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Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 27

Textus Latinus
p. 663

Quaestio II. Utrum per gratiam contingat mereri gratiae augmentum.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum per gratiam contingat mereri gratiae augmentum1. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per Augustinum ad Bonifacium: « Gratia meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur et perfici ».

2. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Omnis habens gratiam, habet unde possit proficere in merito2; sed profectus in merito non est nisi per augmentum gratiae: ergo gratia sui ipsius augmentum mereri potest.

3. Item, peccans uno genere peccati meretur incidere in aliud genus peccati, unde efficitur peior, sicut peccans peccato superbiae meretur incidere in peccatum luxuriae3: ergo pari ratione, qui bene utitur gratia per bonorum operum exercitium videtur mereri, ut fiat sibi gratiae augmentum.

4. Item, laudabilior est qui se extendit ad opus perfectionis cum minori adiutorio, quam qui se extendit cum maiori: ergo si habens minorem gratiam se elevat ad opera aequalis perfectionis cum eo qui habet maiorem, videtur, quod tantundem vel amplius apud Deum mereri habeat: ergo si nulli fit retributio nisi secundum quantitatem gratiae, videtur, quod talis meretur augmentum in gratia.

5. Item, qui petit pie, perseveranter, pro se et ad salutem, meretur exaudiri4; sed qui petit gratiae augmentum continue, hoc modo petit: ergo videtur gratiae augmentum mereri.

Sed contra: 1. Meritum non est respectu eius quod omnino est impossibile; sed gratiam, cum sit forma simplex, augeri est impossibile5: ergo impossibile est mereri gratiae augmentum.

2. Item, meritum non est respectu eius quod est in nobis, sed quod est ab alio6; sed habens gratiam p. 664 per virtutem eius quod habet, potest in bonum proficere; non solum enim habet unde possit stare, sicut dicit Augustinus, sed etiam unde possit proficere. Si igitur profectus gratiae consistit in eius augmento; sicut profectus gratiae est in eius potestate, ita videtur, quod et augmentum: ergo non videtur ad hoc concurrere meritum.

3. Item, nihil augetur nisi per rem eiusdem generis et naturae; sed gratia, quae primo datur, quantum est de natura sui, est ita gratuita, quod non cadit sub merito, sicut supra7 ostensum est, et Augustinus dicit de Trinitate quarto: « Quod meritis redditur, non est gratia ». Si igitur non contingit mereri ipsum gratiae donum, non contingit mereri ipsius gratiae augmentum.

4. Item, Deus remunerat opus secundum quantitatem radicis: ergo tantum meretur quis per opus gratuitum, quanta est illa gratia, a qua exit opus8; si igitur gratia augmentata excedit illam, videtur, quod minor gratia per suum opus non possit mereri sui ipsius augmentum.

5. Item, si aliquis meretur augmentum, tunc si Deus non augeret ei gratiam, esset iniustus; et cum auget, opus illud est remuneratum: ergo videtur, quod opus illud non esset dignum remuneratione gloriae. Si igitur hoc est falsum et impossibile, ut per augmentum gratiae auferatur efficacia merendi gloriam9; impossibile est ponere, quod augmentum gratiae mereri contingat.

Conclusio

Homo gratiae augmentum potest mereri.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, absque dubio tenendum est, quod gratia meretur augeri. — Quis autem sit modus augendi, et modus merendi, difficile est assignare. — Cum enim multi sint modi augendi, quis eorum competat gratiae, non est facile discernere. Contingit enim, aliquid augeri per impermixtionem cum contrario, sicut dicitur, quod « albius est, quod est nigro impermixtius10 ». Contingit nihilominus, aliquid augeri propter hoc, quod minori succedit maius, sicut dies augeri dicuntur. Contingit etiam, aliquid augeri propter aggregationem multorum, sicut lumen augetur in aere propter multitudinem candelarum, ex quarum concursu fit aggregatio luminum. Contingit etiam, aliquid augeri per additionem, sicut augetur corpus per alimentum. Contingit etiam, aliquid augeri per magnificationem rei in se ipsa, sicut augmentata fuit costa, cum de ea facta fuit Eva11, et sicut augmentati fuerunt quinque panes, cum de eis quinque millia hominum pasti sunt. Contingit etiam sexto modo, aliquid augeri per accessum ad suum summum, sicut aliquid dicitur magis pulcrum et magis luminosum, quod magis accedit ad perfectionem pulcritudinis et lucis.

