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Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 27

Textus Latinus
p. 653

ARTICULUS I. De gratia in comparatione ad alium habitum.

QUAESTIO I. Utrum gratia gratum faciens dividi habeat per differentias essentialiter diversas.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum gratia gratum faciens dividi habeat per differentias diversas per essentiam. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Magister in littera1 sumens auctoritatem Augustini, dividit gratiam in praevenientem et subsequentem. Si igitur recta divisio debet esse per opposita; et opposita non possunt fieri circa idem simul et semel: videtur igitur quod impossibile sit, unam et eandem gratiam esse praevenientem et subsequentem. Quodsi tu dicas, istam divisionem esse solummodo per differentias quantum ad actum et effectum, non quantum ad habitum; contra hoc est quod dicitur in Glossa super Exodi trigesimum tertium2: Si inveni gratiam etc., ibi Glossa: «Non una gratia sufficit Sanctis. Una enim praecedit, ut Dominum diligant et cognoscant, altera subsequitur, ut se mundos custodiant»: ergo divisio gratiae in praevenientem et subsequentem non solum est per diversos usus, sed etiam per diversos habitus.

2. Item, primae ad Corinthios duodecimo3: Divisiones gratiarum etc. Si igitur illae gratiae, quas ibi distinguit Apostolus, divisae sunt, et a Spiritu sancto dividuntur; videtur, quod essentialiter distinguantur. Si tu dicas, quod loquitur de gratiis gratis datis, non de gratia gratum faciente; obiicitur contra hoc, quia plura sunt necessaria ad hoc, quod quis habeat gratiam gratum facientem quam gratiam gratis datam: ergo si ad perfectionem usus gratiae gratis datae requiritur habituum multitudo, multo fortius ad perfectionem gratiae gratum facientis.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. «Si unum oppositorum dicitur multipliciter, et reliquum, quod illi opponitur4»; sed culpa, eo ipso quod culpa est, opponitur gratiae gratum facienti, secundum quod gratia est: ergo cum multae sint differentiae culparum, quae formaliter distinguuntur; videtur, quod multae sint differentiae gratiae gratum facientis, quae essentialiter diversificentur.

4. Item, «habitus diversificantur per actus5»; sed ad gratiam, secundum quod huiusmodi, pertinet animam curare, pertinet etiam a malo praeservare, pertinet etiam eam in bono fortificare. Si igitur isti sunt alii et alii actus, secundum quos etiam medicinae corporales ad invicem distinguuntur, quia alia p. 654 est medicina praeservativa, alia curativa, alia restaurativa; pari ratione videtur hoc convenire gratiae.

5. Item, sicut se habet scientia respectu cognoscendorum, sic se habet gratia respectu meritorum; sed scientia respectu diversorum cognoscibilium est alia et alia6: ergo videtur, quod gratia, quae est principium diversorum meritorum, sit alia et alia; haec autem est gratia gratum faciens: ergo etc.

Sed contra: 1. Prima divisio gratiae gratum facientis est in praevenientem et subsequentem; sed ista membra, ut dicit Magister in littera7, non faciunt diversitatem habituum, sed effectuum: ergo nec aliqua alia membra gratiam dividentia.

2. Item, eadem est lucis influentia, quae fugat tenebras et illuminat aerem: ergo in spiritualibus eadem est influentia, quae culpam expellit et ad bonum disponit; sed prima est gratia praeveniens, secunda subsequens: ergo videtur, quod una tantum gratia sit in anima.

3. Item, unius acceptati una est acceptatio8. Si igitur gratia gratum faciens non est aliud quam ipsa acceptatio sive ratio acceptandi, qua anima acceptatur a Deo; videtur, quod in uno homine unam tantum sit ponere gratiam gratum facientem.

4. Item, imago recreationis respondet imagini creationis; sed ad imaginem creationis non solum requiritur potentiarum pluralitas, sed etiam essentiae unitas, ad quam reducatur9 illa pluralitas: ergo et in imagine recreationis necesse est ponere aliquem habitum unum, in quo uniantur omnes habitus virtutum; hic autem non est nisi gratia gratum faciens: ergo etc.

