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Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 29

Textus Latinus
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Articulus I. De necessitate gratiae ante peccatum primorum hominum.

Quaestio I. Utrum absque dono gratiae homo esset Deo acceptus in statu innocentiae.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum absque dono gratiae homo esset Deo acceptus in statu innocentiae. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Genesis primo1: Vidit Deus cuncta, quae fecerat, et erant valde bona; sed summo bono non potest non complacere illud quod est valde bonum: si ergo homo inter ceteras creaturas inferiores principatum obtinebat, videtur, quod ipse valde bonus erat; et si hoc, ergo Deus illum acceptabat.

2. Item, Sapientiae undecimo2: Diligis omnia, Domine, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti; sed homo in statu innocentiae nihil habebat, quod esset dignum odio, et totum quod habebat, a Deo factum erat: ergo Deus ipsum totaliter diligebat; sed quod sic a Deo diligitur ab eo acceptatur: ergo etc.

3. Item, Proverbiorum octavo3: Ego diligentes me diligo; sed homo secundum statum naturae institutae diligebat Deum propter se et super omnia, quia rectus erat: ergo videtur, quod etiam praeter omnem gratiam Deus eum amabat; et si hoc, ergo Deo acceptus erat.

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4. Item, artifex creatus complacet sibi in opere suo et illud acceptat, quando ipsum fabricat ad voluntatem suam4; sed Deus, qui est summus artifex, hominem formaverat ad imaginem suam, et optima ratione eum condiderat: ergo videtur, quod ex naturalibus sibi datis homo Deo placebat.

5. Item, nihil est, quod plus faciat animam caram Deo et acceptam, quam quod sit tota pulcra, et nulla sit in ea macula5; sed anima Adae in statu innocentiae tota erat pulcra, et nulla erat in ea macula, quantum erat ex naturali conditione: ergo absque omni gratia superaddita Deo erat accepta.

6. Item, aut Deus poterat facere aliquam creaturam ita bonam, quod ex puris naturalibus sibi placeret, aut non. Si non, videtur, quod non esset omnipotens. Si sic, ergo non videtur, quod ad hoc, quod natura placeat Deo, necessarium sit superaddi donum gratiae. Si igitur homo perfecte conditus fuit secundum exigentiam status naturae6, videtur, quod Deo placebat absque omni dono gratiae superadditae.

Sed contra:

1. Hebraeorum undecimo7: Sine fide impossibile est placere Deo; sed fides est donum superadditum naturae, secundum quod dicitur primae ad Corinthios duodecimo: ergo sine dono gratiae naturae superadditae nullus potest placere Deo.

2. Item, Sapientiae septimo8: Neminem diligit Deus, nisi illum qui cum sapientia inhabitat; sed sapientia est donum Dei naturae superadditum, secundum quod infra subiungitur nono capitulo: Mitte illam de caelis sanctis tuis etc.: ergo absque dono gratiae naturae superadditae impossibile est, Dei amicum esse.

3. Item, Dionysius in libro de Angelica Hierarchia9: «Lex divinitatis est inferiora per media, et media per superiora reducere»; sed media bona sunt potentiae naturales, bona maxima sunt gratia et virtutes, quibus non contingit male uti: ergo secundum rectum ordinem anima non potest ad Deum redire nec Deo placere, nisi perficiatur per dona virtutum et gratiae.

4. Item, nihil excellentius est secundum naturam in homine quam ipsa imago10; sed imago indifferens est ad acceptandum et non acceptandum: ergo ad hoc, quod aliqua anima a Deo acceptetur, necesse est, ultra naturalia esse aliquod donum naturae superadditum.

5. Item, quotiescumque Deus animam acceptat, eam in coniugium sibi desponsat. Unde et animam dicit sponsam suam in Cantico11. Sed quantumcumque aliqua creatura sit excellens, semper in infinitum est Deo inferior: ergo nunquam digna est in coniugium assumi, nisi Deus ex mera liberalitate condescendat; et hoc est praestare gratiam: ergo etc.

6. Item, cum Deus hominem acceptat, filium suum reputat, secundum quod dicitur Ioannis primo12: Dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri. Sed creatura, quantumcumque sit nobilis, semper est Dei serva; sed servus non potest adoptari in filium, quin fiat ei gratia: ergo impossibile est, quod aliqua creatura acceptetur a Deo sine munere gratiae superadditae.

