Dist. 16, Part 1, Art. 4, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 16
Articulus IV. De contritione quoad intensionem.
Consequenter quantum ad quartum articulum quaeritur de contritionis intensione; et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum contritio possit intendi. Secundo, utrum oporteat intensius conteri de uno peccato quam de alio.
Quaestio I. Utrum contritio possit intendi.
Circa primum, quod possit intendi, videtur:
1. Quia contritio est actus alicuius virtutis; sed quaelibet virtus potest intendi, ut in primo1 probatum est de caritate; sed augmentata eius virtute, augetur eius motus: ergo etc.
2. Item, in contritione non sunt nisi duo, scilicet dolor et gratia, et unum est sicut formale, reliquum sicut materiale2; sed est possibile, dolorem in nobis intendi, possibile est etiam, gratiam augeri: ergo etc.
3. Item, si non potest intendi, ergo in omnibus est aequalis; sed contritione existente aequali, aequalis est iustificatio et gratificatio3: ergo omnes secundum hoc essent aequaliter iusti.
4. Item, in omni actu animae, in quo contingit proficere per assuefactionem et continuationem, contingit ipsum intendi; hoc patet; sed profectus est in multiplicatione contritionis et frequentatione: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. Nihil intenditur, cuius « impositio est in termino4 »; sed impositio contritionis est in termino, quia contritio est divisio in minima; sed minimo non est minus: ergo etc.
2. Item, nihil intenditur, quo non potest cogitari vel esse maius5; sed illo quod habet effectum infinitum, nihil potest esse maius, cum sit infinitum: ergo nihil tale potest intendi. Sed contritio est huiusmodi, cum deleat omnem culpam, quod est virtutis infinitae: ergo etc.
3. Item, omne quod intenditur, aut intenditur per accessum ad veram nominis impositionem, vel per depurationem a contrario6; sed contritio non intenditur per depurationem a contrario, cum statim, cum est, expellat totaliter omnem culpam, quia habet gratiam coniunctam; nec per accessum ad impositionem nominis veram, quia eius « impositio est in termino »: ergo etc.
4. Item, si intenditur, aut ergo a gratia, aut a libero arbitrio. A libero arbitrio non, quoniam contritio est motus gratuitus, et talis mensuratur secundum quantitatem gratiae; sed augmentum gratiae et caritatis non potest esse a libero arbitrio, sed a Deo. Si a gratia; contra: gratia uniformiter movet liberum arbitrium, quantum est de se: ergo non videtur intendere in eo contritionem. Praeterea, secundum illud attenditur intensio vel augmentum penes quod consistit ratio quantitatis; sed quantitas est ex parte materiae, formalis vero contritionis ratio potius convenit gratiae quam materialis: ergo secundum illam non intenditur nec augetur.
Conclusio.
Contritio potest intendi atque augeri tum secundum fervorem motus, tum secundum augmentum virtutis poenitentiae per gratiam factum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod contritio8 est motus virtutis habens quantitatem virtutis, sicut est virtus, a qua est. Unde et augmentum et intensionem habet secundum illud, a quo recipit quantitatem; haec autem est virtus poenitentiae. Unde sicut certum est, caritatem augeri, ita et poenitentiam; ac per hoc certum est, contritionem10 et intendi et augeri9.
Unde notandum, quod quemadmodum caritas dicitur intendi quantum ad fervorem, et augeri quantum ad essentialem virtutem; et primum est a cooperatione liberi arbitrii, secundum vero est a dono caelesti7: ita et in proposito oportet intelligi, quod motus contritionis ferventior esse potest secundum cooperationem liberi arbitrii. Unde ex aequali gratia aliquando magis fervens elicitur motus, aliquando minus, secundum cooperationem liberi arbitrii. Sed proprie loquendo, non dicitur maior, nisi virtute poenitentiae augmentata; et hoc est per gratiam. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes ostendentes, quod contritio possit intendi.
