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Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 33

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio IV. Utrum virtutes cardinales debeant esse tantum quatuor, an plures.

Quarto quaeritur de virtutibus cardinalibus quantum ad numerum, et est quaestio, utrum tantum debeant esse quatuor, an plures vel pauciores. Et quod tantum sint quatuor, videtur:

1. Per illud quod dicitur Sapientiae octavo1, quod sapientia docet sobrietatem, prudentiam, iustitiam et fortitudinem: si ergo nominat virtutes cardinales sufficienter, videtur, quod sint quatuor, et non plures nec pauciores.

2. Item, hoc ipsum probatur per Glossam, Genesis secundo2, ubi dicitur, quod fluvius, qui egrediebatur de paradiso, dividebatur in quatuor capita; ibi dicit Glossa, quod per illa quatuor capita intelliguntur « quatuor virtutes cardinales ».

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per Augustinum, qui in libro de Moribus Ecclesiae3 dicit, affectum virtutis esse quadripartitum; sed constat, quod hoc non potest intelligi nisi de cardinalibus: ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per Philosophum4 et per alios tractatores, qui de hac materia loquuntur, quae omnes virtutes consuetudinales et politicas reducunt ad numerum quaternarium.

Sed contra: 1. Virtutes theologicae sunt tres propter trinitatem obiectorum et potentiarum; sed in eisdem potentiis sunt virtutes cardinales et theologicae, licet secundum aliam et aliam comparationem5: ergo videtur, quod sint tantum tres.

2. Item, virtus, quae ordinat ad alterum, est tantum una, videlicet iustitia ad proximum6: ergo videtur, quod una sit tantum virtus, per quam homo ordinatur ad se ipsum; aut si tres sunt virtutes, per quas ordinatur in se, videtur, quod tres sint, per quas ordinetur homo ad proximum, ita quod non tantum sint quatuor, sed etiam se extendant usque ad numerum senarium.

3. Item, super illud Matthaei decimo quinto7: Erant qui manducaverunt quasi quatuor millia hominum; Glossa: « Per prudentiam est cognitio rerum appetendarum et vitandarum; secunda est refrenatio cupiditatis ab his quae temporaliter delectant; tertia est firmitas contra molestias saeculi; quarta vero, quae per omnes diffunditur, est dilectio Dei et proximi »: si ergo dilectio Dei et proximi ponitur una inter cardinales virtutes, videtur, quod sint plures quam quatuor.

4. Item, humilitas, patientia et obedientia sunt magnae virtutes, nec tamen sunt aliqua praedictarum nec videntur theologicae8: ergo videtur, quod cardinalis virtus non sufficienter dividatur per quatuor membra.

Est ergo quaestio de praedictarum virtutum cardinalium numero et sufficientia. [quaestio connexa]

Conclusio.

Numerus et sufficientia virtutum cardinalium consistit in quaternario.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio numerus et sufficientia virtutum cardinalium consistit in quaternario. — Huius autem numeri ratio et sufficientia assignatur multis modis, qui, etsi per omnia non sint rationabiles, tamen conficiunt unum modum dicendi rationabilem et sufficientem. Possunt autem hi modi dicendi ad quatuor reduci secundum quadruplicem comparationem ipsius cardinalis virtutis,

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videlicet ad proprium subiectum, ad actum intrinsecum, ad suum oppositum et ad proprium obiectum.

Primus igitur modus sumendi est penes diversitatem subiectorum. Subiecta enim proxima et immediata ipsarum virtutum sunt potentiae animae, sive vires, quae sunt tres, videlicet rationalis, concupiscibilis et irascibilis, ita quod fortitudo est in irascibili, temperantia est in concupiscibili, sed iustitia et prudentia sunt in rationali, secundum quod dupliciter habet ad alias vires comparari: vel in ratione consiliantis, et sic est prudentia; vel in ratione sententiantis, et sic est iustitia; sive secundum quod habet considerari in se, et sic perficitur habitu prudentiae; vel secundum quod habet alias regere et ordinare9, et sic perficitur habitu iustitiae.