Conclusio. Homo in statu innocentiae ad hoc, ut consecretur in templum Dei, adoptetur in filium, assumatur in coniugium, indiguit gratia gratum faciente.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod dupliciter contingit dicere aliquid acceptari a Deo: uno modo quadam acceptatione generali, ut idem sit acceptare aliquid quod reputare bonum et in bono conservare; et hac acceptatione non tantum acceptatur creatura rationalis, sed etiam omne opus Dei13. Est etiam alia acceptatio specialis, qua dicitur Deus acceptare illud quod dignum reputatur aeterna beatitudine; et tali acceptatione non acceptat Deus nisi creaturam rationalem; illa enim sola est, quae «eius capax est et particeps esse potest14». Hanc autem creaturam rationalem tunc acceptat, cum consecrat in templum et adoptat in filium et assumit in coniugium. Nam animae sanctae, quae Deo placent, et dicuntur templum Dei et dicuntur filiae Dei et dicuntur sponsae Dei, secundum quod colligitur ex novo et veteri Testamento15.

Primum genus acceptationis non requirit superaddi donum gratiae ultra ea quae sunt de conditione naturae. Secundum vero genus acceptationis non potest non esse gratuitum, tum propter gratuitam Dei condescensionem, tum propter creaturae exaltationem ultra terminos sive status naturae. — Gratuita namque condescensio16 in huiusmodi acceptatione necessario requiritur.

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Quod enim Deus immensus habitare velit in anima ut in templo, quod iterum17 velit servum reputare pro filio, quod ancillam suam assumere velit in coniugium; hoc nemo dubitat esse merae gratiae et condescensionis liberalissimae. — Creaturae etiam sublimatio in tali acceptatione ultra statum naturae reperitur. Quod enim creatura consecretur in templum, adoptetur in filium, assumatur in coniugium, hoc est supra naturale complementum omnis creaturae; et ideo nec consecratio nec adoptatio nec unio animae ad Deum fit per aliquam proprietatem naturae, sed per aliquod donum gratiae superadditum, quod animam consecret, ut sit templum; assimilet, ut sit Dei filia; quod faciem animae decoret, ut apta sit esse Dei sponsa. Haec autem omnia facit gratia gratum faciens, cui est adeo iuncta sanctitas, ut nullo modo possit inquinari18, adeo iuncta Dei conformitas, ut nullo modo possit Deo dissimilis fieri; adeo iuncta spiritualis venustas, ut nullo modo possit deformari; et ideo reddit animam Deo acceptam. Et est ratio acceptandi secundum illas tres proprietates praedictas, quae quidem conveniunt ei non secundum tropum aut transumtionem, sed secundum veritatem aut proprietatem. — Et sic patet, quod homo in statu innocentiae gratia gratum faciente indiguit ad hoc, ut Deo placeret. Et haec necessitas sumta est ex parte modi acceptandi.

Posset nihilominus et alia sumi ratio ex parte acceptantis. Deus enim, qui omnia fecit in gloriam suam et nullius indiget19, potissime requirit a creatura rationali honorem. Et quia honorem Deo exhibemus, quando in ipsum omnia referimus tanquam in omnium auctorem et finem, non decrevit Deus hominem perducere ad perfectionem gloriae per aliquid, quod ortum haberet ex principiis naturae, sed per munus additum naturalibus, ut ex hoc homo Deo magis gratus existeret et totius salutis suae opus Deo attribueret20. — Et sic patet, quod nemo potest acceptari a Deo absque munere gratiae superadditae naturae; et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

Ad argumenta pro parte opposita:

Ad 1, 2. Ad rationes ad oppositum, planum est respondere ex his quae dicta sunt. Nam duae primae auctoritates intelliguntur de acceptatione et dilectione secundum generalem modum; nos autem loquimur hic de acceptatione secundum modum specialem, quo Deus acceptat ipsam animam, ut reputet eam dignam aeterna gloria.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur: Ego diligentes me diligo etc.; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de dilectione caritatis, quae non est absque gratia; et haec plurimum differt a dilectione naturali, qua homo diligebat Deum propter se et super omnia, sicut ostensum est supra, distinctione tertia21.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod artifex creatus complacet sibi in opere suo; dicendum, quod istud est verum de illa generali acceptatione et complacentia, qua aliquis reputat aliquid esse bonum; sed de illa acceptatione, qua aliquis sic acceptat aliquid, ut reputet se illi obligatum ad retribuendum aliquid magnum, non habet veritatem. Hanc enim solum contingit reperire circa opus divinum, quod habet liberum arbitrium, et circa quod nata est22 laus et vituperium.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura instituta absque omni gratia esset tota pulcra et sine macula; dicendum, quod etsi esset sine macula, non tamen esset tota pulcra ea pulcritudine, quae est a gratia. Pulcritudo enim gratiae est sancti amoris conciliativa, secundum quod dicit Glossa super illud Psalmi23: Ut exhilaret faciem in oleo; Glossa: «Gratia est quidam nitor animae ad conciliandum sanctum amorem».

