Dist. 34, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 34
QUAESTIO II.
Utrum malum sit in bono sibi opposito.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum malum sive malitia sit in bono sibi opposito. Et quod sic, videtur.
Fundamenta.
1. Augustinus in Enchiridio1: « Cum mala et bona nullus ambigat esse contraria, non solum simul esse possunt, sed mala omnino sine bonis et nisi in bonis esse non possunt ». Hic expresse habetur, quod mala sunt in bonis sibi oppositis.
2. Item, Augustinus2: « In his contrariis, quae bona et mala vocantur, deficit regula dialecticorum, qua dicunt, nulli rei simul inesse contraria »; sed constat, quod non deficeret, nisi mala essent in bonis sibi oppositis: ergo etc.
3. Item, malum dicitur quod corrumpit3; sed non corrumpit nisi illud, in quo est, et ei bono opponitur, quod corrumpit: ergo videtur, quod malum sit in bono sibi opposito.
4. Item, servitus opponitur libertati; sed peccatum, quod facit hominem servum, proprie inest homini secundum voluntatem et liberi arbitrii libertatem: ergo videtur, quod malum substantificari habeat in bono sibi opposito4.
Contra: (Ad oppositum.)
1. Dionysius in libro de Divinis Nominibus5: « Malum non est exsistens neque in exsistentibus »; sed omne bonum est de genere exsistentium: ergo malum non est in bono: ergo nec in bono sibi opposito.
2. Item, virtus et vitium opponuntur, et « tantum unum uni opponitur6 »: si ergo vitium non est in virtute, ergo nec est in bono sibi opposito, nec etiam cum illo.
3. Item, regula dialecticorum est vera et necessaria, ergo non fallit in aliqua materia; nam si falleret in una sola materia, repudianda esset tanquam falsa. Si igitur ars dicit, quod « unum oppositum non est in altero nec cum altero circa idem7 », et bonum malo opponitur; ergo malum non est in bono sibi opposito.
4. Item, si malum potest esse in bono sibi opposito, ergo ab ipso non expellitur; et si non expellitur a suo opposito, videtur, quod non expellatur ab aliquo; et si a nullo expellitur, semper manet: ergo si aliquis semel est malus, semper est malus. Quodsi hoc est falsum, restat, quod et8 primum.
CONCLUSIO.
Malum substantificatur in bono, et non solum in bono, sed etiam in bono quodam modo sibi opposito, non tamen in eo quod directe et formaliter opponitur.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod bonum in creatura dicitur per ordinationem ad summum9. Unde bonum dicitur quod est ordinatum in finem. Ordinatio autem tria respicit: aut ipsum ordinabile, aut illud secundum quod est ordinabile, aut illud per quod ordinatur. (Distinctio.) Et secundum hoc triplex reperitur in nobis bonum, scilicet bonum, quod est ordinabile, et hoc est naturale; et bonum, per quod ordinatur, et hoc est virtus vel gratia; et bonum, secundum quod natura ordinabilis est a gratia, et hoc est habilitas media.
Intelligendum est ergo, quod malum culpae ei bono, quod est ipsa natura vel substantia, non opponitur, quia ipsam substantiam non corrumpit, ut dicit Dionysius10: « Nihil exsistentium corrumpitur in eo quod est essentia vel natura ». (Malum tribus modis se habens ad oppositum.) Ei autem bono, quod est virtus et gratia, simpliciter et directe opponitur. Unde mutuo se expellunt et simul esse non possunt. Ei autem bono, quod est habilitas media, quodam modo opponitur et quodam modo non. Nam illa habilitas media habet comparari ad naturam, cuius est, et ad gratiam, ad quam est. Secundum quod comparatur ad naturam, cuius est, sic non habet oppositionem ad malum, quoniam habilitas illa, ut erat11 talis naturae, indifferens erat ad bonum et ad malum; et sic est subiectum mali. Ut autem comparatur ad gratiam sive virtutem, vel etiam ad finem, ad quem est, sic habet oppositionem ad malum. Nam malum tollit ei rectam ordinationem ad illud ad quod est, et reddit minus et minus habilem.
