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Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 27

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II. Utrum gratia gratum faciens et virtus gratuita differant per essentiam.

Secundo quaeritur de comparatione gratiae ad virtutem gratuitam, et est quaestio, utrum gratia gratum faciens et virtus gratuita differant per essentiam.

Et quod non, videtur:

1. Primo per illud quod Magister1 dicit, et habitum est in lectione praecedenti, quod gratia gratum faciens est «fides cum dilectione»: si ergo fides et caritas virtutes sunt, videtur etc.

2. Item, «quorum definitiones sunt eaedem, ipsa sunt eadem2»; sed gratia sic definitur ab Isidoro: «Gratia est divinae misericordiae donum, per quod bonae voluntatis est exitus»; sed haec definitio convenit virtuti gratuitae: ergo etc.

3. Item, eadem est per essentiam gratia operans et cooperans3; sed gratia cooperans in libero arbitrio non est aliud quam virtus gratuita, cum ipsius sit voluntati cooperari: ergo idem est virtus et gratia.

4. Item, quorum effectus et actus proximus et immediatus est idem, ipsa sunt eadem4; sed gratiae actus respectu subiecti est animam vivificare, respectu Dei est acceptam reddere, respectu operis est ipsum opus meritorium facere. Omnia haec virtuti competunt; nam dicitur ad Romanos primo5: Iustus ex fide vivit; et ad Hebraeos undecimo: Sine fide impossibile est Deo placere; et primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio: Si caritatem non habuero, nihil mihi prodest. Ergo si primi effectus gratiae virtuti attribuuntur, gratia et virtus sunt unus et idem habitus.

5. Item, si habitus sunt diversi, unus non denominat alterum; sed gratia virtutem denominat, dicitur enim virtus gratuita: ergo gratia et virtus non differunt in essentia.

6. Item, circumscripto omni alio habitu, si quis habeat fidem et caritatem, habet unde Deo placeat et unde etiam ei serviat: si igitur illud quod facit Deo placere, est gratia gratum faciens; ergo omni6 habitu circumscripto, intellecto quod quis habeat fidem et caritatem, habet gratiam gratum facientem: ergo gratia gratum faciens non est aliquid per essentiam differens a virtute.

Sed contra: 1. Anselmus de Concordia praedestinationis et liberi arbitrii7: «Rectitudinem voluntatis nullus habet, nisi Dei gratia praeveniente»; sed virtus non est aliud quam rectitudo voluntatis: ergo virtus est a gratia praeveniente. Sed in creaturis differt effectus a causa per essentiam: ergo virtus gratuita essentialiter differt a gratia.

2. Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum est medium operandi respectu alterius, illa differunt per essentiam, quia nihil creatum agit se ipso8; sed gratia in opus bonum et in actum determinatum movet mediante virtute: ergo gratia et virtus gratuita differunt per essentiam.

3. Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum illorum habet actum continuum, et reliquum habet actum interpolatum, illa differunt per essentiam; sed gratia et virtus sunt huiusmodi, quia gratia est in actu continuo — continue enim vivificat et animam Deo reddit acceptam — virtus vero non est continue in ipso actu: ergo etc.

4. Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod habent diversas differentias dividentes, illa differunt per essentiam9; sed gratia dividitur per praevenientem et subsequentem, virtus vero per cardinalem et theologicam: ergo etc.

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5. Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum remanet, reliquo recedente, illa sunt per essentiam diversa10; sed virtus aliquo modo remanet post perpetrationem culpae, gratia vero gratum faciens nullo modo: ergo etc.

6. Item, quaecumque sic se habent, quod unum remanet indivisum, reliquum vero dividitur et multiplicatur, illa essentialiter differunt; sed gratia in una anima est una, sicut ostensum est supra11, virtutes vero multae, sicut ostendetur infra, et Apostolus dicit primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio: Nunc autem manent fides, spes et caritas, tria haec etc.: necesse est igitur, gratiam et virtutes gratuitas differre per essentiam.

Conclusio

Gratia gratum faciens diversa est a virtutum habitibus, qui una gratia fiunt gratuiti.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod circa hoc diversi diversimode senserunt.

Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod gratia nihil aliud est quam virtus. Intellexerunt enim, quod gratia non est aliud quam quaedam rectificatio12 potentiarum animae respectu eius, ad quod sunt. Hanc autem rectificationem, quia supra naturam est, non potest facere nisi Deus. Et quoniam talem rectitudinem faciendo in anima dat virtutes ipsis potentiis, ut rationali fidem, concupiscibili caritatem et irascibili spem; ideo dixerunt, gratiam creatam nihil aliud esse quam virtutem gratuitam, differre autem sola ratione dicendi, quia gratia dicitur, in quantum Deus per illam rectitudinem animam acceptat et approbat, virtus vero, in quantum anima, sic rectificata, habet exire in opera ardua et laudabilia.

