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Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 6

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 36

Textus Latinus
p. 805

Quaestio VI. Utrum caritas sit forma virtutum.

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum caritas sit forma virtutum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per illud quod dicitur ad Romanos primo1: Iustitia revelatur ex fide in fidem; ibi Glossa: « Fides est daemonum et nominetenus Christianorum. Haec est informis qualitas mentis, quae ideo dicitur informis, quia sociam non habet caritatem, quae est forma omnium virtutum ».

2. Item, hoc ostenditur per illud quod dicitur in Glossa ad Galatas quinto2: Fructus autem Spiritus est caritas etc.; ibi Glossa: « Attende, quod in enumeratione fructuum caput virtutum praemisit, id est caritatem. Quae enim alia inter fructus Spiritus debuit tenere primatum, nisi caritas, sine qua virtutes ceterae non reputantur esse virtutes »: si ergo virtutes aliae sine caritate non reputantur esse virtutes, ergo quod sint verae virtutes, hoc habent a caritate: ergo ab ipsa caritate habent complementum et informationem.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione: « Affectus enim imponit nomen operi3 »: ergo nullum opus potest esse rectum, nisi affectus primo rectificetur; affectus autem non potest esse rectus, nisi diligat Deum propter se et super omnia, et hoc est per caritatem: igitur omne opus, cuiuscumque virtutis sit, si rectum est et bonum, hoc habet a caritate. Cum ergo actus caritatis informet omnia opera recta, videtur, quod et ipsa caritas informet omnes alias virtutes, quia, sicut se habet actus ad actum, ita habitus ad habitum.

4. Item, in moralibus complementum et species4 attenditur in ordine ad finem; sed amor summi Boni est illud quod cetera facit in finem debitum tendere: igitur amor summi Boni dat omnibus habitibus gratuitis et eorum operibus formam et complementum. Cum igitur ille amor sit caritas, caritas est forma virtutum.

Sed contra:

1. Super illud ad Colossenses tertio5: Caritas est vinculum perfectionis; ibi Glossa: « Cetera dona perfectum faciunt; caritas omnia ligat, ne abeant »: si ergo aliae virtutes a caritate reddunt habentem perfectum, videtur, quod perfectae sint in se: ergo non indigent perfici nec formari a caritate.

2. Item, diversorum secundum speciem diversae sunt perfectiones secundum speciem; sed habitus virtutum secundum speciem diversificantur, secundum quod in praecedentibus6 est ostensum et communiter tenetur: cum ergo caritas sit virtus una, videtur, quod ab ea aliae virtutes formari non possint.

3. Item, quando aliqua duo in diversis subiectis sunt, impossibile est, unum esse formam alterius; sed caritas cum aliis virtutibus omnibus non reperitur in una potentia, quia diversae virtutes diversas potentias respiciunt7: ergo impossibile est, quod virtutes aliae a caritate informentur.

4. Item, quandocumque aliqua sic se habent, quod sunt species immediate unum genus dividentes et immediate fluentes ab uno principio, unum illorum non potest esse forma alterius, quia oppositum non potest esse forma oppositi, nec disparatum disparati; sed caritas dividitur ex opposito cum aliis virtutibus8; et iterum, omnes virtutes immediate fluunt a gratia, quae est omnium origo et p. 806 forma: ergo una virtus non potest informare alteram; et per hoc concluditur, quod aliae virtutes non formantur a caritate sibi coniuncta.

5. Item, formae non est forma, nec perfectionis perfectio, nec ultimi aliud ultimum reperire, quia iam esset abire in infinitum9; sed quaelibet virtus forma est, quaelibet etiam perfectio potentiae est, quaelibet nihilominus « est ultimum potentiae »: ergo videtur, quod una virtus aliam formam a se ipsa non possit habere: videtur ergo falsum et non intelligibile, quod aliae virtutes formentur a caritate.