Ad argumenta:
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est divisio in minima; dicendum, quod contritio et habet respectum ad obiectum, supra quod dirigitur, et ad virtutem, a qua oritur, sive dicatur habitus, sive liberum arbitrium. Secundum comparationem ad obiectum, quia omne mortale expellit et quasi in pulverem redigit, non habet intendi. Habet etiam comparationem ad vim, a qua exit; et secundum illam viam habet intendi; et in prima via ratio procedit, et ideo non concludit.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est virtutis infinitae; dicendum, quod contritio non delet nisi virtute gratiae; gratia autem est donum, per quod inhabitat in nobis ille, cuius virtus est infinita; et illa est, quae potest in infinitum effectum, et illi virtuti attribuitur expulsio primo et per se et contritioni per illam. Et ideo non sequitur, quod contritio sit infinita; sed quod coniuncta est cum virtute, cuius operatio est infinita.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non accedit magis nec recedit; dicendum, quod utrumque falsum est, immo ratione gratiae magis accedit, ratione vero doloris, dico, quod magis recedit. Dolor enim non tantum habet oppositionem ad culpam, sed etiam ad sequelas et pronitates peccati, quae quodam modo doloris intensione in nobis remittuntur paulative et expelluntur, prout dolor est purior et intensior. Accessus autem ad veram impositionem non attenditur in hoc, quod non habeat verum nomen, sed quia non participat illud in termino secundum rationem gratuiti.
4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum intendatur secundum intensionem doloris, aut gratiae, sive a libero arbitrio, an a gratia; iam patet responsio. Si enim loquamur de fervore; dico, quod est a libero arbitrio; si autem loquamur quantum ad veram augmentationem, sic dico, quod immediate venit ab exercitio poenitentiae, qua augmentata, augetur dolor rationalis partis, qui est detestationis vel displicentiae. — Et si quaeras, unde veniat; dico, quod a Deo effective, a libero arbitrio dispositive, a gratia completive. — Et si tu obiicias, quod gratia uniformis est, et praeterea est forma; dicendum, quod quamvis ipsa uniformiter gratificet, dum tamen magis a Deo influitur et abundantius datur, magis gratificat. — Et rursus, quamvis a gratia, cum sit forma, non habeat principaliter ortum quantitas molis, quae est a materia principaliter, habet tamen ortum quantitas virtutis, quae est a forma; et hoc genere quantitatis est contritio quanta. Et ex hoc patet, quomodo, vel unde habeat quantitatem, et unde habeat intensionem, et qualiter.
I. Conclusiones 1. quaestionis passim supponuntur ab aliis Scholasticis, quin plerique specialiter rem tractent. — In probatione conclusionis 2. minime negatur illud axioma Augustini, quod voluntas hominis in actibus supernaturalibus sit pedissequa gratiae, sed potius hoc asseritur, praesertim in solut. ad 4. Cfr. Concil. Trident., Sess. VI. c. 5. can. 4; S. Thom., infra d. 17. q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. De ipsa quaestione specialiter tractant: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 2. a. 1. § 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 29. — Petr. a Tar., infra d. 17. q. 1. a. 5. — Richard. a Med., infra d. 17. a. 1. q. 9. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. infra d. 17. q. 4.
II. In solutione seq. (2.) quaestionis S. Thom. aliique doctores consentiunt. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 2. — Scot., supra d. 15. q. 1. n. 9. — S. Thom., infra d. 17. q. 2. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3; Suppl. q. 3. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 30. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3. — Richard. a Med., infra d. 17. a. 1. q. 5.
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Article IV. On contrition with respect to intensity.
Next, concerning the fourth article, inquiry is made about the intensity of contrition; and concerning this two things are asked. First it is asked whether contrition can be intensified. Second, whether one ought to be more intensely contrite over one sin than over another.
Question I. Whether contrition can be intensified.
Concerning the first point — that it can be intensified — it seems so:
1. Because contrition is the act of some virtue; but any virtue can be intensified, as was proved in the first [book]1 concerning charity; but when its virtue is augmented, its motion is augmented: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, in contrition there are but two things, namely sorrow and grace, and the one is as it were the formal element, the other as it were the material2; but it is possible for sorrow to be intensified in us, it is also possible for grace to be augmented: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, if it cannot be intensified, then it is equal in all; but, contrition being equal, justification and gratification3 are equal: therefore on this basis all would be equally just.
4. Likewise, in every act of the soul in which it happens that one makes progress through habituation and continuation, it happens that the act itself is intensified; this is evident; but there is progress in the multiplication of contrition and its frequent repetition: therefore etc.