Omnibus his sex modis dixerunt aliqui gratiam augeri. Sed primi tres modi improbari possunt de facili, et in primo libro, distinctione decima septima12 improbati sunt aliquo modo, cum agitur de caritatis augmento. Eodem enim modo tam caritas quam gratia habent augeri. — Tres autem modi sequentes satis convenientes sunt nec improbari de facili possunt. Primus tamen eorum famosior est, pro eo quod magis consonat Sanctorum auctoritatibus, quae videntur dicere, in augmento gratiae infundi novam gratiam, cum loquuntur de diversa Sacramentorum efficacia. Qualiter autem hic modus valeat sustineri, in primo libro distinctione decima septima13 dictum fuit. Ultimus autem modus non est minus intelligibilis quam aliquis praedictorum, immo secundum hunc modum dicendi obiectiones, quae fiunt contra gratiae augmentum, facilius declinari possunt. Quamvis enim augmentum per appositionem videatur repugnare simplicibus, maxime cum in spiritualibus quanto aliquid est simplicius, tanto sit virtute maius14; augmentum tamen per accessum ad summum valde videtur eis consonum. — Quocunque autem horum trium modorum sequentium dicatur, non est magna vis facienda, sed pro certo habentes, gratiam Dei in nobis augeri posse, laborare debemus, qualiter in nobis augeatur per bona opera. Per illa enim, ut dicit Augustinus, « meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur et perfici ».

Modum autem merendi gratiae augmentum sic videre possumus. Contingit enim, aliquid mereri ex congruo, et contingit, aliquid mereri ex condigno. Tunc est meritum ex condigno, quando ratio meriti reperitur ibi perfecte et plene; et tunc est quaedam commensuratio et adaequatio meriti ad praemium. Et quia hoc non potest esse, cum gratia augetur; hinc est, quod non potest quis mereri gratiae augmentum merito con- p. 665 digni; si igitur contingit ipsum augmentum gratiae mereri, hoc est merito congrui. Meritum autem congrui dicitur in quo est aliqua dispositio congruitatis respectu eius, ad quod illa dispositio ordinatur, quae tamen deficit a ratione condignitatis. Et hoc potest esse tripliciter. Aut enim est congruitas sine dignitate; et sic peccator per bona opera in genere, facta extra caritatem, meretur de congruo primam gratiam; ibi enim est quaedam congruitas, quia facit quod in se est; non est tamen condignitas, quia inimicus Dei est et indignus pane, quo vescitur. Aut est ibi dignitas cum indignitate, sicut est, quando vir iustus meretur peccatori primam gratiam: dignitas enim ex parte viri iusti, qui est amicus Dei et dignus a Deo exaudiri, sed indignitas est ex parte peccatoris; et ideo non est ibi plena ratio meriti. Aut est ibi dignitas cum gradus inferioritate; et sic habens gratiam minorem meretur per bonum usum pervenire ad gratiae cumulum; et hic modus merendi, etsi deficiat a merito condigni et contineatur sub merito congrui, maxime tamen inter ceteros modos praedictos merendi accedit ad perfectionem meriti15, et ideo quasi medium tenet inter meritum congrui et meritum condigni. — Ex praedictis igitur haberi potest, qualiter gratia augetur, et etiam, qualiter augeri meretur. Unde auctoritates et rationes ostendentes, quod gratia meretur augeri, concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod cum sit simplex, non potest augeri; dicendum, vel quod gratia non est omnino simplex, sed solum per privationem partium quantitativarum quantitate molis, non autem per privationem partium quantitativarum quantitate virtutis; et quantum ad tale genus partium est ei16 augmentum, non quantum ad primum. Vel potest dici secundum ultimum modum dicendi, quod augmentum, quod attenditur per accessum ad summum, non ponit compositionem, sed quandam maioris simplicitatis et unitatis perfectionem; et ideo non repugnat gratiae ratione simplicitatis essentiae.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod profectus est in potestate gratiae; dicendum, quod quidam est profectus accidentalis, utpote qui attenditur in fervoris intensione, vel habitus radicatione, vel operum multiplicatione; et hic profectus est in potestate gratiae; et secundum hunc profectum gratia non dicitur augeri proprie, quia non efficitur homo dignus maiori praemio substantiali per illum. Alius vero est profectus, qui respicit praemium substantiale, secundum quem dicitur homo dignus maiori praemio; et hic non est in potestate gratiae, sed in sola illius potestate, cuius est gratiam infundere; et ideo hunc gratia non facere, sed mereri dicitur: et penes hunc effectum attenditur gratiae augmentum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod augmentum gratiae est eiusdem generis cum gratia primo data; dicendum, quod etsi sit eiusdem naturae quantum ad rationem habitus, differentia tamen est quantum ad statum, pro eo quod supponit gratiae initium. Et quia eiusdem generis est cum gratia primo data, ideo non potest mereri merito condigni, sed merito congrui. Quia vero gratiam praesupponit, maiori congruitate meretur quis gratiae augmentum quam gratiae initium, sicut supra17 dictum fuit.