6. Item, si aliae virtutes a caritate formantur et habent esse virtutis: igitur esse virtutem soli caritati convenit per se, aliis vero per accidens. Quodsi hoc est falsum, immo aliae virtutes, per se loquendo, virtutes sunt, cum sint species virtutis10: ergo videtur, quod hoc sit falsum, quod caritas sit forma virtutum.

Conclusio.

Conclusio. Omnes virtutes informantur a caritate, quia per ipsam omnes tendunt in finem ultimum et complementum accipiunt.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod habitus cuiuslibet virtutis tripliciter habet considerari secundum triplicem comparationem, videlicet ad obiectum, ad subiectum et ad finem ultimum11. Possumus igitur loqui de virtutibus secundum istum triplicem respectum. — Et si loquamur de eis in comparatione ad obiectum; sic sunt formae tantum se ipsis distinctae, et earum distinctio innotescit per actum et obiectum; et sic non sunt formabiles nec perfectibiles ab aliquo uno, cum ipsae sint formae et perfectiones distinctae. — Si autem loquamur de virtutibus in comparatione ad subiectum; sic formae sunt, et tamen nihilominus formabiles: formae quidem sunt informantes subiectum quantum ad bonitatem moralem; per se ipsas tamen non sufficiunt ad bonitatem gratuitam, per quam anima efficitur Deo placita et accepta: et ideo perfici possunt et formari per gratiam, quae simul gratificat animam et habitus existentes in illa12. — Postremo, si loquamur de ipsis habitibus virtutum in comparatione ad finem ultimum; sic formae sunt et formabiles etiam: formae quidem sunt, quia dispositiones sunt ipsius animae ordinantes ad perveniendum in finem13; formabiles tamen sunt, quia, etsi omnes disponant ad tendendum in finem ultimum, perfectio tamen tendentiae venit ex ipsa caritate. Sicut enim corpora gravia inclinantur ad centrum per pondus, sic spiritus tendunt ad summum Bonum per pondus dilectionis14. — Et huiusmodi signum est, quod caritas habet idem et sub eadem ratione pro obiecto et fine, quod non est reperire in alia virtute. Finis enim est bonum sub ratione boni et Bonum summum; et hoc quidem Bonum sub ratione boni est caritatis obiectum. Et propterea ceterae virtutes quantum ad rationem tendentiae in finem ultimum ab ipsa caritate suscipiunt complementum; et ideo non immerito radici caritatis attribuitur perfectio meriti. — Et secundum hoc concedi potest, ceteras virtutes a caritate formari, sicut auctoritates dicunt, et rationes ad hoc inductae ostendunt, quae concedendae sunt, quoniam verum concludunt15.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod virtutes aliae faciunt animam perfectam; dicendum, quod est perfectio simpliciter, et est perfectio secundum quid16. Quaelibet autem virtus perfectum facit, secundum quid tamen, quia respectu specialis actus et obiecti. Perfectionem autem simpliciter non habet anima nisi in universitate virtutum, in quantum ab una gratia informantur et ab una caritate imperantur, mediante cuius adminiculo perducunt ad finem ultimum. Unde licet aliae virtutes dicantur perficere, ex hoc non potest concludi, quin ipsae perficiantur a caritate; perfectioni enim secundum quid superaddi potest perfectio simpliciter.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diversorum secundum speciem diversae sunt perfectiones secundum speciem; dicendum, quod est perfectio in esse primo, et est perfectio in esse secundo. Verbum autem propositum veritatem habet de perfectione quantum ad esse primum, non autem de perfectione p. 807 quantum ad bene esse. Cum autem dicimus, ipsam caritatem esse formam et perfectivam17 virtutum; hoc non est quantum ad ipsarum primum esse, sed quantum ad bene esse, videlicet quantum ad perfectionem et complementum meriti. Unde sicut ceterae virtutes, licet formaliter distinguantur in genere virtutis, tamen a gratia formantur, secundum quod gratuitae; sic etiam ceterae virtutes, quamvis sint distinctae, a caritate formari possunt, secundum quod meritoriae; perfectionem enim meriti habent ex unica ratione, videlicet ex perfecta tendentia in summum finem18.