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Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 3

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ARTICULUS I.

De simplicitate essentiae in Angelis.

Quaestio I. Utrum Angeli sint compositi ex materia et forma.

Quaeritur ergo primo, utrum in Angelo sit compositio ex diversis naturis, scilicet ex materia et forma. Et quod sic, ostenditur:

1. Per rationem mutationis. Nullum mutabile est simplex; sed Angelus de natura sua est mutabilis et mutatur1: ergo habet compositionem. Sed ulterius, quod ex materia: cuicumque inest mutatio, inest principium mutabilitatis; sed principium mutabilitatis est materia: ergo etc. Prima manifesta est; secunda patet per Augustinum duodecimo Confessionum2: «Omne mutabile insinuat quandam informitatem, qua forma capitur, vel mutatur, vel vertitur». Et Boethius in secundo capitulo libri de Trinitate: «Nihil, quod est mere forma, accidentibus potest subiici». Et ibidem expresse dicit, quod «forma non suscipit accidentia, quia haec non suscipit, nisi materia subiecta». Si tu dicas mihi, quod mutabilitas venit rebus, quia sunt ex nihilo, sicut in pluribus locis vult Augustinus3; sed constat, quod mutabilitas non est pura privatio, immo dicit aliquam positionem: ergo non habet causam ipsam puram privationem. Necesse est ergo, quod habeat causam dicentem positionem; sed non positionem omnimodam, cum etiam dicat privationem: ergo aliquid, quod non est omnino aliquid, nec omnino nihil, sed quod est medium inter aliquid et nihil; hoc autem dicit Augustinus4 materiam: ergo etc.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per rationem actionis et passionis: quia nihil idem et secundum idem agit et patitur; sed Angelus idem agit et patitur: ergo habet aliud et aliud principium, secundum quod agit, et secundum quod patitur. Sed principium, secundum quod agit, est forma, principium vero, secundum quod patitur, non potest esse nisi materia5; ergo etc. Maior per se manifesta est; minor similiter patet; nam Angeli est recipere illuminationes et dare: ergo etc. Si forte des instantiam, quod medium per eandem naturam recipit lumen et dat, ut patet in aere; nulla est instantia, quia medium non habet rationem activi nec cooperativi. Et rursus, haec instantia non potest fieri in vera actione et passione: Angelus enim agit et patitur; dum enim agit quod non debet, patitur quod debet; dum agit culpam, patitur poenam, ut nullo modo sit dedecus peccati sine decore iustitiae6, et haec est passio proprie.

3. Item, hoc videtur per rationem individuationis. In Angelis enim est distinctio hypostasum, non per originem. Fiat ergo talis ratio: omnis distinctio secundum numerum venit a principio intrinseco et substantiali, quia, omnibus accidentibus circumscriptis, differentia numero sunt diversa; sed non venit a forma; ergo venit a principio materiali: ergo etc. Maior per se manifesta est; minor patet per Philosophum, qui dicit de Caelo et mundo7: «Cum dico caelum, dico formam; cum dico hoc caelum, dico materiam». Et idem in pluribus locis dicit, quod «omnino materia numerabiliter se habet». Si tu dicas, quod materia vocatur ipsa hypostasis, sive ipsum quod est; ego quaero a te de hypostasi: aut addit aliquid supra essentiam et formam, aut nihil. Si nihil addit, ergo non contrahit: ergo sicut ipsum universale est natum semper esse et ubique8, sic ipsa hypostasis, sicut patet in

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divinis, quia persona non addit supra essentiam, sed est ubique et immensa, sicut essentia. Ergo cum hypostasis Angeli sit finita et arctata et limitata, et ita hic et nunc, necessario oportet, quod ultra formam addat aliquid arctans substantiale sibi; hoc autem non potest esse nisi materia.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per naturam essentialis compositionis. Angelus enim definitur, et ita participat naturam generis et differentiae: naturam, in qua convenit cum aliis, et naturam, in qua differt9. Ergo cum necesse sit, totam veritatem definitionis realiter inveniri in quolibet Angelo, necesse est in eo ponere naturarum diversitatem. Sed impossibile est, plures naturas concurrere ad constitutionem tertii, quin altera habeat rationem possibilis, altera rationem actualis; quia ex duobus entibus in potentia nihil fit, similiter nec ex duobus entibus in actu10: ergo necesse est etc. Si tu feras mihi instantiam in albedine et in aliis formis, quae habent definiri et habent genera et differentias, nec tamen habent materiam partem sui; instantia omnino nulla est, quia secus est in naturis accidentium, quae habent ortum ex substantia et eius principiis, et de naturis sive differentiis substantiae, quae non habent ortum ex alio genere. Unde necessario sequitur, vel quod albedo habeat diversas naturas in se, vel11 natura speciei et generis primi et subalterni causentur a diversis naturis repertis in subiecto; quodsi ita non potest poni in Angelo, primum ponendum est.

Sed contra:

1. Boethius in fine libri de Duabus Naturis et una persona Christi12: «Omnis natura incorporeae substantiae nullo materiae fundamento innititur; nullum vero corpus est, cui materia non sit subiecta». — Et iterum: «Cum alia res fundamento materiae innitatur, ut corpus, alia vero omnino subiecto materiae non egeat, ut incorporeum; nullo modo fieri potest, ut corpus in incorporalem speciem permutetur». Ex hac auctoritate expresse habetur, quod Angelus non habet materiam.

2. Item, Philosophus de Anima13 dicit, quod «neque corpus est, neque forma in corpore est, neque mixtum cum materia omnino»; et hoc dicit esse verum de intellectu; sed Angelus est huiusmodi: ergo non habet materiam.

3. Item, ostenditur ratione. Universum est perfectissimum secundum ordinem naturarum, ita quod perfectius non potest cogitari rationabiliter; sed cogitari potest rationabiliter14 aliqua substantia spiritualis et immaterialis: ergo illa est in universo: ergo etc. Maior patet per hoc, quod Deus fecit omnia valde bona15; patet etiam per Damascenum capitulo vigesimo nono: «Omnia quae per Dei providentiam fiunt, deductionem convenientem suscipiunt, et ut non est melius, facta sunt». Augustinus de Libero Arbitrio: «Potest esse aliquid in rerum natura, quod tua ratione non cogitas; non esse autem, quod vera ratione cogitas, non potest». Minor patet, quia rationabiliter cogitatur substantia Deo similis per spiritualitatem et immaterialitatem; et hoc videtur: cum enim sit aliqua natura, quae secundum substantiam et esse est actus materiae, ut formae materiales et corporales; alia, quae secundum actum essendi, non secundum essentiam, ut anima rationalis; erit igitur tertia, quae secundum actum et essentiam erit separata.

4. Item, videtur per deductionem ad inconveniens. Inconveniens enim est, quod aliqua natura creata sit nobilior Angelo; sed omnis causa nobilior est suo effectu16: ergo Angelus non habet aliam causam, quam increatam. Sed illa non potest esse causa materialis nec formalis: ergo Angelus non habet nec materiam nec formam aliam, sed essentialiter est forma.

Conclusio

Si materia large sumitur extendendo nomen ad omne potentiale constitutivum, ipsa substantia Angeli composita est ex materia et forma.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod certum est, Angelum non habere essentiam simplicem per privationem omnis compositionis; certum enim est, quod Angelus compositus est compositione multiplici. Potest enim considerari in comparatione ad suum principium; et sic in tantum est compositus, in quantum habet ad ipsum17 dependentiam. Simplicissimum enim absolutissimum est, et omne dependens hoc ipso cadit in aliquam compositionem. — Habet secundo considerari in comparatione ad suum effectum; et sic habet componi18 ex substantia et potentia. — Habet nihilominus considerari ut ens in genere; et sic secundum metaphysicum componitur ex actu et potentia, secundum logicum vero ex genere et differentia. — Item, habet considerari ut ens in se; et sic quantum ad esse actuale est in ipso compositio entis et esse, quantum ad esse essentiale, ex quo est et quod est, quantum ad esse individuale sive personale, sic quod est et quis est19. — Cum ergo angelica essentia dicitur simplex, hoc non est per privationem harum compositionum.

Sed hoc certum est, aliquas compositiones a substantia Angeli removeri, utpote compositionem ex partibus quantitativis, compositionem ex partibus heterogeneis et compositionem ex natura corporali et spirituali, qualis est in homine.

Sed de compositione materiae et formae sive materialis et formalis, de hac dubium est. Et voluerunt aliqui dicere, quod talis removetur ab Angelo, et sunt in eo compositiones prius dictae. — Sed, sicut ostensum est supra20, cum in Angelo sit ratio mutabilitatis non tantum ad non-esse, sed secundum diversas proprietates, sit iterum ratio passibilitatis, sit iterum ratio individuationis et limitationis, postremo ratio essentialis compositionis secundum propriam naturam: non video causam nec rationem, quomodo defendi potest, quin substantia Angeli sit composita ex diversis naturis, et essentia omnis creaturae per se entis; et si21 composita est ex diversis naturis, illae duae naturae se habent per modum actualis et possibilis, et ita materiae et formae. Et ideo illa positio videtur verior esse, scilicet quod in Angelo sit compositio ex materia et forma.

