauzeur (Collatio totius theologiae etc. t. II. q. 12. col. 378 seqq.), secutus cl. nostrum Vega (VII. de Iustificat. c. 7-10.), inter alios locos profert hoc principium Scoti (III. Sent. d. 13. ad 2. quaest. n. 9.): « In commendando Christum malo excedere quam deficere a laude sibi debita, si propter ignorantiam oporteat in alterum incidere ». Tandem Hauzeur concludit, respiciendum potius « ad illam eius intentionem, quam serpere per eius sensum litteralem ». Idem auctor (loc. cit. col. 376) bene observat, quod passio Christi, qua se ipsum, scilicet proprium corpus et sanguinem, animam et vitam personae divinae in sacrificium Deo obtulit, infiniti valoris sit « duplici titulo: offerentis et oblati infiniti; qualibet alia actione solo titulo agentis infiniti. Nec offerebat haec ut finita et seorsim, sed coniunctim cum persona infinita » etc.

V. Praeter locos citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 18. m. 4. a. 1. § 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic a. 4; S. III. q. 46. a. 1. 3, q. 50. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 46. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.

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Question V. Whether God ought to have accepted the mode of satisfaction made through the passion of Christ.

Fifthly it is asked, whether God ought to have accepted the mode of satisfaction made through the passion of Christ. And that he ought, it seems.

1. The debt of death is in no way better discharged than through a freely-undertaken death; but we were all debtors of death: therefore satisfaction was best made to God through the death of him who was not a debtor of death^p427-1.

2. Likewise, in no way is a sin better made amends for, which was committed through pleasantness, than through the harshness of punishment: if therefore the sin of the human race was committed through the taste and pleasantness of the forbidden tree, it seems that the most fitting mode of satisfaction was through the punishment of the cross^p427-2.

3. Likewise, the most suitable mode of satisfaction is through difficulty for a sin which one committed with much ease; but it was most easy for the first man to abstain from sin: therefore the most difficult mode of satisfaction was the most suitable for that sin. But this is by enduring evils even unto death: therefore in this way too Christ made satisfaction^p427-3: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the most fitting mode of satisfaction for pride is through abasement and humiliation; but there was no greater humiliation than that which was in the bearing of the reproach of the cross^p427-4: therefore such a mode of satisfaction was most suited to our infirmity: therefore it was fitting that it be accepted by the supreme physician.

On the contrary: 1. It is of the greatest cruelty to hand over a most just man to death; but Christ was most just: therefore it was most cruel to hand him over to death for any cause whatever: therefore such a mode of satisfaction ought in no way to have been accepted by God. If you say that he did not hand him over to death; on the contrary there is what is said to the Philippians, chapter two^p427-5: He became obedient even unto death; and in many other places the same thing is said.

2. Likewise, it is of the greatest perversity and injustice to condemn the innocent in order that the guilty be absolved; but we all like sheep have gone astray, while he did no sin: therefore it seems that the Lord acted unjustly, when he laid on him the iniquities of us all^p427-6.

3. Likewise, God made not death, neither delighteth in the destruction of the living^p427-7: if therefore God delights in satisfaction and does not delight in anyone's death, it does not seem that he ought to have accepted the death of Christ for satisfaction.

4. Likewise, the life of Christ was much better than his death would be: therefore if the death of Christ could satisfy God for us, much more ought his life to satisfy: therefore he ought rather to have accepted his life for making satisfaction than his death.

5. Likewise, that is not an ordered mode of satisfaction in which sin is added upon sin^p427-8; but Christ could not be slain without a most grave sin: therefore the mode of satisfaction through the death of Christ seems disordered.

6. Likewise, the sin of those killing Christ was graver than the sin of Adam would be: therefore if satisfaction for the sin of Adam could not be made unless Christ died once, it seems that satisfaction could not be made for the sin of those killing Christ unless Christ were killed a second time; by parity of reasoning, nor for that killing unless he were killed a third time, and so on to infinity: therefore it does not seem that such a mode of satisfaction is complete, nor to be accepted by God^p427-9.

Conclusion.

The mode of our satisfaction, made through Christ, was most suitable and most to be accepted by God.

I respond: It must be said that God ought to have accepted this mode beyond all others, because it is the noblest among all that could be or be devised. For it was most acceptable for appeasing God, most suitable for curing the disease, most efficacious for drawing the human race, most prudent for vanquishing the enemy of the human race.

