Dist. 34, Dubia
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 34
Dubia circa litteram Magistri.
Dub. I. In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod mala voluntas angeli vel hominis causa est malorum subsequentium. Sed contra: Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum1 dicit, quod « nullo alio auctore potest homo fieri deterior »: ergo mala voluntas angeli vel hominis non potest malas voluntates in aliis causare. — Item, si omne malum debet imputari ei qui est causa prima, et mala voluntas angeli vel hominis est causa omnium malorum: ergo omnia mala sunt eis imputanda.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est causa vere efficiens et producens, et est causa quodam modo disponens et inducens. Cum ergo dicitur, quod mala voluntas angeli vel hominis est causa malarum voluntatum subsequentium, dicitur per quandam dispositionem et inductionem. Diabolus enim inducit et disponit suggerendo; homo vero corrumpendo naturam et malum exemplum praebendo. Cum autem dicit Augustinus, quod «nullo auctore fit homo deterior», hoc intelligitur tanquam auctore principali. — Aliter. Posset tamen dici, quod littera ista intelligitur de malis subsequentibus primam malam voluntatem hominis et angeli, non respectu diversarum personarum, sed respectu eiusdem, ita quod prima mala voluntas eius est causa omnium malorum, quae ipse facit2.
Dub. II. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit in eodem capitulo3: Voluntas hominis causa est tam peccatorum quam poenarum; quia poena est passio involuntaria4; sed quod causatur a voluntate est voluntarium: ergo poena non causatur a voluntate. — Item, si causatur a voluntate, aut a bona, aut a mala. A bona non; hoc constat, quia nemo punitur pro bona voluntate. A mala non; quia mala voluntas non est causa iusti, in quantum huiusmodi; sed omnis poena iusta est: ergo nulla poena est causata a voluntate.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod voluntas dupliciter dicitur esse causa alicuius; vel per modum merentis, vel per modum efficientis. Cum ergo dicitur voluntas esse causa poenae, hoc non dicitur per modum efficientis, sed potius dicitur per modum merentis. Voluntas enim, causando culpam efficiendo sive deficiendo, meretur poenam, et ita dicitur esse causa poenarum et peccatorum, licet aliter et aliter. Et per hoc patet solutio obiectorum5.
Dub. III. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Bonum, omnino carens malo, integrum bonum est. Hoc enim videtur falsum, quia integrum bonum est illud cui nihil deest de bono; et hoc est bonum, in quo est omne bonum: ergo solum illud est integrum bonum, quod est summum bonum. Sed multa creata sunt carentia omni malo, ut beati Angeli et animae beatae: ergo si hoc verum esset, quod dicit, multa essent summe bona. — Propter hoc est quaestio, utrum aliquod creatum mereatur dici bonum integrum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut perfectum dicitur multipliciter: et quantum ad perfectionem sufficientiae, et quantum ad perfectionem superabundantiae6; sic etiam et integrum bonum potest dici multipliciter: et quantum ad integritatem sufficientiae, et sic dicitur integrum bonum, quod caret omni malo culpae et poenae; et quantum ad integritatem superabundantiae, et sic dicitur integrum bonum, in quo est omne bonum. Et primo modo bonum integrum non dicitur esse summum bonum, sed bonum purum, quia nihil habet de malo admixtum. Secundo vero modo dicitur esse summum bonum, et est in solo Deo per essentiam, in creatura autem per participationem, quae bona7 dicitur in p. 818hoc, quod participat summum bonum, ex cuius participatione habere dicitur omne bonum. Et si tu obiicias, quod summum dicitur per impermixtionem cum contrario8, et ita bonum, quod omnino est impermixtum malo, est summum bonum; dicendum, quod illud verum est in his contrariis, quorum utrumque est natura aliqua; in his autem, quorum unum est natura, et alterum privatio, sicut est in bono et malo, luce et tenebra, non habet veritatem. Unde sicut non dicitur magis luminosum, quia minus habeat de tenebra, sic non dicitur magis bonum, quia minus habeat de malo; sed quemadmodum una stella dicitur maior altera, quia magis accedit ad perfectionem lucis; sic magis bonum dicitur, quod magis accedit ad perfectionem bonitatis. Nihilominus tamen omnino carens malo non potest dici nisi solus Deus, ut fiat vis in hoc, quod dico omnino, ut careat omni malo secundum actum et secundum potentiam et secundum aptitudinem sive secundum primam naturae possibilitatem9.
