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Dist. 34, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 34

Textus Latinus
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QUAESTIO III.

Utrum malum sit in bono tanquam aliquis habitus, an sit pura privatio.

Utrum malum sit in bono tanquam aliquis habitus1, an sit pura privatio. Et quod non sit ibi tanquam habitus et potentia aliqua, sed ut pura privatio, videtur:

1. Primo per illud Ioannis primo2: Sine ipso factum est nihil; Glossa: « Nihil, id est peccatum »: ergo peccatum nihil est.

2. Item, Augustinus3: « Malum non est natura aliqua, sed defectus circa naturam mali nomen accepit »: ergo malum non est aliqua potentia, sed defectus et privatio.

3. Item, Anselmus de Conceptu virginali, capitulo quinto: « Iniustitia omnino nihil est, sicut caecitas. Non enim aliud est caecitas quam absentia visus, ubi debet esse, quae non magis est quid in oculo, ubi debet esse visus, quam in ligno, ubi non debet esse ».

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione: « Bonum et ens convertuntur4 »: ergo de quocumque praedicatur ens, praedicatur et bonum. Si igitur peccatum vel malitia esset ens, malitia, secundum quod huiusmodi, haberet aliquid de bonitate: si ergo non habet aliquid de bonitate, non habet igitur aliquid de entitate.

5. Item, omne ens a summo ente procedit, nec est aliqua essentia, quae non sit in Dei potentia, ut illam producat; sed Deus non potest peccare nec facere culpam5: ergo peccatum, in quantum huiusmodi, non habet aliquid de entitate: ergo nihil est, et privatio pura.

6. Item, omne quod est ens, habet aliquam formam; omne autem, quod habet aliquam formam, habet pulcritudinem; sed peccatum non habet pulcritudinem, cum sit deformitas animae: ergo nihil habet de entitate: ergo puram dicit privationem6.

Sed contra:

Ad oppositum.

1. Augustinus7: « Peccatum est dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum contra legem Dei »; sed omne dictum, vel factum est aliquid: ergo peccatum sive malum est aliquid, non ergo privatio pura.

2. Item, virtus et vitium sunt contraria; sed « contraria sunt in eodem genere8 »; et quaecumque sub eodem genere sunt, utrumque eorum est aliquid et non privatio pura: ergo vitium aliquid est: igitur malum sive peccatum non est omnino nihil.

3. Item, sive accipiatur concrete, sive abstracte, verum est dicere, quod peccatum est in aliquo; et omne quod est in aliquo9, est ens, sicut omne quod legit, est legens, et omne quod amat, est amans; et omne quod est ens, est aliquid et non est privatio pura: ergo peccatum sive malum, sive accipiatur concrete, sive abstracte, non est omnino nihil.

4. Item, nihil quod est pura privatio, intenditur et remittitur10; sed malum vel peccatum intenditur et remittitur, quia unum peccatum est maius alio, et una malitia est maior altera: ergo peccatum sive malitia non est privatio pura.

5. Item, omne ordinatum praesupponit esse; sed malum culpae, secundum quod malum, ordinatur ad malum poenae: si igitur, secundum quod malum, est ordinatum in poena; videtur, quod secundum quod malum, habeat aliquod esse11.

6. Item, aut peccatum est aliquid, secundum quod peccatum, aut nihil. Si aliquid, habeo propositum; si nihil, et Deus punit hominem pro peccato: ergo Deus punit hominem pro nihilo. Sed qui punit alium pro nihilo iniuste punit: ergo si Deus punit hominem pro culpa, videtur, quod in puniendo iniuste faciat.

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Conclusio.

Malum, licet in concreto sit alicuius ut oppositi et ut subiecti, tamen in abstracto non est nisi boni privatio.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod malum sive peccatum dupliciter potest accipi: uno modo abstractive, alio modo concretive. — Secundum autem quod malum dicitur concretive, sic concernit illud quod deformat, vel aliquam actionem, vel aliquam substantiam; et sic dicitur malum res mala, utpote actio mala, vel anima mala. Et hoc modo malum aliquid est et habet esse naturae. Si autem aliquando dicatur ipsa res mala sive peccator nihil esse, hoc dicitur quantum ad bene esse, quod quidem est esse ordinatum. Unde cum dicuntur homines nihil fieri, cum peccant, hoc non dicitur, quia omni esse priventur, sed quia privantur esse ordinato, quod quidem est esse completum, et de quo dicit Boethius12, quod « esse est, quod ordinem retinet servatque naturam ».