Alii vero dixerunt, quod gratia et virtus gratuita essentialiter differunt sicut13 principium et principiatum, et sicut substantia et virtus. Sicut enim potentia animae non est ipsa animae essentia, sed potius emanat et procedit ab illa; sic virtus, quae perficit potentiam, non est ipsa gratia, quae perficit animae substantiam, sed potius aliquid egrediens ab ipsa, ut, sicut anima est quoddam totum potentiale, sic etiam gratia sit quoddam totum potentiale14. Est enim una secundum se, et in quantum respicit ipsam animae substantiam; est tamen origo plurium, in quantum influit in ipsas potentias. Unde dicunt, illas virtutes non solum modo differre, in quantum sunt virtutes, sed etiam in quantum gratuitae, ut sit alia gratia specialis, a qua fides dicitur gratuita, alia, a qua spes, alia, a qua caritas gratuita nuncupatur.

Quaelibet autem harum positionum, etsi probabilitatem habeat, nihilominus tamen, si quis interius aspiciat, videbit, aliquo modo utramque a veritatis tramite declinare. — Nam prima, quae dicit, quod gratia nihil aliud est quam virtutis habitus, necesse habet dicere, aut quod omnes virtutes sint una virtus15, aut quod in uno homine sint multae gratiae gratum facientes. Quorum utrumque est improbabile, et unum est improbatum supra, et aliud est satis improbabile, videlicet quod omnes virtutes sint una virtus, et improbabitur suo loco. Necesse etiam habet dicere, aut quod gratia gratum faciens non totaliter tollitur per culpam, aut quod post peccatum nihil remanet de virtute aliqua. Et primum horum est contra communem doctorum sententiam, secundum vero est contra sensibilem experientiam. Ideo modus iste dicendi non modicam habet calumniam. — Alius etiam a veritate deviare videtur. Primum in eo, quod ponit, quod gratia primo existat in substantia et postmodum influat in potentias: hoc enim improbatum est supra16. Secundo vero in eo, quod ponit, in uno et eodem homine esse diversas gratias gratum facientes; et hoc ipsum supra17 improbatum est. Unus enim est decor, qui datur faciei animae, ex quo non solum ipsa acceptatur, immo etiam habitus et opera.

Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi, quod quemadmodum, cum dico lumen et colorem illuminatum, dico aliam et aliam formam, licet una sit ordinata ad aliam, et quodam modo altera compleatur ex alterius praesentia; similiter intelligendum est de gratia et virtute gratuita. Quemadmodum enim «color qualitas est corporis terminati18», quae a praesentia luminis influxi venustatur et completur, ut possit movere visum; sic virtus, quae est habilitatio potentiae, absque gratia gratum faciente informis est, sicut color sine lumine; sed ea adveniente, ex qua tota anima in se et in suis potentiis decoratur, formari et vivificari dicuntur habitus virtutum et effici Deo accepti19. Et quemadmodum ex lumine infuso et colore non fit unum per essentiam, sed per ordinem; et iterum, lumen, in quantum illuminat aerem coniunctum corpori terminato, et in quantum colorem reddit luminosum, non est aliud et aliud per essentiam, sed sola comparatione differens et secundum esse; et sicut

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unum lumen diversos potest colores ad actum reducere20 sine sui multiplicatione: sic in influentia gratiae et habitu virtutis intelligendum est esse, scilicet quod gratia superveniens cum habitu virtutis, quem formare dicitur, non facit unum per essentiam, sed ideo format, quia ad finem suum ordinat. Similiter gratia, a qua anima dicitur esse Deo grata, et a qua aliqua virtus dicitur esse gratuita, non differt nisi sola comparatione, sicut exemplum positum est in lumine21. Similiter una est gratia, a qua omnes virtutes animae dicuntur esse gratuitae. — Concedendum est igitur, sicut rationes plures ostendunt, quod habitus gratiae gratum facientis et virtutum habitus sunt diversi.

Ad obiecta:

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de Magistro, qui dicit, quod gratia est fides cum dilectione; dicendum, quod illa praedicatio non est per essentiam, sed per quandam concomitantiam et significantiam. Et aliquo modo posset etiam reduci ad praedicationem per causam22.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod definitio gratiae convenit virtuti; dicendum, quod illa notificatio vel non est propria, vel si est propria, non eo modo convenit virtuti, quo dicitur de gratia23; gratia enim est sicut donum primum et excellentissimum inter dona creata, et sicut donum, quod complectitur totam bonitatem donantis. Sic autem intellecta hac notificatione, non competit virtuti.

