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Dist. 16, Part 1, Art. 4, Q. 2

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 16

Textus Latinus
p. 395

Quaestio II. Utrum oporteat intensius conteri de uno peccato quam de alio.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum per contritionem plus vel intensius oporteat conteri de uno peccato quam de alio. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia contritio delens culpam est in instanti, sicut patet de iustificatione impii1; sed motus idem in instanti non potest esse magis et minus intensus: ergo etc.

2. Item, quidquid agit in multa simul, ita quod non in singula, non agit in quoddam plus, in quoddam minus; sed contritio simul agit in multa peccata, ita quod non considerat singula, quia tunc oporteret, respectu illorum dividi actionem: ergo contritio non magis detestatur unum peccatum quam alterum.

3. Item, contritio ea ratione detestatur peccatum, qua separativum est a Deo; sed quodlibet sep. 396parat a Deo, et ita amittitur Deus per unum peccatum mortale, sicut per aliud, et ita per parvum, sicut per magnum: ergo etc.

4. Item, contritio respicit peccatum quantum ad duo, scilicet quantum ad offensam et quantum ad damnum; sed quantum ad offensam omne peccatum habet rationem infiniti, cum sit contra Deum infinitum; quantum ad damnum, omne peccatum aufert omnes virtutes, sicut dicitur Iacobi secundo2, et habetur in littera: Qui peccat in uno factus est omnium reus: cum ergo damnum et offensa habeant rationem aequalitatis, videtur, quod contritio debeat de omnibus esse aequalis.

5. Item, quantumcumque contritio detestetur modicum peccatum, laudabile3 est; et quantumcumque sit parva contritio etiam de maximo peccato, bona est et laudabilis: ergo videtur, quod non sit necessarius gradus intensionis secundum gradum vitiorum et peccatorum.

Contra: 1. Maior est dolor de mortali et debet esse quam de veniali4: ergo pari ratione de uno peccato mortali graviori quam de alio minus gravi5.

2. Item, secundum Gregorium6: « magis se debet punire per satisfactionem qui gravius peccavit »: ergo pari ratione idem ipse, cum gravius peccat, gravius se debet punire per contritionem: si ergo de graviori peccato in diversis oportet esse contritionem maiorem, pari ratione in eodem.

3. Item, is est ordo in dolore, qui est et debet esse in amore, quoniam ab ipso habet ortum; sed magis bonum secundum ordinatam dilectionem magis est amandum: ergo pari ratione maius malum magis est detestandum.

4. Item, contritio est dolor rationalis7; sed dolor consequitur existimationem rationis, existimatio autem rationis non aequaliter pensat omnia peccata, sed quaedam maiora: ergo pari ratione et dolor.

5. Item, esto per impossibile, quod aliquis perplexus esset, ut caderet in alterum duorum malorum; constat, quod si haberet dilectionem ordinatam, magis refugeret maius malum8: ergo si magis refugit ante lapsum, pari ratione et post lapsum, et sic etc.

Conclusio. Contritio, ut est deletiva culpae, ordinem habet ad magis detestandum maius malum secundum habitum, non secundum actum, sed ut est deletiva poenae, etiam secundum actum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod dupliciter est loqui de contritione: aut prout est deletiva culpae, aut prout est deletiva poenae. Si prout est deletiva culpae; sic operatur in iustificatione impii9 in instanti, et sic actu non potest habere ordinem respectu specialium peccatorum, quia simul et in instanti est contra omne peccatum commissum; habet tamen secundum habitum, quia dolor ille habitualiter disponit ad detestandum aliquod plus, aliquod minus; et quia habilitat ad detestandum malum, quia malum, ideo ad magis detestandum maius malum. — Si autem loquamur de10 deletiva poenae; sic dicendum, quod habet maiorem intensionem et minorem etiam secundum actum, sicut ostendunt rationes inductae ad secundam partem.

Ad argumenta: Ad 1 et 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, patet responsio, scilicet ad primum et secundum. Procedunt enim de contritione secundum primam viam, scilicet ut est in iustificatione impii.