5. Item, unus homo omnibus virtutibus idem et aequaliter meretur et in omnibus aequaliter acceptatur; hoc autem non esset, nisi una esset ratio acceptandi ipsum hominem secundum se et in omnibus actibus suis; haec10 autem non est nisi gratia gratum faciens: ergo etc.

CONCLUSIO

In una anima una tantum ponenda est gratia gratum faciens.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in una anima unam tantum est ponere gratiam gratum facientem.

Ratio autem huius sumitur et ex parte principii effectivi et ex parte subiecti et ex parte finis ultimi et ex parte finis primi et etiam intermedii11. — Ex parte principii effectivi, quoniam gratia est influentia a Deo procedens in ipsam animam, secundum quam Deus totam animam sibi assimilat. Unde quia unius rei una est similitudo, in una anima una reperitur gratia procedens ab effectivo principio. — Ex parte subiecti similiter necesse est, gratiam gratum facientem esse unam, pro eo quod gratia comparatur ad animam sicut principium dans ei vitam in esse secundo. Et quoniam unius vivificabilis una est vita sive principium vivificans12; hinc est, quod in una anima una tantum debet esse gratia. — Ex parte vero finis tam primi quam ultimi quam etiam intermedii ratio sumitur. Gratia enim est ad hoc, quod13 faciat hominem Deo acceptum; est etiam ad hoc, ut per ipsam perveniat homo ad unum et summum bonum; est etiam ad hoc, ut opus a libero arbitrio egrediens sit meritorium apud Deum. Quoniam igitur Deus non acceptat hominem secundum quid, sed si acceptat, totum acceptat; et opera eiusdem hominis secundum unum statum sunt aequaliter meritoria; et merces omnium meritorum est una: hinc est, quod necesse est ponere, in uno homine gratiam esse unam, exigente hoc comparatione ad principium effectivum et ad subiectum et ad finem immediatum14 et ultimum. — Unde rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.

Ad argumenta in oppositum:

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de divisione Magistri, quam ponit in littera15; dicendum, quod illa divisio gratiae est penes effectus, quos habet in nobis, quorum unus accipitur respectu mali, a quo liberat, alter respectu boni, ad quod ordinat. Unde notandum est, quod nomen gratiae aequivocatur, ut aliquando accipiatur pro habitu, aliquando pro effectu habitus; et in proposita divisione non accipitur pro habitu, sed pro effectu. Per hunc etiam modum accipitur in illa Glossa, in qua dicitur, quod non una gratia necessaria est Sanctis etc., id est non unus effectus gratiae tantum. Et si tu obiicias, quod «habitus diversificantur per actus et effectus»; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem in actibus primis, quorum unus ad alterum non habet ordinari. Sic autem non est in proposito, quia actus gratiae praevenientis ordinem habet ad actum gratiae subsequentis. p. 655

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Apostoli, dicendum, quod sicut in opponendo16 praedictum est, hoc intelligitur de gratiis gratis datis. Illae enim multiplicantur propter hoc, quod ordinantur ad opera exteriora, ita quod secundum primam et immediatam rationem effectus diversos respiciunt; gratia autem gratum faciens, in quantum huiusmodi, non habet respicere opera exteriora, sicut17 interiora, nisi mediantibus habitibus virtutum et donorum; aut si illa respicit, hoc non est, nisi in quantum considerantur sub una ratione, videlicet sub ratione meriti. — Et ideo non tenet illud quod consequenter obiicit, quod maior est perfectio gratiae gratum facientis quam gratiae gratis datae; quod etsi verum sit intensive, non tamen oportet, quod extensive.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod culpa multiplicatur18, ergo et gratia; responderi potest, quod illa ratio deficit dupliciter. Primum quidem, quia illud intelligitur de multiplicatione non secundum divisionem, quae est in partes subiectivas, sed secundum diversas acceptiones sive significationes. Cum enim irrationale dividatur contra rationale, non oportet, quod tot sint rationalia, quot irrationalia. Secundo etiam deficit, quia uni bono nata sunt opponi plura mala, cum «malum sit multifariam, et bonum uno modo19».

