Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio II. Utrum materia, ex qua compositi sunt Angeli, sit eadem cum materia corporalium.

Secundo dato, quod habeant¹ compositionem ex materia et forma, large sumto nomine materiae ad omne potentiale, quod cum alio venit ad constitutionem tanquam fundamentum rei; quaeritur de illa materia, utrum sit eadem cum materia corporalium. Non loquor de identitate secundum essentiam numeralem, sicut Socrates senex est idem sibi puero secundum substantiam²; sed loquor secundum identitatem naturae communis, ut sicut omnes anuli de auro dicuntur habere eandem materiam per naturam sive essentiam, cum tamen numeraliter varietur, et alia pars secundum substantiam sit in uno, alia in alio. Et quod sit idem per essentiam, videtur.

1. Auctoritate Augustini de Mirabilibus sacrae Scripturae primo capitulo³: «Omnipotens Deus ex informi materia, quam ipse prius de nihilo condidit, cunctarum rerum, hoc est sensibilium et insensibilium, intellectualium et intellectu carentium, species multiformes divisit». Quid hoc expressius?

2. Item, ratione videtur: «In quolibet genere est reperire unum primum, quo mensurantur omnia quae sunt in illo genere», ut vult Philosophus in decimo primae Philosophiae⁴; sed substantia est unum genus, non tantum secundum logicum, qui considerat rerum intentiones, sed secundum metaphysicum, qui considerat essentias rerum: ergo in genere substantiae est unum aliquod, quo mensurantur omnia in illo genere. Sed illud non potest esse principium extrinsecum, cum secundum huius maiorem et minorem participationem intrinsecam⁵ res illius generis magis et minus sint: ergo cum principium intrinsecum non sit nisi forma, vel materia, erit vel materia, vel forma. Si materia, habeo propositum; si forma; sed unitas formae necessario praesupponit unitatem materiae: ergo etc.

3. Item, quandocumque aliqua passio communis inest aliquibus subiectis, necesse est, quod insit eis secundum aliquod commune; sed numerus est in spiritualibus et corporalibus uniformiter, quia eodem numero⁶, quo numeras decem homines, et decem Angelos — numerus enim Angelorum supplebitur ex hominibus — ergo necesse est, aliquam naturam communem in eis reperire, secundum quam haec passio insit. Sed hoc non potest esse forma: restat ergo, quod materia.

4. Item, abstrahatur materia corporalium ab omni forma, iterum materia spiritualium⁷; aut distinguitur, aut non. Si non: ergo sunt idem per essentiam; si sic: cum omnis distinctio sit a forma, ergo habebit formam. Si tu dicas, quod distinctio perfecta est a forma, sed sicut materia habet esse incompletum, ita et distinctionem incompletam; contra: illud in quo maxime differunt spiritualia et corporalia, est simplicitas et compositio: sed materia abstracta ab omni forma est ita simplex, ut punctus: ergo nullam partibilitatem habet: ergo si in hoc non differunt, non videtur, quod in alio. Si dicas, quod per capacitatem; contra: materia non est sua capacitas per essentiam⁸: ergo contingit eam abstrahi a capacitate. Abstrahatur ergo materia spiritualium et corporalium a capacitate; quaero, per quid differant; nullam omnino est dare, nullam assignare differentiam: ergo essentia est eadem per naturam.

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5. Item, forma generis est abstrahibilis a formis specierum sive a differentiis; sed substantia dicit formam generis, corporeum et incorporeum sunt differentiae: ergo ab his potest abstrahi. Sed forma generis naturaliter est prior quam forma differentiarum, sicut dicit Philosophus⁹, quod prius est animal quam homo. Consideretur igitur materia spiritualium et corporalium sub forma generis: nec differunt quantum ad formam, quae consequitur ipsam essentiam materiae¹⁰: ergo multo fortius non differunt quoad ipsam materiam, ut videtur.

6. Item, cum dicitur: materia rerum corporalium est materia, spiritualium materia est materia; aut est convenientia in solo nomine, aut in habitudine, aut in essentia¹¹. Si in solo nomine: ergo cum sit aequivocatio in primo principio, ergo nulla est univocatio. Si in comparatione; abstrahatur ab illa comparatione, tunc aut erit dictum per convenientiam in essentia, aut aequivocatio pura.

Contra:

1. Augustinus duodecimo Confessionum¹²: «Duo fecisti Domine, unum prope te, aliud prope nihil». Et iterum in duodecimo: «Duo sunt carentia temporibus: unum, quod sine ullo defectu contemplationis et sine ullo intervallo mutationis tua aeternitate perfruatur; alterum, quod ita informe erat, ut ex alia forma in quam formam mutaretur, non haberet». Si ergo, quae recte dividuntur, unum non intrat in constitutionem alterius, si angelica natura dividitur contra corporalem naturam sive corporalium¹³: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod loquitur de ea secundum esse; hoc nihil est, quia loquitur de ea, sicut patet in antecedentibus et consequentibus, secundum quod omni forma erat privata, sive ut intelligitur sub omnimoda informitate, et sic consideratur ut immutabilis: ergo etc. Beda¹⁴ etiam et alii Sancti ut sic dividunt.

2. Item, quaecumque communicant in materia, sunt ad invicem transmutabilia, sicut dicit Boethius de Duabus Naturis et una persona Christi¹⁵; sed spiritualia et corporalia non sunt huiusmodi: ergo etc.

3. Item, ratione videtur: sicut potentia agendi essentialiter consequitur formam, ita potentia suscipiendi essentialiter, immo essentialius consequitur materiam¹⁶; sed necessario sequitur, quod si sunt diversae potentiae primae et essentiales aliquarum formarum, ita quod ad aliquem effectum vel actum ordinatur una forma, ad quem non alia, quod differunt per essentiam. Cum ergo materia subiecta corporalibus formis nullo modo possit capere formas spirituales per individuam perfectionem, nec e converso, quia nunquam de Angelo potest fieri corpus, nec e converso: ergo differunt per essentiam.

4. Item, partibilitas inest rebus corporalibus: aut ergo a parte formae, aut a parte materiae radicaliter. Non a parte formae, quia «omnis forma est in simplici essentia consistens¹⁷»: ergo principaliter a parte materiae et originaliter. Aut igitur consequitur ipsam materiam secundum se, aut non; si non, ut si materia sit simplex, quantum est de se, ut punctus: ergo sicut punctus non potest esse materia vel pars superficiei, ita nec materia pars corporis. Quodsi hoc absurdum est¹⁸ — quia dimensiones secundum rationem infinitam consequuntur materiam secundum se: cum ergo sit in corporalibus et spiritualibus, patet etc.