Contingit iterum loqui de malo sive de peccato abstractive; et hoc modo malum sive peccatum in recto sive praedicatione formali non est aliquid, sed nihil, quia non est ens nec bonum, sed privatio boni. Quamvis autem malitia vel peccatum nihil sit in recto, in obliquo tamen alicuius est: et alicuius ut oppositi, et alicuius ut subiecti. — Alicuius ut oppositi, utpote boni; malum enim est privatio boni; et quia sic est privatio boni, ut tamen non sit omnimoda boni annihilatio, sic privat bonum, quod relinquit bonum. Unde sic privat bonum gratiae, quod relinquit13 bonum naturae; sic privat actum, ut relinquat aptitudinem; sic privat bonum, quantum ad effectum, ut tamen in subiecto relinquat debitum; et ideo malum abstractive sumtum, formaliter loquendo, privatio est: et ideo nihil est. — Est etiam alicuius entis ut subiecti, quia est in aliquo ente; non enim est omnimoda privatio sive annihilatio.

— Et quia secundum hanc viam auctoritates et rationes ad primam partem inductae ostendunt, malum sive peccatum nihil esse, ideo concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod peccatum est dictum, vel factum etc.; dicendum, quod ibi accipitur peccatum sive malum concretive, prout concernit actionem substratam; et hoc modo aliquid est, nec hoc repugnat, sed consonat eis quae dicta sunt.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus et vitium sunt contraria; dicendum, quod vitium, secundum quod contrariatur virtuti, utpote luxuria castitati, non tantum dicit privationem, sed etiam dicit aliquem habitum substratum, quo quis redditur facilis ad perpetrandum illud peccati genus; et hoc modo accipiendo vitium, vitium non omnino nihil est. Alio modo accipiendo vitium, prout est privatio boni tantum, sic non contrariatur virtuti secundum rem, immo opponitur sicut privatio et habitus. — Si autem dicatur alicubi, hoc modo vitium contrariari virtuti; accipitur largo modo contrarium pro qualibet oppositione et repugnantia. Vel hoc dicitur, quia, etsi secundum veritatem vitium opponatur virtuti ut privatio, habent tamen virtus et vitium quodam modo legem contrariorum in hoc, quod mutuo se expellunt, et ab uno fit regressus ad alterum; in qua conditione opposita, ut privatio et habitus, ab his quae opponuntur sicut contraria, distinguuntur. Et pro tanto dicit Augustinus in Enchiridio14, quod in hoc fallit regula dialecticorum, vocans bonum et malum contraria; et hoc ex causa praedicta. Nihilominus tamen dicendum est, quod malum est in eodem genere cum bono, sed hoc non proprie et secundum rectam ordinationem, sed hoc est per quandam reductionem15. Et ex hoc non sequitur, quod malum sit aliquid. Nam privationes ad idem genus cum suis habitibus reducuntur, et tamen ipsae, formaliter loquendo, nihil sunt.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malum est in aliquo, ergo est; dicendum, quod illud non sequitur; nam, sicut dicit Philosophus16, « quaedam sunt entia, quaedam sunt entium »; et quamvis privationes possint dici entium, non tamen dicuntur entia. Cum autem dico, malitiam esse in aliquo, dico, eam esse

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entis; sed cum dico, malitiam esse ens, attribuo ei entitatem in se; et primum esse est esse secundum quid, secundum est esse simpliciter; et ideo est ibi sophisma secundum quid et simpliciter17.