On the contrary:
1. Nothing is intensified whose « imposition [of name] is at the limit4 »; but the imposition of contrition is at the limit, because contrition is a division into the least [parts]; but than the least there is nothing less: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, nothing is intensified than which nothing can be thought or be greater5; but than that which has an infinite effect, nothing can be greater, since it is infinite: therefore nothing of this kind can be intensified. But contrition is of this kind, since it blots out every fault, which belongs to an infinite power: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, everything that is intensified is intensified either by approach toward the true imposition of the name, or by purification from a contrary6; but contrition is not intensified by purification from a contrary, since at once, when it exists, it totally expels every fault, because it has grace conjoined to it; nor by approach toward the true imposition of the name, because its « imposition is at the limit »: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, if it is intensified, then either by grace or by free choice. Not by free choice, since contrition is a gratuitous motion, and such a motion is measured according to the quantity of grace; but the increase of grace and charity cannot be from free choice, but from God. If by grace; on the contrary: grace, of itself, moves free choice uniformly: therefore it does not seem to intensify contrition in it. Furthermore, intensity or increase is reckoned according to that in which the formal character of quantity consists; but quantity is on the side of matter, whereas the formal character of contrition belongs rather to grace than to the material element: therefore according to that [formal character] it is not intensified nor augmented.
Conclusion.
Contrition can be intensified and augmented both according to the fervor of its motion, and according to the augmentation of the virtue of penance brought about through grace.
I respond: It must be said that contrition8 is a motion of a virtue having the quantity of the virtue, just as it is a virtue, from which it [comes]. Hence it has both augmentation and intensification according to that from which it receives quantity; and this is the virtue of penance. Hence, just as it is certain that charity is augmented, so too is penance; and through this it is certain that contrition10 is both intensified and augmented9.
Hence it must be noted that, just as charity is said to be intensified with respect to fervor, and to be augmented with respect to its essential virtue; and the first is from the cooperation of free choice, the second from a heavenly gift7: so too in the case at hand it must be understood that the motion of contrition can be more fervent according to the cooperation of free choice. Hence from equal grace a more fervent motion is sometimes elicited, sometimes a lesser, according to the cooperation of free choice. But properly speaking, it is not called greater unless the virtue of penance is augmented; and this is through grace. — Therefore the reasons showing that contrition can be intensified are to be granted.
To the arguments:
1. To the objection that it is a division into the least [parts]; it must be said that contrition has a relation both to the object, upon which it is directed, and to the power from which it arises, whether this be called a habit, or free choice. According to its comparison to the object, since it expels everything mortal and as it were reduces it to dust, it cannot be intensified. It also has a comparison to the power from which it proceeds; and according to that way it can be intensified; and along the first way the argument proceeds, and therefore it does not conclude.
2. To the objection that it belongs to an infinite power; it must be said that contrition does not blot out [sin] except by the power of grace; and grace is a gift through which He dwells in us whose power is infinite; and it is that [power] which can [produce] an infinite effect, and to that power expulsion is attributed primarily and per se, and to contrition through it. And therefore it does not follow that contrition is infinite; but [only] that it is conjoined with a power whose operation is infinite.
3. To the objection that it does not approach more nor recede; it must be said that both are false — rather, by reason of grace it approaches more, while by reason of sorrow, I say, it recedes more. For sorrow has opposition not only to fault, but also to the consequences and inclinations of sin, which in a certain manner are little by little remitted in us and expelled by the intensity of sorrow, in proportion as the sorrow is purer and more intense. But the approach toward the true imposition [of the name] is not reckoned in this — that it does not have a true name — but because it does not participate in it at the limit according to the formal character of the gratuitous.
4. To what is asked, whether it is intensified according to the intensity of sorrow or of grace, or whether by free choice or by grace; the answer is now evident. For if we speak of fervor, I say that it is from free choice; but if we speak with respect to true augmentation, then I say that it comes immediately from the exercise of penance, and once this is augmented, the sorrow of the rational part is augmented, which is [the sorrow] of detestation or displeasure. — And if you ask whence it comes; I say that [it is] from God effectively, from free choice dispositively, from grace completively. — And if you object that grace is uniform, and moreover that it is a form; it must be said that, although it gratifies uniformly, nevertheless inasmuch as it is more fully infused by God and more abundantly given, it gratifies more. — And again, although [it is] from grace, since this is a form, the quantity of mass does not principally have its origin [from it], for that is principally from matter; yet the quantity of virtue, which is from form, does have its origin [from it]; and contrition is quantified by this kind of quantity. And from this it is evident how, or whence, it has quantity, and whence it has intensity, and in what manner.