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quae sunt in diversis subiectis, unum non potest esse alterius forma et perfectio; dicendum, quod aliquid informari ab aliquo est dupliciter: vel sicut a principio constitutivo, vel sicut a principio regitivo et directivo19; vel per alia verba: est forma, quae complet in essendo; et est forma, quae complet in movendo. Cum ergo dicimus, ceteras virtutes formari a caritate; hoc non est, quia caritas sit forma constitutiva ipsarum virtutum, dans eis complementum in essendo; sed quia est forma directiva, dans eis complementum in regendo et ordinando. Sicut enim gravitas lapidem cum omnibus quae in eo sunt, trahit deorsum et dirigit ad centrum; sic caritas animam elevat sursum et ceteras virtutes movet et dirigit ad finem suum. — Quod autem ipse obiicit, quod forma et formatum non possunt esse in diversis subiectis; hoc est verum de forma constitutiva, quae complet in essendo; de alia non habet veritatem. Sicut enim una potentia potest ab alia regi et moveri, sic habitus unius potentiae ab habitu alterius; unde sicut distinctio potentiarum non tollit ordinem in movendo, sic etiam nec impedit informationem virtutum, quae penes illum ordinem attenditur.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtutes ex opposito dividuntur; dicendum, quod hoc est per comparationem ad sua obiecta, secundum quae distinguuntur; et sic una virtus non est forma alterius. In comparatione autem ad ipsam gratiam, in qua colligantur et uniuntur, et ad ipsum finem, ad quem ordinantur; sic non habent oppositionem, immo potius connexionem. Et ex hac parte una virtus potest alteram informare, pro eo quod immediatius tendit in ipsum finem. Unde licet omnes virtutes immediate comparentur ad gratiam, a qua formantur; hoc non impedit, quin per comparationem ad finem una virtus ab alia informetur20. — Posset etiam dici, quod virtus caritatis non solum immediatius ordinat in finem, verum etiam immediatius se habet ad gratiam. Et huius signum est, quia non potest esse informis21, sicut ceterae virtutes. Unde tum ex maiori immediatione ad finem, tum ex maiori immediatione ad gratiam habet alias virtutes informare.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod formae non est forma, nec perfectionis perfectio; dicendum, quod illud intelligendum est, per se loquendo: quia forma non formatur, secundum quod forma, nec perfectio perficitur, secundum quod perfectio, sed secundum quod in se habet aliquam informitatem et aliquam imperfectionem. Et quia aliae virtutes, quantum est de se, informitatem aliquam habent et imperfectionem nec sunt omnino ipsius potentiae ultimativae22; ideo perfici habent et ad maius complementum perduci per gratiam et caritatem. — Praeterea, sicut tactum est prius, caritas non est forma et perfectio aliarum virtutum per constitutionem, vel per compositionem, sed potius per ordinem in finem. Unde virtutes alio modo sunt perfectiones, et alio modo a caritate perficiuntur: perfectiones, inquam, sunt, in quantum subiectum suum qualificant habilitando ad actum sibi debitum; perficiuntur autem, in quantum a caritate imperantur et per eius imperium et adminiculum perfectius in finem ordinantur23.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si caritas est perfectio virtutum, tunc accidit aliis esse virtutes; dicendum, quod hoc esset verum, si virtutes aliae totam perfectionem virtutis traherent a caritate; hoc autem est falsum. Virtutes enim quandam perfectionem habent ex se, et quandam ex gratia superinfusa, et quandam etiam ex caritate superadiuncta, secundum quod tactum est supra. Et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod accidat aliis virtutibus esse virtutes; ex se enim ipsis habent, quod virtutes sint, licet non habeant in tanta completione ex se, in quanta habent esse ex adminiculo caritatis24.

English Translation

Question VI. Whether charity is the form of the virtues.