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia cooperans est virtus; dicendum, quod ille actus non assignatur gratiae secundum se, sed secundum quod est ordinativa virtutis; et sic dicitur libero arbitrio cooperari. Nec ex hoc sequitur, quod idem sit quod virtus; immo si sic argueretur, esset consequens24, sicut si ita argueretur: color movet visum, et lux movet visum: ergo color non differt a luce. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quoniam vivificare et acceptum reddere et opus meritorium facere aliter competit virtuti, aliter gratiae. Gratiae enim competit primo, virtuti vero ex consequenti, videlicet quia ab influentia gratiae formatur et ordinatur.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si habitus sunt diversi, unus non denominat alterum; dicendum, quod est denominatio per inhaerentiam, sicut albedo per album denominat corpus; et denominatio per circumincessionem quandam, in qua aliqua duo sic se habent, quod unum habet ordinare alterum, secundum quod voluntas dicitur deliberans et iustitia prudens25. Et per hunc modum virtus dicitur esse gratuita.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod circumscripto omni habitu etc.; dicendum, quod a caritate non potest circumscribi gratia, quia caritas semper nominat virtutem formatam26. Si quis autem vocaret caritatem habitum amoris, quo natus est homo diligere Deum propter se et super omnia, sic, etsi modo non possit absque gratia reperiri, potest tamen intelligi, sicut in Adam et in primo Angelo ante lapsum fuit, ut supra distinctione tertia27 patuit. — Et sic patet, quod gratia est aliud quam virtus; patet etiam, quod est aliud quam potentiarum rectificatio. Nam in homine quantum ad statum innocentiae erat potentiarum rectitudo, antequam esset gratiae gratum facientis infusio; et hoc melius videbitur infra28, quando agetur de necessitate gratiae secundum statum innocentiae.

Scholion

I. De quodam corollario huius quaestionis iam supra d. 26. q. 5. tractatum est. — Opinionem primam in resp. positam, sed respectu habitus caritatis tantum, sequuntur Scot. (in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica), Durand. (II. Sent. d. 26. q. 1.), Nominales et etiam aliqui insignes theologi posteriores, ut Bellarminus et Estius. — Secundam opinionem, quae asserit, habitus gratiae et caritatis essentialiter distingui, tenet S. Thom. (III. Sent. d. 26. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 110. a. 3; de Verit. q. 27. a. 2.) cum B. Alberto (II. Sent. d. 26. a. 11; S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 98. m. 4; licet quidam de eo falso dicant contrarium), Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 1.), Aegid. R. (II. Sent. q. 2. a. 1.) et plurimis recentioribus. Observandum autem est, a S. Thoma hanc sententiam ita explicari, ut minime ex ea sequatur positio, contra quam argumentatur secundo loco S. Bonav., scilicet quod tunc in uno homine sint plures gratiae.

II. S. Bonav. media via incedendum esse putat, licet et primam et secundam opinionem habere probabilitatem non neget. Convenit autem ipse cum S. Thoma primo in hoc, quod gratia in ordine supernaturali respiciat esse primum, virtus autem esse secundum. Unde ait in Breviloquio (p. V. c. 4.): «Sicut principium productivum sua summa perfectione in dando vitam naturae non tantum dat vivere quantum ad actum primum, verum etiam quantum ad actum secundum, qui est operari; sic necesse est, quod principium reparativum vitam tribuat spiritui in esse gratuito et quantum ad esse et quantum ad operari» etc. — Secundo convenit in eo, quod gratiam ab habitibus virtutum, etiam caritatis, maiore distinctione differre asserit, quam distinctione rationis (cfr. III. Sent. d. 17. a. 1. q. 3.).

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Dissentit vero Seraphicus a secunda opinione in tribus: primo quoad naturam huius distinctionis: dum enim S. Thomas vult, quod gratia a virtutibus, nempe infusis, differat realiter et per essentiam, S. Bonav. docet, quod non per essentiam differat, sed sola comparatione et secundum esse. — Secundo docet, quod gratia insit animae primo secundum libertatem arbitrii (supra d. 26. q. 5.); sed S. Thom. vult, quod primo insit secundum essentiam. Quomodo S. Bonav. illam assertionem intelligat, dictum est supra d. 26. q. 5, et perspicue declaratur IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. q. 4. in corp., ubi duplex modus distinguitur, quo aliquid possit esse in potentia, et asseritur, quod anima non sit capax gratiae et gloriae nisi per mentem, quam vocare solet faciem animae. — Tertio, quod gratia, superveniens virtuti quasi causae materiali, eam formet, sicut lux colorem, non probatur a S. Thom. in Comment. (loc. cit.); qui tamen hoc intelligit in eo sensu, quod efficiatur ex gratia et virtute unum, sicut ex forma et eo cuius est forma. Et fortasse ita rem intellexisse videtur Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 61. m. 2. a. 4.), qui concludit, quod «gratia et virtus sunt idem substantialiter, et non formaliter, sicut ferrum et cultellus substantialiter idem sunt, sed non formaliter; et sic gratia non est virtus omnino secundum esse et rationem, sed secundum substantiam». Sed S. Bonav. (hic in fine corp.) explicite dicit, quod gratia superveniens cum habitu virtutis, quem formare dicitur, non facit unum per essentiam, sed ideo format, quia ad finem suum ordinat (quare gratia magis lux dicatur quam calor, docetur IV. Sent. d. 18. p. II. dub. 3.). — Conferri etiam debet Breviloq. p. V. c. 4, ubi S. Bonav. fere eodem modo loquitur ac S. Thomas, ut iam observavit Dionys. Carth. (II. Sent. d. 26. q. 1. circa finem) his verbis: «Bonav. in Breviloquio suo super his multa conscribit perpulcre, et tamen pene omnia, quae affirmat de gratia, conveniunt caritati, nisi quod postea scribit de ramificatione gratiae [c. 4.] et habitus virtutum et donorum, et probat, gratiam esse distinctam». — De relatione, quam gratia habet ad omnes alias virtutes infusas, cfr. III. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1, ubi fundam. 4. in q. 1. positum sic exprimitur: «Consistit imago recreationis in tribus virtutibus theologicis et unitate gratiae, sicut imago creationis in tribus potentiis et unitate substantiae».

