Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 3
Quaestio III. Utrum materia corporalium et incorporalium sit una numero.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum materia spiritualium et corporalium sit una secundum numerum, aut secundum unitatem aliam. Et quod sit una numero, videtur sic:
1. Omne illud quod ita est unum, quod non recipit distinctionem, est unum numero1; materia per essentiam suam ita est unum, quod omnino nullam habet distinctionem secundum suam essentiam, quia omnis distinctio est a forma: ergo necesse est, materiam in omnibus esse unam numero.
2. Item, «omne quod est unum, est unum vel genere, vel specie, vel numero2»; sed materia non est eadem in spiritualibus et corporalibus unitate generis, vel speciei, cum illa sit solum a forma: ergo a divisione materia est una numero.
3. Item, status perfectus non potest esse nisi in uno3: ergo sicut est status in genere efficientis et finis, ita in genere materiae; sed in genere efficientis primi et finis ultimi sic est status, quod unum solum est primum efficiens per essentiam, ad quod omnia reducuntur: ergo videtur similiter, cum ex parte resolutionis sit status in essentia materiae, quod illa sit una numero.
4. Item, cum dicitur: materia lapidis est materia, et materia Angeli est materia, aut dicitur univoce, aut aequivoce, aut idem praedicatur de se. Sed non aequivoce, quia tunc Angelus et lapis aequivoce dicerentur substantiae; non univoce, quia univocatio est solum in formis et in his quae dicunt formam4: ergo oportet, quod idem praedicetur de se: ergo si materia lapidis et materia Angeli non sunt plures materiae, sed unica, restat, quod materia est in spiritualibus et corporalibus numero una.
5. Item, intelligamus materiam sive spiritualium, sive corporalium per abstractionem ab omnibus formis; intelligitur materia ut simplex, intelligitur materia ut unica, nullo modo multiplicata nec distincta; sed formae supervenientes non mutant essentiam materiae, sed solum esse: ergo si prius erat quantum ad essentiam unica numero, ergo nunc, cum habet formas.
6. Item, intelligamus per impossibile, quod Deus de uno lapide faceret Angelum; tunc mutaretur forma et esse materiae, sed essentia esset salva: ergo materia, cum sit una per essentiam, etiam in hac transmutatione est illius mutationis subiectum; sed illa mutatio est una numero: ergo materia per essentiam manet una numero. Arguitur ergo sic: si in illo Angelo sic producto et lapide praeexistente est materia una numero, et tantum distat ille Angelus a natura corporali, quantum alius Angelus: ergo videtur, quod in aliis Angelis et in aliis rebus corporalibus sit materia una numero5.
Contra:
1. Unum numero respicit esse individuum sive individuatum6; sed materia in corporalibus et spiritualibus non est una unitate individuali: ergo nec una est secundum numerum. Maior patet; minor probatur per hoc, quod «quaecumque sunt eadem numero alicui individuo, inter se sunt una numero»; sed Angelus a sua materia non differt numero, nec lapis a sua: ergo si materia lapidis et Angeli est una numero, ergo lapis et Angelus sunt unum numero; quod falsum est.
2. Item, unum et multum sunt differentiae entis, et entis in actu7; sed materia est omnino ens in potentia: ergo si dividentia non conveniunt nisi eis, quibus convenit divisum: ergo nullo modo potest dici materia per essentiam una numero.
3. Item, si de auro uno fiant diversa vasa
postquam facta sunt, iam illud aurum desinit esse unum propter distinctionem superinductam: cum ergo de materia fiant creaturae genere et specie differentes, videtur ergo, quod materia numeretur in illis: ergo etc.
4. Item, opposita non sunt compossibilia circa idem numero8 — hoc planum est, quia mutuo se expellunt — sed oppositae formae sunt circa materiam, ut est in diversis: ergo impossibile est, materiam esse unam numero.
5. Item, impossibile est, idem numero esse ens et non-ens, quia inter ens et non-ens summa est distantia; sed Angelus secundum suam formam et materiam est in actu; anima antichristi nec est secundum materiam nec secundum formam, immo creanda est secundum suum totum9: ergo impossibile est, quod Angeli et animae sit eadem materia, vel alterius creaturae diversae.
6. Item, creatio non solum terminatur ad esse, sed etiam ad essentiam: ergo ubi sunt diversae creationes, necesse est, diversos esse terminos per essentiam; sed creatio animae Petri et animae antichristi est alia et alia, et utrobique producitur essentia materiae: ergo necesse est, materiam hic et ibi aliam esse per essentiam: ergo impossibile est, esse numero unam.
7. Item, esse simpliciter unum in pluribus, hoc est proprietas Dei, sive esse unum in omnibus10: ergo non competit alii, vel si competit alii, minime competit ei quod maxime distat a Deo; sed materia maxime distat a Deo, cum sit prope nihil: ergo nullo modo videtur ipsi convenire, quod ipsa sit una numero in omnibus, vel etiam in pluribus.