I. The conclusions of the first question are everywhere presupposed by other Scholastics, though most do not treat the matter specially. — In the proof of the second conclusion the axiom of Augustine is by no means denied — that the will of man in supernatural acts is the handmaid of grace — but rather this is asserted, especially in the reply to objection 4. Cf. Council of Trent, Sess. VI, c. 5, can. 4; St. Thomas, below at d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, sub-question 2. On this question specially treat: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. IV, q. 17, m. 2, a. 1, § 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 29. — Peter of Tarentaise, below at d. 17, q. 1, a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, below at d. 17, a. 1, q. 9. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, below at d. 17, q. 4.
II. In the solution of the following (2.) question St. Thomas and other doctors agree. Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. § 2. — Scotus, above at d. 15, q. 1, n. 9. — St. Thomas, below at d. 17, q. 2, a. 3, sub-question 3; Suppl. q. 3, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 30. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. a. 3, sub-question 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, below at d. 17, a. 1, q. 5.
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- 1Dist. 17. p. II. q. 1. seq. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2, ubi de augmento gratiae.D. 17, p. II, q. 1 and following. Cf. II Sent., d. 27, a. 2, q. 2, where the augmentation of grace [is treated].
- 2Nam contritio est dolor gratia informatus. Vide supra a. 1. q. 1. in fine; q. 2. ad 2; a. 2. q. 1. ad 3. et q. 2. pro parte negat. I. — Inferius post gratiam cod. R addit in nobis.For contrition is sorrow informed by grace. See above a. 1, q. 1, at the end; q. 2, ad 2; a. 2, q. 1, ad 3, and q. 2, on the negative side, [arg.] I. — Below, after gratiam, codex R adds in nobis.
- 3Edd. glorificatio.The [printed] editions read glorificatio [glorification].
- 4Gilbert. Porretan., de Sex Principiis, c. ult.: Albissimus vel nigerrimus et huiusmodi sine amplius sunt et minus, eo quod huiusmodi impositio [nominis] in termino est, ultra quem porrigi impossibile est. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 1. scholion; tom. II. pag. 304, nota 9. et pag. 787, nota 8. — Minor insinuata est supra a. 1. q. 1. in fine.Gilbert of Poitiers, On the Six Principles, last chapter: the whitest or the blackest and the like are not further [degrees] of more and less, because the imposition [of the name] of such things is at the limit, beyond which it is impossible to extend. Cf. I Sent., d. 17, p. II, q. 1, scholion; vol. II, p. 304, note 9, and p. 787, note 8. — The minor [premise] was intimated above at a. 1, q. 1, at the end.
- 5Respicitur illud Anselmi, Proslog. c. 3: Deus est id quo maius cogitari non potest.Reference is made to that [saying] of Anselm, Proslogion c. 3: God is that than which nothing greater can be thought.
- 6Aristot., III. Topic. c. 4. (c. 3.): Quae contrariis sunt impermixtiora, magis talia, ut albius quidem nigro impermixtius.Aristotle, Topics III, c. 4 (c. 3): Things that are more unmixed with their contraries are more such, just as the whiter is more unmixed with black.
- 7Cfr. supra pag. 276, nota 1.Cf. above, p. 276, note 1.
- 8Vide infra pag. 399, nota 1. — Pro quod contritio codd. F G (I a secunda manu) K V quod contritionis motus, cod. L quod contritio motus est et.See below, p. 399, note 1. — For quod contritio codices F G (I, by a second hand) K V read quod contritionis motus [the motion of contrition], cod. L quod contritio motus est et.
- 9Cfr. supra d. 12. p. II. a. 1. q. 3.Cf. above d. 12, p. II, a. 1, q. 3.
- 10Cod. X supplet contritio.Codex X supplies contritio.