Quoniam igitur malum culpae primo et principaliter circa habilitatem consistit, et habilitas potentiae opponitur ipsi malo, cum malum reddat ipsam potentiam inhabilem; (Explicatur dictum Augustini.) hinc est, quod Augustinus12 dicit, quod malum habet esse in bono sibi opposito; et quod in huiusmodi oppositis regula dialecticorum deficit, hoc est dicere, quod ad talia opposita non se extendit. Unde ex hoc non sequitur, quod regula dialecticorum falsificetur. Sed quoniam mos est Philosophi13, positis considerationibus, instantias subinferre, non quae falsificent ipsas, sed quae intellectum considerationum rectificent et manifestent; (Notandum.) sic beatus Augustinus, tanquam vir prudens ingenio, in hac instantia manifestat, illam maximam dialecticorum in his oppositis tenere, quae opponuntur oppositione formali, sicut opponitur virtus et vitium, gratia et culpa. In aliis autem oppositis, quae non opponuntur ratione eius quod sunt, sed ratione eius ad quod sunt, non est intelligenda illa regula; nam illa possunt simul stare, sicut stat gratia cum concupiscentia; et iterum, unum potest esse in altero, sicut culpa in habilitate.
Ex his, quae dicta sunt, manifesta est responsio ad quaestionem propositam. (Conclusio.) Dico enim, quod malum substantificatur in bono, et non solum in bono, sed etiam in bono quodam modo sibi opposito, sicut ostendunt rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur. In bono autem, quod directe et formaliter opponitur sibi, substantificari non habet, sicut duae ultimae rationes, quae ad secundam partem inducuntur, ostendunt.
(Solutio oppositorum.)
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de verbo Dionysii, quod malum non est in exsistentibus etc.; dicendum, quod ipse loquitur per se, quod scilicet non est in exsistentibus, secundum quod exsistentia, sed potius secundum quod deficientia, cum sit privatio et defectus, ut iam14 patebit melius.
2. 3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tantum unum uni opponitur; dicendum, quod illud intelligendum est de uno genere oppositionis, et intelligendo secundum idem, et per se loquendo. Habilitas autem potentiae non opponitur ipsi15 nisi ratione virtutis; virtus enim directe opponitur vitio; et quia naturalis habilitas quodam modo inclinat ad virtutem; hinc est, quod vitio opponitur quodam modo, licet non omnino ut virtus; et sic patet totum16.
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QUESTION II.
Whether evil is in the good opposed to it.
Secondly it is asked, whether evil or malice is in the good opposed to it. And that it is, it seems.
Fundamenta.
1. Augustine in the Enchiridion1: « Since no one doubts that evils and goods are contraries, not only can they exist together, but evils altogether cannot exist apart from goods, nor except in goods ». Here it is expressly held that evils are in the goods opposed to them.
2. Likewise, Augustine2: « In these contraries, which are called goods and evils, the rule of the dialecticians fails, by which they say that contraries cannot be present at once in any thing »; but it is established that it would not fail unless evils were in the goods opposed to them: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, that is called evil which corrupts3; but it does not corrupt except that in which it is, and it is opposed to the good which it corrupts: therefore it seems that evil is in the good opposed to it.
4. Likewise, servitude is opposed to liberty; but sin, which makes a human a slave, is properly present in a human according to the will and the liberty of free choice: therefore it seems that evil has to be substantified in the good opposed to it4.
On the contrary: (To the opposite.)
1. Dionysius in the book On the Divine Names5: « Evil is not an existent thing nor among existing things »; but every good is of the genus of existing things: therefore evil is not in the good: therefore neither in the good opposed to it.
2. Likewise, virtue and vice are opposed, and « only one is opposed to one6 »: if therefore vice is not in virtue, then neither is it in the good opposed to it, nor even with it.