4. 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod remuneratio attenditur secundum quantitatem radicis; respondendum est, quod illud intelligitur in merito condigni; in merito autem congrui locum non habet18. Et per hunc etiam modum respondendum est ad illud quod ultimo opponit.

Scholion
p. 666

I. Constat ex Concilio Tridentino (Sess. VI. can. 32.), « ipsum iustificatum bonis operibus, quae ab eo per Dei gratiam et Iesu Christi meritum, cuius vivum membrum est, fiunt... vere mereri augmentum gratiae, vitam aeternam et ipsius vitae aeternae, si tamen in gratia decesserit, consecutionem atque etiam gloriae augmentum ». Hinc nunc communiter cum S. Thoma (S. I. II. q. 114. a. 8.) dicitur, quod « augmentum gratiae cadit sub merito condigni ». Licet autem S. Bonav. alio modo loquendi utatur, cum illud meritum nominet de congruo; tamen dissidium non est nisi de nomine. ipse enim rationem meriti de condigno restringit, rationem vero meriti de congruo extendit, ut patet ex textu, ubi dicit, dignitatem cum gradus inferioritate a merito de condigno deficere, sed ita, ut maxime accedat ad perfectionem meriti et quasi medium teneat inter meritum de congruo et condigno. — Communiter autem distinguebatur « duplex meritum boni operis: unum quasi annexum et concomitans, et hoc modo meretur quis augmentum gratiae, quia opus exiens ab habitu disponit ad eius augmentum; alterum quasi consequens, et hoc modo proprie non meretur quis gratiae augmentum, nisi forte de congruo » (ita Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. n. 3.). Cfr. etiam S. Thom. (hic q. unica a. 5.); insuper Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 2.), qui utrumque modum loquendi probabilem esse censet; Aegid. R. (hic q. 1. a. 3.), qui iisdem ac S. Bonav. distinctionibus utitur et de augmento gratiae dicit: » Hic est plus de merito simpliciter, quam in duobus primis ». — Ratio autem, quare S. Bonav. modum merendi augmentum gratiae nomine distinguit a modo merendi gloriam, videtur fuisse difficultas explicandi, quomodo per minorem gratiam possit quis mereri maiorem, sive quomodo per imperfectum introducatur perfectum. Hanc difficultatem solvit S. Thom. (S. loc. cit. ad 2.) sic: « Augmentum gratiae non est supra virtutem praeexistentis gratiae, licet sit supra quantitatem ipsius; sicut arbor, etsi sit supra quantitatem seminis, non est tamen supra virtutem eius ». Hoc exemplum vide etiam infra q. 3. in fine solution., (cfr. Aegid. R., loc. cit. dub. lat.). De modo, quo gratia concipiatur augeri, variae erant sententiae, sicut de augmento caritatis, ut notatum est I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 1. 2. in scholiis.

II. Ad rem spectat etiam infra d. 29. a. f. q. 2. — Praeter laudatos auctores: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 5. a. 1. ad 3. — Scot., IV. Sent. d. 22. n. 9. seqq. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 102. m. 1. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. unica. Alii commentatores rem tractant I. Sent. d. 17, ubi sermo est de augmento caritatis.