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1. 2. Quod ergo obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritate Boethii22, dicendum, quod loquitur de materia appropriate, scilicet ratione potentiae passivae, «quae est principium patiendi et transmutandi ab alio». Et hoc patet, quia ipse vult probare, quod corporalia non convertuntur in spiritualia, nec e converso. Similiter Philosophus vult dicere, quod anima denudata sit a ratione materiae, secundum quam est causa permixtionis et corruptionis. Et ideo non loquuntur generaliter de materia, sed appropriate; alioquin ipse Boethius contradiceret sibi in principio de Trinitate23, ubi dicit, quod nihil subiicitur accidentibus nisi per materiam; et ibidem, quod solus Deus est immaterialis.

3. Quod obiicitur, quod creatura simplex rationabiliter potest cogitari etc.; dicendum, quod consideratis proprietatibus creaturae, quia creatura eo ipso quod creatura non est actus purus, oportet quod habeat possibilitatem; quia mutabilis est, oportet quod habeat fundamentum; quia limitata et in genere, oportet quod compositionem habeat: unde non potest rationabiliter cogitari quod non potest esse nec fieri. Et si obiicias mihi, quod Deus potest facere, quod forma accidentalis sit sine materia, ut in Sacramento altaris; dicendum, quod nunquam facit, quin semper sit nata esse in materia, et ad illam, quantum est de sui natura, habeat inclinationem. Si ergo Deus res condidit, secundum quod competit naturis ipsarum, patet, quod nunquam debuit facere, formam stare sine materia in conditione rerum, quamvis in miraculis faciat contra naturam et supra naturam. «In conditione enim rerum non quaerimus, quid Deus possit, sed quid congruat naturae ipsius creaturae», sicut dicit Augustinus24.

4. Quod obiicitur, quod causa nobilior est effectu; verum est de efficiente et finali, quae proprie tenent rationem causae; sed de materiali et formali, quae sunt principia ordinata ad compositionem, non habet veritatem simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid.

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Scholion

I. Doctrina catholica docet «unitatem substantialem humanae naturae, quae duabus constat substantiis partialibus, corpore nempe et anima rationali» (Litterae de mandato Pii Papae IX. scriptae 3 Iunii 1877 a Wlad. Czacki), et quidem ita, ut «substantia animae rationalis seu intellectivae vere ac per se humani corporis sit forma» (Concil. Viennens.). Insuper communis doctrina Scholasticorum tunc tenebat, omnia entia corporalia completa, tam viventia quam non viventia, intrinsece constitui ex materia et forma tanquam ex partibus essentialibus. Quoad autem substantias spirituales creatas S. Bonav. cum multis aliis suae aetatis doctoribus docet, etiam in his esse similem ex materia et forma compositionem. Hoc asserit quoad Angelos in tribus huius articuli quaest., et quoad animam humanam infra d. 17. a. 1. q. 2. — Qui imbuti sunt tantum recentioris philosophiae placitis, hi cum vocabulo materiae plerumque connectunt conceptum substantiae completae corporalis et inertis; unde non parum tali doctrina offenduntur, quasi faveat materialismo. Hinc pro intelligenda vera S. Doctoris sententia 1. praelibanda videntur aliqua capita communis doctrinae de unione sive compositione substantiali materiam inter et formam; 2. proponamus, quid S. Bonav. sentiat de ipsa ratione materiae; 3. quoad quaestionem, de qua agitur, videamus, in quibus ipse cum sententia nunc communi conveniat, in quibus dissentiat.

II. Communis doctrina Scholasticorum haec capita tenet. 1. Materia et forma sunt duo elementa realia et principia substantialia, ex quorum unione resultat tertium aliquod, quod est unum compositum substantiale, a duobus suis principiis constituentibus distinctum, atque una completa substantia. In hoc composito remanent duo principia constitutiva, ut entitates reales et substantiales, sed incompletae in genere substantiae et ordinatae ad unum totum, quia constituunt unum ens, ex utroque elemento coalescens. Unio igitur substantialis omnino differt ab unione accidentali. Ut unio sit substantialis, duo requiruntur, scil. primo duo elementa substantialia, quae ut partes substantiales intrant in totum compositum; secundo talis modus unionis, ut inde resultet una completa substantia. — Non est igitur unio substantialis, sed accidentalis, quando duae completae substantiae ita connectuntur, ut etiam in coniunctione maneant intrinsece duae completae substantiae; neque etiam, quando aliquod accidens, quantumcumque necessarium, suo subiecto unitur. Cum enim accidentia non constituant intrinsecus substantiam, sed essentiae quasi extrinsecus insint, nunquam ex ista unione resultat aliquod tertium substantiale, sed non nisi eiusdem substantiae perfectio accidentalis (cfr. infra d. 26. q. 3, praesertim ad 4, et III. Sent. d. 36. q. 6. ad 3.). 2. Porro hic modus unionis substantialis requirit, ut alterum istorum principiorum constituentium sit aliquid indeterminatum, at determinabile, vel receptivum, sive passivum (potentia), alterum vero sit determinans sive perficiens, vel actuans (actus). Unde dicitur hic fundam. 4: «Impossibile est, plures naturas concurrere ad constitutionem tertii, quin altera habeat rationem possibilis, altera rationem actualis; quia ex duobus entibus in potentia nihil fit, similiter nec ex duobus entibus in actu» etc. (cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. dub. 6.). 3. Materia per essentiam est quaedam entitas realis, sed passiva. «Communiter materia prima nominatur quod est in genere substantiae ut potentia quaedam intellecta praeter omnem speciem et formam, et etiam praeter privationem, quae tamen est susceptiva et formarum et privationum» (S. Thom., de Spiritual. Creatur. a. 1.). Materia non existit nec potest existere, saltem naturaliter, nisi sub forma; quia «secundum hoc acquirit esse in actu, quod acquirit formam» (idem, S. I, q. 73. a. 6, et Scot., de Rerum princip. q. 7. a. 1. n. 2.). Materia igitur in se non nisi mente concipitur; «secundum sui essentiam est informis per possibilitatem omnimodam, et dum sic consideratur, ipsa formarum capacitas sive possibilitas est sibi pro forma» (infra d. 12. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.; cfr. supra d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1.). «Formationem habet aliunde, sed informitatem et possibilitatem habet ex propria natura; non tamen potest esse prior duratione. Nunquam enim informitas est nisi per aliquam formam, nec possibilitas nisi per aliquem actum». «Materia a forma dependet et ad ipsam habet necessariam ordinationem» (ibid. ad 1. et 3; cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3 ad 4; d. 30. q. 3; d. 26. q. 1. ad 6.). — Hinc patet, quod materia non est nihil, et tamen non est ens completum et ens actu, cum «ens in potentia simpliciter inter non-ens et ens-actu sit medium» (infra d. 12. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6.). 4. Forma substantialis (entelechia, perfectio) est alterum «principium constitutivum, quae [forma] complet in essendo» (III. Sent. d. 36. q. 6. ad 3.). Ipsa «est pars rei, per quam est actu» (Ioan. a Rupella, I. de Anima, c. 13.), et «principium essendi substantialiter ei, cuius est forma, principium autem dico non effectivum, sed formale, quo aliquid est et denominatur ens» (S. Thom., S. c. Gent. II. c. 68.).