Sixthly and lastly it is asked whether charity is the form of the virtues. And that it is so, it seems:

1. First, from that which is said in Romans one1: Justice is revealed from faith unto faith; there the Gloss: « Faith is [the faith] of demons and of Christians in name only. This is an unformed quality of the mind, which is therefore called unformed because it has not charity as its companion, which is the form of all the virtues ».

2. Likewise, this is shown by that which is said in the Gloss on Galatians five2: But the fruit of the Spirit is charity etc.; there the Gloss: « Note that in the enumeration of the fruits he set before [them] the head of the virtues, that is, charity. For what else among the fruits of the Spirit ought to hold the primacy, except charity, without which the other virtues are not reckoned to be virtues »: if therefore the other virtues without charity are not reckoned to be virtues, therefore that they be true virtues, this they have from charity: therefore from charity itself they have completion and information.

3. Likewise, this very thing seems [so] by reason: « For the affection imposes the name upon the work3 »: therefore no work can be right unless the affection is first set right; but the affection cannot be right unless it love God for his own sake and above all things, and this is through charity: therefore every work, of whatever virtue it be, if it is right and good, this it has from charity. Since therefore the act of charity informs all right works, it seems that charity itself also informs all the other virtues, since, as act stands to act, so habit [stands] to habit.

4. Likewise, in moral matters completion and species4 is regarded in [its] ordering toward the end; but the love of the highest Good is that which makes the rest tend toward their due end: therefore the love of the highest Good gives to all the gratuitous habits and to their works form and completion. Since therefore that love is charity, charity is the form of the virtues.

On the contrary:

1. Upon that [text] of Colossians three5: Charity is the bond of perfection; there the Gloss: « The other gifts make [one] perfect; charity binds all things together, lest they slip away »: if therefore the other virtues from charity render the one having [them] perfect, it seems that they are perfect in themselves: therefore they do not need to be perfected nor formed by charity.

2. Likewise, of things diverse according to species the perfections are diverse according to species; but the habits of the virtues are diversified according to species, according as in the preceding [questions]6 has been shown and is commonly held: since therefore charity is one virtue, it seems that the other virtues cannot be formed by it.

3. Likewise, when any two things are in diverse subjects, it is impossible that one be the form of the other; but charity together with all the other virtues is not found in one power, because diverse virtues regard diverse powers7: therefore it is impossible that the other virtues be informed by charity.

4. Likewise, whenever some things so stand that they are species immediately dividing one genus and immediately flowing from one principle, one of them cannot be the form of the other, because an opposite cannot be the form of [its] opposite, nor one disparate [thing the form] of [its] disparate; but charity is divided in opposition with the other virtues8; and again, all the virtues immediately flow from grace, which is the origin and p. 806 form of all: therefore one virtue cannot inform another; and through this it is concluded that the other virtues are not formed by charity joined to itself.

5. Likewise, of a form there is no form, nor of a perfection [is there] a perfection, nor of an ultimate is there found another ultimate, because then it would be to go off into infinity9; but every virtue is a form, every [virtue] also is a perfection of the power, every [virtue] nonetheless is « an ultimate of the power »: therefore it seems that one virtue cannot have a form from another distinct from itself: therefore it seems false and unintelligible that the other virtues be formed by charity.

6. Likewise, if the other virtues are formed by charity and have the being of a virtue: therefore to be a virtue belongs to charity alone per se, but to the others by accident. But if this is false—nay, rather, the other virtues, speaking per se, are virtues, since they are species of virtue10: therefore it seems that this is false, that charity is the form of the virtues.

Conclusion.