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5. Item, ostenditur hoc a parte finis, quia Angeli facti sunt ad videndam claritatem summae lucis¹⁹: sed materia corporalium de se tenebra est, quod magis permiscetur et magis unitur ei, tanto minus cognoscit et magis est tenebrosum. Si ergo forma Angeli unitur suae materiae maxima indivisione, substantia eius esset ineptissima ad contemplandam lucem. Si ergo propter hoc solum factus est, nunquam habet materiam conformem per unitatem naturae materiae corporali.

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6. Item, videtur, quod non sit ponere materiam tanquam mensuram generis substantiae rerum, quia quae magis participant de ratione materiae, minus sunt entia, et ipsa est quid ignobilissimum in genere entium, quia «prope nihil²⁰». Si ergo illud unum, quod est mensura generis, debet esse perfectissimum in genere illo, ut albedo in genere coloris: patet etc.

Conclusio

Duplici via monstratur, solutionem tum negantem tum affirmantem verum dicere; eos autem melius iudicare asseritur, qui metaphysice materiam secundum suam essentiam intelligunt et eandem esse ponunt.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hanc quaestionem sapientes videntur contrariari sapientibus. Nam magni et profundi clerici et in theologia et in philosophia, qui magis fuerunt veritatis inquisitores, diversificati sunt.

Quidam enim posuerunt, quod materia in spiritualibus et corporalibus differt nec habet unitatem nisi analogiae. — Alii posuerunt, quod est una per essentiam. — Si quis autem velit diligenter considerare, quae istarum positionum sit probabilior et verior, et attendere ad rationes moventes, videbit, quod utraque opinio secundum diversas vias verum dicat, ita quod neutri sunt decepti.

Ratio autem huius diversae positionis fuit diversus modus cognoscendi materiam. Materia enim dupliciter est scibilis, scilicet per privationem et per analogiam. Cognitio per privationem est prius removendo formam, deinde disponens ad formam, et considerando ipsam essentiam nudam in se quasi tenebram intelligibilem. — Cognitio autem per analogiam est per consimilem habitudinem; habitudo autem materiae est per potentiam, et ita haec cognitio est per comparationem materiae ad formam mediante potentia. Potentia autem materiae dupliciter potest comparari ad formam: aut in quantum praebet ei fulcimentum in ratione entis, et sic considerat metaphysicus²¹; aut sub ratione mobilis, et sic considerat naturalis philosophus.

Considerantes igitur materiam secundum privationem omnis formae, tam substantialis quam accidentalis, eadem est; in spiritualibus et corporalibus, dixerunt, per essentiam, quod si enim ab omnibus formis et ab omnibus accidentibus separetur utraque materia, nulla omnino diversitas apparebit²².

Considerantes autem materiam secundum analogiam, scilicet sub ratione potentiae, in quantum praebet fulcimentum formae in ratione entis, dixerunt, esse eandem secundum analogiam, quia ibi consimilis habitudo habetur. Sicut enim materia corporalium sustinet et dat suis formis existere et subsistere, ita etiam materia spiritualium. Est etiam ibi ratio participationis secundum plus et minus. Nam in spiritualibus substat²³ formae substantiali tantum, in corporibus superioribus formae substantiali et quantitati, in inferioribus formae substantiali et quantitati et contrarietati. Et quoniam quod pure est in genere substantiae plus participat de ratione per se stantis et independentis, quod autem plus accedit ad naturam accidentium magis elongatur; hinc est, quod substantiae spirituales per prius et verius sunt substantiae, deinde corpora superiora, postremo corpora inferiora. Et hi non dixerunt, quod esset eadem proprie, quia nec materia corporalium est nata sustinere formas spirituales, nec e converso. — Considerantes autem secundum analogiam sub ratione potentiae, in quantum praebet fulcimentum formae in ratione mobilis, dixerunt etiam, esse eandem per analogiam. Quoniam, sicut in corporalibus est aliquid, quod sustinet variationes quoad proprietates corporales, ita in spiritualibus quoad spirituales; et est ibi ratio prioris et posterioris in participando. Nam materia potest esse fulcimentum variationis secundum situm et formam, ut in corporibus corruptibilibus; aut ad situm tantum, ut in superioribus; aut ad receptionem influentiae et habituum, et perditionem, ut in substantiis spiritualibus.

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Et secundum hanc considerationem proprie est materia in corporibus corruptibilibus, minus proprie in corporibus incorruptibilibus, minime in spiritibus — et inde etiam est, quod dicuntur aliquando immateriales, quia minimum habent de hac possibilitate — et secundum hoc materia est infimum. Et hi non posuerunt materiam eandem²⁴, quoniam materia in Angelis non habet possibilitatem ad transmutationem formarum substantialium nec est possibilis ad recipiendum formas corporales. Et inde est, quod dicit Philosophus, quod spiritualium et corporalium non est materia una²⁵, considerans potentiam materiae in relatione ad formam ut mobilem.

Ex his patet ratio diversitatis et via harum positionum, et quod verum dicunt secundum diversas vias et secundum diversos modos intelligendi. Et sic currunt diversae rationes, et auctoritates inveniuntur ad partes oppositas. Et patet responsio obiectorum. Nec est contradictio, si quis recte intelligat utramque.

Vel aliter potest dici, quod cum loquimur de unitate materiae, loquimur de ipsa, prout ad eam stat resolutio principiatorum; ideo tripliciter possumus loqui, secundum quod tres sunt, qui docent, resolutionem facere ad principium materiale. Nam ad materiam resolvit naturalis, qui considerat generationem et corruptionem: ad eam resolvit physicus universalis, qui considerat omne corpus mobile sive ad situm, sive ad formam; ad eam resolvit metaphysicus, qui considerat omne ens: et unusquisque resolvit secundum amplitudinem suae considerationis.

Nam physicus²⁶ inferior, qui negotiatur circa generationem et corruptionem, considerat materiam, ut est principium generationis et corruptionis; et sic est solum in his inferioribus. Et quoniam omnia talia sunt ad invicem transmutabilia, ideo solum dicit eandem materiam generabilium et corruptibilium. — Physicus superior considerat ipsam materiam mutabilem sive ad situm, sive ad formam, et videt eandem passionem in inferioribus et superioribus, per quam mutabilia sunt ad situm, ut partibilitatem mobilis, cuius principium est materia; et ideo resolvit ad materiam omnis rei corporalis, et secundum hunc physicum est eadem materia in omnibus corporalibus. — Metaphysicus considerat naturam omnis creaturae, et maxime substantiae per se entis, in qua est considerare et actum essendi, et hunc dat forma; et stabilitatem per se existendi, et hanc dat et praestat illud cui innititur forma; hoc est materia. Et quoniam per se esse in spiritualibus et corporalibus dicit communitatem, non aequivocationem, et communitatem²⁷ generis et rei, non analogiae solum²⁸; ideo oportet recurrere ad principii unitatem; ideo secundum metaphysicum in omnibus per se entibus est ponere unitatem materiae.