Conclusio
Materia rerum spiritualium et corporalium, cum non habeat unitatem nec universalitatis nec individuationis, secundum essentiam dici potest una numero per homogeneitatem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod positio philosophorum et physicorum virorum haec fuit et est, quod materia in quibuscumque est, per essentiam est una et una numero. — Et rationem huius assignant, quia materia, hoc ipsum quod est, est ens omnino in potentia; et ideo oportet, quod in quibuscumque est, quod sit per essentiam numero una.
Haec autem ratio bona est, quod melius patet, si pertractetur. Quia enim materia omnino est ens in potentia, ideo per sui essentiam nullum habet actum, nullam formam, ergo nullam distinctionem; si nullam distinctionem habet et non est nihil, oportet ergo, quod sit una sine multitudine, et ita numero una. — Amplius, quia ens omnino in potentia, ideo nec genus nec species esse potest, quae dicunt11 aliquo modo actum; et ideo non potest esse communis eis, quibus est communis, unitate universalitatis vel univocationis: ergo nec genere nec specie est una, et tamen nihilominus est una, et ita est una numero. — Rursus, quia est ens omnino in potentia, ideo de se est infinita et ad formas infinitas; sed Deus, quia infinitus est, ubique unus est sua infinitate, quae venit ex actualitatis summae perfectione: sic et materia, quia infinita, in omnibus materiatis est una propter infinitatem eius, quae venit ex summae possibilitatis imperfectione. — Postremo, quia materia est ens in potentia, unitas eius non potest esse unitas individuationis, sive per continuitatem, sicut mons est unus, sive per actualem simplicitatem, sicut Angelus est unus; sed si habet unitatem, unitatem homogeneitatis habet. Haec autem unitas simul manet in diversis, sicut patet: si de eodem auro fiant multa vasa, illa sunt de eodem auro per homogeneitatem; sed aurum, quod est in uno, differt ab auro, quod est in alio adeo, ut non sint12 unum per continuitatem. Si igitur materia non est una actuali simplicitate, ut Angelus, nec continuitate, ut mons vel auri frustum, sed sola homogeneitate; et haec non tollitur per adventum formarum: ita est materia una sub omnibus formis, sicut omnibus formis abstractis. Sed abstractis omnibus formis, nulla est distinctio in materia, immo intelligitur ut simpliciter una. Nunc13 igitur materia est in omnibus materiatis numero una, quia est ens omnino in potentia; et haec est recta ratio et causa.
Ex his pro magna parte patent obiecta, quoniam ex praedictis colligi potest, qualis est illa unitas, qua materia dicitur una. Non enim est unitas actualis, cuiusmodi est unitas Corisci in foro et theatro14, et cuiusmodi est unitas Dei; sed illa est
unitas magis possibilitatis et potest dici homogeneitatis, quae adeo ampla est, ut sustineat receptionem maioris multitudinis diversitatis formarum superadiectarum quam unitas formae alicuius universalis, etiam generis generalissimi15; et hoc est propter summam possibilitatem. Unde dicitur una numero, quia est una sine numero, quemadmodum ovis, carens signo respectu ovium habentium signum, dicitur esse signata; per hunc modum intelligi potest materia numero una16.
1. Quod ergo obiicitur: unum numero respicit individuum; dicendum, quod verum est, prout unum numero dicit accidens, vel prout consequitur esse actuale17; non autem est verum, prout respicit essentiam, quoniam hoc modo se extendit ad unitatem maioris capacitatis, quam sit unitas individualis; et de illa non sequitur, quod quae sunt eadem uni etc., sicut non sequitur, quod homo et asinus uniuntur in animali, ergo sunt unum inter se.
2. Quod obiicitur, quod unum numero est differentia entis in actu; dicendum, quod verum est de uno, quod dicit unitatem completam. Unitas enim et veritas et bonitas proprie et complete sunt in creatura completa; nihilominus tamen, sicut dicit Augustinus de Vera Religione18, incomplete reperiuntur in materia. Sicut ergo materia incompleta est de se, ita unitatem secundum se habet incompletam, possibilem tamen, quantum ad esse, compleri per formam, cuius adventu constituitur individuum numero unum unitate actuali et completa, ex cuius etiam adventu fit distinctio, et surgit in rebus multitudo.
3. Quod obiicitur de auro, non est simile, quia aurum habet unitatem continuitatis et individuationis, quae opponitur numerationi et discontinuitati; et hoc est, quia aurum, etsi sit materia scyphi, est ens in actu; non sic materia prima respectu materiatorum, ut ostensum est prius19.
4. 5. 6. Quod obiicitur, quod opposita non possunt se compati circa unum, et quod idem non potest esse simul ens et non-ens, et diversis mutationibus introduci in esse; ad haec tria unica est responsio, scilicet quod illud est verum de eo quod est ita unum, quod eius unitas repugnat multitudini, sicut est unum individuum; sed de eo quod est ita unum, quod multitudini non repugnat, immo propter suam possibilitatem admittit omnem diversitatem, non habet veritatem; immo simul et semel habet opposita, simul etiam et semel potest esse in re, et potest esse in potentia agentis, et diversis productionibus produci, sicut diversis formis informari. Et hoc patet, quia forma humanitatis una est unitate universalitatis; ideo simul verum est, quod est homo, qui generatur, et est homo, qui generandus est, et est homo albus, et est homo niger, et in omnibus his est forma universalis una. — Quod si dicas, quod non est simile, quia humanitas non est una numero, ut materia; dico, quod quamvis non sit una numero, sed specie, tamen unitas materiae, quae est unitas homogeneitatis, maioris amplitudinis est quam humanitas ipsa, et maiorem diversitatem admittit. Et ideo nulla est oppositio, nulla omnino contradictio ex comparatione oppositorum ad unitatem materiae per essentiam, sed solum ex comparatione oppositorum ad unitatem materiae secundum esse. Unde sicut, si duo scyphi facti sunt de auro conformi, potest unus destrui, altero remanente, vel unus produci, altero in esse producto; sic intelligendum est in proposito.