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, utrum Deus posset talem naturam facere, quae esset ei accepta absque munere gratiae; dicendum, quod etsi ipse posset omnia tanquam omnipotens, natura tamen non esset capax, unde impossibilitas venit ex parte creaturae. Si enim hoc faceret, nihil aliud esset facere, quam quod faceret, donum gratiae esse donum naturae, et gratiam esse naturam. Hoc autem impossibile est, cum donum gratiae sit ultra terminos naturae. Unde sicut impossibile est, quod homo fiat a Deo beatus per naturam, quamvis possit creari beatus, quia beatitudo consistit in bono, quod est supra omnem naturam; sic etiam intelligendum est et in gratia. — Praeterea, esto quod posset facere, non tamen decrevit, quia non decuit. Et ratio huius dicta est, videlicet ut ex hoc divina servetur gloria, in cuius praeiudicium Deus neminem acceptat; conservetur etiam nihilominus ipsa gratia, quae nullo modo potest nec debet esse ingrata; et ideo sic debet dari, ut reputetur esse gratis data24.

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Scholion

I. Responsio ad hanc quaest. confirmatur condemnatione multarum propositionum Baii, e. g. prop. 4: «Vita aeterna homini integro et Angelo promissa fuit intuitu bonorum operum; et bona opera ex lege naturae ad illam consequendam per se sufficiunt» (cfr. propp. 2. 3. 9. 11. 12. 13. 17. 21. 23.).

Pro duplici acceptatione, quam Seraphicus in principio respons. habet, Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 91. m. 1. a. 3. § 1.) ponit triplicem eiusdem distinctionem: generaliter, quatenus omnes creaturae in se consideratae sunt bonae et Deo acceptae; specialius respectu creaturae rationalis, «in quantum est creatura huiusmodi; specialissime sive propriissime creatura rationalis, in quantum consecratur Deo, ut sit eius templum, adoptatur in filium et sumitur in sponsam. Haec autem sublimatio creaturae rationalis est supra naturale complementum; et ideo nec consecratio nec adoptio nec assumtio huiusmodi fit per aliquam proprietatem naturae, sed per donum superadditum naturae, consecrans animam, ut sit templum, assimilans Deo, ut sit filius vel filia; confoederans Deo sive uniens per conformitatem voluntatis, ut sit sponsa». — In Breviloq. p. V, ubi tota de gratia doctrina dilucide contracta exhibetur, ad rem dicitur (c. 1.), quod gratia «est donum, per quod anima efficitur sponsa Christi, filia Patris aeterni et templum Spiritus S.; quod nullo modo fit nisi ex dignativa condescensione et condescensiva dignatione Maiestatis aeternae per donum gratiae suae»; quae verba deinde praeclara expositione probantur. — Praedicta triplici formula, quae sumta est ex s. Scriptura, bene exprimitur ineffabilis sublimatio, qua creatura rationalis elevatur in consortium et societatem (κοινωνίαν) divinarum personarum (1. Ioan. 1, 3.) et consors fit divinae naturae (II. Petr. 1, 4.). Haec perfectio, quae est omnino gratuita et naturae creatae indebita, vocatur a S. Doctore (infra d. 34. dub. 3.) «perfectio superabundantiae». — De adoptione in filium Dei cfr. I. Sent. d. 26. dub. 6; III. Sent. d. 10. a. 2. q. 2. et dub. 4.