Omnium istorum philosophorum consideratio vera est, sed differenter iudicant. Physicus enim non dicit, eandem esse materiam nisi in corporalibus²⁹, quia nunquam venit ad considerandum materiam secundum essentiam, sed solum secundum esse; et absque dubio aliquod esse habet in corporalibus, quod non in spiritualibus, et aliquod in corruptibilibus, quod non in incorruptibilibus. — Metaphysicus vero non tantum secundum esse, sed secundum essentiam³⁰ considerat; et quia, abstracto omni esse, non est reperire nec etiam fingere diversitatem in materia; ideo dicit, esse unam per essentiam.

Et ideo, cum hanc quaestionem tractat theologus, aut pertractat eam sicut naturalis, aut sicut metaphysicus, quia ipse potest accipere modos omnium scientiarum, cum ei famulentur. Si ut naturalis, sic dicet, non esse eandem; si ut metaphysicus, dicet eandem esse per essentiam, differentem secundum esse. Et quoniam nobiliori modo iudicat metaphysicus quam scientiae inferiores, ideo hi qui posuerunt materiam eandem in spiritualibus et corporalibus, altius elevati, melius iudicaverunt, quamvis secundum diversas considerationes utrique potuerint dicere verum, ut prius ostensum est.

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Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes materiam eandem per essentiam in spiritualibus et corporalibus, sicut manifeste innuit Augustinus in libro de Mirabilibus sacrae Scripturae, qui fuit altissimus metaphysicus.

1. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod distinguitur materia contra angelicam naturam; dicendum, quod loquitur de materia secundum esse, non secundum essentiam. — Vel aliter, distinguitur ratione actualitatis³¹, quae est in Angelo, ratione cuius summe inter creaturas appropinquat Deo, et ratione possibilitatis, quae est in materia de se, ratione cuius est prope nihil.

2. Quod obiicitur: quorum materia est una etc.; dicendum, quod loquitur de materia secundum esse, hoc est de materia transmutabili, ratione cuius dicuntur res ad invicem transmutabiles; et ideo sermo ille secundum physicum et in genere physici est intelligendus, et alii sermones consimiles, qui dicunt, materiam esse diversam. Omnes enim loquuntur de materia secundum esse.

3. Quod obiicitur de potentia suscipiendi, dicendum, quod potentia materiae secundum se consideratae non est magis ad hanc formam quam ad aliam, immo indifferenter se habet ad omnem³². Nam materia in se considerata nec est spiritualis, nec corporalis; et ideo capacitas consequens essentiam materiae indifferenter se habet ad formam sive spiritualem, sive corporalem; sed quia materia nunquam exspoliatur ab omni esse, et quae semel est sub esse corporali nunquam exuitur, et similiter illa quae est sub esse spirituali: hinc est, quod materia consequens esse in spiritualibus et corporalibus est alia et alia.

4. Quod obiicitur de partibilitate, dicendum, quod hoc non est ratione ipsius materiae, quia materia, abstracta omni forma, simplex est; non tamen habet actualem simplicitatem, ut punctus, sed est simplex, quia caret actuali extensione, habet tamen possibilitatem ad illam; et cum natura formae corporalis illi materiae datur, tunc reducitur ad actum. Unde cum dicitur, quod extensio est a materia, non est intelligendum, quod³³ a materia secundum suam essentiam, sed secundum esse, prout suscipit formam corporalem, quae non est nata esse in materia nisi cum extensione, quamvis ipsa in se sit «simplici essentia consistens³⁴».

5. Quod obiicitur, quod materia est tenebra; dicendum, quod tenebra dicitur ratione privationis formae, quae³⁵ forma lumen est; et ideo materia cum privatione repugnaret contemplationi. Et quia in Angelis facta est sub actu perfecto, sublata privatione; hinc est, quod remota est ab ea ratio tenebrositatis; et sic patet illud. Non enim est tenebra per essentiam, nisi quis forte dicat tenebram comparative: sicut creatura omnis tenebra est respectu summae lucis, sic et materia tenebra potest dici et respectu Dei et respectu formae, qua perficitur.

6. Quod obiicitur, quod materia non est illud quo omnia mensurantur³⁶; dicendum, quod licet aliqui voluerint dicere, quod materia, ratione qua est fundamentum, dat esse fixum, et in ea ratione est ratio mensurandi, quia plus sapit et participat de natura generis substantiae, quod magis in se ipso fulcitum est; tamen illud non est conveniens dicere, quod ipsa materia sit illud unum, cum hoc debeat esse completissimum, sicut dicitur in decimo primae Philosophiae³⁷, «quod albedo est mensura omnium colorum». Et ideo dicendum, quod non ponimus materiam unam, quia ipsa sit mensura, sed quia, si non est materia una, impossibile est ponere aliquod unum mensurans, cum illud praesupponat illam³⁸. Quid autem sit illud unum, quod est mensura omnium, quae sunt in genere substantiae, hoc est alterius inquisitionis.

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Scholion

I. Circa unitatem materiae omnibus rebus, ut supponitur, communis, primo in hac q. 2. quaeritur, utrum sit unitas specifica, secundo in q. 3, utrum sit unitas numerica. Neutra quaestio potest habere locum in sententia eorum, qui materiam nullo modo in Angelis ponendam esse censent. Alteram sententiam sequentes disputabant de unitate materiae metaphysicae. S. Bonav. censet, ipsam secundum essentiam sive metaphysice esse unam in omnibus creatis, «unam non unitate universalitatis, nec singularitatis, sed medio modo» (supra d. 2. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. circa med.), sed quatenus ipsa substat formis sive in sensu physico, eam esse diversam in spiritualibus et corporalibus creaturis, nec unam nisi secundum analogiam. Cfr. infra d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. in fine. Ex praedictis autem facile intelligitur, terminos specifica et numerica non posse accipi in sensu proprio, sed debere intelligi in sensu transcendentali i. e. extra decem genera praedicamentorum. Nam materia metaphysica est «ens omnino in potentia, ideo nec genus nec species esse potest, quae dicunt aliquo modo actum» (hic in corp.). Haec unitas magis explicatur infra q. 3. (in fine corp.) et vocatur a S. Doctore unitas homogeneitatis. Homogeneum autem dicitur proprie id quod habet partes omnes eiusdem rationis, ut aqua, et cuius quaelibet pars recipit praedicationem totius.