Si vero quaeratur de hac: malitia est, utrum sit concedenda, vel non; dicendum, quod hoc verbum est, sicut vult Philosophus18, dupliciter potest praedicari. Aliquando accipitur ut compositio media inter duo extrema, et sic dicitur tertium adiacens, ut cum dicitur: homo est albus. Aliquando vero sic praedicatur, ut res importata per ipsum sit attributum sive alterum extremorum. Quando ergo sic dicitur: malitia est; si hoc verbum est accipiatur ut praedicatum, sicut accipiuntur alia verba, ut legit et huiusmodi; tunc locutio est falsa. Est enim sensus: malitia est, id est, malitia est ens, id est essentia aliqua; hoc enim verbum est significat essentiam vel substantiam uniuscuiusque. Alio modo potest intelligi praedicari vel accipi in huiusmodi locutione sicut copula, et est oratio quodam modo defectiva; et tunc est sensus: malitia est, id est, malitia alicui inest, ita quod ipsa malitia potius intelligitur ut alteri inhaerens quam alteri substans, sicut cum dicitur malum19, et intelligitur, aliquid esse malum. Et hoc modo accipiendo non valet: malitia est: ergo est ens.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod pura privatio non intenditur nec remittitur; dicendum, quod si dicatur pura privatio, hoc est privatio nihil ponens nec in recto nec in obliquo; hoc modo verum est dicere, quod non recipit magis et minus20, sicut chimaera nihil est, et hircocervus nihil est21, nec est unum magis nihil quam reliquum. Alio modo dicitur pura privatio, quia nihil ponit in recto, ponit tamen in obliquo; et hoc modo malitia posset dici pura privatio; sed de hac non est verum, quod non recipiat magis et minus. Potest enim magis et minus recipere ratione eius entis, quod respicit quasi in obliquo. Unde dicitur maior privatio, in qua est maioris22 boni corruptio, et in qua minus de bono relinquitur; minor vero, in qua minus de bono corrumpitur et plus relinquitur. Et sic patet, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod peccatum, abstractive loquendo, sit aliqua positio.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod esse ordinatum praesupponit esse; dicendum, quod verum est, quod in his quae per se ordinantur, ordinatum praesupponit esse; in his autem, quae ordinantur per accidens, non praesupponit esse in se, sed ratione illius, in quo vel per quod ordinantur. Et hoc modo malum dicitur ordinari, non quia sit in se ordinatum, cum sit privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, sed quia ordinabilitatem habet in poena ratione ipsius punibilis. Hoc autem melius determinatum est in libro primo, distinctione quadragesima sexta23.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si peccatum nihil est, quod Deus punit hominem pro nihilo; dicendum, quod sicut praetactum est, etsi peccatum nihil sit in recto, nihilominus tamen in obliquo est alicuius entis ut oppositi, et alicuius ut subiecti, circa quod relinquit debitum respectu boni privati. Dico igitur, quod peccatum est meritum poenae, non solum ratione privationis, sed24 ratione debiti relicti et boni privati; unde non est homo dignus puniri solum, quia bono caret, sed quia caret et debet habere. Et licet carentia illa nihil sit, debitum tamen habendi aliquid est; et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quod Deus puniat hominem pro nihilo, quamvis peccatum nihil sit. Hoc autem apertum est, si quis consideret in sensibili exemplo, scilicet cum rex incarcerat servum, quia non reddidit tributum, vel cum aliquis creditor incarcerat aliquem, quia non solvit sibi pecuniam mutuatam; privatio enim non per se, sed cum debito est in causa25.

Scholion

I. Cum distinguatur malum tripliciter, scil. naturale, artificiale et morale, prout est in rebus naturalibus, in artificialibus et in actibus liberis; hic agitur de malo morali sive de malo culpae. Ad quaestionem solvendam necessaria et communis est distinctio hic adhibita inter malum in concreto et malum in abstracto et formaliter accepto. Quod malum in peccatis omissionis formaliter sit privatio, facile intelligitur; sed difficultas est respectu peccatorum commissionis, in quibus non tantum est simplex aversio et privatio debitae rectitudinis in actibus, sed etiam est conversio ad obiectum a rectitudine debita dissonum. Sunt autem aliqui actus ex ipso obiecto et intrinsecus mali, ut odium Dei, quibus nulla inesse videtur aptitudo ad bonum, quae locum dare possit privationi rectitudinis debitae. Hinc orta est intricata controversia inter posteriores theologos de ratione formali et constitutiva peccatorum commissionis. Multi et insignes theologi, duce Caietano (Comment. in S. I. II. q. 71. a. 6, q. 72. a. 1.), putant, istam rationem formalem ponendam esse in conversione, quae concipiatur ut aliquid contrarium rectitudini, non ut pura privatio. Secundum hos igitur tale peccatum non tantum in ratione actus, sed etiam in ratione deformitatis continet aliquam positivam inordinationem et malitiam. — Alia autem sententia hanc positivam malitiam non admittit, sed docet, rationem formalem peccati etiam commissionis in sola consistere privatione debitae iustitiae. Pro qua parte stet S. Thomas, disceptatur inter ipsos eiusdem discipulos. Scotus cum suis, excepto Pontio, omnino sustinet secundam sententiam, quam etiam S. Bonaventura sequitur. Hoc apparet non tantum inde, quia constanter et sine distinctione asserit, formale peccati esse privationem, sed etiam, quia plerisque satis subtilibus difficultatibus, a defensoribus primae sententiae obiectis, iam solvendo praevenit. Praeter hic dicta vide infra d. 37. a. 1. q. 1, praesertim ad 5, d. 41. a. 1. q. 2, ubi bene distinguitur triplex relatio malitiae ad actionem, et in primis d. 42. a. 1. q. 1. et dub. 2. 3; cfr. etiam III. Sent. d. 36. dub.

2. Quo sensu peccatum dicatur vel res vel nihil, vide etiam infra d. 37. dub. 1. et 3. — Etiam alii antiqui Scholastici, saltem si verba attendas, sententiam secundam profitentur. — De verbo S. Augustini (solut. ad 2.), quod hic fallit regula dialecticorum, vide Magistrum, hic c. 5, et S. Thom., de Malo, q. 2. a. 11. ad 10.