Si quis enim vult unitatem materiae intelligere, oportet ab unitate individuali animum abstrahere et super actum imaginationis conscendere et omnino ens in potentia per privationem cogitare; et sic poterit aliqualiter capere. Quamdiu enim materia ut moles extensa cogitatur, ad unitatem essentiae consideratam20 nullo modo pertingitur.
7. Quod ultimo obiicitur satis planum est. Sicut enim Deus est infinitus, et materia infinita, alio tamen modo infinitatis, quae potius est per recessum quam per accessum; unde non competit formae, sed materiae: sic intelligendum est de illa unitate. Deus enim est unus in pluribus, ita quod perfectissimus et omnino actus, et hoc est eius solius; sed materia est una in omnibus, et hoc quia per suam essentiam non potest esse distincta; non sic est de forma. Et sic patent omnia.
In fine huius quaestionis codd. F M addunt haec quae sequuntur, quorum prima pars etiam in cod. K legitur. Licet incertum sit, utrum hoc additamentum a S. Bonaventura, an potius ab aliquo ipsius discipulo scriptum sit, tamen illud non penitus omittendum, sed hoc loco ponendum esse censuimus. Sequimur cod. F, in multis tamen ope duorum aliorum codd. correctum, adiectis intra uncinos paucis lectionibus variantibus ex cod. M.
«Haec autem dicta sunt de unitate materiae spiritualium et corporalium secundum essentiam ipsius nudam et absolutam; quoniam secundum esse diversificari habet in diversis non tantum secundum esse accidentale, sed etiam secundum esse substantiale. Unde in diversis secundum substantiam diversificatur substantialiter, sicut patebit in sequenti articulo quaestionis. Licet autem non contingat in natura reperire essentiam materiae ab omnibus formis et dispositionibus denudatam, contingit tamen vere intelligere et aliquid ei vere attribuere, sicut Augustinus in duodecimo Confessionum21 docet satis aperte, et in libro de Vera Religione dicit, quod est quasi medium inter aliquod et nihil, et Philosophus in primo libro de Generatione dicit, quod est ita simplex sicut punctus. Quemadmodum igitur rerum corporearum compositarum et extensarum contingit vere intelligere materiam esse per essentiam simplicem, et hoc per privationem omnis compositionis et extensionis, quamvis secundum esse naturae impossibile sit, rerum corporearum materiam ab extensione separari, ut in pluribus locis dicit Augustinus, maxime in libro de Immortalitate animae22, et super Genesim ad litteram: sic rerum diversarum et distinctarum et numeratarum vere contingit intelligere materiam per suam essentiam indistinctam et non numeratam, et ita quodammodo numero unam per privationem omnis numerationis et distinctionis, ut praedictum est. Et hoc expresse dicit Commentator super primum Metaphysicae in illo capitulo: Quoniam autem in fundamento [text. 17.], ubi assignat differentiam inter unitatem generis et materiae; id ipsum expressissime dicit super duodecimum [text. 14.], ubi etiam dat modum, qualiter hoc possit intelligi, quod diversorum sit materia numero una, ostendens, quod hoc potius privative dicitur quam positive. Hoc ipsum dicit auctor Fontis vitae in prima parte sui libri et expresse probat in quarto [decimo], quod corporalium et spiritualium [corporalibus et spiritualibus] est materia per essentiam una. Et hoc probat per hoc, quod omnis diversitas est a forma, et per hoc, quod si spiritualia et corporalia non haberent materiam per essentiam unam, impossibile esset, quod aliquid esset eis univocum, quia diversitas radicum prohibet convenientiam in ramis. Aliorum autem auctoritates causa brevitatis omitto. — Et propter haec et his similia dictum fuit a principio, hunc modum dicendi esse philosophicum, quamvis nihil prohibeat, ipsum esse catholicum et theologicum, dum tamen recte intelligatur. In nullo enim modus iste dicendi repugnat dignitati substantiae spiritualis, nec distantiae inter ipsam et corporalem, nec creationi spirituum. Non enim propter hoc oportet ponere, spiritus fieri de materia praeiacente, quia materia, induta forma corporali, non potest illa exspoliari; nec Deus facit contra ea [illa] quae stabilivit [statuit] a principio, et ideo [ita], cum creatur substantia spiritualis, necesse est, cum ea suam materiam concreari. Et quemadmodum creatio spirituum [cod. M omittit spirituum] non tollit eis [ei] convenientiam essentialem in unitate formae specificae, sic etiam non tollit unitatem materiae per essentiam nudam et absolutam, quoniam, sicut dictum fuit, maioris amplitudinis est haec unitas quam unitas generis vel speciei; et praeterea nunquam creatur nec creata fuit materia sine aliqua forma, sub qua habet diversificari, sicut dictum fuit supra. Si quis igitur essentiam materiae nudae potest intelligere, videbit, quod satis probabiliter potest dici una numero privative. Et haec sufficiant de ista positione».