II. Auctores pauci, qui de his tractant, una quaestione hanc et sequentem absolvunt. In solutione consentiunt Scotus, de Rerum princip. q. 8. a. 1; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Sed Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. tantum argumenta pro responsione affirmativa et negativa affert et solvit, quin suum de his sententiis iudicium proferat.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether the matter of which the Angels are composed is the same as the matter of corporeal things.

It being secondly granted that they have¹ a composition of matter and form, the name of matter being taken broadly for every potential [principle] which comes with another to a constitution as the foundation of the thing; it is asked concerning that matter whether it is the same as the matter of corporeal things. I do not speak of identity according to numeral essence, as old Socrates is the same to himself [as] a boy according to substance²; but I speak according to identity of common nature, so that, just as all rings of gold are said to have the same matter by nature or essence, although it is numerically varied, and one part according to substance is in one, another in another. And that it is the same by essence, it seems.

1. By the authority of Augustine, On the Wonders of Sacred Scripture, the first chapter³: «Almighty God, out of formless matter, which He Himself first founded from nothing, divided the multiform species of all things, that is, of sensible and insensible, intellectual and lacking intellect». What [is] more express than this?

2. Likewise, it seems by reason: «In every genus there is to be found one first [thing] by which all the things which are in that genus are measured», as the Philosopher holds in the tenth [book] of the First Philosophy⁴; but substance is one genus, not only according to the logician, who considers the intentions of things, but according to the metaphysician, who considers the essences of things: therefore in the genus of substance there is some one [thing] by which all in that genus are measured. But that cannot be an extrinsic principle, since by its greater and lesser intrinsic participation⁵ the things of that genus are more and less: therefore since an intrinsic principle is only form or matter, it will be either matter or form. If matter, I have what I propose; if form; but the unity of form necessarily presupposes the unity of matter: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, whenever some common passion is in some subjects, it is necessary that it be in them according to something common; but number is in spiritual and corporeal [things] uniformly, because by the same number⁶ by which you number ten men, also ten Angels — for the number of the Angels will be supplied from men — therefore it is necessary to find some common nature in them, according to which this passion is [in them]. But this cannot be form: it remains, therefore, that [it is] matter.

4. Likewise, let the matter of corporeal things be abstracted from every form, again the matter of spiritual [things]⁷; either it is distinguished, or not. If not: then they are the same by essence; if so: since every distinction is from form, then it will have form. If you say that perfect distinction is from form, but that just as matter has incomplete being, so also incomplete distinction; on the contrary: that in which spiritual and corporeal [things] most differ is simplicity and composition: but matter abstracted from every form is as simple as a point: therefore it has no partibility: therefore if they do not differ in this, it does not seem [that they differ] in another. If you say [they differ] by capacity; on the contrary: matter is not its capacity by essence⁸: therefore it happens to be abstracted from capacity. Let then the matter of spiritual and corporeal [things] be abstracted from capacity; I ask by what they differ; there is none at all to give, no difference to assign: therefore the essence is the same by nature.

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5. Likewise, the form of the genus is abstractable from the forms of the species or from the differences; but substance states the form of the genus, corporeal and incorporeal are differences: therefore from these it can be abstracted. But the form of the genus is naturally prior to the form of the differences, as the Philosopher says⁹, that animal is prior to man. Let then the matter of spiritual and corporeal [things] be considered under the form of the genus: nor do they differ as to the form which follows the essence of matter itself¹⁰: therefore much more strongly they do not differ as to matter itself, as it seems.

6. Likewise, when it is said: the matter of corporeal things is matter, the matter of spiritual [things] is matter; either there is agreement in name only, or in relation, or in essence¹¹. If in name only: then since there is equivocation in the first principle, then there is no univocation. If in comparison; let it be abstracted from that comparison, then either it will be said by agreement in essence, or pure equivocation.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine, twelfth [book] of the Confessions¹²: «Two [things] You made, Lord, one near You, the other near nothing». And again in the twelfth: «There are two [things] lacking in times: one which without any defect of contemplation and without any interval of change enjoys Your eternity; the other which was so formless that it had not [a form] out of which it might be changed into [another] form». If, therefore, [the things] which are rightly divided — one does not enter into the constitution of the other — if the angelic nature is divided against corporeal nature or [the nature] of corporeal things¹³: therefore etc. If you say that he speaks of it according to being; this is nothing, because he speaks of it, as is plain in the antecedents and consequents, according as it was deprived of every form, or as it is understood under all-comprehensive formlessness, and so is considered as immutable: therefore etc. Bede¹⁴ too and other Saints so divide [it].

2. Likewise, whatever [things] communicate in matter are mutually transmutable, as Boethius says in On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ¹⁵; but spiritual and corporeal [things] are not of this kind: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason: just as the potency of acting essentially follows form, so the potency of receiving essentially — indeed more essentially — follows matter¹⁶; but it necessarily follows that, if there are diverse first and essential potencies of certain forms, so that to some effect or act one form is ordered, to which not another, [then] they differ by essence. Since therefore the matter subject to corporeal forms can in no way receive spiritual forms by individual perfection, nor conversely, because never can a body be made from an Angel, nor conversely: therefore they differ by essence.

4. Likewise, partibility is in corporeal things: either then from the part of form, or from the part of matter radically. Not from the part of form, because «every form consists in a simple essence¹⁷»: therefore principally from the part of matter and originally. Either then it follows matter itself in itself, or not; if not, [then] as if matter is simple, as far as is of itself, like a point: therefore just as a point cannot be matter or a part of a surface, so neither [can] matter [be] a part of a body. And if this is absurd¹⁸ — because dimensions according to an infinite character follow matter in itself: since therefore [matter] is in corporeal and spiritual [things], it is plain etc.

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5. Likewise, this is shown from the part of the end, because the Angels were made to see the brightness of the highest light¹⁹: but the matter of corporeal things is of itself darkness; the more it is intermixed and the more it is united to it, the less it knows and the more it is dark. If therefore the form of the Angel is united to its matter by the greatest indivision, its substance would be most unfit for contemplating the light. If therefore for this alone it was made, it never has matter conformable [to it] by a unity of nature [with] corporeal matter.

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6. Likewise, it seems that matter is not to be posited as the measure of the genus of the substance of things, because the [things] which participate more of the character of matter are less beings, and it itself is the most ignoble [thing] in the genus of beings, since [it is] «near nothing²⁰». If therefore that one [thing] which is the measure of the genus must be the most perfect in that genus, like whiteness in the genus of color: it is plain etc.

Conclusion

By a twofold way it is shown that the solution, both the negating and the affirming, says the truth; but those are asserted to judge better who metaphysically understand matter according to its essence and posit it to be the same.

I respond: It must be said that concerning this question the wise seem to contradict the wise. For great and profound clerics, both in theology and in philosophy, who were more the inquirers of truth, were diversified.