Secundus autem modus sumendi sufficientiam virtutum attenditur secundum diversitatem actuum intrinsecorum. Tres enim sunt actus, qui necessario concurrunt ad virtutem, videlicet « scire, velle et impermutabiliter operari10 ». Scire autem, quid sit agendum, est ipsius prudentiae; velle vero bonum est ipsius iustitiae; impermutabiliter vero operari est temperantiae et fortitudinis, sed temperantiae in prosperis, fortitudinis in adversis.

Tertius vero modus sumendi attenditur penes comparationem ad opposita, quae sunt quatuor nobis per peccatum inflicta, videlicet ignorantia, concupiscentia, infirmitas et malitia11. Et contra ignorantiam est virtus prudentiae, contra concupiscentiam est virtus temperantiae, contra infirmitatem est virtus fortitudinis, et contra malitiam est virtus iustitiae. Et hic modus dicendi videtur satis rationabilis esse; verumtamen a posteriori sumtus est, quia non virtutes per vitia, sed vitia per virtutum merita distinguuntur12.

Quartus autem modus sumendi est ex parte ipsorum obiectorum, et iste modus sumendi videtur esse rationabilior, quia « habitus per actus, et actus per obiecta diversificari habent13 ». Et hic modus sumendi habet quadruplicari; uno modo sic: nam virtutes aut sunt circa passiones, aut circa actiones14. Si circa passiones; aut illatas, et sic est fortitudo; aut innatas, et sic est temperantia. Si circa actiones; aut circa actiones intrinsecas, quae quidem consistunt in eligendo, et sic est prudentia; aut circa extrinsecas, quae quidem consistunt in exsequendo, et sic est iustitia, ad quam spectat unicuique tribuere iura sua15. — Alio modo potest sumi sic, a parte obiecti, quia virtus aut negotiatur circa malum, aut circa bonum. Si circa malum; aut est innatum, et sic est temperantia; aut illatum, et sic est fortitudo. Si circa bonum; aut ratione16 utilis et expedientis, et sic est prudentia; aut ratione honesti et laudabilis, et sic est iustitia. — Alio vero modo sumitur sic: quia virtus cardinalis aut ordinat17 ad proximum, aut ordinat ad se ipsum. Si ad se ipsum; aut in eligendis, et sic est prudentia; aut in respuendis, et sic est temperantia. Si vero ordinat ad proximum; aut hoc est in reddendis, et sic est iustitia; aut in sustinendis, et sic est fortitudo.

Omnes tamen hi modi dicendi aliquam videntur habere calumniam nec usquequaque attingere ad rationem propriam. Et ideo adhuc restat alius modus dicendi, qui respectu praedictorum est septimus et omnibus praedictis videtur esse magis idoneus. Cum enim virtus cardinalis dicatur, quia ordinat hominem circa ea quae sunt ad finem sive circa quid creatum18; cum homo habeat comparari ad se ipsum et ad alterum, virtus cardinalis aut est regulativa actuum hominis respectu sui, aut respectu proximi. Si respectu sui; hoc potest esse tripliciter secundum actum principalem triplicis virtutis, videlicet rationalis, circa quam est prudentia, concupiscibilis, circa quam est temperantia, et irascibilis, circa quam fortitudo consistit. — Si vero ordinet ad alterum, sic est una virtus, quae quidem dicitur iustitia, quia una est ratio, secundum quam ad alterum ordinat, videlicet ratio debiti. Et quia haec ratio potest attendi secundum actum cuiuslibet potentiae; hinc est, quod iustitia cardinalis circuire dicitur omnes vires19, et tamen una est propter unam rationem ordinandi ad alterum. — Et sic patet numerus et sufficientia praedictarum quatuor virtutum.