II. S. Thom. a S. Bonav. aliquatenus recedit in hoc, quod magis insistit regenerationi supernaturali, quatenus ea respicit ipsam naturam animae. Nam idem subiectum primum gratiae non potentiam, sed ipsam naturam animae esse docet. Hinc ad rem dicit (S. I. II. q. 110. a. 4. in corp.): «Sicut per potentiam intellectivam homo participat cognitionem divinam per virtutem fidei, et secundum potentiam voluntatis amorem divinum per virtutem caritatis; ita etiam per naturam animae participat secundum quandam similitudinem naturam divinam per quandam regenerationem sive recreationem» (cfr. ibid. a. 3; de Verit. q. 27. a. 2.). Licet autem S. Bonav. minime neget, animam etiam secundum naturam («quoad esse primum») perfici a gratia; tamen ipse putat, animam gratia et gloria perfici primo secundum potentias, sive secundum mentem, quam vocat (in Breviloq. p. V. c. 4.) faciem superiorem animae. Unde etiam deiformitas ab ipso primo ponitur in libero arbitrio, ita tamen, ut tota persona et etiam natura elevetur, ut digna sit mysticis sponsalibus et nuptiis cum Deo. Quae qualiscumque differentia inter duos Ss. Doctores a recente auctore, cl. Dr. J. Scheeben (Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik, l. III. n. 807.), fere determinatur, ut sequitur. Secundum S. Bonaventuram status gratiae primo loco significat gratuitam exaltationem personae in sponsam Dei assumtae et decoratae, et inde adoptione et iure haereditario auctae; deiformitas autem interna, primo residens in voluntate, in quo est principium merendi, praecipue manifestatur in producendis fructibus Deo dignis; totum tamen hominem facit Deo acceptum eique infundit id, quod S. Bonav. vocat bene esse. Sed secundum S. Thomam status gratiae primo importat exaltationem ipsius naturae, ex Deo per participationem divinae naturae renatae et dignitate filiationis divinae ita decoratae, ut digna fiat sponsa Filii Dei.

III. Quaestio seq. huius articuli innititur principiis in 1. quaest. positis; sed in eadem, plura magis confirmantur et explicantur. — Notanda est egregia solut. ad 3, de qua cfr. etiam supra d. 28. dub. 1. Haec autem quaestio fere tota, praesertim in resp., convenit cum Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 91. m. 1. a. 3, § 2. Idem maxima ex parte dicendum est de 4 seqq. quaest., quae ibid. inveniuntur hoc ordine: a. 2. q. 1. loc. cit. m. 2. a. 1. — a. 2. q. 2. ibid. m. 1. a. 1. — a. 3. q. 1. ibid. m. 2. a. 2. § 2. — a. 3. q. 2. ibid. m. 2. a. 2, initium resp. est ibi ad 4. (cfr. de hoc supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. in schol.).

IV. Pauci antiqui de his duabus quaest. explicite tractant; principia eorum inveniuntur in seqq. quaest. huius dist. et praecipue in II. Sent. d. 24. — Praeter Alexandrum Hal. iam citatum de quaest. 1. tractat Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1; de quaest. 2. S. Thom., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 24. q. 1. a. 1. 3. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 24. a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1.

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English Translation

Article I. On the necessity of grace before the sin of the first human beings.

Question I. Whether without the gift of grace man would be acceptable to God in the state of innocence.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked whether without the gift of grace man would be acceptable to God in the state of innocence. And that he would, it seems.

1. Genesis 11: God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good; but the highest good cannot fail to take complacency in that which is very good: if therefore man held the chief place among the other lower creatures, it seems that he was very good; and if so, then God accepted him.

2. Likewise, Wisdom 112: Thou lovest all things, O Lord, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made; but man in the state of innocence had nothing that was worthy of hatred, and everything that he had was made by God: therefore God loved him wholly; but what is thus loved by God is accepted by him: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Proverbs 83: I love them that love me; but man according to the state of instituted nature loved God for his own sake and above all things, because he was upright: therefore it seems that even apart from all grace God loved him; and if so, then he was acceptable to God.

4. Likewise, a created craftsman takes complacency in his own work and accepts it, when he fashions it according to his own will4; but God, who is the supreme craftsman, had formed man to his own image, and had created him by the best plan: therefore it seems that from the natural endowments given to him man was pleasing to God.

5. Likewise, there is nothing that makes the soul more dear and acceptable to God than that it be wholly beautiful, and that there be no stain in it5; but the soul of Adam in the state of innocence was wholly beautiful, and there was no stain in it, so far as pertained to its natural condition: therefore apart from all superadded grace it was acceptable to God.

6. Likewise, either God could make some creature so good that from its pure natural endowments it would be pleasing to him, or not. If not, it seems that he would not be omnipotent. If so, then it does not seem that, for nature to be pleasing to God, it is necessary that a gift of grace be superadded. If therefore man was perfectly constituted according to the exigency of the state of nature6, it seems that he was pleasing to God apart from any superadded gift of grace.