For some posited that matter in spiritual and corporeal [things] differs and has no unity except of analogy. — Others posited that it is one by essence. — But if anyone wishes diligently to consider which of these positions is the more probable and the truer, and to attend to the moving reasons, he will see that each opinion according to diverse ways says the truth, so that neither are deceived.

But the reason of this diverse position was the diverse mode of knowing matter. For matter is knowable in two ways, namely by privation and by analogy. Cognition by privation is, first by removing form, then disposing toward form, and considering the bare essence itself in itself as it were an intelligible darkness. — But cognition by analogy is by a like relation; but the relation of matter is by potency, and so this cognition is by the comparison of matter to form by means of potency. But the potency of matter can be compared to form in two ways: either in so far as it furnishes it a support in the character of a being, and so the metaphysician considers [it]²¹; or under the character of the mobile, and so the natural philosopher considers [it].

Those considering matter, therefore, according to the privation of every form, both substantial and accidental, [say it] is the same; in spiritual and corporeal [things], they said, by essence, because if each matter be separated from all forms and from all accidents, no diversity at all will appear²².

But those considering matter according to analogy, namely under the character of potency, in so far as it furnishes the support of form in the character of a being, said it is the same according to analogy, because there a like relation is had. For just as the matter of corporeal things sustains and gives to its forms to exist and subsist, so also the matter of spiritual [things]. There is also there a character of participation according to more and less. For in spiritual [things] it stands under²³ the substantial form only, in the higher bodies under the substantial form and quantity, in the lower under the substantial form and quantity and contrariety. And since that which is purely in the genus of substance participates more of the character of [something] standing per se and independent, but that which approaches more the nature of accidents is more distanced; hence it is that spiritual substances are prior and more truly substances, then the higher bodies, lastly the lower bodies. And these did not say that it was the same properly, because neither is the matter of corporeal things born to sustain spiritual forms, nor conversely. — But those considering according to analogy under the character of potency, in so far as it furnishes the support of form in the character of the mobile, said also that it is the same by analogy. Since, just as in corporeal [things] there is something which sustains the variations as to corporeal properties, so in spiritual [things] as to spiritual [ones]; and there is there a character of prior and posterior in participating. For matter can be a support of variation according to position and form, as in corruptible bodies; or to position only, as in the higher [ones]; or to the reception of influence and habits, and [their] loss, as in spiritual substances.

p. 97

And according to this consideration matter is properly in corruptible bodies, less properly in incorruptible bodies, least of all in spirits — and hence too it is that they are sometimes called immaterial, because they have the least of this possibility — and according to this matter is the lowest. And these did not posit the same matter²⁴, since matter in the Angels has not the possibility for the transmutation of substantial forms, nor is it capable of receiving corporeal forms. And hence it is that the Philosopher says that of spiritual and corporeal [things] the matter is not one²⁵, considering the potency of matter in relation to form as mobile.

From these [things] the reason of the diversity and the way of these positions is plain, and that they say the truth according to diverse ways and according to diverse modes of understanding. And so the diverse reasons run, and the authorities are found [tending] to opposite parts. And the response to the objections is plain. Nor is there a contradiction, if one rightly understands both.

Or it can be said otherwise, that when we speak of the unity of matter, we speak of it as the resolution of [things] caused [by principles] stands toward it; therefore in three ways we can speak, according as there are three who teach [how] to make resolution to the material principle. For the natural [philosopher], who considers generation and corruption, resolves to matter: to it the universal physicist resolves, who considers every mobile body, whether to position or to form; to it the metaphysician resolves, who considers every being: and each one resolves according to the amplitude of his consideration.

For the lower physicist²⁶, who deals with generation and corruption, considers matter as it is the principle of generation and corruption; and so it is only in these lower [things]. And since all such [things] are mutually transmutable, therefore he only says the same matter of the generable and corruptible. — The higher physicist considers matter itself [as] mobile, whether to position or to form, and sees the same passion in the lower and the higher, by which they are mutable to position, like the partibility of the mobile, whose principle is matter; and therefore he resolves to the matter of every corporeal thing, and according to this physicist the matter is the same in all corporeal [things]. — The metaphysician considers the nature of every creature, and most of all of the substance being-per-se, in which there is to consider both the act of being, and this form gives; and the stability of existing-per-se, and this that on which form rests gives and furnishes; this is matter. And since per-se being in spiritual and corporeal [things] states a community, not an equivocation, and a community²⁷ of genus and of thing, not of analogy only²⁸; therefore one must recur to the unity of the principle; therefore according to the metaphysician in all beings-per-se the unity of matter is to be posited.

The consideration of all these philosophers is true, but they judge differently. For the physicist does not say the matter is the same except in corporeal [things]²⁹, because he never comes to consider matter according to essence, but only according to being; and without doubt it has some being in corporeal [things] which [it does] not in spiritual [ones], and some in corruptible [ones] which [it does] not in incorruptible [ones]. — But the metaphysician considers not only according to being but according to essence³⁰; and because, every being abstracted, there is not to be found nor even to feign a diversity in matter; therefore he says it is one by essence.

And therefore, when the theologian treats this question, he either treats it like the natural [philosopher] or like the metaphysician, because he himself can take the modes of all the sciences, since they serve him. If as the natural [philosopher], he will say it is not the same; if as the metaphysician, he will say it is the same by essence, differing according to being. And since the metaphysician judges in a nobler mode than the inferior sciences, therefore those who posited matter the same in spiritual and corporeal [things], raised higher, judged better, although according to diverse considerations both could say the truth, as was shown before.

p. 98

The reasons proving matter the same by essence in spiritual and corporeal [things] are therefore to be granted, as Augustine manifestly intimates in the book On the Wonders of Sacred Scripture, who was a most lofty metaphysician.

1. To what then is objected, that matter is distinguished against the angelic nature; it must be said that he speaks of matter according to being, not according to essence. — Or otherwise, it is distinguished by reason of the actuality³¹ which is in the Angel, by reason of which it most highly among creatures approaches God, and by reason of the possibility which is in matter of itself, by reason of which it is near nothing.

2. To what is objected: of which [things] the matter is one etc.; it must be said that he speaks of matter according to being, that is of transmutable matter, by reason of which things are said to be mutually transmutable; and therefore that statement is to be understood according to the physicist and in the genus of the physicist, and the other like statements which say that matter is diverse. For all speak of matter according to being.

3. To what is objected concerning the potency of receiving, it must be said that the potency of matter considered in itself is not more to this form than to another, but rather is related indifferently to every [form]³². For matter considered in itself is neither spiritual nor corporeal; and therefore the capacity following the essence of matter is related indifferently to form, whether spiritual or corporeal; but because matter is never despoiled of all being, and that which is once under corporeal being is never stripped [of it], and likewise that which is under spiritual being: hence it is that the matter following being in spiritual and corporeal [things] is one and another.