III. Auctoribus laudatis subiungimus Henricum Gand. (Quodl. 4. q. 10.), qui, cum inter essentiam animae et potentias non distinguat nisi secundum rationem, sibi constans dicit: «Gratia et caritas non differunt re, immo id ipsum, quod in ipsa essentia est gratia, in quantum consideratur absolute vel sub ratione essentiae, id ipsum est caritas in ea, in quantum consideratur sub ratione potentiae». Iam hinc patet, Henrici sententiam in re principali differre a sententia Scoti.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether grace that makes pleasing and gratuitous virtue differ by essence.

Secondly there is asked about the comparison of grace to gratuitous virtue, and the question is whether grace that makes pleasing and gratuitous virtue differ by essence.

And that they do not, it seems:

1. First, from that which the Master1 says, and which was set down in the preceding lesson, namely that grace that makes pleasing is «faith with love»: if therefore faith and love are virtues, it seems so, etc.

2. Likewise, «those whose definitions are the same are themselves the same2»; but grace is thus defined by Isidore: «Grace is the gift of divine mercy, through which there is an issuing-forth of good will»; but this definition fits gratuitous virtue: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, operating grace and cooperating grace are by essence the same3; but cooperating grace in free choice is nothing other than gratuitous virtue, since it belongs to it to cooperate with the will: therefore virtue and grace are the same.

4. Likewise, those whose effect and proximate and immediate act is the same are themselves the same4; but the act of grace with respect to its subject is to vivify the soul, with respect to God is to render it accepted, with respect to the work is to make the work itself meritorious. All these belong to virtue; for it is said in Romans chapter one5: The just man lives by faith; and in Hebrews chapter eleven: Without faith it is impossible to please God; and in First Corinthians chapter thirteen: If I have not love, it profits me nothing. Therefore if the first effects of grace are attributed to virtue, grace and virtue are one and the same habit.

5. Likewise, if habits are diverse, one does not denominate the other; but grace denominates virtue, for it is called gratuitous virtue: therefore grace and virtue do not differ in essence.

6. Likewise, with every other habit set aside, if anyone has faith and love, he has that whereby he may please God and also whereby he may serve Him: if therefore that which makes one please God is grace that makes pleasing; then with every6 habit set aside, granted that one has faith and love, he has grace that makes pleasing: therefore grace that makes pleasing is not something differing by essence from virtue.

On the contrary: 1. Anselm On the Concord of Predestination and Free Choice7: «No one has rectitude of the will except by God's grace going before»; but virtue is nothing other than rectitude of the will: therefore virtue is from prevenient grace. But in creatures the effect differs from the cause by essence: therefore gratuitous virtue differs essentially from grace.

2. Likewise, whatever things are so related that one is the medium of operating with respect to the other, those differ by essence, because nothing created acts by itself8; but grace moves into a good work and into a determinate act by means of virtue: therefore grace and gratuitous virtue differ by essence.

3. Likewise, whatever things are so related that one of them has a continuous act, and the other has an interrupted act, those differ by essence; but grace and virtue are of this kind, because grace is in a continuous act — for it continuously vivifies and renders the soul accepted to God — whereas virtue is not continuously in its act: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, whatever things are so related that they have diverse dividing differences, those differ by essence9; but grace is divided into prevenient and subsequent, whereas virtue is divided into cardinal and theological: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, whatever things are so related that one remains while the other withdraws, those are diverse by essence10; but virtue in some way remains after the perpetration of a fault, whereas grace that makes pleasing in no way remains: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, whatever things are so related that one remains undivided, while the other is divided and multiplied, those differ essentially; but grace in one soul is one, as was shown above11, whereas the virtues are many, as will be shown below, and the Apostle says in First Corinthians chapter thirteen: But now there remain faith, hope, and love, these three etc.: it is necessary therefore that grace and the gratuitous virtues differ by essence.