On the contrary:

1. Hebrews 117: Without faith it is impossible to please God; but faith is a gift superadded to nature, according to what is said in First Corinthians 12: therefore without a gift of grace superadded to nature no one can please God.

2. Likewise, Wisdom 78: God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom; but wisdom is a gift of God superadded to nature, according to what is added below in the ninth chapter: Send her out of thy holy heavens etc.: therefore without a gift of grace superadded to nature it is impossible to be a friend of God.

3. Likewise, Dionysius in the book On the Angelic Hierarchy9: «It is the law of the Godhead to lead back the lower things through the middle, and the middle through the higher»; but the middle goods are the natural powers, the greatest goods are grace and the virtues, which cannot be used ill: therefore according to right order the soul cannot return to God nor please God, unless it be perfected through the gifts of the virtues and of grace.

4. Likewise, there is nothing more excellent according to nature in man than the image itself10; but the image is indifferent to being accepted and not accepted: therefore in order that any soul be accepted by God, it is necessary that beyond the natural endowments there be some gift superadded to nature.

5. Likewise, whenever God accepts a soul, he espouses it to himself in marriage. Hence he even calls the soul his bride in the Canticle11. But however excellent any creature may be, it is always infinitely inferior to God: therefore it is never worthy to be taken into marriage, unless God condescends out of mere liberality; and this is to bestow grace: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, when God accepts man, he reckons him as his son, according to what is said in John 112: He gave them power to be made the sons of God. But a creature, however noble it may be, is always the handmaid of God; but a servant cannot be adopted into a son without grace being made for him: therefore it is impossible that any creature be accepted by God without a gift of grace superadded.

Conclusion. Man in the state of innocence, in order that he be consecrated as a temple of God, adopted as a son, taken into marriage, had need of grace that makes pleasing.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that something is said to be accepted by God in two ways: in one way by a certain general acceptance, so that to accept something is the same as to reckon it good and to conserve it in the good; and by this acceptance not only the rational creature is accepted, but also every work of God13. There is also another, special acceptance, by which God is said to accept that which is reckoned worthy of eternal beatitude; and by such an acceptance God accepts none but the rational creature; for that alone is the creature which «is capable of him and can be a partaker of him14». And he accepts this rational creature when he consecrates it as a temple and adopts it as a son and takes it into marriage. For the holy souls, which are pleasing to God, are called both the temple of God and called daughters of God and called brides of God, according to what is gathered from the New and the Old Testament15.

The first kind of acceptance does not require that a gift of grace be superadded beyond those things which are of the condition of nature. But the second kind of acceptance cannot but be gratuitous, both on account of the gratuitous condescension of God, and on account of the exaltation of the creature beyond the bounds or the state of nature. — For a gratuitous condescension16 is necessarily required in an acceptance of this kind.

For that God the immense should wish to dwell in the soul as in a temple, that again17 he should wish to reckon a servant as a son, that he should wish to take his handmaid into marriage; no one doubts that this is of mere grace and of most liberal condescension. — An exaltation of the creature also, beyond the state of nature, is found in such an acceptance. For that a creature should be consecrated as a temple, adopted as a son, taken into marriage, this is above the natural completion of every creature; and therefore neither the consecration nor the adoption nor the union of the soul with God comes about through any property of nature, but through some superadded gift of grace, which consecrates the soul, that it may be a temple; assimilates it, that it may be a daughter of God; which adorns the face of the soul, that it may be fit to be the bride of God. And all these things grace that makes pleasing brings about, to which is joined holiness so closely that it can in no way be defiled18, a conformity to God joined so closely that it can in no way be made unlike to God; a spiritual comeliness joined so closely that it can in no way be deformed; and therefore it renders the soul acceptable to God. And it is the ground of acceptance according to those three properties aforesaid, which indeed belong to it not according to a figure or transferred sense, but according to truth and propriety. — And so it is plain that man in the state of innocence had need of grace that makes pleasing in order that he be pleasing to God. And this necessity is taken on the side of the mode of accepting.

There could nonetheless be taken yet another ground on the side of the one accepting. For God, who made all things for his own glory and stands in need of nothing19, most chiefly requires honor from the rational creature. And since we render honor to God when we refer all things to him as to the author and end of all, God decreed not to lead man to the perfection of glory through something that would take its rise from the principles of nature, but through a gift added to the natural endowments, so that from this man might be more pleasing to God and might attribute to God the whole work of his salvation20. — And so it is plain that no one can be accepted by God without a gift of grace superadded to nature; and the grounds adduced for this are to be conceded.