4. To what is objected concerning partibility, it must be said that this is not by reason of matter itself, because matter, abstracted from every form, is simple; yet it does not have actual simplicity, like a point, but is simple because it lacks actual extension, but has the possibility to it; and when the nature of corporeal form is given to that matter, then it is reduced to act. Whence when it is said that extension is from matter, it is not to be understood that³³ [it is] from matter according to its essence, but according to being, as it receives corporeal form, which is born to be in matter only with extension, although it itself in itself «consists of a simple essence³⁴».

5. To what is objected, that matter is darkness; it must be said that it is called darkness by reason of the privation of form, which³⁵ form is light; and therefore matter with privation would be repugnant to contemplation. And because in the Angels it was made under perfect act, the privation being removed; hence it is that the character of darkness is removed from it; and so that is plain. For it is not darkness by essence, unless perhaps one says darkness comparatively: just as every creature is darkness with respect to the highest light, so also matter can be called darkness both with respect to God and with respect to the form by which it is perfected.

6. To what is objected, that matter is not that by which all [things] are measured³⁶; it must be said that, although some have wished to say that matter, by reason of which it is a foundation, gives fixed being, and in that respect there is in it the character of measuring, because it savors and participates more of the nature of the genus of substance, which is more supported in itself; yet that is not fitting to say, that matter itself is that one [thing], since this must be the most complete, as is said in the tenth [book] of the First Philosophy³⁷, «that whiteness is the measure of all colors». And therefore it must be said that we do not posit matter as one because it itself is the measure, but because, if matter is not one, it is impossible to posit some one measuring [thing], since that presupposes it³⁸. But what that one [thing] is, which is the measure of all [things] which are in the genus of substance, this [belongs] to another inquiry.

p. 99

Scholion

I. Concerning the unity of matter common to all things, as is supposed, first in this q. 2 it is asked whether there is a specific unity, secondly in q. 3 whether there is a numerical unity. Neither question can have a place in the opinion of those who judge that matter is in no way to be posited in the Angels. Those following the other opinion disputed about the unity of metaphysical matter. St. Bonaventure judges that it, according to essence or metaphysically, is one in all created [things], «one not by a unity of universality, nor of singularity, but in a middle mode» (above d. 2, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, in the body, about the middle), but in so far as it stands under forms or in the physical sense, that it is diverse in spiritual and corporeal creatures, nor one except according to analogy. Cf. below d. 12, a. 2, q. 1, at the end. From the aforesaid, however, it is easily understood that the terms specific and numerical cannot be taken in the proper sense, but must be understood in a transcendental sense, i.e. outside the ten genera of the predicaments. For metaphysical matter is «a being wholly in potency, therefore it cannot be either a genus or a species, which state act in some mode» (here in the body). This unity is more explained below q. 3 (at the end of the body) and is called by the holy Doctor unity of homogeneity. But homogeneous is properly said [of] that which has all its parts of the same character, like water, and any part of which receives the predication of the whole.

II. The few authors who treat of these resolve this and the following [question] in one question. In the solution Scotus agrees, On the Principles of Things q. 8, a. 1; Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 1. — But Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3, only brings forward and solves the arguments for the affirmative and negative response, without bringing forth his own judgment about these opinions.