Conclusion

Grace that makes pleasing is diverse from the habits of the virtues, which are made gratuitous by the one grace.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that on this matter different men have thought in different ways.

For some wished to say that grace is nothing other than virtue. For they understood that grace is nothing other than a certain rectification12 of the soul's powers with respect to that for which they exist. But this rectification, since it is above nature, none but God can effect. And since, by making such rectitude in the soul, He gives virtues to the powers themselves — to the rational power faith, to the concupiscible love, and to the irascible hope — therefore they said that created grace is nothing other than gratuitous virtue, but that it differs only by the manner of speaking, because it is called grace insofar as God through that rectitude accepts and approves the soul, whereas it is called virtue insofar as the soul, thus rectified, has to go forth into arduous and praiseworthy works.

But others said that grace and gratuitous virtue differ essentially as13 principle and that which proceeds from a principle, and as substance and power. For just as the power of the soul is not the soul's essence itself, but rather emanates and proceeds from it; so virtue, which perfects the power, is not grace itself, which perfects the soul's substance, but rather something issuing forth from it, so that, just as the soul is a certain potential whole, so also grace is a certain potential whole14. For it is one in itself, and insofar as it regards the soul's substance itself; yet it is the origin of many, insofar as it flows into the powers themselves. Hence they say that those virtues differ not only insofar as they are virtues, but also insofar as they are gratuitous, so that there is one special grace from which faith is called gratuitous, another from which hope, another from which love is named gratuitous.

But each of these positions, although it has probability, nonetheless, if one looks within, one will see that each in some way deviates from the path of truth. — For the first, which says that grace is nothing other than the habit of virtue, must say either that all the virtues are one virtue15, or that in one man there are many graces that make pleasing. Both of which are improbable, and the one has been disproved above, and the other is sufficiently improbable, namely that all the virtues are one virtue, and it will be disproved in its place. It must also say either that grace that makes pleasing is not wholly taken away by fault, or that after sin nothing of any virtue remains. And the first of these is against the common opinion of the doctors, the second against sensible experience. Therefore this manner of speaking has no small objection against it. — The other also seems to deviate from the truth. First in that it posits that grace first exists in the substance and afterwards flows into the powers: for this has been disproved above16. Secondly in that it posits that in one and the same man there are diverse graces that make pleasing; and this very thing has been disproved above17. For there is one comeliness which is given to the face of the soul, by which not only the soul itself is accepted, but even its habits and works.

And therefore there is a third manner of speaking, namely that just as, when I say light and illuminated color, I say one form and another, although the one is ordered to the other, and in a way the one is completed by the presence of the other; so it must be understood concerning grace and gratuitous virtue. For just as «color is a quality of a bounded body18», which by the presence of infused light is adorned and completed, so that it can move sight; so virtue, which is the rendering-apt of a power, is without grace that makes pleasing formless, like color without light; but when that grace comes, by which the whole soul is adorned in itself and in its powers, the habits of the virtues are said to be formed and vivified and made accepted to God19. And just as from infused light and color there comes about not one thing by essence, but by order; and again, light, insofar as it illuminates the air joined to a bounded body, and insofar as it renders color luminous, is not one thing and another by essence, but differing only by comparison and according to being; and just as

one light can reduce diverse colors to act20 without its own multiplication: so it must be understood to be in the influence of grace and the habit of virtue, namely that grace supervening upon the habit of virtue, which it is said to form, does not make one thing by essence, but it forms it for this reason, that it orders it to its end. Similarly grace, from which the soul is said to be pleasing to God, and from which any virtue is said to be gratuitous, does not differ except by comparison alone, as the example was set down concerning light21. Similarly there is one grace, from which all the virtues of the soul are said to be gratuitous. — It must be conceded therefore, as several reasons show, that the habit of grace that makes pleasing and the habits of the virtues are diverse.

To the objections:

1. To that, therefore, which is first objected concerning the Master, who says that grace is faith with love; it must be said that that predication is not by essence, but by a certain concomitance and signification. And in some way it could also be reduced to predication by cause22.

2. To that which is objected, that the definition of grace fits virtue; it must be said that that notification either is not proper, or, if it is proper, does not fit virtue in the manner in which it is said of grace23; for grace is like the first and most excellent gift among created gifts, and like a gift that embraces the whole goodness of the giver. But the notification thus understood does not belong to virtue.

3. 4. To that which is objected, that cooperating grace is virtue; it must be said that that act is not assigned to grace in itself, but according as it is directive of virtue; and so it is said to cooperate with free choice. Nor does it follow from this that it is the same as virtue; rather, if one argued thus, it would be the consequent [fallacy]24, just as if one argued thus: color moves sight, and light moves sight: therefore color does not differ from light. — And by this the reply to the following is clear, since to vivify and to render accepted and to make a work meritorious belong in one way to virtue, in another way to grace. For they belong to grace first, but to virtue consequently, namely because it is formed and ordered by the influence of grace.