III. Attamen in conceptu ipso materiae, si magis determinatur, notabiliter dissentiunt S. Bonaventura et S. Thomas. 1. Secundum S. Thom. materia essentialiter est principium rerum corporalium tantum. Unde tritam illam Aristotelis, VII. Metaph. text. 8. (VI. c. 3.), definitionem, quod sit nec quid nec quantum nec aliquid aliud quippiam dicatur, quibus ens determinatur (μήτε τι μήτε ποσὸν μήτε ἄλλο μηθὲν λέγεται etc.), intelligit in sensu, quod materia sine forma careat natura corporali specifica, sicut caret actu existendi; radicaliter tamen est ens corporale sive materiale. Nam «materia et forma dividunt substantiam materialem» (S. c. Gent. II. c. 54. circa finem). Sed S. Bonav., eandem definitionem accipiens in toto rigore, dicit (hic q. 2. ad 3.): «Materia in se considerata nec est spiritualis, nec corporalis [cfr. infra d. 12. a. 1. q. 3. ad 5.]; et ideo capacitas consequens essentiam materiae indifferenter se habet ad formam, sive spiritualem sive corporalem. Sed quia materia nunquam spoliatur ab omni esse, et quae semel est sub esse corporali nunquam exuitur, et similiter illa, quae est sub esse spirituali: hinc est, quod materia consequens esse in spiritualibus et corporalibus est alia et alia». 2. Hinc S. Bonav. sub uno nomine materiae comprehendit plures res physice differentes, sive considerat materiam essentialiter unam in tribus praecipue statibus. Nam distinguit (hic q. 2. 3. passim, et d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. in fine) materiam secundum essentiam sive secundum se et metaphysice consideratam, et eandem, quatenus est applicata formis. Applicata formis est vel spiritualis vel corporalis, quae ultima iterum alia est in corporibus corruptibilibus, alia in caelestibus incorruptibilibus. 3. Materia secundum essentiam sive metaphysice considerata, quae a Scoto vocatur vel metaphysica vel primo prima (de Rerum princip. q. 1. a. 1. n. 3, et q. 7. a. 2. n. 26; q. 8. a. 3. n. 20.), ita describitur a S. Bonaventura: «Per sui essentiam nullum habet actum, nullam formam, ergo nullam distinctionem» (hic q. 3. in corp.); «materia, abstracta omni forma, simplex est, non tamen habet actualem simplicitatem, ut punctus, sed simplex, quia caret actuali extensione, habet tamen possibilitatem ad illam; et cum natura formae corporalis illi materiae datur, tunc reducitur ad actum» (q. 2. ad 4.); «de se est infinita et ad formas infinitas... quae infinitas venit ex summae possibilitatis imperfectione» (q. 3. in corp.); «quia ens omnino in potentia, ideo nec genus nec species esse potest, quae dicunt aliquo modo actum; et ideo non potest esse communis eis, quibus est communis, unitate universalitatis vel univocationis» (ibidem); «sed si habet unitatem, unitatem homogeneitatis habet... quae adeo ampla est, ut sustineat receptionem maioris multitudinis diversitatis formarum superadiectarum, quam unitas formae alicuius universalis, etiam generis generalissimi; et hoc est propter summam possibilitatem» (ibid.). De

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essentia eius valet, quod S. Doctor de unitate ipsius dicit, scil. ut aliquo modo capiatur, oportet «super actum imaginationis conscendere et omnino ens in potentia per privationem cogitare; et sic poterit aliqualiter capere. Quamdiu enim materia ut moles extensa cogitatur, ad unitatem essentiae consideratam nullo modo pertingitur» (ibid. ad 4. 5. 6.). 4. «Materia applicata formis spiritualibus sublevata est super esse extensionis et super esse privationis et corruptionis; et ideo dicitur materia spiritualis» (infra d. 17. q. 2. in corp.). In his materia est tantum «fulcimentum variationis ad receptionem influentiae et habituum, et perditionem» (hic q. 2. in corp.). — Si autem «suscipit formam corporalem, quae non est nata esse in materia nisi cum extensione, quamvis ipsa in se sit simplici essentia consistens», tunc possibilitas ad extensionem «reducitur ad actum» (q. 2. ad 4.). — Hinc «proprie est materia in corporalibus et corruptibilibus, minus proprie in corporibus incorruptibilibus, minime in spiritibus» (q. 2. in corp.).

IV. Cum dicti doctores in ipsa ratione materiae determinanda dissentiant, fieri nequit, quominus etiam in aliis quaestionibus, in quibus de materia agitur, diversimode vel sentiant, vel saltem loquantur. Sed hae differentiae pertinent ad res philosophicas, praesertim metaphysicas, ut interdum infra observabimus. Sub aspectu autem proprie theologico sunt exigui momenti, etiam in hac quaestione de Angelorum compositione. Quod ut pateat, videamus, in quibus conveniant oppositae sententiae, et in quibus dissentiant. 1. Conveniunt in his: a) Angeli sunt incorporei, quia nec habent corpora coniuncta, ut anima humana, nec in se ipsis materiam corporalem et extensam. b) Ipsi sunt naturaliter incorruptibiles et immortales (cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4. 5. 6.). c) Creati sunt ex nihilo, nullatenus ex materia praeiacente (infra d. 18. a. 2. q. 3. fundam. 3. et ad 3.). d) Item, quoad substantiam sunt simplices, quantum decet creaturam (Breviloq. p. II. c. 6.). Non tamen sunt absolute simplices et actus puri, sed plures habent compositiones. In eis est enim compositio accidentalis «ex substantia et potentia» et actione, quia in nulla creatura actio et potentia operativa est idem quod eius essentia, ut probat S. Thom., S. I. q. 54. a. 3. et 1. (cfr. ibid. q. 3. a. 4.). Item in ordine substantiali inest ipsis compositio metaphysica inter essentiam et existentiam (cfr. supra Schol. ad d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.). De his duabus compositionibus non est dubium: nec etiam, quod debeat removeri a substantia angelica «compositio ex partibus quantitativis et compositio ex partibus heterogeneis et compositio ex natura corporali et spirituali, qualis est in homine» (hic in corp.). 2. Attamen dissentiunt a) in numero earum compositionum, quae ad metaphysicam et logicam spectant, imprimis quoad compositionem, quae spectat ad esse individuale sive personale, vel inter quod est et quis est, ut infra a. 2. q. 2. constabit. Durandus etiam non admittit compositionem logicalem ex genere et differentia hic notatam, quam cum Scoto Aegidius R. bene explicat et sustinet. — Notandum est insuper, quod secundum S. Thom. (S. c. Gent. II. c. 52. 53), compositio ex substantia et esse, quae spectat ad esse actuale, eadem est atque ea «quae a quibusdam dicitur ex quod est et esse, vel ex eo quod est et quo est». Attamen S. Bonav. distinguit inter utramque, et illam secundam refert ad esse essentiale. Sciendum est igitur, hanc Boethii distinctionem (cfr. Schol. ad I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2.) in duplici sensu accipi, ut testatur Richard. a Med. (Sent. d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1.) his verbis: «Quod est ipsius animae est essentia concreta cum proprietatibus naturalibus, et quo est est sua essentia absolute considerata. Vel potest dici secundum alios, quod suum quod est est sua essentia ut per se existens, et suum quo est est suum esse». Quid significent ista secundum primam acceptionem, clarius explicatur a Ioan. a Rupella (1. de Anima, c. 13.): «Essentia, qua creatura est, non dicit nisi respectu eius quod essentiale est creaturae; quod est vero respicit essentiale et accidentale, ut patet in Angelo et anima, quia dicitur de eo quod est anima, quod est rationalis; et hoc est essentiale ei; et quod est iusta, quod est accidentaliter». Quando Seraphicus in corp. loquitur de distinctione quoad esse essentiale, ita intelligendus esse videtur. b) Sed principalis differentia in eo consistit, quod praeter dictas compositiones ipsa essentia Angeli secundum S. Doctorem composita est ex principio materiali et formali, quam sententiam Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 2.) post longiorem discursum sic exprimit: «Ergo in (Angeli) essentia est una res, per quam ipse se movet, et alia res, per quam ipse movetur; et primam rem dicimus formam, secundam dicimus materiam». — Non defuerunt (ut Marcus a Baudunio, Paradisus theol. t. I. q. 44. a. 2.), qui verba S. Doctoris explicare voluerint in sensu pure metaphysico, ita ut nihil dicant nisi distinctionem inter essentiam et esse, et omnino idem cum eo quod S. Thom. (de Spiritual. Creaturis) docet: «In substantia spirituali est compositio potentiae et actus, et per consequens formae et materiae... Sed tamen hoc non est proprie dictum secundum communem usum nominum». — Haec autem expositio manifeste falsa est, quia clarissimis sententiis, quae in hac quaestione et infra d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. occurrunt, violentiam facit. Eliditur etiam haec opinio ipsa controversia, per saecula inter tot auctores de hac compositione ex materia et forma protracta. Nunquam enim dubium exortum est de admittenda aliqua distinctione inter essentiam et existentiam, sive inter quod est et quo est. — Notandum etiam, S. Bonaventuram doctrinam hic traditam usque ad finem suae vitae tenuisse, cum in ultimo suo opere (Hexaem. Serm. II, aliquanto ante finem) inter alia doceat, omnem substantiam creatam distingui «reali distinctione principiorum, quorum unum activum, alterum passivum», et (ibid. Serm. IV. circa med.): «Necesse est enim, cum in omni creatura potentia activa coniuncta sit potentiae passivae, quod illae duae potentiae fundentur super diversa principia». Deinde (paulo inferius) concludit: «Minus est periculosum dicere, quod Angelus sit compositus, etiamsi verum non sit, quam quod sit simplex: quia hoc ego attribuo Angelo, nolens ei attribuere quod ad Deum solum aestimo pertinere, et hoc propter reverentiam Dei. Sed secundum veritatem sic videtur, quia dicit Boethius: Forma simplex subiectum esse non potest: ergo Angelo nihil accideret tunc nec laetitia nec tristitia».