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actus gratiae, secundum quod gratia est, diversificantur etc.; dicendum, quod etsi actus illi diversi sint tanta diversitate, quod in corporalibus diversis rebus attribuuntur, quia alterius medicinae est curare, et alterius praeservare; in spiritualibus tamen non sic diversificantur, ut inducant diversitatem habitus, tum propter ipsorum actuum et effectuum ordinem, tum etiam propter ipsius habitus perfectionem, ex qua habet, ut possit multo melius in plures effectus sine sui multiplicatione, quam natura corporalis hoc possit ex diversarum naturarum coniunctione20.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de scientia, plana est responsio per iam dicta. Non enim est simile, tum quia scientia dicit habitum habentem respectum ad exteriora cognoscibilia secundum speciales et proprias conditiones et naturas; tum etiam, quia aliquo modo scientia creata causari dicitur ex rebus extra; tum etiam, quia ad ipsam scientiam maxime pertinet distinguere21. Opposita autem harum proprietatum et conditionum reperiri habent in gratia, sicut haberi potest ex his quae praedicta sunt; et ideo non plurificatur, sed in una anima reperitur una.

Scholion

I. Consentiunt theologi in hoc, quod una tantum sit gratia, quatenus ipsa est principium vitae supernaturalis; et rursus in hoc, quod «est differentia in gratia per differentes effectus et status, et non per differentes formas. Et secundum hoc dicendum, quod est divisibilis per differentias accidentales, et non per differentias essentiales, quae diversificant essentiam seu formam. Virtus autem divisibilis est utroque modo, scilicet per differentias essentiales et per differentias accidentales» etc. (ita Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 3. a. 1.).

De multis distinctionibus gratiae, quae illa aetate in usu erant, vide hic dub. 1. Praecipue autem ibi notandum est, quod divisiones sumtae ex S. Augustino, scilicet in gratiam praevenientem et subsequentem, operantem et cooperantem, apud auctores et apud ipsum Augustinum in diversis sensibus sumuntur, ut observant S. Thom. (II. Sent. d. 26. a. 5.) et S. Bonav. in dubio citato. Nam inveniuntur dictae modo de gratia increata, modo de creata, modo de habituali, modo de actuali; quod qui non attendit, in periculum incidit falsum sensum auctoribus attribuendi. S. Bonav. in praedicto dubio presse sequitur Alexandrum Hal. (loc. cit. a. 2.), qui diffuse de istis distinctionibus scribit et etiam differentiam gratiae operantis et praevenientis sic explicat: «Eadem est gratia operans et praeveniens, sed differenter: quia utraque comparatur respectu liberi arbitrii ut causa movens ipsum; sed praeveniens dicitur, in quantum semper praesto est ut causa bonae voluntatis, etsi in effectu non causet; operans vero efficit bonam voluntatem. Unde gratia praeveniens et operans dicuntur causa bonae voluntatis, sed praeveniens dicit causam secundum habitum, operans dicit causam secundum actum. — Similiter eadem est gratia subsequens et cooperans; sed subsequens dicitur respectu praevenientis, quae facit voluntatem bonam, eo quod adiuvet voluntatem iam existentem bonam ad faciendum bonum; cooperans vero dicitur respectu liberi arbitrii, in quantum ex gratia et libero arbitrio opus bonum procedit» (cfr. S. Thom., loc. cit. ad 5; S. I. II. q. 111. a. 2. 3.). De multiplici sensu istarum distinctionum late tractat etiam Aegid. R. (II. Sent. d. 26. q. 2. a. 3. 4.).