5. To that which is objected, that if habits are diverse, one does not denominate the other; it must be said that there is a denomination by inherence, as whiteness denominates a body by the white; and a denomination by a certain mutual indwelling, in which two things are so related that one has to order the other, according as the will is called deliberating and justice prudent25. And in this manner virtue is said to be gratuitous.

6. To that which is objected, that with every habit set aside, etc.; it must be said that grace cannot be set aside from love, because love always names a formed virtue26. But if one were to call love the habit of the love by which man is born to love God for His own sake and above all things, then, even though now it cannot be found without grace, it can nevertheless be understood, as it was in Adam and in the first Angel before the fall, as was clear above in the third distinction27. — And thus it is clear that grace is other than virtue; it is clear also that it is other than the rectification of the powers. For in man, as regards the state of innocence, there was a rectitude of the powers before there was the infusion of grace that makes pleasing; and this will be seen better below28, when there will be a treatment of the necessity of grace according to the state of innocence.

Scholion

I. Concerning a certain corollary of this question, treatment has already been made above at d. 26, q. 5. — The first opinion set down in the response, but only with respect to the habit of love, is followed by Scotus (in both Commentaries, here in the single question), Durandus (II Sent. d. 26, q. 1), the Nominalists, and also some distinguished later theologians, such as Bellarmine and Estius. — The second opinion, which asserts that the habits of grace and of love are essentially distinguished, is held by St. Thomas (III Sent. d. 26, a. 1; Summa I-II, q. 110, a. 3; de Verit. q. 27, a. 2) together with Blessed Albert (II Sent. d. 26, a. 11; Summa p. II, tr. 16, q. 98, m. 4; although some falsely say the contrary about him), Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 1, a. 1), Giles of Rome (II Sent. q. 2, a. 1), and very many recent writers. But it must be observed that this opinion is so explained by St. Thomas that the position against which St. Bonaventure argues in the second place — namely that then in one man there are several graces — by no means follows from it.

II. St. Bonaventure thinks that one must proceed by a middle way, although he does not deny that both the first and the second opinion have probability. He agrees with St. Thomas, first, in this: that grace in the supernatural order regards first being, while virtue regards second being. Hence he says in the Breviloquium (p. V, c. 4): «Just as a productive principle by its highest perfection in giving life to nature gives not only to live as regards the first act, but also as regards the second act, which is to operate; so it is necessary that the restorative principle should bestow life upon the spirit in gratuitous being both as regards being and as regards operating» etc. — Secondly he agrees in this, that he asserts grace to differ from the habits of the virtues, even of love, by a greater distinction than the distinction of reason (cf. III Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 3).

The Seraphic Doctor dissents from the second opinion in three respects: first as to the nature of this distinction: for whereas St. Thomas holds that grace differs from the virtues, namely the infused ones, really and by essence, St. Bonaventure teaches that it differs not by essence, but by comparison alone and according to being. — Secondly he teaches that grace is in the soul first according to the liberty of choice (above d. 26, q. 5); but St. Thomas holds that it is in it first according to essence. How St. Bonaventure understands that assertion has been said above at d. 26, q. 5, and is clearly declared at IV Sent. d. 49, p. I, q. 4 in the body, where a twofold manner is distinguished by which something can be in potency, and it is asserted that the soul is not capable of grace and glory except through the mind, which he is wont to call the face of the soul. — Thirdly, that grace, supervening upon virtue as upon a quasi-material cause, forms it, as light forms color, is not proved by St. Thomas in the Commentary (loc. cit.); who nevertheless understands this in the sense that from grace and virtue one thing is brought about, as from form and that of which it is the form. And perhaps Alexander of Hales (Summa p. II, q. 61, m. 2, a. 4) seems to have understood the matter thus, who concludes that «grace and virtue are the same substantially, and not formally, as iron and a knife are substantially the same, but not formally; and so grace is not virtue altogether according to being and account, but according to substance». But St. Bonaventure (here at the end of the body) explicitly says that grace supervening upon the habit of virtue, which it is said to form, does not make one thing by essence, but forms it for this reason, that it orders it to its end (why grace should rather be called light than heat, is taught at IV Sent. d. 18, p. II, dub. 3). — There should also be compared Breviloquium p. V, c. 4, where St. Bonaventure speaks in almost the same manner as St. Thomas, as Dionysius the Carthusian has already observed (II Sent. d. 26, q. 1, near the end) in these words: «Bonaventure in his Breviloquium writes many things on these matters very beautifully, and yet almost everything that he affirms of grace agrees with love, except that afterwards he writes about the ramification of grace [c. 4] and the habit of virtues and gifts, and proves that grace is distinct». — Concerning the relation which grace has to all the other infused virtues, cf. III Sent. d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, where the fourth fundamentum set down in q. 1 is thus expressed: «The image of recreation consists in the three theological virtues and the unity of grace, just as the image of creation consists in the three powers and the unity of substance».