«Est autem et alius hic dicendi modus, quod spiritualium et corporalium non est materia per essentiam una, quantumcumque intelligatur denudari a formis et dispositionibus superadditis, immo adhuc essentialiter distinguuntur se ipsis. Sicut enim prima rerum genera se ipsis distinguuntur, et essentia formae se ipsa distinguitur ab essentia materiae, et essentia materiae a Deo propter simplicitatem; sic essentia materiae se ipsa distinguitur ab essentia materiae. Et secundum hanc positionem, si Deus per infinitatem suae potentiae de corpore faceret spiritum, nihil maneret commune, sed totum transiret in totum. — Et si obiiciatur contra hanc positionem, quod omnis diversitas est a forma, et quod solus actus dividit, et consimilia; breviter secundum hanc positionem respondetur, quod illud verum est de distinctione et diversitate completa. Sicut enim essentia materiae, omni forma abstracta, est incompleta respectu actus essendi, sic etiam respectu distinctionis. Et per hoc possunt quasi omnes rationes ad oppositum determinari, sicut patet pertractanti. Et ideo non oportet in hoc diutius immorari. — Utraque igitur harum positionum in hoc concordat, quod spiritualium et corporalium est materia una unitate analogiae. Sed utrum istud sufficiat dicere ad sustinendam unitatem generis — cum substantiarum et accidentium sint principia eadem per analogiam, sicut vult Philosophus23, nec tamen habeant unum genus commune — utrum etiam oporteat procedere ad unitatem essentiae et ad indistinctionem; diu consideranti et bene intelligenti difficile est videre. Et ideo sanius est uni istarum positionum cum formidine partis alterius adhaerere, quam in alteram omnino praecipitare sententiam; maxime cum magistri et probati clerici utrumque dicant».
Auctores vide in Schol. ad praeced. quaest.
---
Question III. Whether the matter of corporeal and incorporeal things is one in number.
Thirdly it is asked whether the matter of spiritual and corporeal [things] is one according to number, or according to another unity. And that it is one in number, it seems thus:
1. Everything which is so one that it does not receive distinction is one in number1; matter through its essence is so one that it has no distinction at all according to its essence, because every distinction is from form: therefore it is necessary that matter in all [things] be one in number.
2. Likewise, «everything which is one is one either in genus, or in species, or in number2»; but matter is not the same in spiritual and corporeal [things] by a unity of genus or of species, since that is only from form: therefore by division matter is one in number.
3. Likewise, a perfect stopping-point cannot be except in one3: therefore just as there is a stopping-point in the genus of the efficient [cause] and the end, so [there is one] in the genus of matter; but in the genus of the first efficient [cause] and the ultimate end the stopping-point is such that there is only one first efficient [cause] by essence, to which all are reduced: therefore it seems likewise, since on the part of resolution there is a stopping-point in the essence of matter, that it is one in number.
4. Likewise, when it is said: the matter of a stone is matter, and the matter of an Angel is matter, it is said either univocally, or equivocally, or the same is predicated of itself. But not equivocally, because then Angel and stone would be called substances equivocally; not univocally, because univocation is only in forms and in those [things] which state form4: therefore it must be that the same is predicated of itself: therefore if the matter of a stone and the matter of an Angel are not several matters but one, it remains that matter is one in number in spiritual and corporeal [things].
5. Likewise, let us understand the matter either of spiritual or of corporeal [things] by abstraction from all forms; matter is understood as simple, matter is understood as one, in no way multiplied nor distinguished; but supervening forms do not change the essence of matter, but only [its] being: therefore if it was before, as to essence, one in number, then [it is] now, when it has forms.
6. Likewise, let us understand, by the impossible, that God made an Angel from one stone; then the form and being of the matter would be changed, but the essence would be saved: therefore matter, since it is one by essence, even in this transmutation is the subject of that change; but that change is one in number: therefore matter by essence remains one in number. It is argued therefore thus: if in that Angel so produced and in the pre-existing stone the matter is one in number, and that Angel is as distant from corporeal nature as another Angel: therefore it seems that in the other Angels and in the other corporeal things the matter is one in number5.
On the contrary:
1. One in number regards individual or individuated being6; but matter in corporeal and spiritual [things] is not one by an individual unity: therefore neither is it one according to number. The major is plain; the minor is proved by this, that «whatever [things] are the same in number as some individual are among themselves one in number»; but an Angel does not differ in number from its matter, nor a stone from its [own]: therefore if the matter of a stone and of an Angel is one in number, then stone and Angel are one in number; which is false.
2. Likewise, one and many are differences of being, and of being in act7; but matter is wholly a being in potency: therefore if the dividing [members] befit only those to which the divided befits: therefore in no way can matter be called by essence one in number.