Conclusion. All the virtues are informed by charity, because through it they all tend toward the ultimate end and receive completion.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the habit of any virtue has to be considered in a threefold way according to a threefold relation, namely to the object, to the subject, and to the ultimate end11. We can therefore speak of the virtues according to this threefold respect. — And if we speak of them in relation to the object; thus they are forms distinct only by themselves, and their distinction becomes known through act and object; and thus they are not formable nor perfectible by any one [thing], since they themselves are distinct forms and perfections. — But if we speak of the virtues in relation to the subject; thus they are forms, and yet nonetheless formable: forms indeed they are, informing the subject as to moral goodness; yet by themselves they do not suffice for the gratuitous goodness through which the soul is made pleasing and accepted to God: and therefore they can be perfected and formed through grace, which at once makes the soul pleasing [to God] and the habits existing in it12. — Finally, if we speak of the very habits of the virtues in relation to the ultimate end; thus they are forms and also formable: forms indeed they are, because they are dispositions of the soul itself ordering [it] to arriving at the end13; yet formable they are, because, although they all dispose toward tending to the ultimate end, nevertheless the perfection of the tending comes from charity itself. For as heavy bodies are inclined toward the center by [their] weight, so spirits tend toward the highest Good by the weight of love14. — And a sign of this kind is that charity has the same [thing] and under the same account for object and end, which is not to be found in another virtue. For the end is the good under the account of good and the highest Good; and this Good under the account of good is the object of charity. And on that account the other virtues, as to the account of [their] tending toward the ultimate end, receive completion from charity itself; and therefore not without merit is the perfection of merit attributed to the root of charity. — And according to this it can be granted that the other virtues are formed by charity, as the authorities say, and as the reasons adduced for this show, which are to be granted, since they conclude truly15.

1. To that, then, which is first objected on the contrary, that the other virtues make the soul perfect; it must be said that there is a perfection simply, and there is a perfection in a certain respect16. But every virtue makes [the soul] perfect, yet in a certain respect, because in respect of a special act and object. But the soul does not have perfection simply except in the totality of the virtues, inasmuch as they are informed by one grace and commanded by one charity, by whose aid as a means they lead [the soul] to the ultimate end. Hence although the other virtues be said to perfect, from this it cannot be concluded that they themselves are not perfected by charity; for to a perfection in a certain respect a perfection simply can be superadded.

2. To that which is objected, that of things diverse according to species the perfections are diverse according to species; it must be said that there is a perfection in [the] first being, and there is a perfection in [the] second being. But the proposed word holds truth concerning perfection as to first being, but not concerning perfection p. 807 as to well-being. But when we say that charity itself is the form and perfective17 of the virtues; this is not as to their first being, but as to [their] well-being, namely as to the perfection and completion of merit. Hence just as the other virtues, although they be formally distinguished in the genus of virtue, are nevertheless formed by grace, according as [they are] gratuitous; so also the other virtues, although they be distinct, can be formed by charity, according as [they are] meritorious; for they have the perfection of merit from a single account, namely from a perfect tending toward the highest end18.

3. To that which is objected, that of things which are in diverse subjects one cannot be the form and perfection of the other; it must be said that for something to be informed by something is in two ways: either as by a constitutive principle, or as by a ruling and directive principle19; or, in other words: there is a form which completes in being; and there is a form which completes in moving. When therefore we say that the other virtues are formed by charity; this is not because charity is the constitutive form of those virtues, giving them completion in being; but because it is a directive form, giving them completion in ruling and ordering. For as gravity draws downward and directs toward the center the stone together with all that is in it; so charity raises the soul upward and moves and directs the other virtues toward their end. — But as for what he objects, that the form and the thing formed cannot be in diverse subjects; this is true of the constitutive form, which completes in being; of the other it does not hold truth. For as one power can be ruled and moved by another, so the habit of one power [can be ruled and moved] by the habit of another; hence as the distinction of the powers does not take away order in moving, so also it does not impede the information of the virtues, which is regarded according to that order.