First, indeed, it was most acceptable for appeasing God; on account of which Anselm says in the second book of Cur Deus homo, chapter eleven: « Nothing harsher and more difficult can a man suffer for the honor of God, of his own accord and not out of debt, than death. And in no way can a man give himself more to God than when he hands himself over to death for his honor ». And this is what is said to the Ephesians, chapter five^p428-1: He delivered himself an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness.

Secondly, too, it was most suitable for curing the disease. For the first man had sinned through pride and gluttony and disobedience, as Gregory says^p428-2, and it was shown in the second book; for he willed to be made like to God through the sublimity of knowledge, to taste the pleasantness of the tree, and to transgress the limit of the divine precept. And since healing must be done through the contrary, therefore the most suitable mode of satisfaction was through abasement, humiliation, and the fulfillment of the divine will. And all these things shine forth sufficiently in the passion itself; and of these the Apostle says to the Philippians, chapter two^p428-3: He humbled himself, becoming obedient even unto death, even the death of the cross.

Thirdly, moreover, it was most efficacious for drawing the human race. For the passion availed unto salvation only for those who clung to God by a pure will through love. For God decreed to save the human race in no other way than by the free^p428-4 choice of the will; and in no other way, the choice of the will being preserved, could God more draw man to his love than by enduring for him the gibbet of the cross: on account of which it is said in John, chapter twelve^p428-5: I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all things to myself. And Hugh, On the Pledge of the Bride: « To show you how much he loved you, he freed you from death only by dying, that he might not only bestow the benefit of compassion, but might also show the affection of charity ».

Fourthly, too, it was most prudent for conquering the adversary. For it was fitting that Christ should overcome the devil by his prudence, just as the devil by his cunning deceived the first man. On account of which it is said in Job, chapter twenty-six^p428-6: His prudence has struck the proud one; and in chapter forty: Canst thou take leviathan with a hook? On account of which it is said in the preceding distinction, chapter one: « The Redeemer came, and the deceiver was conquered; he stretched out for him as a snare his cross, he set before him as a bait his blood ».

From these four reasons it appears sufficiently that this mode of satisfaction for us was most suitable and most to be accepted by God. And the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is first objected on the contrary, that it was of great cruelty to hand over a most just man to death; it must be said that God did not hand him over by inflicting death, or by commanding others that they should hand him over, but by permitting and by accepting his will; and therefore there was no cruelty in God, because he did not thirst for the blood of Christ, but accepted his most excellent will; this is the sum of Anselm's response in the book Cur Deus homo^p428-7. Whence if it is sometimes said that the Father handed him over to death, or that he suffered by the will of the Father, or anything similar, it must be understood in the aforesaid manner: not that the Father compelled him unwilling, but that he received him as willing and devoted.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that it is impious to condemn the innocent and to absolve the guilty; it must be said that this is true if the innocent one is condemned unwilling; but if the innocent one is willing to offer and expose^p428-8 himself for the salvation of the guilty, nothing prevents his oblation from deserving to be accepted. And in this way it must be understood to have been in the matter at hand, because Christ endured the passion not by compulsion, but voluntarily, for our salvation.

3. To that which is objected, that God does not delight in anyone's destruction; it must be said that it is true that God does not delight in punishment, insofar as it is afflictive and corruptive of nature; nevertheless he delights, and the most excellent will pleases him, through which the punishment is endured and is ordered to the honor of God and to the absolution of the guilty man.

4. To that which is objected, that the life of Christ was better than his death; it must be said that without doubt it is true; yet it does not follow that he ought not rather to have made satisfaction through death than through life^p428-9, for two reasons: first indeed, because satisfaction ought to be penal, and the greatest satisfaction most penal; secondly, because it is of greater perfection to will to die for the honor of God than to will to live, and it proceeds from greater charity and exceeds the limits of nature more; and therefore that reason does not compel.

5. To that which is objected, that it is not an ordered mode of satisfaction where sin is added upon sin; it must be said that it is true, when sin is added upon sin on the part of him who ought to make satisfaction; but it is not so in the matter at hand. For Christ in dying did not sin, but as far as in him lay, he wiped out all sins. And if you say that he ought to have chosen such a mode in which neither he himself nor another would sin; it must be said that this is not necessary. For in this is manifested the supreme wisdom of God, that he knows how to draw from evils not only goods, but even the best; which he did most of all in the most precious death of Christ^p429-1.