3. Likewise, if from one gold diverse vessels are made
after they are made, now that gold ceases to be one on account of the distinction superinduced: since therefore from matter creatures differing in genus and species are made, it seems then that matter is numbered in them: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, opposites are not compossible about the same [thing] in number8 — this is plain, because they mutually expel one another — but opposite forms are about matter, as it is in diverse [things]: therefore it is impossible that matter be one in number.
5. Likewise, it is impossible that the same in number be a being and a non-being, because between being and non-being there is the greatest distance; but an Angel according to its form and matter is in act; the soul of Antichrist is neither according to matter nor according to form, but rather is to be created according to its whole9: therefore it is impossible that the matter of an Angel and of a soul be the same, or of another diverse creature.
6. Likewise, creation is terminated not only at being but also at essence: therefore where there are diverse creations, it is necessary that the terms be diverse by essence; but the creation of the soul of Peter and of the soul of Antichrist is one and another, and in both the essence of matter is produced: therefore it is necessary that matter here and there be other by essence: therefore it is impossible that it be one in number.
7. Likewise, to be simply one in many — this is a property of God, or to be one in all10: therefore it does not befit another, or if it befits another, least of all does it befit that which is most distant from God; but matter is most distant from God, since it is near nothing: therefore in no way does it seem to befit it that it itself be one in number in all, or even in many.
Conclusion
The matter of spiritual and corporeal things, since it has a unity neither of universality nor of individuation, can according to essence be called one in number by homogeneity.
I respond: It must be said that the position of the philosophers and physical men was and is this, that matter in whatever [things] it is, is by essence one and one in number. — And they assign the reason for this, that matter, this very [thing] which it is, is a being wholly in potency; and therefore it must be that in whatever [things] it is, it be by essence one in number.
But this reason is good, which is better plain if it is treated through. For because matter is wholly a being in potency, therefore through its essence it has no act, no form, therefore no distinction; if it has no distinction and is not nothing, it must then be one without multitude, and so one in number. — Further, because [it is] a being wholly in potency, therefore it can be neither a genus nor a species, which state11 act in some mode; and therefore it cannot be common to those to which it is common by a unity of universality or univocation: therefore it is one neither in genus nor in species, and yet nonetheless is one, and so is one in number. — Again, because it is a being wholly in potency, therefore of itself it is infinite and [open] to infinite forms; but God, because He is infinite, is everywhere one by His infinity, which comes from the perfection of the highest actuality: so also matter, because [it is] infinite, in all things-made-of-matter is one on account of its infinity, which comes from the imperfection of the highest possibility. — Lastly, because matter is a being in potency, its unity cannot be a unity of individuation, whether by continuity, as a mountain is one, or by actual simplicity, as an Angel is one; but if it has a unity, it has a unity of homogeneity. But this unity remains at once in diverse [things], as is plain: if from the same gold many vessels are made, they are of the same gold by homogeneity; but the gold which is in one differs from the gold which is in another to such a degree that they are not12 one by continuity. If therefore matter is one not by actual simplicity, like an Angel, nor by continuity, like a mountain or a lump of gold, but by homogeneity alone; and this is not removed by the advent of forms: so matter is one under all forms, just as [it is one] all forms being abstracted. But, all forms being abstracted, there is no distinction in matter, but rather it is understood as simply one. Now13 therefore matter is in all things-made-of-matter one in number, because it is a being wholly in potency; and this is the right reason and cause.
From these [things] for the most part the objections are plain, since from the aforesaid it can be gathered what that unity is by which matter is called one. For it is not an actual unity, of the kind that is the unity of Coriscus in the marketplace and the theater14, and of the kind that is the unity of God; but that is
a unity rather of possibility, and can be called [a unity] of homogeneity, which is so ample that it sustains the reception of a greater multitude of diversity of forms superadded than the unity of any universal form, even of the most general genus15; and this is on account of the highest possibility. Whence it is called one in number, because it is one without number, just as a sheep lacking a mark, with respect to sheep having a mark, is said to be marked; in this mode matter can be understood [as] one in number16.
1. To what then is objected: one in number regards an individual; it must be said that it is true in so far as one in number states an accident, or in so far as it follows actual being17; but it is not true in so far as it regards essence, since in this mode it extends to a unity of greater capacity than is individual unity; and from that it does not follow that [things] which are the same as one [are the same as one another], etc., just as it does not follow that man and ass are united in animal, therefore they are one among themselves.
2. To what is objected, that one in number is a difference of being in act; it must be said that it is true of the one which states a complete unity. For unity and truth and goodness are properly and completely in a complete creature; nevertheless, however, as Augustine says On True Religion18, they are found incompletely in matter. As therefore matter is incomplete of itself, so it has a unity according to itself [that is] incomplete, yet possible, as to being, to be completed through form, by whose advent there is constituted an individual one in number by an actual and complete unity, from whose advent also distinction comes to be, and a multitude arises in things.
3. To what is objected concerning gold, it is not similar, because gold has a unity of continuity and of individuation, which is opposed to numeration and discontinuity; and this is because gold, although it is the matter of the cup, is a being in act; not so prime matter with respect to things-made-of-matter, as was shown before19.