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Ad obiecta:

Ad 1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod virtutes theologicae sunt tres secundum trinitatem potentiarum etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia virtutum theologicarum est ordinare hominem ad Deum, qui solus est finis omnium bonorum; cardinalium vero est hominem ordinare ad se et ad proximum: et ideo necesse est, plures virtutes reperiri ex parte ista quam ex illa, propter unam comparationis differentiam superadditam, ratione cuius attenditur iustitia.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod iustitia, quae ordinat ad alterum, est tantum una: ergo similiter et aliae virtutes cardinales, quae ordinant hominem ad se ipsum; dicendum, quod non est simile. Et ratio huius est: quia virtutes, quae respiciunt hominem in se, attenduntur penes actus virium principales, qui quoniam diversi sunt, necesse est, illas esse diversas: sed virtus, quae ordinat ad alterum, non sumit20 rationem distinctionis ab actibus principalibus ipsarum virium, pro eo quod per eosdem actus, secundum quos ordinatur homo in se, ordinatur etiam ad proximum: et ideo distinctionem sumit ex ratione comparandi ad alterum. Et quia ratio illa, ut dictum est, unica est; ideo virtus iustitiae, quae est ad alterum ordinativa, habet unitatem; nec ex hoc oportet de aliis similiter concludere, quia non est simile hinc et inde.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praeter has virtutes cardinales Glossa ponit dilectionem Dei et proximi; dicendum, quod ipsa dilectio proximi non ponitur ibi, quia sit virtus cardinalis, sed quia ipsa est, quae maxime adiuvat iustitiam-virtutem, ut affectum nostrum possit respectu proximi recte regulare. Nisi enim quis proximum suum diligat, non est facile, ut ius21 debitum sibi reddat.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de aliis virtutibus, utpote de humilitate, patientia et obedientia; dicendum, quod omnes illae virtutes pro magna parte reduci habent ad istas, sicut ad radicalia principia, in quibus residens est ratio movendi et dirigendi primaria; propter quod etiam cardinales a cardine nuncupantur. Unde patientia ad fortitudinem reducitur et aliae plures, quae sunt ipsius species materiales, secundum quod innuunt tractatores morales22. Humilitas vero et obedientia reduci habent ad ipsam iustitiam. — Et si tu obiicias, quod humilitas non semper ordinat ad alterum, et similiter patientia; responderi potest, quod idem homo sortitur rationem duplicis personae, sicut patet: homo cum accusat se ipsum, idem est accusator et reus; et cum iudicat se ipsum, idem est iudex et condemnatus. Sic intelligendum est in humilitate et patientia et aliis etiam specialibus virtutibus, quae reduci habent ad ipsam iustitiam, secundum quod est virtus cardinalis et specialis. Dicitur tamen omnes vires circuire, quia aliqui habitus, qui ad ipsam reducuntur, spectant ad partem rationalem, sicut veritas; aliqui ad concupiscibilem, sicut largitas; aliqui ad irascibilem, sicut ira per zelum et poenitentia, secundum quod in quarto libro, distinctione decima quarta dicitur. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.

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English Translation

Question IV. Whether the cardinal virtues ought to be only four, or more.

Fourthly there is inquiry concerning the cardinal virtues as regards their number, and the question is whether they ought to be only four, or more or fewer. And that there are only four seems to be the case:

1. By that which is said in Wisdom the eighth chapter1, that wisdom teaches sobriety, prudence, justice, and fortitude: if therefore it names the cardinal virtues sufficiently, it seems that they are four, and not more nor fewer.

2. Likewise, this same thing is proved by the Gloss, on Genesis the second chapter2, where it is said that the river which went out from paradise was divided into four heads; there the Gloss says that by those four heads are understood « the four cardinal virtues ».

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown by Augustine, who in the book On the Morals of the Church3 says that the affection of virtue is fourfold; but it is established that this cannot be understood except of the cardinal virtues: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this same thing is shown by the Philosopher4 and by other treatise-writers who speak on this matter, who reduce all the customary and political virtues to the number four.

On the contrary: 1. The theological virtues are three on account of the trinity of objects and powers; but in the same powers are the cardinal and theological virtues, although according to one comparison and another5: therefore it seems that there are only three.

2. Likewise, the virtue which orders to another is only one, namely justice toward the neighbor6: therefore it seems that there is only one virtue by which man is ordered to himself; or if there are three virtues by which he is ordered to himself, it seems that there are three by which man is ordered to the neighbor, so that there are not only four, but they even extend as far as the number six.