4. To that which is objected, that the virtues are divided in opposition; it must be said that this is by comparison to their objects, according to which they are distinguished; and thus one virtue is not the form of another. But in comparison to grace itself, in which they are bound together and united, and to the end itself, to which they are ordered; thus they do not have opposition, but rather connection. And from this side one virtue can inform another, for the reason that it tends more immediately into the end itself. Hence although all the virtues be immediately compared to grace, by which they are formed; this does not impede that, through comparison to the end, one virtue be informed by another20. — It could also be said that the virtue of charity not only more immediately orders [the soul] into the end, but also stands more immediately to grace. And a sign of this is that it cannot be unformed21, as the other virtues [can]. Hence both from a greater immediacy to the end, and from a greater immediacy to grace, it has [the power] to inform the other virtues.

5. To that which is objected, that of a form there is no form, nor of a perfection a perfection; it must be said that that is to be understood, speaking per se: because a form is not formed, according as [it is] a form, nor is a perfection perfected, according as [it is] a perfection, but according as in itself it has some unformedness and some imperfection. And because the other virtues, as far as is of themselves, have some unformedness and imperfection, nor are they wholly of the ultimative power itself22; therefore they have to be perfected and led to a greater completion through grace and charity. — Moreover, as was touched on before, charity is not the form and perfection of the other virtues by constitution, or by composition, but rather by [their] ordering toward the end. Hence the virtues are perfections in one way, and in another way are perfected by charity: perfections, I say, they are, inasmuch as they qualify their subject by enabling [it] for the act due to it; but they are perfected inasmuch as they are commanded by charity and, through its command and aid, are more perfectly ordered toward the end23.

6. To that which is objected, that if charity is the perfection of the virtues, then it is accidental to the others to be virtues; it must be said that this would be true if the other virtues drew the whole perfection of a virtue from charity; but this is false. For the virtues have a certain perfection from themselves, and a certain [perfection] from superinfused grace, and a certain [perfection] also from superadded charity, according as was touched on above. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that it is accidental to the other virtues to be virtues; for from their very selves they have that they are virtues, although they do not have [it] in such completion from themselves as they have being from the aid of charity24.