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English Translation
p. 663

Question II. Whether through grace it happens that an increase of grace is merited.

Secondly it is asked, whether through grace it happens that an increase of grace is merited1. And that it does, it seems:

1. First, through Augustine to Boniface: « Grace merits to be increased, so that, increased, it may merit also to be perfected ».

2. Likewise, this seems so by reason. Everyone having grace has whence he can advance in merit2; but advancement in merit is only through an increase of grace: therefore grace can merit its own increase.

3. Likewise, one sinning by one kind of sin merits to fall into another kind of sin, whence he becomes worse, just as one sinning by the sin of pride merits to fall into the sin of lust3: therefore by parity of reasoning, one who uses grace well through the exercise of good works seems to merit that an increase of grace be made for him.

4. Likewise, more praiseworthy is he who extends himself to a work of perfection with less help than he who extends himself with more: therefore if one having lesser grace raises himself to works of equal perfection with one who has more, it seems that he has to merit as much or more with God: therefore if recompense is given to none except according to the quantity of grace, it seems that such a one merits an increase in grace.

5. Likewise, he who asks piously, perseveringly, for himself, and unto salvation, merits to be heard4; but he who asks for an increase of grace continually asks in this way: therefore it seems that an increase of grace is merited.

On the contrary: 1. There is no merit with respect to that which is altogether impossible; but grace, since it is a simple form, to be increased is impossible5: therefore it is impossible to merit an increase of grace.

2. Likewise, there is no merit with respect to that which is in us, but with respect to what is from another6; but one having grace p. 664 through the power of what he has, can advance into the good; for he not only has whence he can stand, as Augustine says, but also whence he can advance. If therefore the advancement of grace consists in its increase; just as the advancement of grace is in its own power, so it seems that its increase is too: therefore merit does not seem to concur to this.

3. Likewise, nothing is increased except by a thing of the same genus and nature; but grace, which is first given, as far as is of its own nature, is so gratuitous that it does not fall under merit, as was shown above7, and Augustine says in the fourth book On the Trinity: « What is rendered for merits is not grace ». If therefore it does not happen that the gift of grace itself is merited, it does not happen that the increase of grace itself is merited.

4. Likewise, God recompenses a work according to the quantity of its root: therefore one merits only as much through a gratuitous work as is that grace from which the work proceeds8; if therefore the increased grace exceeds that, it seems that lesser grace cannot, through its own work, merit its own increase.

5. Likewise, if anyone merits an increase, then if God did not increase grace for him, He would be unjust; and when He increases it, that work is recompensed: therefore it seems that that work would not be worthy of the recompense of glory. If therefore this is false and impossible, that through an increase of grace the efficacy of meriting glory be taken away9; it is impossible to hold that an increase of grace happens to be merited.

Conclusion

A man can merit an increase of grace.

I respond: It must be said that, as Augustine says, it is without doubt to be held that grace merits to be increased. — But what is the mode of increasing, and the mode of meriting, is difficult to assign. — For since there are many modes of increasing, which of them belongs to grace is not easy to discern. For it happens that something is increased by unmixing with its contrary, as it is said that « that is whiter which is more unmixed with black10 ». It happens nonetheless that something is increased on account of this, that a greater succeeds to a lesser, as the days are said to increase. It happens also that something is increased on account of the aggregation of many, as light is increased in the air on account of a multitude of candles, from whose concurrence there comes to be an aggregation of lights. It happens also that something is increased by addition, as a body is increased by nourishment. It happens also that something is increased by the magnification of the thing in itself, as the rib was increased when Eve was made from it11, and as the five loaves were increased when from them five thousand men were fed. It happens also in a sixth mode, that something is increased by approach to its highest, as something is said to be more beautiful and more luminous which approaches more to the perfection of beauty and of light.