Dub. IV. Item quaeritur de verbo illo Augustini, quod dicit in expositione illius verbi: Vae! his qui dicunt malum bonum etc.; id quod dictum est in prophetia, intelligendum est de ipsis rebus, quibus homines mali sunt, non de hominibus. Hoc enim videtur falsum, quia, sicut peccat ille qui dicit, adulterium esse bonum vel homicidium, ita peccat qui dicit, impium esse iustum. Unde et maledicitur ille qui iustificat impium pro muneribus10: ergo non tantum de rebus, sed etiam de hominibus habet intelligi.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dico hominem malum, et dico hominem, et dico malitiam. Potest igitur attribui bonitas ei, aut bonitas naturae secundum quod homo, aut bonitas moris ratione malitiae. Et primo quidem modo attribuere ei bonitatem veritatis est, non detestationis propheticae. Secundo modo, meretur maledictionem; sed hoc est, non quia laudat hominem, secundum quod homo, sed quia laudat eum, secundum quod malus. Et hoc non est aliud quam laudare malitiam. Cum enim dicit Augustinus, quod hoc non intelligitur de hominibus, sed de rebus; non negat, quin peccatum sit in commendando hominem malum; sed hoc vult dicere, quod non est peccatum, si commendetur natura, sed peccatum est, si commendetur malitia11.
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Doubts concerning the text of the Master.
Doubt I. In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which he says, that the evil will of an angel or of a man is the cause of the evils that follow. But on the contrary: Augustine in the book Eighty-three Questions1 says that « by no other author can a man be made worse »: therefore the evil will of an angel or of a man cannot cause evil wills in others. — Likewise, if every evil ought to be imputed to him who is the first cause, and the evil will of an angel or of a man is the cause of all evils: therefore all evils are to be imputed to them.
I respond: It must be said that there is a cause truly efficient and producing, and there is a cause that is in a certain manner disposing and inducing. When therefore it is said that the evil will of an angel or of a man is the cause of the evil wills that follow, this is said by way of a certain disposition and inducement. For the devil induces and disposes by suggesting; but man [does so] by corrupting nature and by furnishing a bad example. But when Augustine says that «by no author is a man made worse», this is understood as [no] principal author. — Otherwise. Yet it could be said that this text is understood of the evils following the first evil will of man and of the angel, not with respect to diverse persons, but with respect to the same [person], so that his first evil will is the cause of all the evils which he himself does2.
Doubt II. Likewise it is asked about that which he says in the same chapter3: The will of man is the cause both of sins and of punishments; because punishment is an involuntary passion4; but what is caused by the will is voluntary: therefore punishment is not caused by the will. — Likewise, if it is caused by the will, [it is caused] either by a good one, or by an evil one. Not by a good one; this is clear, because no one is punished for a good will. Not by an evil one; because an evil will is not the cause of what is just, insofar as it is such; but every punishment is just: therefore no punishment is caused by the will.
I respond: It must be said that the will is said to be the cause of something in two ways; either by way of meriting, or by way of efficiency. When therefore it is said that the will is the cause of punishment, this is not said by way of efficiency, but rather it is said by way of meriting. For the will, by causing fault either by acting or by failing, merits punishment, and so it is said to be the cause of punishments and of sins, although in one way and in another. And by this the solution of the objections is plain5.
Doubt III. Likewise it is asked about that which he says: The good, entirely lacking evil, is an integral good. For this seems to be false, because an integral good is that to which nothing of good is lacking; and this is the good in which is every good: therefore that alone is an integral good which is the highest good. But many created things are lacking all evil, as the blessed Angels and the blessed souls: therefore if what he says were true, many things would be supremely good. — On account of this there is a question, whether anything created merits to be called an integral good.