Scholion. This question has no scholion of its own. The closing doctrinal note (caritas as motor, forma, and finis of all the virtues; forma directiva rather than constitutiva — cf. this question's reply Ad 3; Petr. a Tar. on the threefold form of each virtue; the wider doxography on Petr. Lombardi III. Sent. d. 27) is supplied by the article-style scholion §II of the preceding question (`bon-sent-III-d36-a1-q5`), which expressly opens « Quoad ultimam quaestionem… » — "As to the last question…". The apparatus marker 24 (Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.) confirms this redirect. See d36-a1-q5 scholion §II.
Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 17. — De Glossa cfr. supra pag. 492, nota 7.
    Verse 17. — On the Gloss cf. above, p. 492, note 7.
  2. Vers. 22. — Quoad Glossam vide supra pag. 602, nota 4. — Pro Item, hoc codd. A F H I L N T U Z bb Item, hoc ipsum, cod. X Item, hoc idem.
    Verse 22. — As to the Gloss see above, p. 602, note 4. — For Item, hoc ("Likewise, this") codices A F H I L N T U Z bb [read] Item, hoc ipsum, codex X Item, hoc idem.
  3. Ambros., I. de Offic. c. 30. n. 147. Cfr. II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XL. — Circa finem arg. pro caritas informet edd. 1. 2 caritas in se teneat, Vat. caritas informet et in se teneat. Deinde post ita cod. K repetit se habet.
    Ambrose, On the Duties [of Ministers] I, c. 30, n. 147. Cf. II Sent., text of the Master, d. XL. — Near the end of the argument, for caritas informet ("charity informs") editions 1 and 2 [read] caritas in se teneat, the Vatican [edition] caritas informet et in se teneat. Then after ita codex K repeats se habet.
  4. Sive forma; nam εἶδος, quod in textibus Graecis legitur, significat et speciem et formam. Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 70. (c. 7.), et V. Metaph. text. 2. seq. nec non VIII. text. 12. (IV. c. 2. et VII. c. 4.), ubi etiam docet, formam et finem plerumque coincidere sive idem esse. Vide supra pag. 617, nota 5. — De ipso arg. cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Pro in moralibus plures codd. in moribus habere videntur.
    Or "form"; for εἶδος, which is read in the Greek texts, signifies both species and form. Cf. Aristotle, Physics II, text 70 (c. 7), and Metaphysics V, text 2 ff., and also VIII, text 12 (IV c. 2 and VII c. 4), where he also teaches that form and end frequently coincide or are the same. See above, p. 617, note 5. — On the argument itself cf. II Sent., d. 38, a. 1, q. 1 ff. — For in moralibus ("in moral matters") several codices appear to have in moribus.
  5. Vers. 14. — Glossa habetur penes Petr. Lombard, et ut interlinearis etiam apud Lyranum; est secundum Haym., qui in hunc locum dicit: Vinculum enim perfectionis est caritas, quia per illam omnia bona ligantur, ne pereant.
    Verse 14. — The Gloss is had in Peter Lombard, and as the interlinear [gloss] also in Lyra; it is according to Haymo, who on this passage says: For charity is the bond of perfection, because through it all good things are bound together, lest they perish.
  6. Dist. 27. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 33. q. 1. seq. — De maiori cfr. Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 25. (IX. c. 9.). — In fine arg. ex cod. K supplevimus aliae virtutes, quae verba in plurimis codd. desunt, et pro quibus edd. cum paucis codd. exhibent aliae tantum.
    Dist. 27, a. 1, q. 1, and d. 33, q. 1 ff. — On the major [premise] cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 25 (IX c. 9). — At the end of the argument from codex K we supplied aliae virtutes ("the other virtues"), which words are lacking in most codices, and in place of which the editions, with a few codices, exhibit aliae ("the others") only.
  7. Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 2, d. 26. a. 2. q. 3, d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 4. et d. 33. q. 3.
    Cf. above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 2; d. 26, a. 2, q. 3; d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, fundamentum 4; and d. 33, q. 3.
  8. Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. — De ratione subinde adducta cfr. supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 5. in corp. — Maiorem huius arg., in qua post aliquo codd. B T addunt duo, insinuant Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Simul. et Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Differentia.
    Cf. above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1. — On the reasoning thereupon adduced cf. above, d. 23, a. 2, q. 5, in the body. — The major [premise] of this argument—in which, after aliquo, codices B T add duo ("two")—Aristotle suggests, Categories, c. On the Simultaneous, and Porphyry, Isagoge, c. On Difference.
  9. Similiter dicit Aristot., V. Phys. text. 13. (c. 2.): Amplius autem in infinitum fiet abitio, si erit mutationis mutatio et generationis generatio. — De minori, in qua respicitur definitio virtutis ab Aristot. exhibita, cfr. supra pag. 388, nota 2. et pag. 741, nota 7. — Pro aliud ultimum codd. G I L aa quid ultimum, edd. aliquod ultimum. Inferius post habere Vat. addit vel informare.