II. Alex. Hal., p. II. q. 94. m. 2. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, II. Sent. d. 35. q. unica, d. 37. q. 1. — S. Thom., hic a. 2; S. I. q. 48. a. 1. 2; I. II. q. 18. a. 1, q. 71. a. 6; de Malo, q. 1. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 5; S. p. I. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 1. a. 1; p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 35. q. unica.

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English Translation

QUESTION III.

Whether evil is in the good as some habit, or whether it is pure privation.

Whether evil is in the good as some habit1, or whether it is pure privation. And that it is not there as a habit and some power, but as a pure privation, it seems:

1. First, by that [text] of John, first [chapter]2: Without him was made nothing; the Gloss: « Nothing, that is, sin »: therefore sin is nothing.

2. Likewise, Augustine3: « Evil is not any nature, but a defect concerning a nature took the name of evil »: therefore evil is not any power, but a defect and privation.

3. Likewise, Anselm On the Virginal Conception, chapter five: « Injustice is wholly nothing, just as blindness. For blindness is nothing other than the absence of sight where it ought to be, which is no more a something in the eye, where sight ought to be, than in wood, where it ought not to be ».

4. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason: « The good and being are convertible4 »: therefore of whatever being is predicated, the good is also predicated. If therefore sin or malice were a being, malice, insofar as it is such, would have something of goodness: if therefore it does not have anything of goodness, it does not then have anything of entity.

5. Likewise, every being proceeds from the highest being, nor is there any essence which is not in the power of God to produce it; but God cannot sin nor commit fault5: therefore sin, insofar as it is such, does not have anything of entity: therefore it is nothing, and a pure privation.

6. Likewise, everything that is a being has some form; but everything that has some form has beauty; but sin does not have beauty, since it is a deformity of the soul: therefore it has nothing of entity: therefore it states pure privation6.

On the contrary:

To the opposite.

1. Augustine7: « Sin is something said, or done, or desired against the law of God »; but everything said, or done, is something: therefore sin or evil is something, therefore not a pure privation.

2. Likewise, virtue and vice are contraries; but « contraries are in the same genus8 »; and whatever are under the same genus, each of them is something and not a pure privation: therefore vice is something: therefore evil or sin is not wholly nothing.

3. Likewise, whether it be taken concretely or abstractly, it is true to say that sin is in something; and everything that is in something9 is a being, just as everything that reads is reading, and everything that loves is loving; and everything that is a being is something and is not a pure privation: therefore sin or evil, whether it be taken concretely or abstractly, is not wholly nothing.

4. Likewise, nothing that is a pure privation is intensified and remitted10; but evil or sin is intensified and remitted, because one sin is greater than another, and one malice is greater than another: therefore sin or malice is not a pure privation.

5. Likewise, everything ordained presupposes being; but the evil of fault, insofar as it is evil, is ordained to the evil of punishment: if therefore, insofar as it is evil, it is ordained in punishment; it seems that, insofar as it is evil, it has some being11.

6. Likewise, either sin is something, insofar as it is sin, or nothing. If something, I have my thesis; if nothing, and yet God punishes the human for sin: therefore God punishes the human for nothing. But he who punishes another for nothing punishes unjustly: therefore if God punishes the human for fault, it seems that in punishing he acts unjustly.

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Conclusion.

Evil, although in the concrete it belongs to something as its opposite and as its subject, yet in the abstract is nothing but the privation of the good.

I respond: It must be said that evil or sin can be taken in two ways: in one way abstractly, in another way concretely. — But insofar as evil is said concretely, it thus concerns that which it deforms, whether some action or some substance; and thus a bad thing is called evil, such as a bad action, or a bad soul. And in this way evil is something and has the being of nature. But if sometimes the bad thing itself or the sinner is said to be nothing, this is said as to the well-being, which indeed is ordered being. Whence when humans are said to become nothing when they sin, this is not said because they are deprived of all being, but because they are deprived of ordered being, which indeed is complete being, and of which Boethius says12, that « being is that which retains order and preserves nature ».

It happens again to speak of evil or sin abstractly; and in this way evil or sin in the direct [predication] or formal predication is not something, but nothing, because it is not a being nor a good, but the privation of the good. But although malice or sin is nothing in the direct [predication], yet in the oblique it belongs to something: both to something as its opposite, and to something as its subject. — To something as its opposite, namely the good; for evil is the privation of the good; and because it is thus the privation of the good, yet so that it is not an utter annihilation of the good, it so privates the good that it leaves the good. Whence it so privates the good of grace that it leaves13 the good of nature; it so privates the act that it leaves the aptitude; it so privates the good as to its effect that nevertheless it leaves the obligation in the subject; and therefore evil taken abstractly, formally speaking, is a privation: and therefore it is nothing. — It also belongs to some being as its subject, because it is in some being; for it is not an utter privation or annihilation.

— And because according to this way the authorities and reasons adduced for the first part show that evil or sin is nothing, therefore they are to be granted.