3. Likewise, the rule of the dialecticians is true and necessary, therefore it does not fail in any matter; for if it failed in even one matter, it would have to be rejected as false. If therefore the art says that « one opposite is not in the other nor with the other concerning the same thing7 », and good is opposed to evil; therefore evil is not in the good opposed to it.
4. Likewise, if evil can be in the good opposed to it, then it is not expelled from it; and if it is not expelled by its opposite, it seems that it is not expelled by anything; and if it is expelled by nothing, it always remains: therefore if anyone is once evil, he is always evil. But if this is false, what remains is also8 the first [proposition].
CONCLUSION.
Evil is substantified in good, and not only in good, but even in a good in some manner opposed to it, yet not in that which is directly and formally opposed to it.
I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that good in a creature is so called by ordination to the highest9. Whence that is called good which is ordained to an end. But ordination regards three things: either the orderable [thing] itself, or that according to which it is orderable, or that by which it is ordained. (A distinction.) And according to this a threefold good is found in us, namely the good which is orderable, and this is the natural; and the good by which it is ordained, and this is virtue or grace; and the good according to which the nature is orderable by grace, and this is the intermediate aptitude.
It must be understood, therefore, that the evil of guilt is not opposed to that good which is the nature or substance itself, because it does not corrupt the substance itself, as Dionysius says10: « Nothing of existing things is corrupted in that which is its essence or nature ». (Evil related to its opposite in three ways.) But to that good which is virtue and grace, it is opposed simply and directly. Whence they mutually expel one another and cannot exist together. But to that good which is the intermediate aptitude, it is in some manner opposed and in some manner not. For that intermediate aptitude has to be compared to the nature, of which it is, and to the grace, to which it is. According as it is compared to the nature, of which it is, thus it has no opposition to evil, since that aptitude, as it was11 of such a nature, was indifferent to good and to evil; and thus it is the subject of evil. But as it is compared to grace or virtue, or even to the end, to which it is, thus it has opposition to evil. For evil takes away from it the right ordination to that to which it is, and renders it less and less apt.
Since therefore the evil of guilt consists first and principally about the aptitude, and the aptitude of the power is opposed to evil itself, since evil renders the power itself unapt; (The saying of Augustine explained.) hence it is that Augustine12 says that evil has being in the good opposed to it; and that in oppositions of this kind the rule of the dialecticians fails — this is to say that it does not extend to such opposites. Whence from this it does not follow that the rule of the dialecticians is falsified. But since it is the custom of the Philosopher13, when considerations have been set down, to subjoin instances, not such as falsify them, but such as rectify and make manifest the understanding of the considerations; (To be noted.) thus the blessed Augustine, as a man prudent in genius, in this instance makes manifest that that maxim of the dialecticians holds in those opposites which are opposed by formal opposition, as virtue and vice are opposed, [or] grace and guilt. But in other opposites, which are not opposed by reason of that which they are, but by reason of that to which they are, that rule is not to be understood; for those can stand together, as grace stands together with concupiscence; and again, one can be in the other, as guilt in the aptitude.
From the things which have been said, the response to the question proposed is manifest. (Conclusion.) For I say that evil is substantified in good, and not only in good, but even in a good in some manner opposed to it, as the reasons show which are adduced for the first part. But in the good which is directly and formally opposed to it, it has not to be substantified, as the two last reasons show which are adduced for the second part.
(Solution of the opposing [arguments].)
1. To that which is objected concerning the word of Dionysius, that evil is not among existing things etc.; it must be said that he speaks per se, namely that it is not among existing things, according as they are existing, but rather according as they are deficient, since it is a privation and a defect, as will now14 appear more clearly.
2. 3. 4. To that which is objected, that only one is opposed to one; it must be said that this is to be understood of one genus of opposition, and understanding it according to the same [respect], and speaking per se. But the aptitude of the power is not opposed to it15 except by reason of virtue; for virtue is directly opposed to vice; and because the natural aptitude in some manner inclines to virtue; hence it is that it is opposed to vice in some manner, although not altogether as virtue [is]; and thus the whole is clear16.