III. To the authors cited we add Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 4, q. 10), who, since he does not distinguish between the essence of the soul and the powers except according to reason, consistently with himself says: «Grace and love do not differ in reality; rather, that very thing which in the essence itself is grace, insofar as it is considered absolutely or under the account of essence, that same thing is love in it, insofar as it is considered under the account of power». And from this it is already clear that Henry's opinion differs in the principal matter from the opinion of Scotus.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Dist. XXVI. c. 3. et ibid. in Comment. dub. 2. et 3. — Pro Et quod non Vat. falso et contra contextum Et quod sint idem, refragantibus codd. L P Q W bb (K T a secunda manu), qui nobiscum conveniunt. Paulo post pro lectione praecedenti Vat. distinctione praecedenti; at multi codd., ut C K L O R S T aa bb cc ee, et edd. 1, 2, 3 confirmant nostram lectionem.
    Distinction XXVI, c. 3, and in the same place in the Commentary, dub. 2 and 3. — For And that they do not the Vatican edition falsely and against the context [reads] And that they are the same, opposed by codices L P Q W bb (K T by a second hand), which agree with us. A little after, for the preceding lesson the Vatican edition has the preceding distinction; but many codices, such as C K L O R S T aa bb cc ee, and editions 1, 2, 3, confirm our reading.
  2. Secundum Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.): Haec autem non eadem sunt, eo quod definitiones diversae. Cfr. supra pag. 648, nota 4. — Verba Isidori vide ibid. nota 7. — De diversis definitionibus virtutis, quae in hoc et seqq. argg. tanguntur, vide infra dub. 3.
    According to Aristotle, Topics VI, c. 3 (c. 4): But these are not the same, because the definitions are diverse. Cf. above p. 648, note 4. — See the words of Isidore in the same place, note 7. — On the diverse definitions of virtue, which are touched upon in this and the following arguments, see below, dub. 3.
  3. Sicut ostensum est quaest. praeced.
    As was shown in the preceding question.
  4. Cfr. illud Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1: Nam quaecumque simpliciter eadem, etiam generationes eorum et corruptiones eaedem, et effectiva et corruptiva. Cfr. etiam tom. I. pag. 51, nota 11.
    Cf. that passage of Aristotle, Topics VII, c. 1: For whatever things are simply the same, their generations too and corruptions are the same, and what produces and what corrupts. Cf. also vol. I, p. 51, note 11.
  5. Vers. 17. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 6, tertius loc. cit. v. 3. — Paulo superius post Omnia haec Vat. adiicit eadem per essentiam.
    Verse 17. — The following text is the cited place, v. 6; the third is the cited place, v. 3. — A little above, after All these the Vatican edition adds the same by essence.
  6. Cod. aa subiungit alio. Circa finem arg. edd. cum pluribus codd. pro aliquid incongrue substituunt aliud.
    Codex aa appends another. Near the end of the argument the editions, with several codices, incongruously substitute other for something.
  7. Quaest. 3. c. 4: Sicut ergo illam [rectitudinem] nullus accipit, nisi gratia praeveniente, ita nullus eam servat, nisi eadem gratia subsequente. — Aristot., II. Magnor. Moral. c. 9. (c. 8.): Causa et cuius est causa, aliud est.
    Question 3, c. 4: As therefore no one receives that [rectitude] except by prevenient grace, so no one preserves it except by the same grace following after. — Aristotle, Magna Moralia II, c. 9 (c. 8): The cause and that of which it is the cause are diverse.
  8. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. et d. 8. p. II. q. 2.
    Cf. I Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, and d. 8, p. II, q. 2.
  9. Aristot., I. Topic. c. 13: Eorundem eaedem differentiae.
    Aristotle, Topics I, c. 13: Of the same things the differences are the same.
  10. Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1: Si potest alterum sine altero esse, non enim erit idem ad idem [οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταὐτόν i. e. non enim erit idem].
    Aristotle, Topics VII, c. 1: If one can be without the other, then it will not be the same as the same [οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταὐτόν, i.e. for it will not be the same].
  11. Quaest. praeced. — De diversitate virtutum vide III. Sent. d. 33. per totam. — Textus Apostoli est loc. cit. v. 13.
    The preceding question. — On the diversity of the virtues see III Sent. d. 33 throughout. — The text of the Apostle is the cited place, v. 13.
  12. Codd. U V cc et ed. 1 rectitudo.
    Codices U V cc and edition 1 [read] rectitude.
  13. Cod. aa subiungit differunt.
    Codex aa appends they differ.
  14. Cfr. supra pag. 600, nota 1. — Mox post secundum se Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et aliquibus codd. omittit et.