6. To that which is objected last, that the sin of those killing Christ was graver etc.; it must be said that, whatever may be the case as to the gravity—since concerning this there is at present no question^p429-2—nevertheless, granted that it had been graver, it was not necessary on this account for Christ to suffer a second time. For the single passion of Christ not only sufficed to make satisfaction for the sin of Adam, but also for the whole multitude of sins. Whence the death of Christ availed for those very ones killing him, if they were willing to be converted to Christ; for the merit of the suffering Christ was infinitely greater than the offense of the betraying Judas, the inciting Jew, and the crucifying gentile would be, inasmuch as Christ had more of goodness than they would have of malice. Moreover, as Anselm says^p429-3, ignorance excused them in some way, as was said above; and therefore it was not necessary for Christ to suffer again for their sins, but, as the Apostle says to the Hebrews, chapter ten^p429-4: by one oblation he has perfected forever them that are sanctified.

Scholion.

I. This question properly treats of the suitability of the mode by which Christ, suffering for us, made satisfaction; but at the same time, especially in the solution to the sixth objection, there is touched the controversy over the value of that satisfaction, which without doubt was not only sufficient, copious, and condign, but even superabundant. But this being supposed, there were still agitated among the later Scholastics, concerning three points, controversies which it is helpful to refer to briefly, so that the doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor concerning Christ's grace (above, d. 13.), his merit (d. 18.), and his satisfaction (in this d. 20.) may be better perceived. The disagreement, then, concerning the value of the satisfaction of Christ (and the same is to be judged concerning his merit) was on these points: 1. Whether and how this value depends on the acceptation of God. 2. Whether and by what account it is infinite. 3. Whether the satisfaction of Christ is according to the rigor of commutative justice. And from the same root that threefold difference of opinions took its origin.

II. With respect to the first question, the Nominalists and most Scotists taught that the value of satisfactory works depends solely on the acceptation of God. For the Nominalists generally proclaimed this principle: « Any merit can be accepted passively for as much and for as many as the whole Trinity wills actively » (so Gabriel Biel, III. Sent. d. 19. note 3.). A few others held that such acceptation contributes nothing to the account of satisfaction. But the more common opinion, proceeding by a middle way, holds that this acceptation is required not indeed for the essence of merit and satisfaction, but for its complement, inasmuch namely as in it is implied a certain obligation of justice, which surely can in no way be conceived on the part of God who rewards, except on the supposition of his own spontaneous promise. But although the opinion of the Nominalists is commonly imposed on Scotus and even by his own disciples; nevertheless others of the same school, such as Mastrius, Hauzeur, Frassenius, Henno, more rightly interpret certain of his equivocal words from other places (cfr. III. Sent. d. 19. n. 9.), and say that his mind is that this satisfaction, antecedently to the divine acceptation, is already of itself condign in first act, yet from the acceptation of God, who by his promise binds himself to remit the debt, becomes condign in second act. Concerning this interpretation of Scotus, the disciple of St. Thomas, Gotti (Theol. scholastico-dogmat. t. III. tr. 1. q. 3. dub. 4. § 3. n. 17.), says: « If these things are so, we shall easily agree with Scotus and the Scotists ».

That St. Bonaventure favors the more common opinion is gathered from what he generally teaches concerning condign merit and the acceptation of God in II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 3, and d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. and following (cfr. also IV. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. in the body), where he distinguishes a twofold divine acceptation, of which the one (habitual and intrinsic) is founded in the very grace of adoption, which dignifies the one who works and his work, while the other (as it were extrinsic) arises from the divine promise, and itself falls upon the meritorious act itself. This doctrine can, as to its substance, be applied also to the merit and satisfaction of Christ with respect to each acceptation. Yet it must be observed that the acceptation differs greatly in each case. For the foundation of the acceptation of works done by a pure creature is the grace of adoption, which is in an extraneous person; but in Christ it is the grace of the hypostatic union, and he himself, even as this man, is the natural Son of God, true God, and to the accepting God not at all extraneous (cfr. above, d. 10. a. 2. q. 1. and the scholion). The hypostatic union itself, therefore, in a most eminent manner already contains the most perfect acceptation of the satisfaction.