By all these six modes some have said that grace is increased. But the first three modes can be disproved easily, and in the first book, distinction seventeen12, they were disproved in some manner, when grace was treated of the increase of charity. For in the same way both charity and grace have to be increased. — But the three following modes are sufficiently fitting and cannot be disproved easily. The first of them, however, is more famous, for the reason that it accords more with the authorities of the Saints, which seem to say that in the increase of grace a new grace is infused, when they speak of the diverse efficacy of the Sacraments. But in what manner this mode can be sustained was said in the first book, distinction seventeen13. But the last mode is not less intelligible than any of the foregoing; nay, according to this mode of speaking the objections which are made against an increase of grace can more easily be set aside. For although increase by apposition seems to be repugnant to simple things, especially since in spiritual things the more simple a thing is, the greater it is in power14; nevertheless increase by approach to the highest seems very consonant with them. — But by whichever of these three following modes it be said, no great force is to be put upon it, but, holding for certain that the grace of God can be increased in us, we ought to labor that it be increased in us through good works. For through them, as Augustine says, « it merits to be increased, so that, increased, it may merit also to be perfected ».

But the mode of meriting an increase of grace we can see thus. For it happens that something is merited congruously (ex congruo), and it happens that something is merited condignly (ex condigno). Then there is merit from condignity, when the account of merit is found there perfectly and fully; and then there is a certain commensuration and adequation of the merit to the reward. And because this cannot be when grace is increased; hence it is that one cannot merit an increase of grace by the merit of con- p. 665 dignity; if therefore it happens that the increase of grace itself is merited, this is by the merit of congruity. But the merit of congruity is said to be that in which there is some disposition of congruity with respect to that to which that disposition is ordered, which nevertheless falls short of the account of condignity. And this can be in a threefold manner. For either there is congruity without worthiness; and thus a sinner, through good works in their kind, done outside charity, merits congruously the first grace; for there is a certain congruity, because he does what is in him; there is not, however, condignity, because he is an enemy of God and unworthy of the bread on which he feeds. Or there is worthiness with unworthiness, as is the case when a just man merits the first grace for a sinner: for there is worthiness on the part of the just man, who is a friend of God and worthy to be heard by God, but there is unworthiness on the part of the sinner; and therefore the full account of merit is not there. Or there is worthiness with inferiority of degree; and thus one having lesser grace merits, through good use, to arrive at the fullness of grace; and this mode of meriting, even though it falls short of the merit of condignity and is contained under the merit of congruity, nevertheless, among the other aforesaid modes, approaches most to the perfection of merit15, and therefore holds, as it were, a middle between the merit of congruity and the merit of condignity. — From the foregoing, therefore, it can be had how grace is increased, and also how it merits to be increased. Hence the authorities and reasons showing that grace merits to be increased are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected on the contrary, that since it is simple, it cannot be increased; it must be said, either that grace is not altogether simple, but only by the privation of quantitative parts in respect of the quantity of bulk, not however by the privation of quantitative parts in respect of the quantity of power; and as regards such a genus of parts there is increase for it16, not as regards the first. Or it can be said, according to the last mode of speaking, that the increase which is attended to by approach to the highest does not posit composition, but a certain perfection of greater simplicity and unity; and therefore it is not repugnant to grace by reason of the simplicity of its essence.

2. To that which is objected, that the advancement is in the power of grace; it must be said that there is a certain accidental advancement, namely that which is attended to in the intensity of fervor, or in the rootedness of the habit, or in the multiplication of works; and this advancement is in the power of grace; and according to this advancement grace is not properly said to be increased, because a man is not made worthy of a greater substantial reward through it. But there is another advancement, which regards the substantial reward, according to which a man is said worthy of a greater reward; and this is not in the power of grace, but in the sole power of Him whose it is to infuse grace; and therefore grace is said not to make this, but to merit it: and it is in regard to this effect that the increase of grace is attended to.

3. To that which is objected, that the increase of grace is of the same genus as the grace first given; it must be said that, although it is of the same nature as regards the account of habit, there is nevertheless a difference as regards state, for the reason that it supposes the beginning of grace. And because it is of the same genus as the grace first given, therefore it cannot be merited by the merit of condignity, but by the merit of congruity. But because it presupposes grace, with greater congruity does one merit the increase of grace than the beginning of grace, as was said above17.

4. 5. To that which is objected, that recompense is attended to according to the quantity of the root; it must be answered that that is understood in the merit of condignity; in the merit of congruity, however, it has no place18. And by this mode also it must be answered to that which it objects in the last place.