V. Verumtamen haec sententia a S. Bonaventura nec primo inventa nec ab ipso solo vel a paucis propugnata est, sed illa aetate a multis et magnis doctoribus tenebatur; unde Petr. a Tar. (II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. a. 2.) de hac controversia dicit: «Duplex est celebris opinio». Defensores eius credebant, eam certissime esse sententiam S. Augustini, praecipue propter locum luculentum ex libro de Mirabilibus s. Scripturae (hic q. 2. fund. 1.). Sed nunc constat, hunc librum esse spurium. Attamen S. Augustinus in libris de Gen. ad lit. pluries loquitur de materia spirituali, et in sensu, qui praedictae sententiae favet, ut V. c. 5. n. 13; VII. c. 5. n. 7, c. 6. n. 9; et ibid. post longiorem inquisitionem c. 17. n. 39. dicitur: «Quid nisi de spirituali materia anima facta congruentius creditur»? — Eandem sententiam cum iisdem distinctionibus circa materiam fere omnes magistri Franciscani (excepto Ioanne a Rupella) usque ad saec. 16. docuerunt, inter quos nominamus Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 20. m. 2. § 1. et q. 61. m. 1; Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. et a. 2. q. 1, et d. 17. a. 1. q. 1, cum plurimis aliis antiquis discipulis S. Bonaventurae, ut testantur opera inedita Matthaei ab Aquasparta, Gulielmi de Mara (Marra), Petri Ioan. Olivi, Alexandri ab Alexandria. Sed praecipue nominandus est Scotus, qui id quod de Anima q. 15. breviter dicit, in suis quaestionibus disputatis, a Waddingo sub titulo de Rerum principiis primum editis, q. 7. 8. late tractat et (q. 7. a. 2.) duodecim conclusionibus proponit. In nonnullis autem ipse dissentit a S. Bonaventura. Nam hoc contradicente (infra d. 12. a. 1. q. 1.) Scot. docet, materiam sine forma a Deo creari posse. In hac hypothesi (ut dicit ibid. q. 7. a. 2. n. 28.) «materia nihil ageret, quia quamvis compositum agat, potentiam tamen activam habet a forma; sicut forma existens absque materia nihil pateretur. Sicut enim forma est principium actionis, sic materia passionis». Quod principium approbat etiam S. Thom. (de Potent. q. 1. a. 1. in corp.). Eandem opinionem, saltem ut probabilem, defendunt inter Scotistas Petrus ab Aquila (hic q. 1.), Ioan. de Bacone (II. Sent. d. 14. q. 1. a. 3.), Nicolaus de Nise (c. 92. q. 3.), Pelbartus de Themeswar (Rosar. t. II. art. Angelus et materia), Vorrilongus (hic q. 1.) aliique plurimi. Ex recentioribus Hieronymus a Montefortino in Summa Scoti (t. II. q. 50. a. 2.) eam proponit ut probabilem; et Barthol. a Barberiis (Cursus theol. p. II. disp. 2. q. 6. 7.) probabiliorem eam esse late probare vult. — Ex Ordine Praedicatorum Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 2, et d. 17. q. 1. a. 2.) utramque sententiam probabilem aestimat, ex utraque parte argg. opposita solvit, et sententiam S. Bonaventurae nominat priorem et planiorem, oppositam vero subtiliorem. B. autem Albertus (hic a. 1.) reicit quidem nomen materiae; in ipsa autem re vix a S. Bonaventura discedit, dum ponit, quod in omnibus creaturis «fundamentum primum in se sit unum... Et in hanc opinionem ego bene concordo, et praecipue propter hoc, quia videtur impossibile, quod aliqua proprietas sit in diversis, quae non gratia alicuius substantiae communis sit in eis; proprietas autem multis et spiritualibus et corporalibus communis est substare et sustinere formam: ergo necesse est ponere substantiam communem, quae sit in eis; et haec meo iudicio non dicetur materia, sed fundamentum» (cfr. initium sequentis quaest.). — Ipse S. Thomas, licet oppositae sententiae propugnator, tamen asserit (S. I. q. 75. a. 6.): «Dato etiam, quod anima esset ex materia et forma composita, ut quidam dicunt, adhuc oporteret ponere eam incorruptibilem». Hanc sententiam ibi, adhibito exemplo corporum caelestium, quae illa aetate habebantur incorruptibilia, pluribus probat. Sed opposita sententia nunc omnino in scholis praevalet. Eam sequuntur praeter Ioan. a Rupella et plures posteriores Scotistas, S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 3. q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 50. a. 2, q. 75. a. 5; S. c. Gent. II. c. 50; de Spiritual. Creat. a. 1; de Anima, a. 6; et praecipue de Substant. separatis, c. 5-8, ubi late disputat contra Avicebron (Ibn Gebirol). — B. Albert., loc. cit. et S. p. II. tr. 1. q. 3. m. 3. a. 2. q. incid. 4. — Aegid. R., hic d. 3. p. I. q. 1. a. 1. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 4. q. 16. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

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English Translation

ARTICLE I.

On the simplicity of essence in the Angels.

Question I. Whether the Angels are composed of matter and form.

It is asked, therefore, first, whether in an Angel there is a composition of diverse natures, namely of matter and form. And that [there is] so, is shown:

1. By the reason of change. Nothing changeable is simple; but the Angel of its nature is changeable and is changed1: therefore it has composition. But further, that [it is] from matter: in whatever there is change, there is a principle of changeableness; but the principle of changeableness is matter: therefore etc. The first is manifest; the second is plain through Augustine, twelfth [book] of the Confessions2: «Everything changeable suggests a certain formlessness, by which form is received, or is changed, or is turned». And Boethius in the second chapter of the book On the Trinity: «Nothing which is purely form can be subjected to accidents». And in the same place he expressly says that «form does not receive accidents, because it [form] does not receive [them], unless matter is the subject». If you say to me that changeableness comes to things because they are from nothing, as in many places Augustine holds3; but it is established that changeableness is not a pure privation, but rather states some positing: therefore it does not have for its cause a pure privation itself. It is necessary, then, that it have a cause stating a positing; but not an absolute positing, since it also states privation: therefore something which is not wholly something, nor wholly nothing, but which is a middle between something and nothing; and this Augustine calls4 matter: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, this same [thing] is shown by the reason of action and passion: because nothing identical and according to the same [respect] acts and is acted upon; but an Angel according to the same [respect] acts and is acted upon: therefore it has one and another principle, according to which it acts and according to which it is acted upon. But the principle according to which it acts is form, but the principle according to which it is acted upon can only be matter5; therefore etc. The major is manifest of itself; the minor likewise is plain; for it belongs to an Angel to receive illuminations and to give [them]: therefore etc. If perhaps you give the instance that a medium by the same nature receives light and gives [it], as is plain in air; there is no instance at all, because a medium has not the character of [something] active nor cooperative. And again, this instance cannot occur in true action and passion: for an Angel acts and is acted upon; for while it acts what it ought not, it suffers what it ought; while it does fault, it suffers penalty, so that in no way is the disgrace of sin without the beauty of justice6, and this is passion properly.

3. Likewise, this is seen by the reason of individuation. For in the Angels there is a distinction of hypostases, not through origin. Let then this reasoning be made: every distinction according to number comes from an intrinsic and substantial principle, because, all accidents being removed, things differing in number are diverse; but it does not come from form; therefore it comes from a material principle: therefore etc. The major is manifest of itself; the minor is plain through the Philosopher, who says in On the Heaven and the World7: «When I say heaven, I say form; when I say this heaven, I say matter». And the same [author] in many places says that «matter wholly behaves numerably». If you say that matter is called the hypostasis itself, or the very that-which-is; I ask you concerning the hypostasis: either it adds something over essence and form, or nothing. If it adds nothing, then it does not contract: therefore just as the universal itself is born always to be and to be everywhere8, so the hypostasis itself, as is plain in

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divine [things], because the person does not add over the essence, but is everywhere and immense, like the essence. Therefore since the hypostasis of the Angel is finite and constricted and limited, and so here and now, it is necessarily required that beyond form it add something substantial constricting it; and this can only be matter.

4. Likewise, this same [thing] is shown by the nature of essential composition. For an Angel is defined, and so participates the nature of genus and of difference: the nature in which it agrees with others, and the nature in which it differs9. Therefore since it is necessary that the whole truth of the definition be really found in any Angel, it is necessary to posit in it a diversity of natures. But it is impossible that several natures concur in the constitution of a third, but that one have the character of the possible, the other the character of the actual; because from two beings in potency nothing comes to be, likewise neither from two beings in act10: therefore it is necessary etc. If you bring me the instance of whiteness and of other forms, which have [the property] to be defined and have genera and differences, nor however have matter [as] a part of themselves; the instance is none at all, because it is otherwise in the natures of accidents, which have [their] origin from substance and its principles, and [it is otherwise] concerning the natures or differences of substance, which do not have [their] origin from another genus. Whence it necessarily follows either that whiteness has diverse natures in itself, or11 that the nature of the species and of the first and subaltern genus are caused by diverse natures found in the subject; and if this cannot be posited so in an Angel, the first [alternative] must be posited.