To the arguments for the opposite side:

To 1, 2. To the grounds for the opposite it is easy to reply from the things that have been said. For the first two authorities are to be understood of acceptance and love according to the general mode; but we are speaking here of acceptance according to the special mode, by which God accepts the soul itself, so as to reckon it worthy of eternal glory.

To 3. To that which is objected: I love them that love me etc.; it must be said that this is understood of the love of charity, which is not without grace; and this differs very greatly from the natural love by which man loved God for his own sake and above all things, as was shown above, in the third distinction21.

To 4. To that which is objected, that a created craftsman takes complacency in his own work; it must be said that this is true of that general acceptance and complacency, by which someone reckons something to be good; but of that acceptance by which someone so accepts something as to reckon himself bound to it to repay something great, it does not hold true. For this is found only with regard to a divine work, which has free choice, and with regard to which praise and blame are by nature in place22.

To 5. To that which is objected, that nature as instituted, apart from all grace, would be wholly beautiful and without stain; it must be said that even if it were without stain, it would nevertheless not be wholly beautiful with that beauty which is from grace. For the beauty of grace is conciliative of holy love, according to what the Gloss says upon that verse of the Psalm23: That he may make the face cheerful with oil; the Gloss: «Grace is a certain brightness of the soul for conciliating holy love».

To 6. To that which is objected, whether God could make such a nature as would be acceptable to him without a gift of grace; it must be said that although he himself could do all things as omnipotent, nature nevertheless would not be capable, whence the impossibility comes on the side of the creature. For if he were to do this, it would be nothing else than to make the gift of grace to be a gift of nature, and grace to be nature. But this is impossible, since the gift of grace is beyond the bounds of nature. Hence just as it is impossible that man be made blessed by nature by God, although he can be created blessed, because beatitude consists in a good that is above all nature; so also is it to be understood in the matter of grace. — Moreover, granted that he could do it, he nonetheless did not decree it, because it was not fitting. And the ground of this has been stated, namely that from this the divine glory be preserved, to whose prejudice God accepts no one; and that grace itself likewise be preserved, which can in no way and ought in no way to be ungratuitous; and therefore it ought to be given in such a way that it be reckoned to be given gratuitously24.

Scholion

I. The response to this question is confirmed by the condemnation of many of the propositions of Baius, e. g. prop. 4: «Eternal life was promised to man in his integrity and to the Angel in view of good works; and good works by the law of nature suffice of themselves to attain it» (cfr. propp. 2, 3, 9, 11, 12, 13, 17, 21, 23).

For the twofold acceptance which the Seraphic Doctor sets down at the beginning of the response, Alexander of Hales (S. p. II. q. 91. m. 1. a. 3. § 1.) posits a threefold distinction of the same: generally, inasmuch as all creatures considered in themselves are good and acceptable to God; more specially with respect to the rational creature, «inasmuch as it is a creature of this kind; most specially or most properly the rational creature, inasmuch as it is consecrated to God, that it may be his temple, is adopted as a son and is taken as a bride. But this exaltation of the rational creature is above the natural completion; and therefore neither the consecration nor the adoption nor the assumption of this kind comes about through any property of nature, but through a gift superadded to nature, consecrating the soul, that it may be a temple, assimilating it to God, that it may be a son or daughter; allying it to God or uniting it through conformity of will, that it may be a bride». — In the Breviloquium, p. V, where the whole doctrine of grace is set forth lucidly in brief, it is said to the point (c. 1.) that grace «is a gift through which the soul is made the bride of Christ, the daughter of the eternal Father and the temple of the Holy Spirit; which comes about in no way except from the deigning condescension and the condescending deigning of the eternal Majesty through the gift of his grace»; which words are then proved by a splendid exposition. — By the aforesaid threefold formula, which is taken from holy Scripture, there is well expressed the ineffable exaltation by which the rational creature is raised into the consortium and fellowship (κοινωνίαν) of the divine persons (1 John 1, 3.) and is made a partaker of the divine nature (2 Peter 1, 4.). This perfection, which is wholly gratuitous and not owed to created nature, is called by the holy Doctor (below, d. 34. dub. 3.) «the perfection of superabundance». — On the adoption into a son of God cfr. I Sent. d. 26. dub. 6; III Sent. d. 10. a. 2. q. 2. and dub. 4.