    Cf. above p. 600, note 1. — Presently, after in itself, the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 and some codices omits and.
  15. Quaest. 1. — Quod omnes virtutes non sint una virtus, ostenditur III. Sent. d. 33. q. 2. Ibid. d. 31. a. 1. q. 1. probatur etiam, quod caritas semel habita possit amitti; idem probatur de gratia supra d. 26. q. 4.
    Question 1. — That all the virtues are not one virtue is shown at III Sent. d. 33, q. 2. In the same place, d. 31, a. 1, q. 1, it is also proved that love once had can be lost; the same is proved concerning grace above at d. 26, q. 4.
  16. Dist. 26. q. 5. — Paulo superius pro videtur Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 dicitur.
    Distinction 26, q. 5. — A little above, for it seems the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 [reads] it is said.
  17. Quaest. 1. — Mox post habitus Vat., cum edd. 3, 4 nec non aliqui codd. subiiciunt eius. Subinde post dicendi cod. aa addit melior.
    Question 1. — Presently, after habits the Vatican edition, with editions 3, 4 and also some codices, adds of it. Thereupon, after of speaking codex aa adds better.
  18. Secundum Aristotelem; cfr. supra pag. 320, nota 5.
    According to Aristotle; cf. above p. 320, note 5.
  19. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 5; d. 27. q. 1. et 4. nec non d. 36. q. 6. — Mox pro aerem non pauci codd., inter quos F K T cc ee, cum edd. 1, 2, 3 aera; forma Graeca.
    Cf. III Sent. d. 23, a. 2, q. 5; d. 27, q. 1 and 4, and also d. 36, q. 6. — Presently for aerem (air) not a few codices, among which F K T cc ee, with editions 1, 2, 3 [read] aera; the Greek form.
  20. Codd. I V Z deducere. In seqq. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 informare et informat pro formare et format.
    Codices I V Z [read] to lead down. In what follows the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 [reads] to inform and informs for to form and forms.
  21. De lumine vide supra d. 13. a. 2. et 3. Loco verborum sicut exemplum positum est, quae ex codd. aa bb restituimus, in plurimis codd. nec non in Vat. et ceteris edd. legitur sicut primum expositum est.
    On light see above d. 13, a. 2 and 3. In place of the words as the example was set down, which we have restored from codices aa bb, in very many codices and also in the Vatican edition and the other editions there is read as was first explained.
  22. Libr. III. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2. ad similem obiectionem, nempe quod virtus non sit aliud quam caritas, S. Doctor respondet: Dicendum, quod praedicatio illa est praedicatio causalis. Ideo enim omnes virtutes definiri possunt per caritatem, quia amor caritatis dat eis rationem merendi, qua ablata, non est, proprie loquendo, dicenda virtus esse in anima. Cfr. supra d. 26. dub. 2.
    In Book III Sent. d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2, to a similar objection — namely that virtue is nothing other than love — the holy Doctor replies: It must be said that that predication is a causal predication. For all the virtues can be defined by love for this reason, that the love of charity gives them the account of meriting, which being taken away, there is not, properly speaking, to be called a virtue in the soul. Cf. above d. 26, dub. 2.
  23. Codd. I V Z bb verba sic transponunt: non eo modo dicitur de gratia, quo convenit virtuti.
    Codices I V Z bb transpose the words thus: it is not said of grace in the manner in which it fits virtue.
  24. Scilicet fallacia consequentis. Cfr. supra d. 1. p. I. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3. — Ante consequens ed. 1 male interserit etiam.
    Namely the fallacy of the consequent. Cf. above d. 1, p. I, a. 3, q. 1, ad 3. — Before consequent edition 1 wrongly inserts also.
  25. Nempe voluntas dicitur deliberans ex actu rationis praecedentis, et iustitia dicitur prudens ex prudentia, quam praesupponit. Cfr. supra d. 25. p. I. q. 6. in corp.
    Namely the will is called deliberating from the act of preceding reason, and justice is called prudent from the prudence which it presupposes. Cf. above d. 25, p. I, q. 6, in the body.
  26. Ratio huius est, quia, ut dicitur III. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 4, secundum se totam opponitur culpae generaliter.
    The reason for this is that, as is said at III Sent. d. 27, a. 1, q. 4, it is according to its whole self opposed to fault generally.
  27. Part. II. a. 3. q. 1, ubi de Angelis agitur. De Adamo vide infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3. et a. 2. q. 2.
    Part II, a. 3, q. 1, where the Angels are treated. On Adam see below d. 29, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3, and a. 2, q. 2.
  28. Dist. 29. a. 1. q. 1. seq.
    Distinction 29, a. 1, q. 1 and following.
← Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 1Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 3→