But on the contrary:

1. Boethius, at the end of the book On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ12: «Every nature of an incorporeal substance rests on no foundation of matter; but there is no body to which matter is not subject». — And again: «Since one thing rests on a foundation of matter, like a body, but another wholly needs not a substrate of matter, like the incorporeal; in no way can it come about that a body be changed into an incorporeal species». From this authority it is expressly had that the Angel does not have matter.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher On the Soul13 says that «it is neither a body, nor is form in a body, nor mixed with matter at all»; and this he says is true of the intellect; but the Angel is of this kind: therefore it does not have matter.

3. Likewise, it is shown by reason. The universe is most perfect according to the order of natures, so that a more perfect cannot reasonably be conceived; but there can reasonably be conceived14 some spiritual and immaterial substance: therefore that is in the universe: therefore etc. The major is plain by this, that God made all [things] very good15; it is plain also through Damascene, chapter twenty-nine: «All [things] which come to be through the providence of God receive a fitting deduction, and were made as [there] is nothing better». Augustine On Free Choice: «There can be something in the nature of things which you do not conceive by your reason; but that what you conceive by a true reason does not exist, cannot [be]». The minor is plain, because reasonably is conceived a substance similar to God by spirituality and immateriality; and this is seen: for since there is some nature which according to substance and being is the act of matter, like the material and corporeal forms; another which [is so] according to the act of being, not according to essence, like the rational soul; there will therefore be a third, which according to act and essence will be separate.

4. Likewise, it is seen by reduction to an unfitting [conclusion]. For it is unfitting that some created nature be nobler than an Angel; but every cause is nobler than its effect16: therefore the Angel has no other cause than the uncreated. But that cannot be a material nor a formal cause: therefore the Angel has neither matter nor any other form, but is essentially form.

Conclusion

If matter is taken broadly, extending the name to every potential constitutive [principle], the very substance of the Angel is composed of matter and form.

I respond: It must be said that it is certain the Angel does not have a simple essence by the privation of all composition; for it is certain that the Angel is composed by a manifold composition. For it can be considered in comparison to its principle; and so it is composite to the extent that it has a dependence17 on it. For the most simple is the most absolute, and everything dependent by that very fact falls into some composition. — It has, secondly, to be considered in comparison to its effect; and so it has [the property] to be composed18 of substance and potency. — It has nonetheless to be considered as a being in a genus; and so according to the metaphysician it is composed of act and potency, but according to the logician of genus and difference. — Likewise, it has to be considered as a being in itself; and so as to actual being there is in it a composition of being and to-be, as to essential being, of by-which-it-is and that-which-is, as to individual or personal being, thus that-which-is and who-it-is19. — When therefore the angelic essence is called simple, this is not by the privation of these compositions.

But this is certain, that some compositions are removed from the substance of the Angel, namely composition from quantitative parts, composition from heterogeneous parts, and composition from corporeal and spiritual nature, such as is in man.

But concerning the composition of matter and form, or of the material and the formal, concerning this there is doubt. And some have wished to say that such [composition] is removed from the Angel, and there are in it the compositions before stated. — But, as was shown above20, since in the Angel there is a reason of changeableness not only to non-being but according to diverse properties, there is again a reason of passibility, there is again a reason of individuation and limitation, lastly a reason of essential composition according to [its] proper nature: I do not see the cause nor the reason how it can be defended but that the substance of the Angel is composed of diverse natures, and [so] the essence of every creature being-through-itself; and if21 it is composed of diverse natures, those two natures are related in the mode of the actual and the possible, and so of matter and form. And therefore that position seems to be the truer, namely that in the Angel there is a composition of matter and form.

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1. 2. To what then is objected to the contrary from the authority of Boethius22, it must be said that he speaks of matter appropriately, namely by reason of the passive potency, «which is the principle of suffering and of being transmuted by another». And this is plain, because he himself wishes to prove that corporeal [things] are not converted into spiritual [ones], nor conversely. Likewise the Philosopher wishes to say that the soul is denuded of the reason of matter, according to which it is the cause of intermixture and corruption. And therefore they do not speak generally of matter, but appropriately; otherwise Boethius himself would contradict himself in the beginning of On the Trinity23, where he says that nothing is subjected to accidents except through matter; and in the same place, that God alone is immaterial.

3. To what is objected, that a simple creature can reasonably be conceived etc.; it must be said that, the properties of a creature being considered, because a creature by the very fact that [it is] a creature is not pure act, it must have possibility; because it is changeable, it must have a foundation; because it is limited and in a genus, it must have composition: whence there cannot reasonably be conceived [that] which can neither be nor come to be. And if you object to me that God can make an accidental form be without matter, as in the Sacrament of the altar; it must be said that He never does so, but that [the form] is always born to be in matter, and to it, as far as is of its own nature, has an inclination. If therefore God founded things according to what befits their natures, it is plain that He never had to make a form stand without matter in the founding of things, although in miracles He acts against nature and above nature. «For in the founding of things we do not ask what God can [do], but what is congruous to the nature of the creature itself», as Augustine says24.

4. To what is objected, that a cause is nobler than its effect; it is true of the efficient and the final [cause], which properly hold the character of cause; but of the material and the formal, which are principles ordered to composition, it does not hold true simply, but only in a certain respect.

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Scholion

I. Catholic doctrine teaches «the substantial unity of human nature, which consists of two partial substances, namely body and rational soul» (Letters written by the mandate of Pope Pius IX, 3 June 1877, by Wlad. Czacki), and indeed so that «the substance of the rational or intellective soul is truly and per se the form of the human body» (Council of Vienne). Moreover the common doctrine of the Scholastics then held that all complete corporeal beings, both living and non-living, are intrinsically constituted of matter and form as of essential parts. But as regards created spiritual substances St. Bonaventure, with many other doctors of his age, teaches that in these too there is a similar composition of matter and form. This he asserts as regards the Angels in the three questions of this article, and as regards the human soul below at d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. — Those who are imbued only with the tenets of more recent philosophy mostly connect with the word matter the concept of a complete corporeal and inert substance; whence they are not a little offended by such doctrine, as if it favored materialism. Hence, for understanding the true opinion of the holy Doctor, 1. some heads of the common doctrine on the substantial union or composition between matter and form seem worth premising; 2. let us set forth what St. Bonaventure thinks about the very notion of matter; 3. as regards the question at issue, let us see in what he agrees with the now common opinion, in what he dissents.

II. The common doctrine of the Scholastics holds these heads. 1. Matter and form are two real elements and substantial principles, from whose union results some third [thing], which is one substantial composite, distinct from its two constituting principles, and one complete substance. In this composite the two constitutive principles remain, as real and substantial entities, but incomplete in the genus of substance and ordered to one whole, because they constitute one being, coalescing from each element. The substantial union therefore wholly differs from accidental union. For a union to be substantial, two [things] are required, namely first two substantial elements, which as substantial parts enter into the whole composite; secondly such a mode of union that from it results one complete substance. — It is therefore not a substantial but an accidental union, when two complete substances are so connected that even in the conjunction two complete substances remain intrinsically; nor also when some accident, however necessary, is united to its subject. For since accidents do not constitute substance intrinsically, but are as it were extrinsically in the essence, never from such union does there result some third substantial [thing], but only an accidental perfection of the same substance (cf. below d. 26, q. 3, especially ad 4, and III Sent. d. 36, q. 6, ad 3). 2. Further, this mode of substantial union requires that one of those constituting principles be something indeterminate, yet determinable, or receptive, or passive (potency), but the other be determining or perfecting, or actuating (act). Whence it is said here, fundamentum 4: «It is impossible that several natures concur in the constitution of a third, but that one have the character of the possible, the other the character of the actual; because from two beings in potency nothing comes to be, likewise neither from two beings in act» etc. (cf. I Sent. d. 8, p. II, dub. 6). 3. Matter through [its] essence is a certain real entity, but passive. «Commonly prime matter is named that which is in the genus of substance as a certain potency understood apart from every species and form, and also apart from privation, which however is receptive both of forms and of privations» (St. Thomas, On Spiritual Creatures, a. 1). Matter does not exist nor can it exist, at least naturally, except under a form; because «according to this it acquires being in act, [namely] that it acquires form» (the same, S. I, q. 73, a. 6, and Scotus, On the Principles of Things, q. 7, a. 1, n. 2). Matter therefore in itself is conceived only by the mind; «according to its essence it is formless by an all-comprehensive possibility, and while it is so considered, the very capacity or possibility of forms is for it in place of a form» (below d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, in the body; cf. above d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1). «It has [its] formation from elsewhere, but [its] formlessness and possibility it has from its proper nature; yet it cannot be prior in duration. For formlessness never is except through some form, nor possibility except through some act». «Matter depends on form and has to it a necessary ordination» (ibid. ad 1 and 3; cf. I Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 3 ad 4; d. 30, q. 3; d. 26, q. 1, ad 6). — Hence it is plain that matter is not nothing, and yet is not a complete being and a being in act, since «a being in potency simply is a middle between non-being and being-in-act» (below d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, ad 6). 4. The substantial form (entelechy, perfection) is the other «constitutive principle, which [form] completes in being» (III Sent. d. 36, q. 6, ad 3). It «is the part of the thing by which it is in act» (John of La Rochelle, I On the Soul, c. 13), and «the principle of being substantially to that whose form it is, but I call [it] a principle not effective but formal, by which something is and is denominated a being» (St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 68).