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that sin is something said, or done, etc.; it must be said that there sin or evil is taken concretely, insofar as it concerns the underlying action; and in this way it is something, nor does this conflict, but is consonant with the things which have been said.

2. To that which is objected, that virtue and vice are contraries; it must be said that vice, insofar as it is contrary to virtue, such as lust to chastity, not only states a privation, but also states some underlying habit, by which someone is rendered prone to perpetrating that kind of sin; and taking vice in this way, vice is not wholly nothing. Taking vice in another way, insofar as it is the privation of the good only, thus it is not contrary to virtue according to the thing, but rather is opposed as privation and habit. — But if it be said somewhere that in this way vice is contrary to virtue; the contrary is taken in the broad sense for any opposition and incompatibility. Or this is said because, even if according to truth vice is opposed to virtue as a privation, yet virtue and vice have in a certain way the law of contraries in this, that they mutually expel one another, and from one there is a return to the other; in which condition the opposites, as privation and habit, are distinguished from those which are opposed as contraries. And to that extent Augustine says in the Enchiridion14, that in this the rule of the dialecticians fails, calling the good and evil contraries; and this for the aforesaid reason. Nevertheless it must be said that evil is in the same genus with the good, but this not properly and according to the right ordering, but this is by a certain reduction15. And from this it does not follow that evil is something. For privations are reduced to the same genus with their habits, and yet they themselves, formally speaking, are nothing.

3. To that which is objected, that evil is in something, therefore it is; it must be said that this does not follow; for, as the Philosopher says16, « certain things are beings, certain are of beings »; and although privations can be called of beings, yet they are not called beings. But when I say that malice is in something, I say that it is

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of a being; but when I say that malice is a being, I attribute entity to it in itself; and the first being is being in a certain respect, the second is being simply; and therefore there is there a sophism of [what is true] in a certain respect and [what is true] simply17.

But if it be asked about this [proposition]: malice is — whether it is to be granted, or not; it must be said that this word is, as the Philosopher wills18, can be predicated in two ways. Sometimes it is taken as a composition intermediate between two extremes, and thus it is called the third adjacent, as when it is said: the human is white. But sometimes it is so predicated that the thing imported by it is the attribute or one of the extremes. When therefore it is thus said: malice is; if this word is is taken as a predicate, just as other verbs are taken, such as reads and the like; then the statement is false. For the sense is: malice is, that is, malice is a being, that is, some essence; for this word is signifies the essence or substance of each thing. In another way it can be understood to be predicated or taken in such a statement as a copula, and it is a sentence in a certain way defective; and then the sense is: malice is, that is, malice is in something, so that malice itself is understood rather as inhering in another than as standing under another, as when it is said evil19, and it is understood that something is evil. And taking it in this way it does not hold: malice is: therefore it is a being.

4. To that which is objected, that pure privation is neither intensified nor remitted; it must be said that if pure privation is so called, this is a privation positing nothing either in the direct or in the oblique; in this way it is true to say that it does not admit more and less20, just as a chimera is nothing, and a goat-stag is nothing21, nor is the one more nothing than the other. In another way it is called pure privation, because it posits nothing in the direct, but does posit in the oblique; and in this way malice could be called pure privation; but of this it is not true that it does not admit more and less. For it can admit more and less by reason of that being which it regards as if in the oblique. Whence that is called a greater privation in which there is the corruption of a greater22 good, and in which less of the good is left; but the lesser, in which less of the good is corrupted and more is left. And thus it is clear that from this it does not follow that sin, speaking abstractly, is some positing.

5. To that which is objected, that ordered being presupposes being; it must be said that it is true that in those things which are ordered through themselves, the ordered presupposes being; but in those things which are ordered through accident, it does not presuppose being in itself, but by reason of that in which or through which they are ordered. And in this way evil is said to be ordered, not because it is ordered in itself, since it is the privation of mode, species, and order, but because it has orderability in punishment by reason of the punishable thing itself. But this is better determined in the first book, distinction forty-six23.

6. To that which is objected, that if sin is nothing, that God punishes the human for nothing; it must be said that, as was touched on before, even if sin is nothing in the direct, nevertheless in the oblique it belongs to some being as its opposite, and to something as its subject, concerning which it leaves an obligation with respect to the good privated. I say therefore that sin is the merit of punishment, not only by reason of the privation, but24 by reason of the obligation left over and the good privated; whence the human is not worthy of being punished only because he lacks the good, but because he lacks [it] and ought to have [it]. And although that lack is nothing, yet the obligation of having something is something; and therefore from this it does not follow that God punishes the human for nothing, although sin is nothing. But this is plain, if one considers it in a sensible example, namely when a king imprisons a servant because he did not render the tribute, or when some creditor imprisons someone because he did not pay him the money lent; for the privation is not by itself, but together with the debt, in the cause25.