3. Likewise, on that text of Matthew the fifteenth chapter7: There were those who ate, about four thousand men; the Gloss: « Through prudence there is the knowledge of things to be sought and to be avoided; the second is the curbing of cupidity from those things which delight temporally; the third is firmness against the troubles of the world; but the fourth, which is diffused through all, is the love of God and of neighbor »: if therefore the love of God and of neighbor is placed as one among the cardinal virtues, it seems that there are more than four.

4. Likewise, humility, patience, and obedience are great virtues, and yet they are not any of the aforesaid, nor do they seem theological8: therefore it seems that the cardinal virtue is not sufficiently divided by four members.

There is therefore a question concerning the number and sufficiency of the aforesaid cardinal virtues. [a connected question]

Conclusion.

The number and sufficiency of the cardinal virtues consists in the number four.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt the number and sufficiency of the cardinal virtues consists in the number four. — But the ground and sufficiency of this number is assigned in many ways, which, although they are not in all respects reasonable, nevertheless make up one reasonable and sufficient way of speaking. Now these ways of speaking can be reduced to four according to a fourfold comparison of the cardinal virtue itself,

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namely to its proper subject, to its intrinsic act, to its opposite, and to its proper object.

The first way of taking [it], then, is according to the diversity of the subjects. For the proximate and immediate subjects of the virtues themselves are the powers of the soul, or the forces, which are three, namely the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible, such that fortitude is in the irascible, temperance is in the concupiscible, but justice and prudence are in the rational, according as it has to be compared with the other forces in two ways: either in the character of deliberating, and so it is prudence; or in the character of passing sentence, and so it is justice; or according as it has to be considered in itself, and so it is perfected by the habit of prudence; or according as it has to rule and order the others9, and so it is perfected by the habit of justice.

But the second way of taking the sufficiency of the virtues is regarded according to the diversity of the intrinsic acts. For there are three acts which necessarily concur for virtue, namely « to know, to will, and immutably to operate10 ». But to know what is to be done belongs to prudence; to will the good belongs to justice; but immutably to operate belongs to temperance and fortitude, but to temperance in prosperity, to fortitude in adversity.

But the third way of taking [it] is regarded according to the comparison to the opposites, which are four, inflicted on us through sin, namely ignorance, concupiscence, infirmity, and malice11. And against ignorance is the virtue of prudence, against concupiscence is the virtue of temperance, against infirmity is the virtue of fortitude, and against malice is the virtue of justice. And this way of speaking seems to be sufficiently reasonable; nevertheless it is taken a posteriori, since the virtues are not distinguished through the vices, but the vices through the merits of the virtues12.

But the fourth way of taking [it] is from the side of the objects themselves, and this way of taking [it] seems to be more reasonable, because « habits have to be diversified through acts, and acts through objects13 ». And this way of taking [it] has to be fourfold; in one way thus: for virtues are either about the passions or about the actions14. If about the passions; either those inflicted, and so it is fortitude; or those innate, and so it is temperance. If about the actions; either about intrinsic actions, which indeed consist in choosing, and so it is prudence; or about extrinsic [actions], which indeed consist in carrying out, and so it is justice, to which it belongs to render to each one his rights15. — In another way it can be taken thus, from the side of the object, because virtue either deals with evil or with good. If about evil; either it is innate, and so it is temperance; or inflicted, and so it is fortitude. If about good; either by reason16 of the useful and expedient, and so it is prudence; or by reason of the honorable and praiseworthy, and so it is justice. — But in another way it is taken thus: because the cardinal virtue either orders17 to the neighbor or orders to itself. If to itself; either in things to be chosen, and so it is prudence; or in things to be rejected, and so it is temperance. But if it orders to the neighbor; either this is in things to be rendered, and so it is justice; or in things to be endured, and so it is fortitude.

Yet all these ways of speaking seem to have some flaw and not in every respect to attain to the proper ground. And therefore there yet remains another way of speaking, which with respect to the aforesaid is the seventh, and to all the aforesaid seems to be more suitable. For since the cardinal virtue is so called because it orders man about those things which are toward the end, or about something created18; since man has to be compared to himself and to another, the cardinal virtue is either regulative of the acts of man with respect to himself, or with respect to the neighbor. If with respect to himself; this can be in three ways according to the principal act of a threefold virtue, namely the rational, about which is prudence, the concupiscible, about which is temperance, and the irascible, about which fortitude consists. — But if it orders to another, then it is one virtue, which indeed is called justice, because there is one ground according to which it orders to another, namely the ground of what is owed. And because this ground can be regarded according to the act of any power whatever; hence it is that the cardinal justice is said to traverse all the forces19, and yet it is one on account of one ground of ordering to another. — And so the number and sufficiency of the aforesaid four virtues is clear.