Ad 3 et 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de separatione et damno et offensa, dicendum, quod separatio attenditur in elongatione secundum dissimilitudinem, et offensa secundum contemptum, et damnum secundum amissionem gratuitorum et vulnerationem naturalium sive dehabilitationem11; et in his poenae gradus est; unde illud non valet. Quamvis enim Deus ab omnibus offendatur, tamen aliqui contemnunt eum plus, aliqui minus; et similiter in aliquo peccato plus natura laeditur et a virtute plus elongatur.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod de parvo non minus potest dolere11a; dicendum, quod sicut in caritate non est dare, quin amor, quantumcumque sit parvus et quantumcumque magnus, semper sit bonus, tamen in sua magnitudine et parvitate necessario habet ordinem; sic in proposito est intelligendum. Et sic facile est ad cetera respondere12.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether one ought to be contrite more intensely for one sin than for another.

Secondly it is asked whether through contrition one ought to be contrite more, or more intensely, for one sin than for another. And that one ought not, it seems:

1. Because the contrition which blots out guilt is in an instant, as is clear concerning the justification of the ungodly1; but the same motion in an instant cannot be more and less intense: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, whatever acts upon many things at once, so that it does not act upon them singly, does not act upon one more and another less; but contrition acts upon many sins at once, so that it does not consider them singly, because then it would be necessary, with respect to them, that the action be divided: therefore contrition does not detest one sin more than another.

3. Likewise, contrition detests sin by that account by which it is something separating from God; but anything whateverp. 396separates from God, and so God is lost through one mortal sin just as through another, and so through a small one just as through a great one: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, contrition regards sin in two respects, namely as to offense and as to harm; but as to offense every sin has the character of the infinite, since it is against the infinite God; as to harm, every sin takes away all the virtues, as is said in the second chapter of James2, and is held in the text: Whoever sins in one is made guilty of all: since therefore harm and offense have the character of equality, it seems that contrition ought to be equal concerning all of them.

5. Likewise, however much contrition detests a slight sin, it is praiseworthy3; and however small the contrition, even concerning the greatest sin, it is good and praiseworthy: therefore it seems that a degree of intensity according to the degree of vices and sins is not necessary.

On the contrary: 1. The grief over a mortal sin is greater, and ought to be, than over a venial one4: therefore by parity of reasoning over one graver mortal sin than over another less grave one5.

2. Likewise, according to Gregory6: « he who has sinned more gravely ought to punish himself more by satisfaction »: therefore by parity of reasoning the same person, when he sins more gravely, ought to punish himself more gravely through contrition: if therefore over a graver sin in different persons the contrition must be greater, by parity of reasoning so in the same person.

3. Likewise, that order is in grief which is and ought to be in love, since it takes its origin from it; but the greater good, according to ordered love, is more to be loved: therefore by parity of reasoning the greater evil is more to be detested.

4. Likewise, contrition is a rational grief7; but grief follows the estimation of reason, and the estimation of reason does not weigh all sins equally, but some as greater: therefore by parity of reasoning grief too.

5. Likewise, suppose by the impossible that someone were so perplexed that he would fall into one of two evils; it is settled that, if he had ordered love, he would shun the greater evil more8: therefore if he shuns it more before the fall, by parity of reasoning so after the fall, and so etc.

Conclusion. Contrition, insofar as it is destructive of guilt, has an order toward detesting the greater evil more according to habit, not according to act; but insofar as it is destructive of punishment, also according to act.

I respond: It must be said that there are two ways of speaking of contrition: either insofar as it is destructive of guilt, or insofar as it is destructive of punishment. If insofar as it is destructive of guilt; thus it operates in the justification of the ungodly9 in an instant, and thus actually it cannot have an order with respect to particular sins, because at once and in an instant it is against every sin committed; it has it, however, according to habit, because that grief habitually disposes one to detest one thing more, another less; and because it makes one apt to detest evil, as it is evil, therefore to detest the greater evil more. — But if we speak of it as10 destructive of punishment; then it must be said that it has greater and lesser intensity even according to act, as the reasons brought forward for the second part show.