Scholion

I. Since evil is distinguished in three ways, namely natural, artificial, and moral, insofar as it is in natural things, in artificial things, and in free acts; here the discussion is of moral evil or the evil of fault. For solving the question, the distinction here employed is necessary and common: between evil in the concrete and evil in the abstract and formally taken. That evil in sins of omission is formally a privation is easily understood; but the difficulty is with respect to sins of commission, in which there is not only a simple turning-away and privation of the due rectitude in the acts, but there is also a turning-toward an object dissonant from the due rectitude. But there are certain acts evil from the object itself and intrinsically, such as the hatred of God, in which no aptitude toward the good seems to be present, which could give place to a privation of the due rectitude. Hence has arisen an intricate controversy among the later theologians concerning the formal and constitutive character of sins of commission. Many and distinguished theologians, with Cajetan as their leader (Commentary on the Summa I. II. q. 71. a. 6, q. 72. a. 1.), think that this formal character is to be placed in the conversion, which is conceived as something contrary to rectitude, not as a pure privation. According to these, therefore, such a sin contains, not only in the character of act, but also in the character of deformity, some positive disorder and malice. — But another opinion does not admit this positive malice, but teaches that the formal character of sin, even of commission, consists in the privation alone of the due justice. On which side St. Thomas stands is disputed among his own disciples. Scotus with his followers, with the exception of Pontius, wholly maintains the second opinion, which S. Bonaventure also follows. This appears not only from the fact that he constantly and without distinction asserts the formal [element] of sin to be a privation, but also because he anticipates by his solution most of the rather subtle difficulties objected by the defenders of the first opinion. Besides the things said here, see below d. 37. a. 1. q. 1, especially ad 5, d. 41. a. 1. q. 2, where the threefold relation of malice to action is well distinguished, and especially d. 42. a. 1. q. 1. and dub. 2. 3; cfr. also III. Sent. d. 36. dub.

2. In what sense sin is called either a thing or nothing, see also below d. 37. dub. 1. and 3. — Other ancient Scholastics also, at least if you attend to the words, profess the second opinion. — On the word of St. Augustine (in the solution to 2.), that here the rule of the dialecticians fails, see the Master, here c. 5, and St. Thomas, On Evil, q. 2. a. 11. ad 10.