Non inutilis esse nobis videtur observatio Estii (II. Sent. d. 26. § 7.), quod gratia, quae secundum Augustinum dicta est cooperans, interdum simplici vocabulo operans vocatur, et vicissim operans dicitur cooperans. Et addit rationem: «Si enim gratiae cooperatur liberum arbitrium producendo in se volendi actum, consequens est, etiam libero arbitrio in eodem actu cooperari gratiam, quia cooperans ad cooperantem relative dicitur» (cfr. Alex. Hal., citatus supra in schol. ad II. Sent. d. 26. q. 6.). Eo magis hoc notandum est, quia Scholastici antiqui effectum gratiae operantis minime restringunt ad solos primos actus indeliberatos, a gratia excitatos, sed potius docent, quod per eandem voluntas efficiatur bona, «quia Deus illam infundendo voluntatem hominis sanat et praeparat» (S. Bonav., supra d. 26. q. 6.). Constat autem, quod hic effectus in adultis sine cooperatione et motu liberi arbitrii non obtinetur; unde illud respectu talis gratiae operantis et moventis non est tantum motum, sed etiam se ipsum movens, «assentiendo Deo excitanti atque vocanti» (Trid. Sess. VI. can. 4.). Nec dissentiunt Bonav. aliique Scholastici, quando gratiae operanti, ut eam distinguant a cooperante, attribuunt, quod moveat voluntatem; nec ipse S. Thom. dissentit, quando (S. loc. cit. a. 2.) addit, quod in effectu gratiae operantis «mens nostra est mota et non movens, solus autem Deus movens». Nam haec ultima verba, adhibitis aliis locis, exponi debent et possunt (cfr. Caietan. in hunc locum, Estius, loc. cit. § 8, aliique commentatores Summae). — De hac cooperatione liberi arbitrii respectu gratiae operantis vide etiam verba Alexandri Hal. et Richardi a Med., supra d. 26. q. 6. in schol.

II. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 26. q. unica a. 6; S. I. II. q. 111. a. 2. ad 4; de Verit. q. 27. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 10; S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 101. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 26. q. unica a. 5. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 26. a. unicus q. 6. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 26. q. 5.

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English Translation

Article I. On grace in comparison with another habit.

Question I. Whether sanctifying grace must be divided through essentially diverse differences.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether sanctifying grace must be divided through differences diverse by essence. And that it must, it seems.

1. The Master in the text1, taking up the authority of Augustine, divides grace into prevenient and subsequent. If, then, a right division must be through opposites, and opposites cannot come to be about the same thing at one and the same moment, it therefore seems that it is impossible for one and the same grace to be both prevenient and subsequent. But if you say that this division is only through differences as to act and effect, not as to habit; against this is what is said in the Gloss on the thirty-third chapter of Exodus2: If I have found grace etc., where the Gloss says: «One grace does not suffice for the saints. For one precedes, that they may love and know the Lord; another follows, that they may keep themselves clean»: therefore the division of grace into prevenient and subsequent is not only through diverse uses, but also through diverse habits.

2. Likewise, in the first letter to the Corinthians, chapter twelve3: Divisions of graces etc. If, then, those graces which the Apostle there distinguishes are divided, and are divided by the Holy Spirit, it seems that they are essentially distinguished. If you say that he is speaking of freely given graces (gratiae gratis datae), not of sanctifying grace; it is objected against this that more is necessary for one to have sanctifying grace than freely given grace: therefore if a multitude of habits is required for the perfection of the use of freely given grace, much more so for the perfection of sanctifying grace.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems to follow by reason. «If one of two opposites is said in many ways, so too is the other which is opposed to it4»; but fault (culpa), by the very fact that it is fault, is opposed to sanctifying grace insofar as it is grace: therefore, since there are many differences of faults which are formally distinguished, it seems that there are many differences of sanctifying grace which are essentially diversified.