Scholion
p. 666

I. It is established from the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, can. 32), « that the one justified, by the good works which are done by him through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, of whom he is a living member... truly merits an increase of grace, eternal life, and — if he has departed in grace — the attainment of that same eternal life, and also an increase of glory ». Hence it is now commonly said with St. Thomas (S. I-II, q. 114, a. 8) that « an increase of grace falls under the merit of condignity ». But although St. Bonaventure uses another mode of speaking, since he names that merit one of congruity; nevertheless the dissension is only over the name. For he restricts the account of merit of condignity, but extends the account of merit of congruity, as is clear from the text, where he says that worthiness with inferiority of degree falls short of the merit of condignity, but in such a way that it approaches most to the perfection of merit and holds, as it were, a middle between the merit of condignity and of congruity. — But commonly there was distinguished « a twofold merit of a good work: one as it were annexed and concomitant, and in this mode one merits an increase of grace, because the work proceeding from the habit disposes to its increase; the other as it were consequent, and in this mode one does not properly merit an increase of grace, except perhaps congruously » (so Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, n. 3). Cf. also St. Thomas (here, the single q., a. 5); moreover Richard of Middleton (here a. 2, q. 2), who judges both modes of speaking to be probable; Giles of Rome (here q. 1, a. 3), who uses the same distinctions as St. Bonaventure and says of the increase of grace: » Here there is more of merit simply than in the two first ». — But the reason why St. Bonaventure distinguishes by name the mode of meriting an increase of grace from the mode of meriting glory seems to have been the difficulty of explaining how through lesser grace one can merit a greater, or how through the imperfect the perfect is introduced. St. Thomas solves this difficulty (S. loc. cit., ad 2) thus: « An increase of grace is not above the power of pre-existing grace, although it is above its quantity; just as a tree, even though it is above the quantity of the seed, is nevertheless not above its power ». See this example also below, q. 3, at the end of the solution (cf. Giles of Rome, loc. cit., the Latin dubium). On the mode in which grace is conceived to be increased, there were various opinions, as on the increase of charity, as was noted in I Sent., d. 17, p. II, q. 1, 2, in the scholia.