III. Yet in the very concept of matter, if it is more determined, St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas notably dissent. 1. According to St. Thomas matter essentially is the principle of corporeal things only. Whence that trite definition of Aristotle, VII Metaphysics text 8 (VI, c. 3), that it is said [to be] neither what nor how much nor any other such thing by which a being is determined (μήτε τι μήτε ποσὸν μήτε ἄλλο μηθὲν λέγεται etc.), he understands in the sense that matter without form lacks a specific corporeal nature, just as it lacks the act of existing; yet radically it is a corporeal or material being. For «matter and form divide material substance» (Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 54, near the end). But St. Bonaventure, taking the same definition in full rigor, says (here q. 2, ad 3): «Matter considered in itself is neither spiritual nor corporeal [cf. below d. 12, a. 1, q. 3, ad 5]; and therefore the capacity following the essence of matter is related indifferently to form, whether spiritual or corporeal. But because matter is never despoiled of all being, and that which is once under corporeal being is never stripped [of it], and likewise that which is under spiritual being: hence it is that the matter following being in spiritual and in corporeal [things] is one and another». 2. Hence St. Bonaventure under the one name of matter comprehends several physically differing things, or considers matter as essentially one in three principal states. For he distinguishes (here q. 2, 3, passim, and d. 12, a. 2, q. 1, at the end) matter according to essence, or according to itself and metaphysically considered, and the same as it is applied to forms. Applied to forms it is either spiritual or corporeal, which last is again one in corruptible bodies, another in the incorruptible heavenly [ones]. 3. Matter according to essence, or metaphysically considered, which by Scotus is called either metaphysical or first-first (On the Principles of Things, q. 1, a. 1, n. 3, and q. 7, a. 2, n. 26; q. 8, a. 3, n. 20), is thus described by St. Bonaventure: «Through its essence it has no act, no form, therefore no distinction» (here q. 3, in the body); «matter, abstracted from every form, is simple, yet it does not have actual simplicity, like a point, but [is] simple because it lacks actual extension, but has the possibility to it; and when the nature of corporeal form is given to that matter, then it is reduced to act» (q. 2, ad 4); «of itself it is infinite and [open] to infinite forms... which infinity comes from the imperfection of the highest possibility» (q. 3, in the body); «because [it is] a being wholly in potency, therefore it cannot be either a genus or a species, which state act in some mode; and therefore it cannot be common to those to which it is common by a unity of universality or univocation» (ibid.); «but if it has a unity, it has a unity of homogeneity... which is so ample that it sustains the reception of a greater multitude of diversity of forms superadded than the unity of any universal form, even of the most general genus; and this is on account of the highest possibility» (ibid.). Of

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its essence holds what the holy Doctor says of its unity, namely that, for it to be grasped in some way, one must «ascend above the act of imagination and conceive [it] wholly [as] a being in potency through privation; and so one will be able to grasp [it] somewhat. For as long as matter is conceived as extended mass, the unity of essence considered is in no way attained» (ibid. ad 4, 5, 6). 4. «Matter applied to spiritual forms is raised above the being of extension and above the being of privation and corruption; and therefore it is called spiritual matter» (below d. 17, q. 2, in the body). In these [things] matter is only a «support of variation for the reception of influence and of habits, and for [their] loss» (here q. 2, in the body). — But if «it receives a corporeal form, which is born to be in matter only with extension, although it [the matter] in itself consists of a simple essence», then the possibility to extension «is reduced to act» (q. 2, ad 4). — Hence «matter is properly in corporeal and corruptible [things], less properly in incorruptible bodies, least of all in spirits» (q. 2, in the body).

IV. Since the said doctors dissent in the very notion of matter to be determined, it cannot but be that also in other questions, in which matter is treated, they either think diversely, or at least speak [diversely]. But these differences pertain to philosophical, especially metaphysical, matters, as we shall sometimes observe below. But under the properly theological aspect they are of small moment, even in this question on the composition of the Angels. That this may be plain, let us see in what the opposed opinions agree, and in what they dissent. 1. They agree in these: a) The Angels are incorporeal, because they have neither conjoined bodies, like the human soul, nor in themselves corporeal and extended matter. b) They are naturally incorruptible and immortal (cf. I Sent. d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, ad 4, 5, 6). c) They were created from nothing, in no way from pre-lying matter (below d. 18, a. 2, q. 3, fundamentum 3 and ad 3). d) Likewise, as regards substance they are simple, as much as befits a creature (Breviloquium p. II, c. 6). Yet they are not absolutely simple and pure acts, but have several compositions. For in them there is an accidental composition «of substance and potency» and action, because in no creature is action and operative potency the same as its essence, as St. Thomas proves, S. I, q. 54, a. 3 and 1 (cf. ibid. q. 3, a. 4). Likewise in the substantial order there is in them a metaphysical composition between essence and existence (cf. above the Scholion at d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 1). Concerning these two compositions there is no doubt: nor also that there must be removed from the angelic substance «composition from quantitative parts and composition from heterogeneous parts and composition from corporeal and spiritual nature, such as is in man» (here in the body). 2. Yet they dissent a) in the number of those compositions which pertain to metaphysics and logic, especially as to the composition which pertains to individual or personal being, or between that-which-is and who-it-is, as below at a. 2, q. 2, will be established. Durandus also does not admit the logical composition of genus and difference here noted, which with Scotus, Giles of Rome well explains and sustains. — It must moreover be noted that, according to St. Thomas (Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 52, 53), the composition of substance and being, which pertains to actual being, is the same as that «which by some is said [to be] of that-which-is and being, or of that which-is and by-which-it-is». Yet St. Bonaventure distinguishes between the two, and refers that second to essential being. It must therefore be known that this Boethian distinction (cf. the Scholion at I Sent. d. 8, p. II, q. 2) is taken in a twofold sense, as Richard of Middleton attests (Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1) in these words: «The that-which-is of the soul itself is the essence concrete with its natural properties, and the by-which-it-is is its essence considered absolutely. Or it can be said, according to others, that its that-which-is is its essence as existing per se, and its by-which-it-is is its being». What these signify according to the first acceptation is more clearly explained by John of La Rochelle (1 On the Soul, c. 13): «The essence, by which a creature is, states [it] only with respect to that which is essential to a creature; but the that-which-is respects the essential and the accidental, as is plain in the Angel and the soul, because it is said of that which is the soul, that it is rational; and this is essential to it; and that it is just, which is accidental». When the Seraphic [Doctor] in the body speaks of distinction as to essential being, he is to be understood thus. b) But the principal difference consists in this, that besides the said compositions the very essence of the Angel, according to the holy Doctor, is composed of a material and a formal principle, which opinion Richard of Middleton (here a. 1, q. 2), after a longer discourse, thus expresses: «Therefore in the (Angel's) essence there is one thing by which it moves itself, and another thing by which it is moved; and the first thing we call form, the second we call matter». — There have not been lacking [those] (like Marcus of Baudunium, Paradisus theol. t. I, q. 44, a. 2) who wished to explain the words of the holy Doctor in a purely metaphysical sense, so that they say nothing but the distinction between essence and being, and wholly the same as what St. Thomas (On Spiritual Creatures) teaches: «In a spiritual substance there is a composition of potency and act, and consequently of form and matter... But yet this is not properly said according to the common usage of names». — But this exposition is manifestly false, because it does violence to the very clear statements which occur in this question and below at d. 27, a. 1, q. 2. This opinion is also struck down by the controversy itself, drawn out through the centuries among so many authors concerning this composition of matter and form. For never did doubt arise about admitting some distinction between essence and existence, or between that-which-is and by-which-it-is. — It must also be noted that St. Bonaventure held the doctrine here delivered to the end of his life, since in his last work (Hexaëmeron, Sermon II, somewhat before the end) among other [things] he teaches that every created substance is distinguished «by a real distinction of principles, of which one [is] active, the other passive», and (ibid. Sermon IV, about the middle): «For it is necessary, since in every creature an active potency is conjoined to a passive potency, that those two potencies be founded upon diverse principles». Then (a little below) he concludes: «It is less dangerous to say that an Angel is composite, even if it be not true, than that it is simple: because this I attribute to the Angel, not willing to attribute to it what I judge to pertain to God alone, and this on account of reverence for God. But according to truth it seems thus, because Boethius says: A simple form cannot be a subject: therefore to an Angel nothing would then be accident, neither joy nor sorrow».