II. St. Thomas departs somewhat from St. Bonaventure in this, that he insists more on the supernatural regeneration inasmuch as it regards the nature of the soul itself. For he teaches that the same first subject of grace is not the power but the nature of the soul itself. Hence he says to the point (S. I. II. q. 110. a. 4. in corp.): «Just as through the intellective power man participates in the divine cognition through the virtue of faith, and according to the power of will in the divine love through the virtue of charity; so also through the nature of the soul he participates according to a certain likeness in the divine nature through a certain regeneration or recreation» (cfr. ibid. a. 3; de Verit. q. 27. a. 2.). But although St. Bonaventure by no means denies that the soul is perfected by grace also according to nature («as to first being»); nevertheless he himself holds that the soul is perfected by grace and glory first according to the powers, or according to the mind, which he calls (in the Breviloquium p. V. c. 4.) the higher face of the soul. Hence also deiformity is placed by him first in free choice, yet in such a way that the whole person and also the nature is elevated, that it may be worthy of the mystical betrothals and nuptials with God. This difference of whatever kind between the two holy Doctors is approximately determined by a recent author, the distinguished Dr. J. Scheeben (Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik, vol. III. n. 807.), as follows. According to St. Bonaventure the state of grace signifies in the first place the gratuitous exaltation of the person taken up and adorned as a bride of God, and thence increased by adoption and hereditary right; but the interior deiformity, residing first in the will, in which is the principle of meriting, is manifested chiefly in the producing of fruits worthy of God; yet it makes the whole man acceptable to God and infuses into him that which St. Bonaventure calls well-being. But according to St. Thomas the state of grace imports first the exaltation of nature itself, reborn from God through participation in the divine nature and so adorned with the dignity of divine filiation that it becomes worthy to be the bride of the Son of God.

III. The following question of this article rests upon the principles set down in the first question; but in it many things are more confirmed and explained. — Worthy of note is the excellent solution to 3, on which cfr. also above d. 28. dub. 1. This question, moreover, almost wholly, especially in the response, agrees with Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 91. m. 1. a. 3, § 2. The same is for the most part to be said of the 4 following questions, which are found there in this order: a. 2. q. 1. loc. cit. m. 2. a. 1. — a. 2. q. 2. ibid. m. 1. a. 1. — a. 3. q. 1. ibid. m. 2. a. 2. § 2. — a. 3. q. 2. ibid. m. 2. a. 2, the beginning of the response is there at ad 4. (cfr. on this above d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. in the scholion).