To the arguments: To 1 and 2. To that, then, which is objected on the contrary, the response is clear, namely to the first and second. For they proceed concerning contrition according to the first way, namely as it is in the justification of the ungodly.

To 3 and 4. To that which is objected concerning separation and harm and offense, it must be said that separation is regarded in the estrangement according to unlikeness, and offense according to contempt, and harm according to the loss of gratuitous goods and the wounding of natural ones, or the disabling of them11; and in these there is a degree of punishment; whence that argument does not hold. For although God is offended by all, yet some despise him more, some less; and likewise in one sin nature is more wounded and is more estranged from virtue.

To 5. To that which is objected, that over a small sin one can grieve no less11a; it must be said that, just as in charity it cannot be granted that love — however small and however great it be — is not always good, yet in its greatness and smallness it necessarily has an order; so it is to be understood in the matter proposed. And thus it is easy to respond to the rest12.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 1
    Pro ratio, quod in plurimis codd. desideratur, cod. K (1 a secunda manu) argumentum. Cod. aa comparationem pro viam.
    In place of ratio, which is wanting in most codices, codex K (1, by a second hand) reads argumentum. Codex aa reads comparationem for viam.
  2. 2
    A cod. bb suppletur peccati.
    From codex bb peccati is supplied.
  3. 3
    Cod. H, cod. E neque, alii codd. et ed. 1 quia non; ita quia non, Vat. et quod non.
    Codex H, codex E read neque, the other codices and edition 1 read quia non; thus quia non, the Vatican edition et quod non.
  4. 4
    Scilicet quod contritio, quae intenditur, nondum fuerit contritio vera.
    Namely that the contrition which is intensified would not yet have been true contrition.
  5. 5
    Cfr. supra pag. 391, nota 1.
    Cf. above, p. 391, note 1.
  6. 6
    Vers. 10: Offendat autem in uno etc. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Pro omne peccatum edd. unum peccatum.
    Verse 10: But offend in one etc. See here the text of the Master, c. 2. — For omne peccatum the editions read unum peccatum.
  7. 7
    Edd. laudabilis.
    The editions read laudabilis.
  8. 8
    Deut. 25, 2: Pro mensura peccati erit et plagarum modus. Cfr. Apoc. 18, 7, et Ambros., de Lapsu virginis consecr. c. 8. n. 37.
    Deut. 25:2: According to the measure of the sin shall the manner of the stripes also be. Cf. Rev. 18:7, and Ambrose, On the Fall of a Consecrated Virgin c. 8, n. 37.
  9. 9
    Vide supra pag. 364, nota 6, et pag. 380, nota 1.
    See above, p. 364, note 6, and p. 380, note 1.
  10. 10
    Cfr. III. Sent. d. 29. q. 1. — Superius pro sed magis cod. K sed maius.
    Cf. III Sent., d. 29, q. 1. — Above, for sed magis codex K reads sed maius.
  11. 11
    Cfr. II. Sent. d. 35. a. 1. et 2. De dissimilitudine vide August., Enarrat. in Ps. 34. serm. 2. n. 6.
    Cf. II Sent., d. 35, a. 1 and 2. On unlikeness see Augustine, Enarration on Ps. 34, sermon 2, n. 6.
  12. 11a
    Cod. aa de parvo multum potest dolere, et magno minus potest dolere.
    Codex aa reads over a small sin one can grieve much, and over a great one less can one grieve.
  13. 12
    Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question. ---
Cited by

4 places in the Opera Omnia citethis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

Whether venial sins can be destroyed by grace without contrition or interior pain
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 21
supra d. 16. p. I. a. 4. q. 2.
Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Dist. XXI, Part II)
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 21
supra d. 16. p. 1. a. 4. q. 2.
Whether forgiven sins return as to the debt of punishment
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 22
supra d. 16. p. I. a. 4. q. 2.
Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Dist. XXII)
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 22
supra d. 16. p. I. a. 4. q. 2.

4 further references address the article or printed page this question belongs to, rather than the question itself.

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