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Apparatus Criticus

Vat. Angelus habeat. Mox plures codd. cum ed. 1 possibile pro potentiale.
The Vatican edition [reads] Angelus habeat. Then several codices with ed. 1 [read] possibile for potentiale.
Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Differentia.
Cf. Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter on Difference.
Libr. I, sed non est Augustini, vide Schol. ad q. 1. — In hoc textu cod. V cum originali ex nihilo pro de nihilo. Paulo superius cod. O Et quod sit eadem pro Et quod sit idem.
Book I, but it is not Augustine's, see the Scholion at q. 1. — In this text codex V, with the original, [reads] ex nihilo for de nihilo. A little above codex O [reads] Et quod sit eadem for Et quod sit idem.
In hac propositione, quae ex Averroe sumta est, complectuntur ea quae Aristot. loc. cit. text. 3. seqq. (IX. c. 1.) maxime text. 7. de mensura dicit. — De seq. prop. cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia; IV. et VI. Metaph. text. 1. seqq. (III. et V. c. 1.), in qua plures codd. voci intentiones praemittunt rationes et, cod. U praeterea addit communes. Paulo inferius post in genere substantiae est codd. U X Y interserunt reperire, et dein post omnia cod. H adiungit quae sunt.
In this proposition, which is taken from Averroes, are comprehended those [things] which Aristotle at the place cited, text 3 ff. (IX, c. 1), especially text 7, says about measure. — On the following proposition cf. Aristotle, Categories, the chapter on Substance; IV and VI Metaphysics text 1 ff. (III and V, c. 1), in which several codices prefix to the word intentiones [the words] rationes et, codex U moreover adds communes. A little below, after in genere substantiae est, codices U X Y insert reperire, and then after omnia codex H adds quae sunt.
Non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 perperam extrinsecam.
Not a few codices, with editions 1, 2, wrongly [read] extrinsecam.
Fide codd. H K P Q T V bb pro modo substituimus numero, quod Aristoteli magis congruit (de quo vide supra d. 2. p. 1. a. 1. q. 1. arg. 4. ad opp.), et paulo inferius τρόπος pro esse, quod tantum cod. cc et ed. 1 cum Vat. ponunt. Circa initium arg. aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 substantiis pro subiectis.
On the faith of codices H K P Q T V bb we substitute for modo the word numero, which agrees better with Aristotle (on which see above d. 2, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, arg. 4, ad opp.), and a little below τρόπος ["mode"] for esse, which only codex cc and ed. 1 with the Vatican edition put. Near the beginning of the argument some codices with ed. 1 [read] substantiis for subiectis.
Vat. glossando: abstrahatur etiam materia spiritualium ab omni forma; quaero tunc.
The Vatican edition, by glossing: let the matter of spiritual [things] too be abstracted from every form; I ask then.
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. ad 4.
Cf. I Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, ad 4.
Libr. VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.): Nam genere quidem posterior est, specie autem priorem differentiam esse oportet. Cfr. XI. Metaph. c. 1. (X. c. 1.) et Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Communitatibus et differentiis generis: «Genera quidem priora sunt iis quae sunt sub se positae differentiis; propter quod simul quidem eis auferunt, non autem simul auferuntur ab eis; sublato enim animali, aufertur rationale et irrationale; differentiae vero non amplius simul auferunt genus; nam etsi omnes interimantur, tamen substantia animata sensitiva intelligitur, quae est animal». Idem dicitur in libro de Causis, prop. 1.
Book VI Topics c. 3 (c. 6): For [it] is indeed posterior in genus, but the difference must be prior in species. Cf. XI Metaphysics c. 1 (X, c. 1) and Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter on the commonalities and differences of genus: «Genera indeed are prior to the differences placed under them; for which reason they take [the differences] away with [themselves], but are not taken away together with them; for, the animal being removed, the rational and irrational is removed; but the differences do not further take away the genus together [with themselves]; for even if all be destroyed, nevertheless an animate sensitive substance is understood, which is animal». The same is said in the book On Causes, prop. 1.
Intellige: capacitatem ad formam (cfr. supra d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1.).
Understand: the capacity for form (cf. above d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1).
Aliis verbis: aut est aequivocatio, aut analogia, aut univocatio, de quibus cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. in princ. et IV. Metaph. text. 2. (III. c. 1.); et 1. Sent. d. 7. q. 1. Schol. — In fine arg. cod. cc et ed. 1 prima pro pura.
In other words: either it is equivocation, or analogy, or univocation, on which cf. Aristotle, Categories at the beginning, and IV Metaphysics text 2 (III, c. 1); and 1 Sent. d. 7, q. 1, Scholion. — At the end of the argument codex cc and ed. 1 [read] prima for pura.
Cap. 7. n. 7. — Sequens textus est ibid. c. 12. n. 15, Vide supra pag. 60, nota 1.
Chapter 7, n. 7. — The following text is ibid. c. 12, n. 15. See above p. 60, note 1.
Cod. F prosequitur: nullo modo erit materia Angeli et rerum corporalium, ergo etc. Paulo superius post intrat in pluribus codd. deest in.
Codex F continues: in no way will the matter of the Angel and of corporeal things be [one], therefore etc. A little above, after intrat, in several codices in is lacking.
Vide supra d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. arg. 2. ad opp. et ibid. a. 2. q. 3. in corp.
See above d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, arg. 2, ad opp., and ibid. a. 2, q. 3, in the body.
Cap. 6: Sola enim mutari transformarique in se possunt quae habent unius materiae commune subiectum. — In cod. I additur et Philosophus de Generatione et corruptione, ubi libr. I. text. 1. dicitur: Una omnium materia habentium ad invicem transmutationem.
Chapter 6: For only those can be changed and transformed into one another which have the common subject of one matter. — In codex I is added and the Philosopher On Generation and Corruption, where book I, text 1, it is said: The matter of all [things] having mutual transmutation is one.
Cfr. supra pag. 89, nota 8. — Paulo inferius cod. cc et ed. 1 per se pro primae et codd. A T vel individuam pro per individuam.
Cf. above p. 89, note 8. — A little below codex cc and ed. 1 [read] per se for primae, and codices A T vel individuam for per individuam.
Gilb. Porretanus, de Sex principiis, c. 1. — Aliquanto post cod. F sed cum pro ut si.
Gilbert of Poitiers, On the Six Principles, c. 1. — Somewhat after, codex F [reads] sed cum for ut si.
Hic supplendum est: consequitur materiam secundum se; et. Quae verba, vel similia, probabiliter exciderunt ante quia dimensiones. — Quod sequitur confirmat et explicat hanc propositionem ex Averroe, de Substantia orbis in princ., qui docet, dimensiones interminatas i. e. per se seu in natura dimensionis tantum, existere primitus in materia prima et praecedere formam in materia, dimensiones vero terminatas sequi formam in materia. — Cod. aa indefinitam pro infinitam. Vat. dein post cum ergo supplet ipsa materia secundum se; deinde multi codd. sint pro sit; cod. I post spiritualibus addit non; et cod. T post rationem infinitam ponit etc. et omittit quod sequitur.
Here must be supplied: it follows matter in itself; and. Which words, or similar [ones], probably dropped out before quia dimensiones. — What follows confirms and explains this proposition from Averroes, On the Substance of the Orb, at the beginning, who teaches that unterminated dimensions, i.e. per se or in the nature of dimension only, exist primarily in prime matter and precede form in matter, but terminated dimensions follow form in matter. — Codex aa [reads] indefinitam for infinitam. The Vatican edition then, after cum ergo, supplies ipsa materia secundum se; then many codices [read] sint for sit; codex I after spiritualibus adds non; and codex T after rationem infinitam puts etc. and omits what follows.
Cfr. supra pag. 15, nota 10. — Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 Item obiicitur a parte finis pro Item ostenditur hoc a parte finis. Dein codd. K U Y Z post claritatem subiiciunt ipsius. Mox codd. F K et quanto magis pro et quod magis.
Cf. above p. 15, note 10. — Not a few codices with ed. 1 [read] Item obiicitur a parte finis for Item ostenditur hoc a parte finis. Then codices K U Y Z, after claritatem, subjoin ipsius. Then codices F K [read] et quanto magis for et quod magis.