IV. Few of the ancients treat explicitly of these two questions; their principles are found in the following questions of this distinction and especially in II Sent. d. 24. — Besides Alexander of Hales already cited, on question 1 there treats Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 1; on question 2 St. Thomas, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, II Sent. d. 24. q. 1. a. 1. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, II Sent. d. 24. a. 1. q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1. a. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 31.
    Verse 31 (Gen. 1, 31).
  2. Vers. 25, ubi pro Domine Vulg. quae sunt.
    Verse 25 (Wisd. 11, 25), where for O Lord the Vulgate has which are.
  3. Vers. 17. — Ratio minori addita: quia rectus erat, respicit illud Eccl. 7, 30: Solummodo hoc inveni, quod Deus fecerit hominem rectum.
    Verse 17 (Prov. 8, 17). — The reason added to the minor premise: because he was upright, looks to that text of Ecclesiastes 7, 30: Only this I have found, that God made man upright.
  4. Aristot., IX. Ethic. c. 7. de artificibus ait: Unusquisque enim opus proprium magis amat, quam ab opere amaretur, si animatum fieret. De minori cfr. Gen. 1, 26.
    Aristotle, Ethics IX. c. 7, says of craftsmen: For each one loves his own work more than he would be loved by the work, if it became animate. On the minor premise cfr. Gen. 1, 26.
  5. Alluditur ad illud Cant. 4, 7: Tota pulcra es, amica mea, et macula non est in te.
    Allusion is made to that text of Canticles 4, 7: Thou art all fair, my love, and there is no spot in thee.
  6. Deut. 32, 4: Dei perfecta sunt opera. — Pro perfecte cod. aa in perfectione.
    Deut. 32, 4: The works of God are perfect. — For perfectly codex aa reads in perfection.
  7. Vers. 6. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 9: Alteri [datur] fides in eodem Spiritu.
    Verse 6 (Heb. 11, 6). — The following text is from the place cited, v. 9 (1 Cor. 12, 9): To another [is given] faith in the same Spirit.
  8. Vers. 28: Neminem enim diligit Deus nisi eum qui etc. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 10.
    Verse 28 (Wisd. 7, 28): For God loveth none but him who etc. — The following text is from the place cited, v. 10 (Wisd. 9, 10).
  9. Cap. 4. § 3. Ipsa verba vide supra pag. 277, nota 7. — De minori, quae est secundum Augustinum, cfr. supra d. XXVII. c. 3. lit. Magistri.
    Chapter 4, § 3. For the very words see above, p. 277, note 7. — On the minor premise, which is according to Augustine, cfr. above d. XXVII. c. 3. in the text of the Master.
  10. Vide supra d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. — Hoc arg. in cod. cc et ed. 1 terminatur sic: aliquod donum gratiae superadditum naturae.
    See above d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. — This argument in codex cc and edition 1 ends thus: some gift of grace superadded to nature.
  11. Cap. 4, 8: Veni de Libano, sponsa mea.
    Chapter 4, 8 (Cant. 4, 8): Come from Libanus, my bride.
  12. Vers. 12. — Paulo inferius pro quin fiat ei gratia cod. cc et ed. 1 nisi fiat ex gratia.
    Verse 12 (John 1, 12). — A little below, for without grace being made for him codex cc and edition 1 read unless it be made from grace.
  13. Sap. 6, 8: Aequaliter cura est illi de omnibus. Ibid. 11, 2-5: Diligis enim omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti.
    Wisd. 6, 8: He hath equally care of all. Ibid. 11, 2-5: For thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made.
  14. August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11. Cfr. supra pag. 393, nota 6, ubi idem ab Aristot. dictum invenies.
    Augustine, On the Trinity XIV. c. 8. n. 11. Cfr. above p. 393, note 6, where you will find the same said by Aristotle.
  15. Epist. I. Cor. 3, 16; II. 6, 16; Ioan. 1, 12; Cant. 4, 8.
    Epistle 1 Cor. 3, 16; 2 Cor. 6, 16; John 1, 12; Cant. 4, 8.
  16. Vat. voci condescensio praefigit Dei.
    The Vatican edition prefixes of God to the word condescension.
  17. Cod. cc et ed. 1 hic repetunt iterum. Mox pro in coniugium codd. et edd. 1, 2 in coniugio, qui codd. et edd. ceterum paulo inferius etiam exhibent in coniugium.
    Codex cc and edition 1 here repeat again. Presently, for into marriage the codices and editions 1, 2 read in marriage, which codices and editions however a little below also exhibit into marriage.
  18. Verba sanctitas etc. usque ad adeo iuncta inclusive, quae in Vat. desunt, restituimus ex codd. A F X Y aa bb ee. Paulo superius pro Dei filia codd. F H K T X Z et alii cum edd. 1, 2. divina filia. Paulo inferius pro Dei conformitas codd. A N deiformitas.
    The words holiness etc. up to and including joined so closely, which are wanting in the Vatican edition, we have restored from codices A F X Y aa bb ee. A little above, for daughter of God codices F H K T X Z and others with editions 1, 2 read divine daughter. A little below, for conformity to God codices A N read deiformity.
  19. Cfr. supra d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — Edd., excepta 1, addunt laude.
    Cfr. above d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. and d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. in the body. — The editions, except the first, add with praise.
  20. Vide supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 2. in corp., ubi haec ratio magis explicatur.
    See above d. 12. a. 1. q. 2. in the body, where this reasoning is more fully explained.
  21. Part. II. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3. Cfr. d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. ad 6.
    Part II, a. 3. q. 1. ad 3. Cfr. d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. ad 6.
  22. Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 agglutinat esse, quod etiam in cod. F a manu posteriore adiectum est.
    The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 appends esse («to be»), which has also been added in codex F by a later hand.
  23. Psalm. 103, 16. — Verba Augustini super hunc locum, ex quibus Glossa delibata est, vide supra pag. 637, nota 8.
    Psalm 103, 16. — The words of Augustine upon this place, from which the Gloss is drawn, see above p. 637, note 8.
  24. Rom. 11, 6: Si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus; alioquin gratia iam non est gratia.
    Rom. 11, 6: And if by grace, then not now by works; otherwise grace is no more grace. ---
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