I respond: It must be said that, just as perfect is said in many ways: both with regard to the perfection of sufficiency, and with regard to the perfection of superabundance6; so also integral good can be said in many ways: both with regard to the integrity of sufficiency, and thus that is called integral good which lacks all evil of fault and of punishment; and with regard to the integrity of superabundance, and thus that is called integral good in which is every good. And in the first manner integral good is not said to be the highest good, but a pure good, because it has nothing of evil admixed. But in the second manner it is said to be the highest good, and it is in God alone by essence, but in a creature by participation, which is called good7 in p. 818this, that it participates in the highest good, from whose participation it is said to have every good. And if you object that highest is said by the unmixedness with the contrary8, and thus the good which is entirely unmixed with evil is the highest good; it must be said that this is true in those contraries, of which each is some nature; but in those of which one is a nature, and the other a privation, as is the case with good and evil, light and darkness, it does not hold true. Hence just as a thing is not said to be more luminous because it has less of darkness, so a thing is not said to be more good because it has less of evil; but just as one star is said to be greater than another because it approaches more to the perfection of light; so that is said to be more good which approaches more to the perfection of goodness. Nevertheless, entirely lacking evil cannot be said [of any] except God alone, so that emphasis be placed on this, that I say entirely, so that it lack all evil according to act and according to potency and according to aptitude, or according to the first possibility of nature9.
Doubt IV. Likewise it is asked about that word of Augustine, which he says in the exposition of that saying: Woe to those who call evil good etc.; that which was said in the prophecy is to be understood of the things themselves, by which men are evil, not of the men. For this seems to be false, because, just as he sins who says that adultery or homicide is good, so he sins who says that the impious man is just. Hence also he is cursed who justifies the impious for bribes10: therefore it has to be understood not only of things, but also of men.
I respond: It must be said that when I say an evil man, I also say man, and I say malice. Goodness therefore can be attributed to him, either the goodness of nature according as he is man, or the goodness of morals by reason of malice. And in the first manner indeed, to attribute goodness to him is [an act] of truth, not of the prophetic detestation. In the second manner, he merits a curse; but this is so, not because he praises the man, according as he is man, but because he praises him, according as he is evil. And this is nothing else than to praise malice. For when Augustine says that this is not understood of men, but of things; he does not deny that there is sin in commending an evil man; but he wishes to say this, that there is no sin if nature be commended, but there is sin if malice be commended11.
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- Quaest. 3. seq.Question 3 and following.
- Codd. T bb fecit. — Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 98. m. 6; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 2.Codices T, bb read fecit. — Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 98, m. 6; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text, 2.
- Scil. c. 3.Namely, c. 3.
- Verba Anselmi allata sunt supra pag. 714, nota 1.The words of Anselm were cited above, p. 714, note 1.
- Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2.Cf. above, a. 1, q. 2.
- Vide Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16.).See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 21 (IV, c. 16).
- Codd. F I K X cc etc. nec non ed. 1 beata. — Cfr. Boeth., de Hebdomadibus sive Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint etc.Codices F, I, K, X, cc etc., and likewise edition 1, read beata. — Cf. Boethius, On the Hebdomads, or How Substances Are Good in That They Are, etc.
- Vide supra pag. 664, nota 4, ubi etiam codd. signavimus, qui pro per impermixtionem substituunt per immixtionem. Iidem codd. cum ed. 1 et hic per immixtionem habent. Pro quod summum cod. cc et ed. 1 exhibent quod bonum.See above, p. 664, note 4, where we also noted the codices which for per impermixtionem substitute per immixtionem. The same codices with edition 1 here too read per immixtionem. For quod summum codex cc and edition 1 give quod bonum.
- Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 18. m. 7.Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. I, q. 18, m. 7.
- Isai. 5, 22, seq.: Vae! qui potentes estis... Qui iustificatis impium pro muneribus, et iustitiam iusti aufertis ab eo. — Pro maledicitur cod. O dicitur Vae, Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 malus dicitur.Isaiah 5:22 f.: Woe to you who are mighty... Who justify the impious for bribes, and take away the justice of the just man from him. — For maledicitur codex O reads dicitur Vae; the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 malus dicitur.
- De hoc dubio cfr. S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.On this doubt cf. St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.