V. Nevertheless this opinion was neither first invented by St. Bonaventure nor propugned by him alone or by a few, but in that age was held by many and great doctors; whence Peter of Tarentaise (II Sent. d. 17, q. 1, a. 2) says of this controversy: «There is a twofold famous opinion». Its defenders believed it most certainly to be the opinion of St. Augustine, especially on account of the luculent passage from the book On the Wonders of Sacred Scripture (here q. 2, fundamentum 1). But now it is established that this book is spurious. Yet St. Augustine in the books On Genesis according to the Letter several times speaks of spiritual matter, and in a sense which favors the aforesaid opinion, as V, c. 5, n. 13; VII, c. 5, n. 7, c. 6, n. 9; and ibid., after a longer inquiry, c. 17, n. 39, it is said: «What [else] than that the soul is made of spiritual matter is more congruously believed?» — The same opinion, with the same distinctions concerning matter, almost all the Franciscan masters (except John of La Rochelle) taught until the 16th century, among whom we name Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 20, m. 2, § 1, and q. 61, m. 1; Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 2, and a. 2, q. 1, and d. 17, a. 1, q. 1, with very many other ancient disciples of St. Bonaventure, as the unpublished works of Matthew of Aquasparta, William de la Mare (Marra), Peter John Olivi, Alexander of Alexandria attest. But especially to be named is Scotus, who [treats] what he says briefly On the Soul q. 15, in his disputed questions, first edited by Wadding under the title On the Principles of Things, q. 7, 8, treats at length and (q. 7, a. 2) proposes in twelve conclusions. In some [things], however, he himself dissents from St. Bonaventure. For, this one contradicting (below d. 12, a. 1, q. 1), Scotus teaches that matter can be created by God without form. On this hypothesis (as he says ibid. q. 7, a. 2, n. 28) «matter would do nothing, because, although the composite acts, it has its active potency from form; just as form existing without matter would suffer nothing. For just as form is the principle of action, so matter [is the principle] of passion». Which principle St. Thomas also approves (On Power q. 1, a. 1, in the body). The same opinion, at least as probable, defend among the Scotists Peter of Aquila (here q. 1), John of Bacon (II Sent. d. 14, q. 1, a. 3), Nicholas of Nise (c. 92, q. 3), Pelbartus of Themeswar (Rosarium t. II, art. Angelus et materia), Vorrilongus (here q. 1), and very many others. Of the more recent, Jerome of Montefortino in the Summa of Scotus (t. II, q. 50, a. 2) proposes it as probable; and Bartholomew of Barberiis (Cursus theol. p. II, disp. 2, q. 6, 7) wishes to prove at length that it is the more probable. — Of the Order of Preachers, Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 1, a. 2, and d. 17, q. 1, a. 2) esteems both opinions probable, solves the arguments opposed from each part, and names the opinion of St. Bonaventure the prior and the plainer, but the opposite the subtler. But Bl. Albert (here a. 1) rejects indeed the name of matter; but in the thing itself he scarcely departs from St. Bonaventure, while he posits that in all creatures «the first foundation in itself is one... And with this opinion I well concord, and especially on account of this, that it seems impossible that any property be in diverse [things] which is not in them by grace of some common substance; but the property common to many both spiritual and corporeal [things] is to stand-under and to sustain form: therefore it is necessary to posit a common substance which is in them; and this, in my judgment, will not be called matter, but foundation» (cf. the beginning of the following question). — St. Thomas himself, although a propugnator of the opposite opinion, yet asserts (S. I, q. 75, a. 6): «Even granted that the soul were composed of matter and form, as some say, it would still be necessary to posit it incorruptible». This opinion he there, with the example of the heavenly bodies, which in that age were held incorruptible, proves at length. But the opposite opinion now wholly prevails in the schools. It is followed, besides John of La Rochelle and several later Scotists, [by] St. Thomas, II Sent. d. 3, q. 1, a. 1; S. I, q. 50, a. 2, q. 75, a. 5; Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 50; On Spiritual Creatures a. 1; On the Soul, a. 6; and especially On Separate Substances, c. 5-8, where he disputes at length against Avicebron (Ibn Gebirol). — Bl. Albert, loc. cit. and S. p. II, tr. 1, q. 3, m. 3, a. 2, q. incid. 4. — Giles of Rome, here d. 3, p. I, q. 1, a. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 4, q. 16. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. August., VI. de Trin. c. 6. n. 8: Nihil enim simplex mutabile est, omnis autem creatura mutabilis. — Paulo inferius post materia codd. N Q addunt videtur. Dein aliqui codd. ut H I U bb bis mutationis pro mutabilitatis. — Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 12. (I. brev. c. 2.) ait: Sed etiam materiam necesse est in eo quod movetur, intelligere.
    Augustine, VI On the Trinity, c. 6, n. 8: For nothing simple is changeable, but every creature is changeable. — A little below, after materia, codices N Q add videtur. Then some codices, as H I U bb, [read] twice mutationis for mutabilitatis. — Aristotle, II Metaphysics text 12 (I, brief, c. 2), says: But matter too must be understood in that which is moved.
  2. Cap. 19. n. 28: «Et verum est, quod omne mutabile insinuat notitiae nostrae quandam informitatem, qua formam capit, vel qua mutatur et vertitur». Aliqui codd. cum textu originali qua formam capit pro qua forma capitur. — Verba Boethii sunt: Formae vero subiectae esse non possunt. Nam quod ceterae formae [praeter Deum] subiectae accidentibus sint, ut humanitas, non ita accidentia suscipit eo quod ipsa est, sed eo quod materia ei subiecta est. Dum enim materia subiecta humanitati suscipit quodlibet accidens, ipsa hoc suscipere videtur humanitas. Forma vero, quae est sine materia, non poterit esse subiectum nec vero inesse materiae.
    Chapter 19, n. 28: «And it is true that everything changeable suggests to our knowledge a certain formlessness, by which it receives form, or by which it is changed and turned». Some codices, with the original text, [read] qua formam capit for qua forma capitur. — The words of Boethius are: But forms cannot be subjects. For [as to] the fact that the other forms [besides God] are subjected to accidents, like humanity, it [humanity] does not receive accidents by the fact that it itself is, but by the fact that matter is subject to it. For while the matter subject to humanity receives any accident, humanity itself seems to receive this. But form which is without matter cannot be a subject nor indeed be in matter.
  3. De Natura boni, c. 1. n. 1; II. de Lib. Arb. c. 20. n. 34; XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 8; Epist. 118. ad Dioscorum, c. 3. n. 15.
    On the Nature of the Good, c. 1, n. 1; II On Free Choice, c. 20, n. 34; XII On the City of God, c. 8; Epistle 118 to Dioscorus, c. 3, n. 15.
  4. Libr. XII. Confess. c. 3. n. 3: «Nonne tu Domine docuisti me, quod priusquam istam informem materiam formares atque distingueres, non erat aliquid, non color, non figura, non corpus, non spiritus? Non tamen omnino nihil, erat quaedam informitas sine ulla specie». Et ibid. c. 6. n. 6. fatetur, se materiae conceptum tunc acquisivisse, quando ipsam cogitabat ut «quiddam inter formatum et nihil, nec formatum nec nihil, informe prope nihil».
    Book XII Confessions, c. 3, n. 3: «Did you not, Lord, teach me that before you formed and distinguished that formless matter, there was not anything — not color, not figure, not body, not spirit? Yet not wholly nothing: there was a certain formlessness without any species». And ibid. c. 6, n. 6, he confesses that he then acquired the concept of matter, when he conceived it as «something between the formed and nothing, neither formed nor nothing, formless [and] near nothing».
  5. Aristot., II. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 53. (c. 9.): Materiae enim est pati et moveri; movere autem et facere alterius potentiae (scil. formae).
    Aristotle, II On Generation and Corruption, text 53 (c. 9): For it belongs to matter to suffer and to be moved; but to move and to make [belongs] to another potency (namely form).
  6. Cfr. August., III. de Lib. Arbit. c. 19. n. 26.
    Cf. Augustine, III On Free Choice, c. 19, n. 26.
  7. Libr. I. text. 92. (c. 9.): Alterum igitur est hoc caelum et caelum simpliciter; et hoc quidem ut species et forma, illud autem ut cum materia mixtum. Cfr. ibid. text. 95. — Sequens textus habetur I. Phys. text. 66. (c. 7.): Ὅλως ἡ ὕλη ἀριθμητή; XIV. Metaph. c. 8. (XIII. c. 5.) autem modo substantivo: Ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς ὕλη, i. e. numerus vero materia. Cfr. etiam ibid. VII. text. 28. et 41. (VI. c. 8. et 11.), VIII. text. 10. (VII. c. 3.), XII. text. 27. (XI. c. 5.), ubi dicitur, quod materia sit principium numericae diversitatis.