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To the objections:

To 1. But to that which is first objected to the contrary, that the theological virtues are three according to the trinity of powers etc.; it must be said that the case is not alike, because it belongs to the theological virtues to order man to God, who alone is the end of all goods; but to the cardinal it belongs to order man to himself and to the neighbor: and therefore it is necessary that more virtues be found on this side than on that, on account of one difference of comparison superadded, by reason of which justice is regarded.

To 2. To that which is objected, that justice, which orders to another, is only one: therefore likewise the other cardinal virtues also, which order man to himself; it must be said that the case is not alike. And the reason of this is: that the virtues which regard man in himself are regarded according to the principal acts of the forces, which, since they are diverse, it is necessary that those [virtues] be diverse: but the virtue which orders to another does not take20 the ground of its distinction from the principal acts of the forces themselves, for the reason that through the same acts, according to which man is ordered in himself, he is also ordered to the neighbor: and therefore it takes its distinction from the ground of comparison to another. And because that ground, as has been said, is single; therefore the virtue of justice, which is ordinative to another, has unity; nor from this is it necessary to conclude likewise about the others, because the case is not alike on this side and that.

To 3. To that which is objected, that besides these cardinal virtues the Gloss places the love of God and of neighbor; it must be said that the love of neighbor itself is not placed there because it is a cardinal virtue, but because it is that which most of all aids the virtue of justice, that it may be able rightly to regulate our affection with respect to the neighbor. For unless one loves his neighbor, it is not easy that he render to him the right21 owed.