II. Alexander of Hales, p. II. q. 94. m. 2. — Scotus, in each Scriptum, II. Sent. d. 35. q. unica, d. 37. q. 1. — St. Thomas, here a. 2; Summa I. q. 48. a. 1. 2; I. II. q. 18. a. 1, q. 71. a. 6; On Evil, q. 1. a. 1. — B. Albert, here a. 5; Summa p. I. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 1. a. 1; p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 3. — Petrus a Tarantasia, q. 1. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 35. q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vat. addit et potentia aliqua: et.
    The Vatican [edition] adds et potentia aliqua: et ("and some power: and").
  2. Vers. 3. — Glossa sumta est, sed non ad verbum, ex August., in Ioan. Evang. tract. 1. n. 13, de quo vide supra pag. 640, nota 8. Cfr. etiam Prosperi, Lib. sent., sent. 228, quae innititur August., Enarrat. in Ps. 68. serm. 1. n. 5.
    Verse 3. — The Gloss is taken, but not word for word, from Augustine, On the Gospel of John tract. 1. n. 13, on which see above p. 640, note 8. Cfr. also Prosper, Book of Sentences, sent. 228, which rests upon Augustine, Commentary on Ps. 68. serm. 1. n. 5.
  3. Libr. XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 9: Mali enim nulla natura est, sed amissio boni mali nomen accepit. Ibid. c. 22: Cum omnino natura nulla sit malum, nomenque hoc non sit nisi privationis boni. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. seq.
    Book XI. On the City of God, c. 9: For of evil there is no nature, but the loss of good took the name of evil. Ibid. c. 22: Since wholly no nature is evil, and this name is nothing but [the name] of the privation of good. Cfr. here the text of the Master, c. 4. seq.
  4. Cfr. supra pag. 805, nota 4.
    Cfr. above p. 805, note 4.
  5. Vide I. Sent. d. 42. q. 2, et infra d. 37. a. 1. et 2. — Paulo superius pro nec est cod. aa quia non est. Versus finem arg. pro de entitate plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 de ente.
    See I. Sent. d. 42. q. 2, and below d. 37. a. 1. and 2. — A little above, for nec est cod. aa [reads] quia non est. Toward the end of the argument, for de entitate very many codices with edd. 1, 2 [read] de ente.
  6. De hoc arg. cfr. August., de Vera Relig. c. 18. n. 35. seqq. — In hoc arg. pro omne autem, quod cum Vat. retinuimus, codd. cum primis edd. minus sincere omne enim.
    On this argument cfr. Augustine, On True Religion c. 18. n. 35. seqq. — In this argument, for omne autem, which with the Vatican [edition] we have retained, the codices with the first editions less faithfully [read] omne enim.
  7. Libr. XXII. contra Faustum, c. 27, ubi textus originalis: Peccatum... vel concupitum aliquid contra aeternam legem.
    Book XXII. Against Faustus, c. 27, where the original text [reads]: Sin... or desired, something against the eternal law.
  8. Aristot., III. Rhetor. c. 4. (c. 2.); de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis; X. Metaph. text. 24. (IX. c. 8.). Cfr. etiam de Praedicam. c. de Quanto; V. Metaph. text. 16. et X. text. 14. (IV. c. 10. et IX. c. 4.), ubi contraria dicuntur ea quae in eodem genere plurimum differunt. — De propos. seq. cfr. illud Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 4: « Aut enim simpliciter in nullo genere eodem privatio, aut non in ultimo, ut si visus in ultimo genere est sensu, caecitas non erit sensus ». Ratio haec est: quia suprema rerum generum sive praedicamenta exhibent quid positionis, idcirco, quia species sub iis collocatae ipsa participare i. e. rationem participati suscipere (Aristot., loc. cit. c. 1.) debent, necesse est, etiam species vocare quid positivum et non esse puram privationem.
    Aristotle, III. Rhetoric c. 4. (c. 2.); On the Categories c. on Opposites; X. Metaphysics text. 24. (IX. c. 8.). Cfr. also On the Categories c. on Quantity; V. Metaphysics text. 16. and X. text. 14. (IV. c. 10. and IX. c. 4.), where those things are called contraries which differ the most in the same genus. — On the following proposition cfr. that [text] of Aristotle, IV. Topics c. 4: « For either there is simply no privation in the same genus, or not in the ultimate, as if sight is in the ultimate genus of sense, blindness will not be a sense ». The reason is this: because the highest genera of things or the categories exhibit something of position, therefore, since the species placed under them must participate in them, that is, take on the character of the participated (Aristotle, in the cited place, c. 1.), it is necessary that the species also be called something positive and not be a pure privation.
  9. Codd. F K T Y ee et alii nec non ed. 1 omittunt in aliquo. — De maiori cfr. quaest. praeced.
    Codd. F K T Y ee and others, and also ed. 1, omit in aliquo ("in something"). — On the major cfr. the preceding question.
  10. Cfr. supra pag. 111, nota 3. — Mox pro vel non pauci codd., ut F K W Y bb ee, cum ed. 1 et.
    Cfr. above p. 111, note 3. — Then, for vel not a few codices, such as F K W Y bb ee, with ed. 1 [read] et.
  11. Vide August., II. de Morib. Manich. c. 6. n. 8. seq. — In principio propos. pro omne ordinatum codd. K T cc et alii cum ed. 1 exhibent esse ordinatum, quae lectio commendatur verbis solutionis postea datae; ibi enim fere omnes codd. et edd. legunt esse ordinatum. Mox post si igitur cod. bb bene interiicit malum, et in cod. T legitur: si igitur, secundum quod malum est, ordinatum est in poena etc. Pro in poena Vat. et edd. 3, 4 substituunt ad poenam, Vat. insuper transformavit est ordinatum in ordinatur.
    See Augustine, II. On the Morals of the Manichees c. 6. n. 8. seq. — At the beginning of the proposition, for omne ordinatum codd. K T cc and others with ed. 1 exhibit esse ordinatum, which reading is commended by the words of the solution given afterward; for there nearly all the codices and editions read esse ordinatum. Then after si igitur cod. bb rightly inserts malum, and in cod. T is read: si igitur, secundum quod malum est, ordinatum est in poena etc. For in poena the Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 substitute ad poenam, and the Vatican [edition] moreover transformed est ordinatum into ordinatur.