4. Likewise, «habits are diversified through acts5»; but to grace, as such, it belongs to heal the soul, it belongs also to preserve it from evil, it belongs also to strengthen it in good. If, then, these are different and different acts, according to which bodily medicines too are distinguished from one another — since one p. 654 medicine is preservative, another curative, another restorative — by parity of reasoning this seems to belong to grace.

5. Likewise, as knowledge stands with respect to the things to be known, so grace stands with respect to merits; but knowledge with respect to diverse knowable things is different and different6: therefore it seems that grace, which is the principle of diverse merits, is different and different; but this is sanctifying grace: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. The first division of sanctifying grace is into prevenient and subsequent; but these members, as the Master says in the text7, do not make a diversity of habits, but of effects: therefore neither do any other members dividing grace.

2. Likewise, the same is the influx of light that drives away darkness and illumines the air: therefore in spiritual matters the same is the influx that expels fault and disposes to good; but the first is prevenient grace, the second subsequent: therefore it seems that there is only one grace in the soul.

3. Likewise, of one thing accepted there is one acceptance8. If, then, sanctifying grace is nothing other than the acceptance itself, or the ground of accepting, by which the soul is accepted by God, it seems that in one man only one sanctifying grace is to be posited.

4. Likewise, the image of re-creation corresponds to the image of creation; but for the image of creation there is required not only a plurality of powers, but also a unity of essence to which that plurality may be reduced9: therefore in the image of re-creation too it is necessary to posit some one habit in which all the habits of the virtues are united; but this is nothing other than sanctifying grace: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, one man merits the same and equally by all the virtues and is accepted equally in all; but this would not be so unless there were one ground of accepting the man himself in himself and in all his acts; but this10 is nothing other than sanctifying grace: therefore etc.

Conclusion

In one soul only one sanctifying grace is to be posited.

I respond: It must be said that in one soul only one sanctifying grace is to be posited.

And the reason for this is taken both from the side of the effective principle and from the side of the subject and from the side of the ultimate end and from the side of the first end and also the intermediate end11. — From the side of the effective principle, because grace is an influx proceeding from God into the soul itself, according to which God assimilates the whole soul to himself. Hence, since of one thing there is one likeness, in one soul there is found one grace proceeding from the effective principle. — From the side of the subject likewise it is necessary that sanctifying grace be one, since grace is compared to the soul as a principle giving it life in its second being (esse secundo). And since of one thing capable of being made alive there is one life or one vivifying principle12, hence it is that in one soul there ought to be only one grace. — But from the side of the end, both first and ultimate and also intermediate, the reason is taken. For grace exists for this, that13 it may make a man acceptable to God; it exists also for this, that through it a man may attain to the one and highest good; it exists also for this, that the work proceeding from free choice may be meritorious before God. Since, therefore, God does not accept a man in a qualified way, but if he accepts, he accepts the whole; and the works of the same man in one state are equally meritorious; and the reward of all merits is one: hence it is that it is necessary to posit in one man that grace is one, this being required by the comparison to the effective principle and to the subject and to the immediate14 and ultimate end. — Hence the reasons which show this are to be granted.

To the arguments to the contrary:

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary concerning the division of the Master, which he sets down in the text15; it must be said that that division of grace is according to the effects which it has in us, of which one is taken with respect to evil, from which it frees, the other with respect to good, to which it orders. Hence it is to be noted that the name of grace is equivocal, so that it is taken sometimes for the habit, sometimes for the effect of the habit; and in the division proposed it is not taken for the habit, but for the effect. In this way too it is taken in that Gloss, in which it is said that not one grace is necessary for the saints etc., that is, not one effect of grace only. And if you object that «habits are diversified through acts and effects»; it must be said that this holds true of first acts, of which one is not ordered to another. But it is not so in the case at hand, because the act of prevenient grace has an ordering to the act of subsequent grace. p. 655

2. To that which is objected from the authority of the Apostle, it must be said that, as was said above in the objecting16, this is to be understood of freely given graces. For these are multiplied because they are ordered to external works, so that according to their first and immediate character they regard diverse effects; but sanctifying grace, as such, does not regard external works, as it does17 interior ones, except through the mediation of the habits of the virtues and gifts; or if it does regard them, this is only insofar as they are considered under one character, namely under the character of merit. — And therefore that which it consequently objects does not hold, that the perfection of sanctifying grace is greater than that of freely given grace; for although this is true intensively, it need not be so extensively.