To 4. To that which is objected concerning the other virtues, namely concerning humility, patience, and obedience; it must be said that all those virtues for the most part have to be reduced to these, as to radical principles, in which resides the primary ground of moving and directing; on account of which also they are called cardinal, from the hinge [cardo]. Hence patience is reduced to fortitude, and many others, which are its material species, according as the moral treatise-writers indicate22. But humility and obedience have to be reduced to justice itself. — And if you object that humility does not always order to another, and likewise patience; it can be answered that the same man takes on the character of a double person, as is evident: a man, when he accuses himself, is the same accuser and accused; and when he judges himself, is the same judge and condemned. So it is to be understood in humility and patience and other special virtues also, which have to be reduced to justice itself, according as it is a cardinal and special virtue. Yet it is said to traverse all the forces, because certain habits which are reduced to it pertain to the rational part, as truth; certain ones to the concupiscible, as liberality; certain ones to the irascible, as anger through zeal and penitence, according as is said in the fourth book, distinction fourteen. And by this the response to the objections is clear.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 7. Cfr. supra pag. 711, nota 2.
    Verse 7 [Wisd. 8, 7]. Cfr. above, p. 711, note 2.
  2. Vers. 10. — De Glossa, quae est ordinaria, cfr. Ambros., de Paradiso, c. 3. n. 14; August., II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 10. n. 13; XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 21; Gregor., II. Moral. c. 49. n. 76. — Pro probatur per Glossam plurimi codd. de paradiso, qui dividebatur, Glossa.
    Verse 10 [Gen. 2, 10]. — On the Gloss, which is the Ordinary [Gloss], cfr. Ambrose, On Paradise c. 3 n. 14; Augustine, On Genesis against the Manichees II c. 10 n. 13; City of God XIII c. 21; Gregory, Morals II c. 49 n. 76. — For probatur per Glossam very many codices read de paradiso, qui dividebatur, Glossa.
  3. Libr. I. c. 15. n. 25. — Vide supra q. 2. arg. 1. ad oppos.
    Book I c. 15 n. 25. — See above, q. 2, argument 1 to the opposite [side].
  4. Libr. de Virtut. et vitiis, c. 1, et III. Ethic. c. 6. seqq.; Plato, IV. Dialog. de Republ. (ed. Serrani, tom. 2. pag. 427); Cicero, II. Rhetor. c. 53; Macrob., I. In Somnium Scipionis, c. 8. — Paulo inferius pro politicas reducunt Vat. quae... politicae reducuntur. Pro qui codd. BCDW X no ubi, cod. A quia, codd. GLNQ ubi.
    Book On Virtues and Vices c. 1, and Ethics III c. 6 ff.; Plato, Republic dialogue IV (Serranus's ed., tom. 2 p. 427); Cicero, Rhetoric II c. 53; Macrobius, On the Dream of Scipio I c. 8. — A little below, for politicas reducunt the Vatican reads quae... politicae reducuntur. For qui codices BCDW X read no ubi, codex A quia, codices GLNQ ubi.
  5. Cfr. supra q. 1. ad 3. — De maiori vide supra d. 26. n. 1. q. 3. et d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 2. et 3.
    Cfr. above, q. 1 ad 3. — On the major premise see above, d. 26 n. 1 q. 3 and d. 27 a. 1 q. 1, fundamentum 2 and 3.
  6. Vide supra q. 2. ad 1. — In fine arg. pro senarium cod. Z septenarium.
    See above, q. 2 ad 1. — At the end of the argument, for senarium ("six") codex Z reads septenarium ("seven").
  7. Vers. 38. Verba Glossae sumta sunt ex August., 83 Qq. q. 61. n. 4. et referuntur etiam a Beda, in hunc loc. Cod. bb initium Glossae sic refert: Unum est cognitio rerum etc., edd. autem sic: Per quaternarium quatuor virtutes cardinales intelliguntur. Prima est prudentia cognitio rerum etc. August. loco laudato ait: Neque in ipsa turba quinque millia hominum fuerunt, sicut illic, ubi carnales legem accipientes, id est quinque sensibus carnis dediti significantur, sed quatuor millia potius, quo numero significantur spirituales propter quatuor animi virtutes, quibus in hac vita spiritaliter vivitur, prudentiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem et iustitiam. Quarum prima est cognitio rerum appetendarum et fugiendarum... tertia firmitas animi adversus ea quae temporaliter molesta sunt etc.
    Verse 38 [Matt. 15, 38]. The words of the Gloss are taken from Augustine, 83 Questions q. 61 n. 4, and are reported also by Bede on this place. Codex bb reports the beginning of the Gloss thus: One is the knowledge of things etc.; but the editions thus: By the number four the four cardinal virtues are understood. The first is prudence, the knowledge of things etc. Augustine in the place cited says: Nor in that crowd itself were there five thousand men, as there, where those receiving the law carnally, that is, given over to the five senses of the flesh, are signified; but rather four thousand, by which number are signified the spiritual, on account of the four virtues of the soul by which one lives spiritually in this life, prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice. Of which the first is the knowledge of things to be sought and to be fled... the third [is] firmness of soul against those things which are temporally troublesome etc.