August., XII. Confess. c. 7. n. 7. — De seq. prop. cfr. Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 2-7. (IX. c. 1.), ubi proprietates mensurae recensentur, et etiam exemplum albedinis in genere coloris occurrit.
Augustine, XII Confessions, c. 7, n. 7. — On the following proposition cf. Aristotle, X Metaphysics text 2-7 (IX, c. 1), where the properties of measure are reviewed, and also the example of whiteness in the genus of color occurs.
Sub hoc respectu Aristot. considerat materiam VII. Metaph. text. 8. (VI. c. 3.), ubi ipsam definit «quae per se ipsam neque quid neque quantum neque aliquid aliud quippiam dicitur, quibus ens determinatur». Cfr. X. text. 16. (IX. c. 4.). — Fide cod. Z substituimus considerando pro considerare. Cod. T ponit dispositiones, codd. bb cc et ed. 1 dispositionem pro disponens, et aliqui codd. ut K X V post quasi interserunt quandam.
Under this respect Aristotle considers matter [in] VII Metaphysics text 8 (VI, c. 3), where he defines it «[that] which through itself is said neither what nor how much nor any other such thing, by which a being is determined». Cf. X, text 16 (IX, c. 4). — On the faith of codex Z we substitute considerando for considerare. Codex T puts dispositiones, codices bb cc and ed. 1 dispositionem for disponens, and some codices, as K X V, after quasi insert quandam.
Aristot., I. Phys. text. 69. (c. 7.): Subiecta autem natura scibilis est secundum analogiam; ut enim ad statuam aes, aut ad formam materia et informe se habet, priusquam accipiat formam, sic haec ad substantiam etc. De iis quae sequuntur cfr. Aristot., VI. Metaph. text. 1. seqq. (V. c. 1.). — Cod. I in hac prop. verbis per potentiam praefigit ad formam. Mox cod. T potest considerari pro potest comparari.
Aristotle, I Physics text 69 (c. 7): But the underlying nature is knowable by analogy; for as bronze is to a statue, or matter and the formless to form before it receives form, so this [is] to substance etc. On the [things] which follow cf. Aristotle, VI Metaphysics text 1 ff. (V, c. 1). — Codex I in this proposition prefixes to the words per potentiam [the words] ad formam. Then codex T [reads] potest considerari for potest comparari.
Subaudi cum cod. bb materia. — Averroes, I. Phys. text. 70: Subiectum sustentat formam, secundum quod forma non potest esse sine subiecto; forma autem sustentat subiectum, secundum quod est complementum eius, et secundum quod subiectum non potest denudari a forma.
Supply, with codex bb, materia. — Averroes, I Physics text 70: The subject sustains form, in so far as form cannot be without a subject; but form sustains the subject, in so far as it is its complement, and in so far as the subject cannot be denuded of form.
Cod. U bene addit eorum. Paulo inferius auctoritate cod. cc et ed. 1 posuimus corporibus corruptibilibus pro corporalibus et corruptibilibus, quod Vat. cum aliis mss. minus congrue habet.
Codex U well adds eorum. A little below, on the authority of codex cc and ed. 1, we have put corporibus corruptibilibus for corporalibus et corruptibilibus, which the Vatican edition with other manuscripts less congruously has.
Aristot., VIII. Metaph. text. 12. (VII. c. 4.) ait: «In naturalibus igitur et generabilibus substantiis necesse est ita procedere, si quis recte procedet... De naturalibus autem, sed perpetuis substantiis alia ratio est; fortassis etenim quaedam non habent materiam, aut non talem, sed solum quae secundum locum mobilis est». Averroes super hunc locum dicit: Substantiae vero aeternae, quia in eis non est potentia ad corruptionem, non est in eis materia, sed materia earum est aliquid existens in actu, scil. corpus; ideo dignius habent hoc nomen subiectum quam hoc nomen materia... istae substantiae caelestes non habent materiam, scil. quia non sunt compositae ex materia et forma, sed ex corpore et forma animata intelligibili, non ita quod anima sit res animata, non ita quod illic est aliquid, quod animatur per animam aut vivit per vitam, sed sunt animata per se et viva... et ideo dicit Themistius, quod sol et luna et stellae aut sunt formae sine materiis, aut habent materias per aequivocationem, sicut est dispositio in materia intellectus.
Aristotle, VIII Metaphysics text 12 (VII, c. 4), says: «In natural and generable substances, therefore, it is necessary to proceed thus, if one will proceed rightly... But of the natural yet perpetual substances there is another account; for perhaps some do not have matter, or not such [matter], but only that which is mobile according to place». Averroes on this place says: But the eternal substances, because in them there is no potency to corruption, in them there is no matter, but their matter is something existing in act, namely a body; therefore they have the name «subject» more worthily than the name «matter»... these celestial substances do not have matter, namely because they are not composed of matter and form, but of a body and an intelligible animate form, not so that the soul is an animate thing, not so that there is something there which is animated through a soul or lives through a life, but they are animate per se and living... and therefore Themistius says that the sun and moon and stars either are forms without matters, or have matters by equivocation, as is the disposition in the matter of the intellect.
Vat. hic et in seqq. pluries philosophus pro physicus.
The Vatican edition here and in the following [passages] several times [reads] philosophus for physicus.
Plures codd. ut K X Y aa communem, plures alii perperam omnem.
Several codices, as K X Y aa, [read] communem, several others wrongly omnem.
Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 12. (IV. c. 6.).
Cf. Aristotle, V Metaphysics text 12 (IV, c. 6).
Non pauci codd. in hac prop., refragante contextu, omittunt nisi. Opponitur enim infra metaphysicus tum physico superiori, qui omnium omnino corporalium rerum, non autem spiritualium, unam materiam esse vult, tum physico inferiori, qui istam unitatem restringit ad materiam rerum terrenarum.
Not a few codices in this proposition, the context being opposed, omit nisi. For below the metaphysician is opposed both to the higher physicist, who wishes the matter of absolutely all corporeal things, but not of spiritual [ones], to be one, and to the lower physicist, who restricts that unity to the matter of earthly things.
In cod. cc et ed. 1 additur et in quantum ipsa est substantia in potentia solum.
In codex cc and ed. 1 is added and in so far as it itself is a substance in potency only.
Cod. cc et ed. 1: Vel aliter, distinguitur contra naturam angelicam non ratione contrarietatis, sed ratione actualitatis. Vat. cum codd. F K cc satis bene distinguit (scil. Augustinus) pro distinguitur; cod. bb distinguit rationem pro distinguitur ratione. Paulo inferius post possibilitatis cod. cc et ed. 1 subnectunt et privationis.
Codex cc and ed. 1: Or otherwise, it is distinguished against the angelic nature not by reason of contrariety, but by reason of actuality. The Vatican edition, with codices F K cc, fairly well [reads] distinguit (namely Augustine) for distinguitur; codex bb [reads] distinguit rationem for distinguitur ratione. A little below, after possibilitatis, codex cc and ed. 1 subjoin et privationis.
In cod. aa adiungitur formam sive spiritualem, sive corporalem.
In codex aa is added formam sive spiritualem, sive corporalem.
Supple cum codd. F V est.
Supply, with codices F V, est.
Ex definitione formae a Gilb. Porretano prolata, in libro Sex Princip. c. 1.
From the definition of form brought forward by Gilbert of Poitiers, in the book Six Principles, c. 1.
Vat. cum nonnullis codd. quia. Aliquanto inferius plures codd. cum ed. 1 comparatione, cod. aa in comparatione pro comparative. Circa finem solutionis plures codd. et etiam respectu formae pro et respectu formae.
The Vatican edition, with some codices, [reads] quia. Somewhat below, several codices with ed. 1 [read] comparatione, codex aa in comparatione for comparative. Near the end of the solution several codices [read] et etiam respectu formae for et respectu formae.
Plurimi codd. cum 3 primis edd., contradicente contextu, numerantur.
Very many codices, with the first 3 editions, the context contradicting, [read] numerantur.
Text. 7. (IX. c. 2.).
Text 7 (IX, c. 2).
De quo vide supra d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 2, ubi unitas temporis repetitur ab unitate materiae. De seq. propositione cfr. d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, ubi tangitur, quod Deus est omnium mensura extra genus.
On which see above d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, where the unity of time is traced back to the unity of matter. On the following proposition cf. d. 2, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, where it is touched on that God is the measure of all [things] outside the genus. ---

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