3. To that which is objected, that fault is multiplied18, therefore grace too; it can be answered that that reasoning fails in two ways. First indeed, because that is to be understood of a multiplication not according to division into subjective parts, but according to diverse acceptations or significations. For since the irrational is divided against the rational, it need not be that there are as many rational things as irrational. Secondly it also fails, because to one good many evils are apt to be opposed, since «evil is manifold, and good is in one way19».

4. To that which is objected, that the acts of grace, insofar as it is grace, are diversified etc.; it must be said that although those acts are diverse with so great a diversity that in bodily things they are attributed to diverse things — since it belongs to one medicine to cure and to another to preserve — yet in spiritual things they are not so diversified as to induce a diversity of habit, both because of the order of the acts and effects themselves, and also because of the perfection of the habit itself, by which it has that it can far better reach into many effects without its own multiplication than bodily nature can do this through the conjunction of diverse natures20.

5. To that which is objected concerning knowledge, the response is plain from what has already been said. For there is no parallel, both because knowledge denotes a habit having a respect to exterior knowable things according to their special and proper conditions and natures; and also because in some way created knowledge is said to be caused by things outside; and also because to knowledge itself it especially belongs to distinguish21. But the opposites of these properties and conditions are found in grace, as can be had from what has been said before; and therefore it is not multiplied, but in one soul is found one.

Scholion

I. Theologians agree in this, that there is only one grace, insofar as it is the principle of the supernatural life; and again in this, that «there is a difference in grace through differing effects and states, and not through differing forms. And according to this it must be said that it is divisible through accidental differences, and not through essential differences, which diversify the essence or form. But virtue is divisible in both ways, namely through essential differences and through accidental differences» etc. (so Alex. of Hales, Summa p. III. q. 61. m. 3. a. 1.).

Concerning the many distinctions of grace which were in use in that age, see here dub. 1. But it is especially to be noted there that the divisions taken from St. Augustine, namely into prevenient and subsequent grace, operating and cooperating, are taken among the authors and in Augustine himself in diverse senses, as St. Thomas (II. Sent. d. 26. a. 5.) and St. Bonaventure in the dubium cited observe. For they are found said now of uncreated grace, now of created, now of habitual, now of actual; and one who does not attend to this falls into the danger of attributing a false sense to the authors. St. Bonaventure in the aforesaid dubium closely follows Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. a. 2.), who writes at length about these distinctions and also explains the difference between operating and prevenient grace thus: «It is the same grace that operates and prevenes, but differently: because each is compared with respect to free choice as a cause moving it; but it is called prevenient insofar as it is always at hand as a cause of good will, even if it does not cause it in effect; but operating grace effects good will. Hence prevenient and operating grace are called the cause of good will, but the prevenient names the cause according to the habit, the operating names the cause according to the act. — Similarly the same grace is subsequent and cooperating; but it is called subsequent with respect to the prevenient, which makes the will good, in that it helps the will, already existing as good, to do good; but it is called cooperating with respect to free choice, insofar as from grace and free choice a good work proceeds» (cfr. St. Thomas, loc. cit. ad 5; S. I. II. q. 111. a. 2. 3.). On the manifold sense of these distinctions Aegidius Romanus also treats at length (II. Sent. d. 26. q. 2. a. 3. 4.).