  8. Pro nec videntur theologicae edd. ut videtur. — Codd. et edd. 1, 2 non ita bene rationales et mox rationalem; multi codd., cum abbreviate scribant, sunt dubiae interpretationis.
    For nec videntur theologicae ("nor do they seem theological") the editions read ut videtur ("as it seems"). — Codices and editions 1, 2 [read], not so well, rationales ("reasonable") and shortly after rationalem; many codices, since they write in abbreviated form, are of doubtful interpretation. <!-- p.720 (Respondeo band: modi 1–4, nn.1–6) -->
  9. Aristot., V. Topic. c. 1: Rationalis proprium [est] principare ad concupiscibile et irascibile, eo quod illud quidem imperat, haec autem parent. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 604, nota 5. — Hunc (I.) modum dicendi insinuat Aristot., de Virtut. et vitiis, c. 1. Cfr. etiam quaest. praeced. — Paulo superius pro vel in ratione consiliantis cod. A videlicet in ratione consiliantis.
    Aristotle, Topics V c. 1: It is proper to the rational to rule over the concupiscible and irascible, because the former commands, but these obey. Cfr. tom. II p. 604 note 5. — This (first) way of speaking Aristotle insinuates in On Virtues and Vices c. 1. Cfr. also the preceding question. — A little above, for vel in ratione consiliantis codex A reads videlicet in ratione consiliantis.
  10. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 4. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 924, nota 12.
    Aristotle, Ethics II c. 4. Cfr. tom. II p. 924 note 12.
  11. Ut Scholastici docent, provocantes ad Bedam; cfr. tom. II. pag. 721, nota 6. — Inferius pro videtur satis rationabilis [multi codd. rationalis] esse cod. K ut videtur, satis rationabilis est.
    As the Scholastics teach, appealing to Bede; cfr. tom. II p. 721 note 6. — Below, for videtur satis rationabilis [many codices rationalis] esse codex K reads ut videtur, satis rationabilis est.
  12. Quia, ut Aristot., II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 18. (c. 3.) ait, « privatione prior affirmatio », sive secundum translationem Arabico-latinam: habitus est ante privationem. Cfr. supra pag. 570, nota 3. — Pro sumtus est plurimi codd. sumtum est.
    Because, as Aristotle says in On the Heavens and the World II text 18 (c. 3), « affirmation is prior to privation », or according to the Arabic-Latin translation: the habit is before the privation. Cfr. above, p. 570 note 3. — For sumtus est very many codices read sumtum est.
  13. Vide supra pag. 470, nota 8. in fine.
    See above, p. 470 note 8, at the end.
  14. Cfr. supra pag. 472, nota 2.
    Cfr. above, p. 472 note 2. <!-- p.721 (Respondeo-tail nn.7–11 + replies nn.1–4; nn.5 ff. forwarded to q5) -->
  15. Cod. K attribuere quod suum est, codd. FT merita sua.
    Codex K reads to attribute what is one's own, codices FT his merits.
  16. Permulti codd. et edd. 1, 2 in ratione. Paulo post cod. V iterum in ratione.
    Very many codices and editions 1, 2 read in ratione. A little after, codex V again [reads] in ratione.
  17. Supple: hominem.
    Supply: man.
  18. Cfr. supra q. 1.
    Cfr. above, q. 1.
  19. August., II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 10. n. 14: « Quartus fluvius [paradisi, scil. Euphrates; cfr. Gen. 2, 14.] non dictum est contra quid vadat, aut quam terram circumeat; iustitia enim ad omnes partes animae pertinet, quia ipsa ordo et aequitas animae est, qua sibi ista tria concorditer copulantur: prima prudentia, secunda fortitudo, tertia temperantia; et in ista tota copulatione atque ordinatione iustitia » [consistit]. Idem insinuat Aristot., de Virtut. et vitiis, c. 1. dicens: Rationalis quidem [partis animae] virtus est prudentia... totius autem animae, iustitia. — Codd. A M omnes virtutes, quae lectio respondet Glossae in arg. 3. ad oppos. allegatae.
    Augustine, On Genesis against the Manichees II c. 10 n. 14: « Of the fourth river [of paradise, namely the Euphrates; cfr. Gen. 2, 14] it is not said against what it goes, or what land it skirts; for justice pertains to all the parts of the soul, since it is itself the order and equity of the soul, by which those three are harmoniously joined to one another: first prudence, second fortitude, third temperance; and in this whole joining and ordering justice [consists] ». The same Aristotle insinuates in On Virtues and Vices c. 1, saying: The virtue of the rational [part of the soul] indeed is prudence... but of the whole soul, justice. — Codices A M read all the virtues, which reading corresponds to the Gloss alleged in argument 3 to the opposite.
  20. Vat. subdit tantum. Paulo inferius post ordinatur etiam non pauci codd. adiiciunt et. Deinde pro est ad alterum ordinativa cod. K ad alterum ordinativa.
    The Vatican adds tantum ("only"). A little below, after ordinatur etiam not a few codices add et. Then for est ad alterum ordinativa codex K reads ad alterum ordinativa.
  21. Cod. Y iuris.
    Codex Y reads iuris ["of the right," genitive].
  22. Cfr. supra pag. 561, nota 7. De proposito seq. vide infra dub. 1.
    Cfr. above, p. 561 note 7. On the following proposition see below, dub. 1.
← Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 3Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 5→