4. 5. 6. To what is objected, that opposites cannot suffer one another about one [thing], and that the same cannot be at once a being and a non-being, and be introduced into being by diverse changes; to these three [there] is one response, namely that that is true of the [thing] which is so one that its unity is repugnant to multitude, as is one individual; but of the [thing] which is so one that it is not repugnant to multitude, but rather on account of its possibility admits every diversity, it does not hold true; rather it has at once and at one time opposites, can also at once and at one time be in the thing, and can be in the potency of an agent, and be produced by diverse productions, just as [it can] be informed by diverse forms. And this is plain, because the form of humanity is one by a unity of universality; therefore it is at once true that there is a man who is generated, and there is a man who is to be generated, and there is a white man, and there is a black man, and in all these there is one universal form. — But if you say that it is not similar, because humanity is not one in number, like matter; I say that although it is not one in number but in species, yet the unity of matter, which is a unity of homogeneity, is of greater amplitude than humanity itself, and admits a greater diversity. And therefore there is no opposition, no contradiction at all from the comparison of opposites to the unity of matter by essence, but only from the comparison of opposites to the unity of matter according to being. Whence just as, if two cups are made of conformable gold, one can be destroyed, the other remaining, or one produced, the other being in produced being; so it must be understood in the matter at hand.
For if anyone wishes to understand the unity of matter, he must abstract the mind from individual unity and ascend above the act of imagination and conceive [it] wholly [as] a being in potency through privation; and so he will be able somewhat to grasp [it]. For as long as matter is conceived as extended mass, the unity of essence considered20 is in no way attained.
7. To what is objected last is plain enough. For just as God is infinite, and matter [is] infinite, yet by another mode of infinity, which is rather by recess than by access; whence it does not befit form but matter: so it must be understood of that unity. For God is one in many, so that [He is] most perfect and wholly act, and this is of Him alone; but matter is one in all, and this because by its essence it cannot be distinct; not so is it of form. And so all [the objections] are plain.
At the end of this question codices F M add the [things] which follow, of which the first part is also read in codex K. Although it is uncertain whether this addition was written by St. Bonaventure, or rather by some disciple of his, yet we have judged that it must not be entirely omitted, but placed in this place. We follow codex F, in many [places] however corrected by the aid of two other codices, a few variant readings from codex M being added within brackets.
«But these [things] have been said of the unity of the matter of spiritual and corporeal [things] according to its bare and absolute essence; since according to being it has to be diversified in diverse [things] not only according to accidental being, but also according to substantial being. Whence in [things] diverse according to substance it is diversified substantially, as will be plain in the following article of the question. But although it does not happen in nature to find the essence of matter denuded of all forms and dispositions, it does however happen truly to understand [it] and to attribute something truly to it, as Augustine in the twelfth [book] of the Confessions21 teaches openly enough, and in the book On True Religion says that it is as it were a middle between something and nothing, and the Philosopher in the first book On Generation says that it is as simple as a point. As therefore of corporeal composite and extended things it happens truly to understand matter to be by essence simple, and this by the privation of all composition and extension, although according to the being of nature it is impossible for the matter of corporeal things to be separated from extension, as in many places Augustine says, especially in the book On the Immortality of the Soul22, and on Genesis according to the letter: so of diverse and distinct and numbered things it happens truly to understand matter through its essence [as] undistinguished and not numbered, and so in a certain way one in number by the privation of all numeration and distinction, as was said before. And this the Commentator expressly says on the first [book] of the Metaphysics in that chapter: But since in the foundation [text 17], where he assigns the difference between the unity of genus and of matter; the same he says most expressly on the twelfth [book] [text 14], where he also gives the mode in which this can be understood, that the matter of diverse [things] is one in number, showing that this is said rather privatively than positively. The same the author of the Fount of Life says in the first part of his book and expressly proves in the fourth [fourteenth], that of corporeal and spiritual [things] the matter is by essence one. And this he proves by this, that every diversity is from form, and by this, that if spiritual and corporeal [things] did not have matter by essence one, it would be impossible that anything be univocal to them, because the diversity of the roots prohibits agreement in the branches. But the authorities of others I omit for the sake of brevity. — And on account of these and similar [things] it was said from the beginning that this mode of speaking is philosophical, although nothing prohibits it from being catholic and theological, provided however it be rightly understood. For in no [respect] does this mode of speaking conflict with the dignity of spiritual substance, nor with the distance between it and the corporeal, nor with the creation of spirits. For it is not necessary on account of this to posit that spirits come to be from pre-lying matter, because matter, clothed with corporeal form, cannot be despoiled of it; nor does God act against the [things] which He established from the beginning, and so, when a spiritual substance is created, it is necessary that with it its matter be co-created. And just as the creation of spirits [cod. M omits spirits] does not take from them the essential agreement in the unity of specific form, so also it does not take away the unity of matter according to [its] bare and absolute essence, since, as was said, this unity is of greater amplitude than the unity of genus or species; and besides, matter is never created nor was created without some form, under which it has to be diversified, as was said above. If therefore anyone can understand the bare essence of matter, he will see that it can probably enough be called one in number privatively. And let these [things] suffice concerning this position».