III. As to the second controversy, the holy Fathers and certain decrees of the supreme Pontiffs (cfr. the Constitution Unigenitus of Clement VI.) proclaim the satisfaction of Christ to be infinite. The Nominalists wish to explain this in such a way that the merit of Christ in itself is finite simply, yet accepted by God as sufficient for infinite sons of Adam, if there were to be such. Similarly the Scotists are accustomed to say that this merit was not formally and intrinsically infinite, but in a certain respect and extrinsically, both on account of the holiness of the divine person and on account of the divine acceptation. But the disciples of St. Thomas with very many others say that it was simply and intrinsically infinite. This, however, they understand not with respect to the physical entity of the meritorious works, which without doubt is created and finite, nor according to the specific and essential goodness of the acts, which they take from the object, but with respect to the value in the genus of morals, inasmuch as in themselves and intrinsically they are infinitely dignified by the person of the Word. For although the meritorious actions proceed immediately from the human nature of Christ, as it is the principle by which; this nature nevertheless is united not extrinsically but intrinsically with the infinite person, to whom, as it is the principle which, those actions are attributed and from whom they intrinsically draw infinite value. Truly there is no parity, as some say, between the objective and extrinsic infinity, which is commonly attributed to mortal sin by reason of its relation to the object against which it offends (which is certainly extrinsic to the action), and the infinity of which the discourse is, since the relation of Christ's human nature and of his operation to the person of Christ is altogether singular and utterly differs from that by which a sinful action is referred to, or rather against, God.

IV. The third controversy, which concerns the question whether Christ made satisfaction according to the whole rigor of commutative justice, which the Nominalists, Scotists, and others deny, while the Thomists with not a few affirm it, is in itself of less moment than the preceding, since it is supposed by all that the account of commutative justice is not applied to God except according to analogy. Whence in this controversy there arises in some measure a dispute about a word. Yet it is easily conceded that this satisfaction can broadly be called rigorous, although there do not belong to it in the strict sense all the conditions which among men are required in acts of commutative justice for such rigor. In this controverted matter the words of St. Bonaventure agree well with the doctrine of St. Thomas, and we are persuaded that his opinion does not diverge from it, whatever Barth. de Barberiis (Cursus theolog. p. III. disp. 10. q. 7.) may say, who strives to draw St. Bonaventure to the opinion of the Scotists. For the holy Doctor not only several times says that the merit of Christ is infinite (cfr. here ad 6, q. 6. ad 4.), but also always traces back this infinity to the infinite dignity of the person of the Word (cfr. above, d. 13. a. 1. q. 2, especially ad 3.); but granted that the dignity of the person who works concurs to give value to the work, and that greater dignity gives greater value; surely infinite dignity must also increase the value to infinity. But the passages which the aforesaid author urges to the contrary speak only of the created grace of Christ in itself, and of the meritorious acts of Christ according to their physical or specific entity. Alexander of Hales holds the same opinion, when he attributes to any action, even to a single drop of Christ's blood, on account of the dignity of the person, sufficiency for all satisfaction (S. p. III. q. 18. m. 3. a. 2. ad 3, cfr. q. 17. m. 3.). Even in the school of Scotus there are some, such as Hauzeur and Vulpes, who attribute to Scotus a mind different from what his words sound, adducing other testimonies of his. Especially Hauzeur (Collatio totius theologiae etc. t. II. q. 12. col. 378 and following), following our distinguished Vega (VII. de Iustificat. c. 7-10.), among other passages brings forward this principle of Scotus (III. Sent. d. 13. ad 2. quaest. n. 9.): « In commending Christ I prefer to exceed rather than to fall short of the praise due to him, if on account of ignorance one must fall into one or the other ». Finally Hauzeur concludes that one should look rather « to that intention of his, which creeps through his literal sense ». The same author (loc. cit. col. 376) well observes that the passion of Christ, by which he offered himself, namely his own body and blood, his soul and life of the divine person, in sacrifice to God, is of infinite value « by a twofold title: of the offerer and of the offered, both infinite; whereas any other action is so only by the title of the agent who is infinite. Nor did he offer these things as finite and separately, but conjointly with the infinite person » etc.

V. Besides the passages cited: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 18. m. 4. a. 1. § 1. 2. — S. Thom., here a. 4; S. III. q. 46. a. 1. 3, q. 50. a. 1. — B. Albert., here a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., here a. 46. — Richard. a Med., here q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following question, here q. 1.

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