    Book I, text 92 (c. 9): This heaven, therefore, and heaven simply are different; and this indeed as species and form, but that as mixed with matter. Cf. ibid. text 95. — The following text is had [in] I Physics text 66 (c. 7): «Matter is wholly numerable»; XIV Metaphysics c. 8 (XIII, c. 5), however, in the substantive mode: «But number [is] matter», i.e. number indeed [is] matter. Cf. also ibid. VII text 28 and 41 (VI, c. 8 and 11), VIII text 10 (VII, c. 3), XII text 27 (XI, c. 5), where it is said that matter is the principle of numerical diversity.
  8. Aristot., 1. Poster. c. 21. (c. 31.). — Paulo inferius post essentiam supplevimus ex cod. cc et ed. 1 sed, pro quo codd. F K quia habent, cod. T quae.
    Aristotle, 1 Posterior [Analytics], c. 21 (c. 31). — A little below, after essentiam, we have supplied from codex cc and ed. 1 sed, for which codices F K have quia, codex T quae.
  9. Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 43. (VI. c. 12.). — Cod. O naturam generis, in qua convenit cum aliis, et naturam differentiae, in qua differt ab aliis.
    Cf. Aristotle, VII Metaphysics text 43 (VI, c. 12). — Codex O [reads] the nature of genus, in which it agrees with others, and the nature of difference, in which it differs from others.
  10. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 49. (VI. c. 13.). — Paulo superius nonnulli codd. ut A R rationem potentialis pro rationem possibilis.
    Aristotle, VII Metaphysics text 49 (VI, c. 13). — A little above, some codices, as A R, [read] rationem potentialis for rationem possibilis.
  11. Supple cum Vat. quod.
    Supply, with the Vatican edition, quod.
  12. Cap. 6. In hoc textu fere omnes codd. (excepto cod. 1) cuius materia pro cui materia, quod concordat cum originali. In altero textu, qui invenitur ibidem, Vat. spiritum pro speciem.
    Chapter 6. In this text almost all the codices (except codex 1) [read] cuius materia for cui materia, which accords with the original. In the other text, which is found in the same place, the Vatican edition [reads] spiritum for speciem.
  13. Libr. III. text. 6. (c. 4.): «Unde neque rationabile est, ipsum mixtum esse cum corpore. Qualis enim quidam utique fieret, calidus aut frigidus? Et ei instrumentum (organum) aliquod esset, quod esset sicut sensitivo; nunc autem nullum est». Averroes ibid.: «neque corpus neque virtus in corpore».
    Book III, text 6 (c. 4): «Whence it is not even reasonable that it [the intellect] be mixed with body. For of what kind would [it] be, hot or cold? And there would be for it some instrument (organ), as there is for the sensitive [power]; but now there is none». Averroes ibid.: «neither a body nor a power in a body».
  14. Sola Vat. omittit sed cogitari potest rationabiliter. Cod. cc et ed. 1 post sed subiungunt in universo. Codd. W bb nam perfectius pro ita quod perfectius.
    The Vatican edition alone omits sed cogitari potest rationabiliter. Codex cc and ed. 1, after sed, subjoin in universo. Codices W bb [read] nam perfectius for ita quod perfectius.
  15. Gen. 1, 31: Viditque Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. — Verba Damasceni, II. de Fide orthod. c. 29: «Providentia est voluntas Dei, per quam res omnes convenienti ratione reguntur... atque ita, ut meliori modo prorsus existere non possint» (ὅτι ἓν πάντα τὰ ὄντα τὴν πρόσφορον διεξαγωγὴν λαμβάνει... καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔνι κρεῖττω γενέσθαι). Ultimam partem Vat. sola sic exhibet: et ut est melius, facta sunt; sensus quidem idem est, sed sententia Damasceni non ita fideliter quoad verba redditur, sicuti in textu nostro. — Textus August. est loc. cit. libro III. c. 5. n. 13.
    Genesis 1:31: And God saw all [things] which He had made, and they were very good. — The words of Damascene, II On the Orthodox Faith, c. 29: «Providence is the will of God by which all things are ruled by a fitting reason... and so that they could not at all exist in a better mode» (ὅτι... «that all the things which are receive a fitting deduction... and as there is no [possibility] for a better to come to be»). The last part the Vatican edition alone presents thus: and they were made as [there] is better; the sense indeed is the same, but the statement of Damascene is not so faithfully rendered as to the words as in our text. — The text of Augustine is, at the place cited, book III, c. 5, n. 13.
  16. Cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 2. § 8. et c. 9. § 6; August., 83 Qq. q. 2.
    Cf. Dionysius, On the Divine Names, c. 2, § 8, and c. 9, § 6; Augustine, 83 Questions, q. 2.
  17. Codd. U aa ab ipso. Paulo inferius post hoc ipso in cod. A additur quod dependet, et dein post compositionem in Vat. quia differt quo est et quid est.
    Codices U aa [read] ab ipso. A little below, after hoc ipso, in codex A is added quod dependet, and then after compositionem in the Vatican edition quia differt quo est et quid est.
  18. Codd. F N bb compositionem.
    Codices F N bb [read] compositionem.
  19. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2.
    Cf. I Sent. d. 8, p. II, q. 2.
  20. Hic in fundamentis.
    Here in the fundamenta.
  21. Vat., mutata interpunctione, per se entis sic composita. Paulo post codd. P Q potentialis pro possibilis.
    The Vatican edition, the punctuation changed, [reads] per se entis sic composita. A little after, codices P Q [read] potentialis for possibilis.
  22. In fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 de auctoritatibus Boethii et Augustini [cod. Y philosophi et Augustini] dicendum [plures codd. dico, alii dicunt] quod loquuntur de etc. Sed inter obiectiones superius positas nulla ex Augustino invenitur: ergo vel ipsa excidit, vel lectio codd. non est recta; ideoque nihil mutavimus. Ipse August., VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 5. n. 8. seqq. in resolvenda quaestione, utrum anima humana sit a Deo ex nihilo creata, an ex praeiacente materia educta, c. 12. n. 19. dicit: «Omne quippe corpus in omne corpus posse mutari, non defuerunt qui assererent. Corpus autem aliquod sive terrenum sive caeleste converti in animam fierique naturam incorpoream, nec quemquam sensisse scio, nec fides hoc habet». Idem repetit ibid. c. 20. n. 26. Quia S. Bonav. in seqq. ad hanc sententiam recurrit, lectio sic formari posset: Quod ergo obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritatibus Boethii et Philosophi, secundum Augustinum dicendum, quod loquuntur de materia... Et hoc patet, quia ille [ita cod. K pro ipse] vult etc. — Definitio potentiae passivae sumta est ex Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 2. (VIII. c. 1.).
    In almost all the manuscripts and ed. 1 [it reads] de auctoritatibus Boethii et Augustini [codex Y philosophi et Augustini] dicendum [several codices dico, others dicunt] quod loquuntur de etc. But among the objections set above none from Augustine is found: therefore either it [an Augustine objection] dropped out, or the reading of the codices is not correct; and therefore we have changed nothing. Augustine himself, VII On Genesis according to the Letter, c. 5, n. 8 ff., in resolving the question whether the human soul was created by God from nothing or drawn out from pre-lying matter, c. 12, n. 19, says: «That every body can be changed into every body, there have not been lacking [those] who asserted [it]. But that any body, whether earthly or heavenly, is converted into soul and becomes an incorporeal nature, I know neither that anyone has thought, nor does faith hold this». The same he repeats ibid. c. 20, n. 26. Because St. Bonaventure in what follows recurs to this opinion, the reading could be formed thus: To what then is objected to the contrary from the authorities of Boethius and the Philosopher, according to Augustine it must be said that they speak of matter... And this is plain, because that one [so codex K for ipse] wishes etc. — The definition of passive potency is taken from Aristotle, IX Metaphysics text 2 (VIII, c. 1).
  23. Cap. 2. Vide supra pag. 89, nota 2. Ibid. ait: Sed divina substantia sine materia forma est, atque ideo unum est et id quod est. Reliqua enim non sunt id quod sunt etc. — Paulo superius non pauci codd. secundum quam est ratio pro secundum quam est causa. Circa finem solutionis post ibidem codd. H cc et ed. 1 bene supplent dicit.
    Chapter 2. See above p. 89, note 2. There he says: But the divine substance is form without matter, and therefore is one and that which it is. For the rest are not that which they are etc. — A little above, not a few codices [read] secundum quam est ratio for secundum quam est causa. Near the end of the solution, after ibidem, codices H cc and ed. 1 well supply dicit.
  24. Libr. II. de Gen. ad lit. c. 1. n. 2: Nunc enim, quemadmodum Deus instituerit naturas rerum, secundum Scripturas eius nos convenit quaerere, non quid in eis vel ex eis ad miraculum potentiae suae velit operari. — Sequens causa nobilior est effectu: cod. aa suo effectu.
    Book II On Genesis according to the Letter, c. 1, n. 2: For now it befits us to ask, according to His Scriptures, in what manner God instituted the natures of things, not what He may will to work in them or from them for a miracle of His power. — On the following a cause is nobler than its effect: codex aa [reads] suo effectu. ---
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