«But there is also another mode of speaking here, that of spiritual and corporeal [things] the matter is not by essence one, however much it be understood to be denuded of superadded forms and dispositions, but rather they are still essentially distinguished by themselves. For just as the first genera of things are distinguished by themselves, and the essence of form is distinguished by itself from the essence of matter, and the essence of matter [is distinguished] from God on account of simplicity; so the essence of matter is distinguished by itself from the essence of matter. And according to this position, if God by the infinity of His power made a spirit from a body, nothing common would remain, but the whole would pass into the whole. — And if it be objected against this position that every diversity is from form, and that act alone divides, and similar [things]; briefly according to this position it is answered that that is true of complete distinction and diversity. For just as the essence of matter, every form being abstracted, is incomplete with respect to the act of being, so also with respect to distinction. And through this almost all the reasons to the opposite can be determined, as is plain to one treating [them]. And therefore there is no need to delay longer on this. — Each therefore of these positions agrees in this, that of spiritual and corporeal [things] the matter is one by a unity of analogy. But whether it suffices to say this for sustaining the unity of genus — since of substances and accidents the principles are the same by analogy, as the Philosopher holds23, nor however do they have one common genus — whether it is also necessary to proceed to a unity of essence and to indistinction; for one considering long and understanding well it is difficult to see. And therefore it is sounder to adhere to one of these positions with fear of the other part, than to precipitate the opinion wholly into the other; especially since masters and approved clerics say both».
For the authors see in the Scholion to the preceding question.
---
- Sub hoc respectu ait Aristot., I. Topic. c. 6. (c. 5.) et VII. c. 1: «Maxime autem indubitanter quod unum est numero idem ab omnibus videtur dici». Rationem minori additam VII. Metaph. text. 49. (VI. c. 13.) ita exprimit: ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια χωρίζει, i. e. actus namque separat. — In ipsa minori cod. cc et ed. 1 ita est una pro ita est unum.Under this respect Aristotle says, I Topics c. 6 (c. 5) and VII, c. 1: «Most indubitably, that which is one in number seems to be called the same by all». The reason added to the minor [in] VII Metaphysics text 49 (VI, c. 13) he expresses thus: ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια χωρίζει, i.e. for act separates. — In the minor itself codex cc and ed. 1 [read] ita est una for ita est unum.
- Aristot., 1. Topic. c. 6. (c. 3.) et V. Metaph. text. 12. (IV. c. 6.). — Verba ergo a divisione (Vat. addit sufficienti), quae in fine argumenti habentur, significant modum argumentandi, de quo tom. I. pag. 420, nota 5.Aristotle, 1 Topics c. 6 (c. 3) and V Metaphysics text 12 (IV, c. 6). — The words ergo a divisione (the Vatican edition adds sufficienti), which are had at the end of the argument, signify the mode of arguing, on which [see] tom. 1, p. 420, note 5.
- Cfr. Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1; VIII. Phys. text. 48. (c. 6.); II. Metaph. text. 5. et XII. text. 36. (I. brev. c. 2. et XI. c. 10.). — Cod. O nisi in uno numero: unde sicut etc. Paulo inferius nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 est principium efficiens pro est primum efficiens.Cf. Aristotle, VII Topics c. 1; VIII Physics text 48 (c. 6); II Metaphysics text 5 and XII text 36 (I, brief, c. 2, and XI, c. 10). — Codex O [reads] nisi in uno numero: unde sicut etc. A little below some codices with ed. 1 [read] est principium efficiens for est primum efficiens.
- Aristot., de Praedicam. in princ. et c. de Substantia. — Post de se in cod. cc et ed. 1 additur ipso.Aristotle, Categories at the beginning and the chapter on Substance. — After de se in codex cc and ed. 1 is added ipso.
- Vat. omittit in hac prop. verba in aliis Angelis et. Aliquanto superius cod. F illius transmutationis subiectum pro illius mutationis subiectum.The Vatican edition omits in this proposition the words in aliis Angelis et. Somewhat above codex F [reads] illius transmutationis subiectum for illius mutationis subiectum.
- Nam ait Aristot., III. Metaph. text. 14. (II. c. 4.): Numero unum dicere aut singulare nihil differt. — Probationem minoris insinuat Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1. et I. Phys. text. 17. (c. 2.).For Aristotle says, III Metaphysics text 14 (II, c. 4): To say one in number or singular differs in nothing. — The proof of the minor Aristotle insinuates, VII Topics c. 1 and I Physics text 17 (c. 2).
- Aristot., III. Metaph. text. 16. (II. c. 4.): Omnia vero entia aut unum aut plura, quorum unumquodque unum est. — Paulo inferius voci divisum cod. U praemittit esse.Aristotle, III Metaphysics text 16 (II, c. 4): But all beings [are] either one or many, of which each one is one. — A little below codex U prefixes to the word divisum [the word] esse.
- Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et II. Periherm. c. 4. (c. 14.): Simul autem non contingit eidem inesse contraria.Aristotle, Categories, the chapter on Opposites, and II On Interpretation c. 4 (c. 14): But contraries cannot be in the same [thing] at once.