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- Cap. 14. n. 4. — Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.Chapter 14, n. 4. — Cfr. here the text of the Master, c. 5.
- Enchirid. c. 14. n. 4, ubi textus originalis voci regulae adiungit illa et subinde voculae simul praemittit duo.Enchiridion c. 14. n. 4, where the original text adds illa to the word regulae and then prefixes duo to the little word simul.
- Ut dicit Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 20. Cfr. infra d. 35. per totam.As Dionysius says, On the Divine Names c. 4. § 20. Cfr. below d. 35. throughout.
- Diony., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 20: Tenetur [κρατεῖται] autem et hoc [malum] boni participatione et substantificat [οὐσιοῖ] et suimet privationem bonum tota sui participatione. [Translatio Scoti Erig.]. — De maiori vide supra d. 25. p. I. q. 1. In minori respicitur illud Ioan. 8, 34: Omnis qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Cfr. Rom. 6, 6. 20. — Pro et liberi arbitrii edd., excepta 1, per liberi arbitrii.Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 4. § 20: But this too [evil] is held [κρατεῖται] by the participation of the good, and the good substantifies [οὐσιοῖ] even its own privation by the total participation of itself. [Translation of Scotus Eriugena]. — Concerning the major [premise] see above d. 25. p. I. q. 1. In the minor there is regarded that of John 8, 34: Everyone who commits sin is the slave of sin. Cfr. Rom. 6, 6. 20. — For et liberi arbitrii the editions, except 1, [read] per liberi arbitrii.
- Cap. 4. § 20. in fine et in princ. § 21. et § 34.Chapter 4. § 20. at the end and at the beginning [of] § 21. and § 34.
- Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 17. (IX. c. 5.) et I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 10. (c. 2.).Aristotle, X. Metaphysics text 17 (IX. c. 5.) and I. On the Heavens and the Earth, text 10 (c. 2.).
- Verba Aristotelis vide supra pag. 100, nota 1. Paulo superius post repudianda esset multi codd., ut 1 K T ee, addunt et.For the words of Aristotle see above p. 100, note 1. A little earlier after repudianda esset many codices, as 1 K T ee, add et.
- In plurimis codd. et ed. 1 desideratur et.In most codices and ed. 1 et is wanting.
- Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 finem.The Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] finem.
- De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 23. Pro corrumpitur (φθείρεται) multi codd., inter quos F H K T aa, cum primis edd. perperam corrumpit. Lectionem corrumpitur rectam esse, evidenter apparet ex his verbis, quae loc. cit. verbis a S. Bonaventura allatis continuantur, nimirum: sed defectu iuxta naturam ordinis, harmoniae et commensurationis ratio infirmatur, manere similiter habens. [Scot. Erig.]. Infra d. 33. a. 1. q. 1. arg. ult. ad opposit. omnes codd. habent corrumpitur.On the Divine Names c. 4. § 23. For corrumpitur (φθείρεται) many codices, among them F H K T aa, with the first editions wrongly [read] corrumpit. That the reading corrumpitur is the correct one evidently appears from these words, which in the place cited continue upon the words adduced by S. Bonaventure, namely: but by a defect the account of the order, harmony, and commensuration according to nature is weakened, [the thing] retaining the like having. [Scotus Eriugena]. Below d. 33. a. 1. q. 1. in the last argument to the opposite all the codices have corrumpitur.
- Cod. aa hic et paulo post est.Cod. aa here and a little after [reads] est.
- Vide hic fundam. 1. et 2.See here fundamenta 1 and 2.
- Praesertim in Topic., ut videre est supra pag. 639, nota 2.Especially in the Topics, as is to be seen above p. 639, note 2.
- Quaest. seq.The following question.
- Simul audi: malo, vel vitio, quam vocem Vat. addit.Hear together [with it]: malo ["to evil"], or vitio ["to vice"], which word the Vatican [edition] adds.
- Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion on the preceding question.