The observation of Estius (II. Sent. d. 26. § 7.) seems to us not useless, that the grace which according to Augustine is called cooperating is sometimes called by the simple word operating, and in turn operating is called cooperating. And he adds the reason: «For if free choice cooperates with grace by producing in itself the act of willing, it follows that grace too cooperates with free choice in the same act, since cooperating is said relatively to the one cooperating» (cfr. Alex. of Hales, cited above in the scholion on II. Sent. d. 26. q. 6.). This is the more to be noted, because the ancient Scholastics by no means restrict the effect of operating grace to the first undeliberated acts alone, aroused by grace, but rather teach that through the same grace the will is made good, «because God, by infusing it, heals and prepares the will of man» (St. Bonaventure, above d. 26. q. 6.). But it is established that this effect is not obtained in adults without the cooperation and motion of free choice; hence, with respect to such operating and moving grace, that is not only something moved, but also moving itself, «by assenting to God who arouses and calls» (Trid. Sess. VI. can. 4.). Nor do Bonaventure and the other Scholastics dissent, when, in order to distinguish operating grace from cooperating grace, they attribute to it that it moves the will; nor does St. Thomas himself dissent, when (S. loc. cit. a. 2.) he adds that in the effect of operating grace «our mind is moved and not moving, but God alone is moving». For these last words, with other passages adduced, must and can be explained (cfr. Cajetan on this passage, Estius, loc. cit. § 8, and the other commentators on the Summa). — On this cooperation of free choice with respect to operating grace see also the words of Alexander of Hales and Richard of Mediavilla, above d. 26. q. 6. in the scholion.

II. Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. — St. Thomas, II. Sent. d. 26. q. unica a. 6; S. I. II. q. 111. a. 2. ad 4; de Verit. q. 27. a. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 10; Summa p. II. tr. 16. q. 101. m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, II. Sent. d. 26. q. unica a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, II. Sent. d. 26. a. unicus q. 6. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II. Sent. d. 26. q. 5.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Dist. praeced. c. 2. seqq. et hic c. 1. — Aristot., I. de Partib. animalium, c. 3. dicit: Oppositis item dividendum est. Cfr. II. Poster. c. 14. (c. 12.). — De sententia: Opposita non possunt fieri circa idem simul et semel, cfr. quod ex Aristot. attulimus supra pag. 100, nota 1. — Pro debet esse cod. aa debet fieri.
    The preceding distinction, c. 2 ff., and here c. 1. — Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals I. c. 3, says: Division must likewise be made by opposites. Cf. Posterior Analytics II. c. 14 (c. 12). — On the maxim opposites cannot come to be about the same thing at one and the same moment, cf. what we adduced from Aristotle above on p. 100, note 1. — For debet esse codex aa reads debet fieri.
  2. Vers. 13. — Glossam referunt Strabus et Lyranus.
    Verse 13. — Strabo and Lyranus report the Gloss.
  3. Vers. 4.
    Verse 4.
  4. Aristot., I. Topic. c. 13. et V. Ethic. c. 1.
    Aristotle, Topics I. c. 13, and Ethics V. c. 1.
  5. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 1: Ut uno verbo dicam, ex similibus operationibus habitus fiunt; unde operationes qualitate quadam praeditas oportet reddere, quippe cum ex earum differentiis habitus quoque [differentes] consequantur.
    Aristotle, Ethics II. c. 1: To say it in one word, habits arise from like operations; hence one must render the operations endowed with a certain quality, since from their differences differing habits too result.
  6. Ut insinuat Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 38. (c. 8.), et I. Metaph. c. 1. seqq. Cfr. etiam I. Poster. c. 23. (c. 28.).
    As Aristotle intimates, On the Soul III, text 38 (c. 8), and Metaphysics I. c. 1 ff. Cf. also Posterior Analytics I. c. 23 (c. 28).
  7. Hic c. 1.
    Here, c. 1.
  8. Plures codd., inter quos F K bb, hic et paulo inferius acceptio.
    Several codices, among them F K bb, here and a little below read acceptio.
  9. Cfr. supra d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 3.
    Cf. above, d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 3.
  10. Ita Vat. cum ed. 3 et pluribus codd., in aliis hoc.
    So the Vatican edition with ed. 3 and several codices; in others hoc.
  11. Verba et etiam intermedii desunt in multis codd., ut F H I L O T X Y Z aa bb, et in edd. 2, 3; in ed. 1 legitur ex parte subiecti et ex parte finis primi, medii et ultimi. Probabiliter haec verba, ex sequente explicatione sumta, a posterioribus manibus interpolata sunt.
    The words and also intermediate are absent in many codices, such as F H I L O T X Y Z aa bb, and in eds. 2, 3; in ed. 1 it reads from the side of the subject and from the side of the first, middle, and ultimate end. Probably these words, taken from the explanation that follows, were interpolated by later hands.
  12. Cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 89. seqq. (c. 5.), et supra pag. 225, nota 6.
    Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul I, text 89 ff. (c. 5), and above on p. 225, note 6.
  13. Codd. V bb ut.
    Codices V bb read ut.
  14. Cod. aa intermedium; cod. cc et ed. 1 hic interiiciunt medium.
    Codex aa reads intermedium (intermediate); codex cc and ed. 1 here insert medium (middle).
  15. Cod. aa de divisione Augustini, quam ponit Magister in littera.
    Codex aa reads concerning the division of Augustine, which the Master sets down in the text.
  16. Supra in ipsa obiectione secunda.
    Above, in the second objection itself.
  17. Vat. cum cod. ee sive; ed. 1 omittit sicut interiora.
    The Vatican edition with codex ee reads sive (or); ed. 1 omits sicut interiora (as interior ones).
  18. Vat. multipliciter dicitur. — De partibus subiectivis cfr. supra pag. 598, nota 9.
    The Vatican edition reads is said in many ways. — On subjective parts cf. above, p. 598, note 9.
  19. Aristot., I. Magnor. Moral. c. 22. (c. 23.), ubi et haec exempla afferuntur: «quemadmodum sanitas quidem simplex (ἁπλοῦς), sed multiformis morbus; itidem virtus simplex, cum sit vitium tamen multiforme». Idem habetur VII. Moral. Eudem. c. 6. (c. 5.). Quia tamen tempore S. Bonav. libri Ethic. magis divulgati erant, S. Doctor verba respexisse videtur, quae habentur II. Ethic. c. 6, et quae iuxta antiquam versionem (in ed. oper. S. Thomae) sic sonant: Boni enim quidem simpliciter (ἁπλῶς), multifarie autem mali. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 810, nota 5. — Pro multifariam cod. T multifarium, cod. W multiplex.
    Aristotle, Magna Moralia I. c. 22 (c. 23), where these examples too are brought forward: «just as health is simple (ἁπλοῦς), but disease manifold; likewise virtue is simple, while vice is nevertheless manifold». The same is found in Eudemian Ethics VII. c. 6 (c. 5). But since in the time of St. Bonaventure the books of the Ethics were more widely circulated, the holy Doctor seems to have had in view the words found in Ethics II. c. 6, which according to the old version (in the edition of the works of St. Thomas) run thus: For the good is simple (ἁπλῶς), but the evil manifold. Cf. vol. I, p. 810, note 5. — For multifariam codex T reads multifarium, codex W multiplex.
  20. Cfr. Liber de Causis, prop. 17, ubi inter alia haec: Quod virtus, quanto plus approximat uni puro et vero, fit vehementior eius unitas, et quanto vehementior fit eius unitas, est infinitas in ea magis apparens etc.
    Cf. Liber de Causis, prop. 17, where among other things: that the more a power approaches the one, pure and true, its unity becomes the more vehement, and the more vehement its unity becomes, the more does infinity appear in it etc.
  21. Vide de his Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 1. seqq. et VI. text. 1. seqq. (V. c. 1.). — In fine solut. cod. aa addit gratia.
    On these matters see Aristotle, Metaphysics I. c. 1 ff. and VI, text 1 ff. (V. c. 1). — At the end of the solution codex aa adds gratia.
← Dist. 27, Divisio TextusDist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 2→