- Supple cum cod. L esse.Supply, with codex L, esse.
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 1. ad 1. et d. 37. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.Cf. I Sent. d. 8, p. II, q. 1, ad 1, and d. 37, p. I, a. 2, q. 1.
- Vat. hic incipit novam propositionem et substituit Quia dicit pro quae dicunt. Eadem Vat. paulo superius, mutata interpunctione, omittit verba si nullam distinctionem. Dein post Amplius quia codd. Y aa adiiciunt est.The Vatican edition here begins a new proposition and substitutes Quia dicit for quae dicunt. The same Vatican edition a little above, the punctuation changed, omits the words si nullam distinctionem. Then after Amplius quia codices Y aa add est.
- Fide cod. cc et ed. 1 supplevimus unus, quod etiam contextus requirit. Multi codd. cum ed. 1 paulo inferius, mutata interpunctione et adiecto est, ita legunt: sic et materia quia infinita (cod. T quae infinite) in omnibus materiatis est, et una etc., quae lectio cum prima parte huius prop. non convenit.On the faith of codex cc and ed. 1 we have supplied unus, which the context also requires. Many codices with ed. 1 a little below, the punctuation changed and est added, so read: sic et materia quia infinita (codex T quae infinite) in omnibus materiatis est, et una etc., which reading does not agree with the first part of this proposition.
- Cod. Vat. cum pluribus mss. sit. Cod. L Tunc.The Vatican edition with several manuscripts [reads] sit. Codex L [reads] Tunc.
- Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 104. (c. 11.) ad demonstrandum quod nunc temporis re ipsa sit idem et ratione tantum alterum, adducit sophisma illud, quo «Sophistae accipiunt, diversum Coriscum in Lyceo esse et Coriscum in foro; et hoc igitur ex eo, quia alibi et alibi est, diversum est». Quae verba S. Thomas (lect. 18.) ita exponit: Et hoc modo [scil. ratione alterum] sophistae utuntur altero, cum dicunt, Coriscum alterum esse in theatro et in foro; sic arguentes secundum sophisma accidentis; esse in foro est aliud ab eo quod est in theatro; sed Coriscus est nunc in foro, nunc in theatro: ergo est alius a se.Aristotle, IV Physics text 104 (c. 11), to demonstrate that the now of time is really the same and other only in reason, adduces that sophism by which «the Sophists assume that the Coriscus in the Lyceum is diverse from the Coriscus in the marketplace; and this, therefore, from this, that because he is elsewhere and elsewhere, he is diverse». Which words St. Thomas (lecture 18) thus expounds: And in this mode [namely by reason other] the sophists use «other», when they say that Coriscus is other in the theater and in the marketplace; thus arguing according to the sophism of accident; to be in the marketplace is other than that which is in the theater; but Coriscus is now in the marketplace, now in the theater: therefore he is other than himself.
- Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie: Substantia, cum suprema sit, eo quod nihil supra eam sit, genus est generalissimum.Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter on Species: Substance, since it is supreme — in that nothing is above it — is the most general genus.
- In cod. I additur: Unde Augustinus, XII. Confess. c. 6. dicit, quod materia ignorando cognoscitur, scil. per privationem omnis formae; est ergo una numero ratione suae possibilis infinitatis, defectibilitatis.In codex I is added: Whence Augustine, XII Confessions, c. 6, says that matter is known by not-knowing, namely through the privation of all form; it is therefore one in number by reason of its possible infinity, [its] defectibility.
- Sub quo respectu individuum a Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie, definitur: cuius collectio proprietatum nunquam in alio eadem erit. Cfr. etiam Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 11.Under which respect the individual is defined by Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter on Species: one whose collection of properties will never be the same in another. Cf. also Damascene, III On the Orthodox Faith, c. 11.
- Cap. 32. n. 60: «Nam quis non admonitus videat, neque ullam speciem neque ullum omnino esse corpus, quod non habeat unitatis qualecumque vestigium»? Ad pleniorem intelligentiam cfr. supra pag. 17, nota 4.Chapter 32, n. 60: «For who, being admonished, would not see that there is neither any species nor any body at all which does not have some trace of unity»? For a fuller understanding cf. above p. 17, note 4.
- In corp. quaest.In the body of the question.
- Codd. W aa considerandam, codd. P Q consideratione, Vat. omittit consideratam. Paulo superius nonnulli codd. ascendere pro conscendere.Codices W aa [read] considerandam, codices P Q consideratione, the Vatican edition omits consideratam. A little above some codices [read] ascendere for conscendere.
- Cap. 3. seqq. Deinde c. 18. n. 35. seq. — Text. 27. (c. 5.).[Confessions XII,] chap. 3 ff. Then c. 18, n. 35 f. — Text 27 (c. 5).
- Cap. 8. n. 13. — VII. c. 12. n. 18. — Hucusque cod. K.Chap. 8, n. 13. — VII, c. 12, n. 18. — Up to here [follows] codex K.
- Libr. XII. Metaph. text. 19. seqq. (XI. c. 4.).Book XII Metaphysics text 19 ff. (XI, c. 4). ---