    Aristotle says likewise, Physics V, text 13 (c. 2): But further, the going-off would proceed to infinity, if there were a change of change and a generation of generation. — On the minor [premise], in which the definition of virtue set forth by Aristotle is regarded, cf. above, p. 388, note 2, and p. 741, note 7. — For aliud ultimum ("another ultimate") codices G I L aa [read] quid ultimum, the editions aliquod ultimum. Below, after habere, the Vatican [edition] adds vel informare.
  10. Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 1. docet, species participare genera, vel aliis verbis, rationem generum suscipere. — Paulo superius pro esse virtutis codd. I L Z aa esse virtutes, et pro esse virtutem cod. F esse virtutis.
    Aristotle, Topics IV, c. 1, teaches that species participate in genera, or, in other words, take on the account of [their] genera. — A little above, for esse virtutis codices I L Z aa [read] esse virtutes, and for esse virtutem codex F esse virtutis.
  11. Vide supra d. 23. dub. 1, d. 26. dub. 2, d. 27. dub. 1.
    See above, d. 23, dubium 1; d. 26, dubium 2; d. 27, dubium 1.
  12. Cfr. supra q. 1. in fine corp.
    Cf. above, q. 1, at the end of the body.
  13. Vide supra pag. 488, nota 9. definitionem virtutis, quam August. perhibet. — Cod. Z finem ultimum.
    See above, p. 488, note 9, the definition of virtue which Augustine furnishes. — Codex Z [reads] finem ultimum.
  14. Cfr. supra pag. 639, nota 3. — De seqq. vide supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3. et 5; a. 2. q. 1. et dub. 1. — Paulo ante edd. voci pondus adiungunt molis.
    Cf. above, p. 639, note 3. — On what follows see above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3 and ad 5; a. 2, q. 1, and dubium 1. — A little before, the editions append to the word pondus ("weight") [the word] molis ("of mass").
  15. Alan. ab Insulis, Theolog. Regul. regula 91: Caritas inter virtutes est causa prior [siquidem, ut ipse explicat, ipsa est causa, quare opus dicatur bonum], diuturnitate maior [ipsa enim non excidit], mater informatione, forma apparitione [per opera videlicet caritatis magis apparent ceterae virtutes], finis remuneratione, universalior opere [quia omne opus bonum significat, caritatem esse in operante et opus ipsum fieri ex caritate ac propter amorem Dei].
    Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, rule 91: Charity among the virtues is the prior cause [since, as he himself explains, it is the cause why a work is called good], greater in duration [for it itself does not fail], mother in [its] informing, form in [its] manifesting [namely, through the works of charity the other virtues more appear], end in [its] rewarding, more universal in operation [because every good work signifies charity to be in the one operating and the work itself to come to be from charity and on account of the love of God].
  16. Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16.). — Subinde pro perfectum Vat. animam perfectam. Inferius pro perducunt cod. A perducuntur, et proxime post pro finem ultimum codd. X Y perfectionem termini. Demum post ex hoc edd. subdunt tamen, et dein post quin cod. Z interiicit et.
    Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 21 (IV c. 16). — Thereupon, for perfectum the Vatican [edition reads] animam perfectam. Below, for perducunt codex A [reads] perducuntur, and just after, for finem ultimum codices X Y [read] perfectionem termini. Finally, after ex hoc the editions add tamen, and then after quin codex Z inserts et.
  17. Cod. K perfectionem. Paulo inferius pro complementum codd. A F completionem.
    Codex K [reads] perfectionem. A little below, for complementum codices A F [read] completionem.
  18. Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. ad 1. et a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo superius post formari edd. inserunt tamen.
    Cf. above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1, and a. 2, q. 1. — A little above, after formari the editions insert tamen.
  19. Vide supra pag. 720, nota 1. — Post pauca pro et est forma codd. A F et est alia.
    See above, p. 720, note 1. — After a few [words], for et est forma codices A F [read] et est alia.
  20. Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 4. — Superius pro hoc non impedit edd. hoc tamen non impedit.
    Cf. above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 4. — Above, for hoc non impedit the editions [read] hoc tamen non impedit.
  21. Vocem perfectio supplevimus ex cod. Z. Paulo inferius pro Et quia aliae edd. Et quia aliquae.
    We supplied the word perfectio from codex Z. A little below, for Et quia aliae the editions [read] Et quia aliquae.
  22. Cod. Z nec sunt in ipsis potentiae ultimatae.
    Codex Z [reads] nec sunt in ipsis potentiae ultimatae ("nor are they in the very things of the ultimate power").
  23. Cod. U ordinationem. Idem cod. cum cod. A circa finem solut. pro perficiuntur autem substituit perficiuntur tum, in quantum a caritate perficiuntur, aut.
    Codex U [reads] ordinationem. The same codex, with codex A, near the end of the solution, for perficiuntur autem substitutes perficiuntur tum, in quantum a caritate perficiuntur, aut.
  24. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion on the preceding question.
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