II. Relevant to the matter also is below, d. 29, a. f., q. 2. — Besides the authors cited: Alex. of Hales, S. p. III, q. 61, m. 5, a. 1, ad 3. — Scotus, IV Sent., d. 22, n. 9 seqq. — Bl. Albert, S. p. II, tr. 16, q. 102, m. 1. — Biel, on this and the following question, here the single q. Other commentators treat the matter in I Sent., d. 17, where there is discussion of the increase of charity.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 enim. Aliquanto inferius pro attenditur ed. 1 non attenditur; perperam.
    The Vatican edition, with editions 2, 3, 4, reads enim. Somewhat below, for attenditur edition 1 reads non attenditur; wrongly.
  2. Vide supra pag. 634, nota 6.
    See above, p. 634, note 6.
  3. Cfr. quaest. praeced.
    Cf. the preceding question.
  4. Vide infra d. 36. a. I. q. I.
    See below, d. 36, a. 1, q. 1.
  5. Vide supra pag. 662, nota 1.
    See above, p. 662, note 1.
  6. Scilicet a Deo, qui dat gratiae augmentum et praemium. — Sententia Augustini, quae paulo inferius memoratur, habetur de Corrept. et gratia, c. 11. n. 31. seqq. et Enchirid. c. 106. seq. n. 28. Vide lit. Magistri supra d. XXIV. c. 1. et infra d. XXIX. c. 1. — Pro potest in bonum proficere Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 potest in maius bonum proficere. Circa finem arg. Vat. voci augmentum addit gratiae.
    Namely, from God, who gives the increase of grace and the reward. — The sentence of Augustine, which is recalled a little below, is found in On Rebuke and Grace, c. 11, n. 31 seqq., and in the Enchiridion, c. 106 seq., n. 28. See the text of the Master above, d. 24, c. 1, and below, d. 29, c. 1. — For potest in bonum proficere the Vatican edition, with editions 3, 4, reads potest in maius bonum proficere. Near the end of the argument the Vatican edition adds gratiae to the word augmentum.
  7. Quaest. praeced. — Verba Augustini, hic ex IV. de Trin. c. 1. n. 2. citata, integra haec sunt: Pluviam quippe voluntariam (Ps. 67, 10.) non nisi gratiam vult intelligi, non meritis redditam, sed gratis datam, unde et gratia nominatur. — De maiori cfr. Aristot., 1. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 25. seqq. (c. 5.).
    The preceding question. — The words of Augustine, cited here from the fourth book On the Trinity, c. 1, n. 2, are in full as follows: A voluntary rain (Ps. 67:10) He wishes to be understood as nothing but grace, not rendered for merits, but given gratuitously, whence also it is named grace. — On greater cf. Aristotle, book 1 On Generation and Corruption, text 25 seqq. (c. 5).
  8. Cfr. supra d. XXVI. lit. Magistri, c. 1. in fine. — Vat. quantum ex illa gratia, ex qua exit opus.
    Cf. above, d. 26, the text of the Master, c. 1, at the end. — The Vatican edition reads quantum ex illa gratia, ex qua exit opus.
  9. Plures codd., inter quos H li aa bb ce, cum edd. 2, 3, 4 perperam gratiam.
    Several codices, among which H li aa bb ce, with editions 2, 3, 4, wrongly read gratiam.
  10. Aristot., III. Topic. c. 4. (c. 5.). Cfr. IV. Phys. text. 85. (c. 9.). — Pro per impermixtionem codd. H K T Y aa bb et alii cum ed. 1 per immixtionem.
    Aristotle, III Topics, c. 4 (c. 5). Cf. IV Physics, text 85 (c. 9). — For per impermixtionem codices H K T Y aa bb and others, with edition 1, read per immixtionem.
  11. Gen. 2, 21. — De augmentatis quinque panibus cfr. Ioan. 6, 11. seqq.
    Gen. 2:21. — On the increased five loaves cf. John 6:11 seqq.
  12. Part. II. q. 1. seq.
    Part II, q. 1 seq.
  13. Part. II. q. 2, ubi etiam ultimus augendi gratiam modus explicatur. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 7. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo inferius pro quae fiunt contra codd. H K T bb etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 quae fiunt circa. Post pauca Vat. per appositionem transformavit in per oppositionem, et mox pro repugnare non pauci codd., ut C H K R S T aa bb ce etc., cum ed. 2 exhibent impugnare. Deinde pro tanto sit in edd. 2, 3, 4 legitur tanto fit.
    Part II, q. 2, where also the last mode of increasing grace is explained. Cf. IV Sent., d. 7, a. 2, q. 2. — A little below, for quae fiunt contra codices H K T bb etc., with editions 1, 2, 3, read quae fiunt circa. After a little, the Vatican edition transformed per appositionem into per oppositionem, and presently, for repugnare, not a few codices, such as C H K R S T aa bb ce etc., with edition 2, give impugnare. Then, for tanto sit, in editions 2, 3, 4 there is read tanto fit.
  14. Cfr. Liber de Causis prop. 17, unde supra pag. 655, nota 4. quaedam attulimus.
    Cf. the Book of Causes, prop. 17, from which we adduced certain things above, p. 655, note 4.
  15. Cod. cc cum ed. 1 ad perfectam meriti rationem.
    Codex cc, with edition 1, reads ad perfectam meriti rationem.
  16. Multi codd. cum primis edd. subiiciunt enim.
    Many codices, with the first editions, subjoin enim.
  17. Hic in corp. et quaest. praeced. — Paulo superius Vat. S. Bonav. — Tom. II.
    Here in the body and in the preceding question. — A little above the Vatican edition reads S. Bonav. — Tome II.
  18. Cod. L subiungit possibile. Pro ei Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 substituit ibi. — De hoc duplici modo respondendi cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 2. ad 2. et 3. — Cfr. Anselm., de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 3. c. 6. — Paulo superius codd. C I K L O R S T et alii cum ed. 2 omittunt radicis.
    Codex L subjoins possibile. For ei the Vatican edition, with editions 3, 4, substitutes ibi. — On this twofold mode of answering cf. I Sent., d. 17, p. II, q. 2, ad 2 and 3. — Cf. Anselm, On the Concord of the Foreknowledge of God with Free Choice, q. 3, c. 6. — A little above, codices C I K L O R S T and others, with edition 2, omit radicis.
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