  12. Eandem obiectionem profert Anselm., de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 6.
    Anselm proffers the same objection, On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin c. 6.
  13. Libr. IV. de Consol. prosa 2. — Mox pro abstractive edd., excepta 1, cum pluribus codd. abstracte.
    Book IV. On Consolation, prose 2. — Then, for abstractive the editions, except 1, with several codices [read] abstracte.
  14. Cod. T relinquat.
    Cod. T [reads] relinquat.
  15. Cap. 14. n. 4. Vide quaest. praeced. fundam. 2. et corp. quaest. — De praecedentibus cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, ubi etiam differentiae signantur, quae habentur inter ea quae sibi opponuntur secundum habitum ac privationem, et quae sibi opponuntur ut contraria. Inter quas differentias etiam haec est, quod unum contrarium (nisi alicui insit per naturam) mutari possit in alterum, quod in privatione autem et habitu impossibile sit ad invicem mutationem fieri; ex habitu enim in privationem mutatio fit, a privatione vero in habitum impossibile est; neque enim caecus factus aliquis rursus vidit » etc. Inter exempla pro contrariis illud quoque affertur, quod S. Bonav., supra d. 28. a. 1. q. 1. circa initium corp. quaest. in exemplum subiecit, quando ex studioso fit pravus et ex pravo studiosus: « Pravus enim ad meliores exercitationes deductus et doctrinas... si certe semel, quamvis modicum, incrementum sumserit, palam est, quia aut perfecte mutabitur, aut satis multum incrementum sumet ».
    Chapter 14. n. 4. See the preceding question, fundamentum 2. and the body of the question. — On the preceding cfr. Aristotle, On the Categories c. on Opposites, where the differences also are marked which are had between those things which are opposed to one another according to habit and privation, and those which are opposed to one another as contraries. Among which differences this also is, that one contrary (unless it be present to something by nature) can be changed into the other, but that in privation and habit it is impossible for a mutual change to be made; for from habit into privation change is made, but from privation into habit it is impossible; « for neither does anyone made blind see again » etc. Among the examples for contraries that is also adduced which S. Bonaventure, above d. 28. a. 1. q. 1. near the beginning of the body of the question, set down as an example, when from the studious one becomes depraved and from the depraved studious: « For the depraved, led to better exercises and doctrines... if certainly once, however little, he takes an increase, it is plain that either he will be perfectly changed, or he will take an increase fairly great ».
  16. Cfr. supra pag. 48, nota 1.
    Cfr. above p. 48, note 1.
  17. Libr. VII. Metaph. text. 2. (VI. c. 1.), ubi docet, substantiam proprie dici ens, cetera vero entia dici, « eo quod vere « entis » [substantiae] sint vel qualitates » etc. Cfr. XI. c. 3. (X. c. 3.), ubi idem specialiter de privatione docetur. — Paulo superius non pauci codd., ut F H K T Y etc., cum edd. 1, 2 alio pro aliquo.
    Book VII. Metaphysics text. 2. (VI. c. 1.), where he teaches that substance is properly called a being, but the rest are called beings, « in that they are truly of a "being" [i.e. of substance], whether qualities » etc. Cfr. XI. c. 3. (X. c. 3.), where the same is taught specifically of privation. — A little above, not a few codices, such as F H K T Y etc., with edd. 1, 2 [read] alio for aliquo.
  18. Cfr. Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.).
    Cfr. Aristotle, I. Sophistical Refutations c. 4. (c. 5.).
  19. Libr. II. Periherm. c. 1. Vide tom. I. pag. 136, nota 7.
    Book II. On Interpretation c. 1. See vol. I. p. 136, note 7.
  20. Cod. F addit est.
    Cod. F adds est.
  21. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 1. (c. 1.): Etenim quae sunt omnes existimant alicubi esse, quod vero non est, nusquam esse. Ubi enim est hircocervus, aut sphinx?
    Aristotle, IV. Physics text. 1. (c. 1.): For all suppose that the things which are, are somewhere, but that which is not, is nowhere. For where is a goat-stag, or a sphinx?
  22. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 maior.
    The Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] maior.
  23. Quaest. 5. — Pro determinatum est Vat. determinabitur, reliqua propos. verba deinde omittens.
    Question 5. — For determinatum est the Vatican [edition] [reads] determinabitur, then omitting the remaining words of the proposition.
  24. Vat. adiicit etiam. — Superius meritum accipe active.
    The Vatican [edition] adds etiam ("also"). — Above, take meritum ("merit") actively.
  25. Anselm., de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 6: Licet pariter nihil sit absentia iustitiae, et ubi debet esse iustitia, et ubi non debet esse; punit tamen Deus recte peccatores non pro nihilo, sed propter aliquid, quia... et debitum sibi honorem, quem sponte reddere noluerunt, ab invitis exigit, et ne quid inordinatum sit in regno eius, eos separatim a iustis ordine competenti disponit. Creaturas autem, in quibus iustitia non debet esse, non punit pro absentia iustitiae, hoc est pro nihilo, quia non est aliquid, quod ab illis exigat, nec ordo congruus universitatis rerum hoc postulat etc.
    Anselm, On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin c. 6: Although equally the absence of justice is nothing, both where justice ought to be and where it ought not to be; yet God rightly punishes sinners not for nothing, but on account of something, because... and the honor due to himself, which they were unwilling to render of their own accord, he exacts from them unwilling, and lest anything be disordered in his kingdom, he disposes them apart from the just in fitting order. But creatures in which justice ought not to be, he does not punish for the absence of justice, that is, for nothing, because there is not anything which he might exact from them, nor does the fitting order of the universe of things demand this etc.
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