Dist. 15, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 15
Articulus II. De modo satisfaciendi in speciali.
Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de modo satisfaciendi in speciali. Et circa hoc quatuor quaeruntur.
Primo quaeritur, de quibus debeat fieri eleemosyna.
Secundo, utrum ieiunio contingat satisfacere.
Tertio, utrum contingat satisfacere oratione.
Quarto et ultimo quaeritur de restitutione.
Quaestio I. De quibus debeat fieri eleemosyna.
Circa primum proceditur sic. Communiter dicitur, quod eleemosyna debet fieri de rebus propriis, iuste acquisitis et necessariis. Et quod solum de rebus propriis, videtur:
1. Quia dicit ius1, quod non potest alienari possessio nisi a proprio domino; sed cum eleemosyna datur, possessio alienatur, quia fit ipsius pauperis recipientis: ergo nullus potest dare eleemosynam, nisi qui habet proprium et super rem temporalem habet dominium.
2. Item, hoc probatur ex textu Bibliae, Proverbiorum tertio2: Honora Dominum de tua substantia, et de primitiis frugum tuarum da pauperibus.
Quod autem solum de iuste acquisitis, ostenditur.
3. Ecclesiastici trigesimo quarto3: Immolantis ex iniquo oblatio est maculata; et infra: Dona iniquorum non probat Altissimus.
4. Item, Gregorius in Moralibus4: «Eleemosyna Redemptoris oculis placet, quae non ex illicitis, vel p. 370 iniquitate congeritur, sed quae de rebus concessis et iuste acquisitis». Et iterum ipse dicit: «Non est computanda eleemosyna, si pauperibus dispensetur quod ex illicitis rebus acquiritur».
Item, quod de necessariis, videtur.
5. Illud enim non est satisfactorium, ad quod quis alias tenetur; sed quilibet tenetur ad dandum superflua pauperibus, quantumcumque sit sine peccato, Lucae undecimo5: Quod superest date eleemosynam: ergo etc.
6. Item, Gregorius in homilia6 super illud: Facite dignos fructus poenitentiae: «Qui se novit nonnulla illicita commisisse debet a licitis abstinere»: ergo si abstinentia satisfactoria non est illa quae est ab illicitis, sed quae a licitis; videtur similiter, quod eleemosyna satisfactoria sit illa, non quae est de superfluis, sed quae de necessariis.
Ad oppositum, quod non debeat esse de necessariis, ut resolvendo sive destruendo incipiamus, videtur:
1. Quia unusquisque tenetur se magis quam alterum diligere7: ergo tenetur sibi necessaria reservare.
2. Item, dare necessaria vitae humanae est supererogationis; sed nullus sacerdos potest imponere opera supererogationis: ergo nec talem eleemosynam. Si ergo eleemosyna illa, quae est imposita a sacerdote, est satisfactoria, non oportet, quod sit de necessariis.
Item, videtur, quod possit esse de iniuste acquisitis.
3. Quia Lucae decimo sexto8 dicitur: Facite vobis amicos de mammona iniquitatis; Glossa: «Iniquitas bene dispensata vertitur in iustitiam».
4. Item Augustinus, in Causa decima quarta, quaestione quinta9: «Qui habetis aliquid de malo facite inde bonum».
Item, hic quaeritur, si meretrix, vel usurarius, vel aleator de lucro suo possint facere eleemosynam, cum omnes hi malo modo acquirant.
Item, videtur, quod non oporteat fieri ex propriis.
5. Quia filii Israel abstulerunt vasa Aegyptiorum, Exodi duodecimo10, et postea obtulerunt ea in usum tabernaculi, Exodi trigesimo quinto.
6. Item, si hoc esset verum, cum mulier et filius et monachus non habeant dominium; videtur, quod nullam eleemosynam possint facere; quod falsum est, cum magis teneantur esse hospitales, et frequenter mulieres plus dent11 quam viri.
Conclusio. Eleemosyna, ut proprie sit satisfactoria, debet fieri de propriis, iuste acquisitis et necessariis secundum communem usum vivendi.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod illud est necessarium ad hoc, quod eleemosyna sit satisfactoria, scilicet quod ille qui tribuit, iusto eam titulo habeat et tenere et possidere possit; si enim aliter habeat, potius tenetur reddere quam dare.
Quod ergo quaeritur, utrum necesse sit eleemosynam dare de proprio; dicendum, quod aut dicitur proprium, quia habet principale dominium alienandi, aut quia ab alio habet sibi commissum officium administrandi. Primo modo simpliciter potest facere ille qui habet proprium; secundo modo non potest facere, superiore prohibente, ut monachus, qui administrat res et bona monasterii ex mandato abbatis, potest utique eleemosynam dare; si autem ille vetet, non potest nec debet. Unde Causa duodecima, quaestione prima12: «Certum est, quod monachus nihil habere, vel dare, vel accipere sine superioris licentia debet», nisi forte ille qui indiget, sit in extrema necessitate; tunc enim non debet obedire abbati, quia manifeste faceret contra Deum. Similiter iudicandum est de muliere — si non habeat dotem, vel aliquid iuxta dotem — quod contra mandatum viri non potest eleemosynam facere, si conscientia dictat ei, quod nullo modo velit; sed non debet sibi formare conscientiam, quod vir prohibeat medium, sed superfluitatem, nisi manifeste viderit voluntatem viri ad oppositum.
5. Si ergo obiiciatur de filiis Israel, qui furati sunt; dicendum, quod Dominus transtulit dominium, et revera non fuit ibi furtum.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sunt malae conditionis monachi; dicendum, quod non, quia unica temporalium dimissione, si vere dimiserunt temporalia, meruerunt tantum, quantum in multis; et praeterea, bona voluntas supplet quod deest ex manu. p. 371
Ad illud quod quaeritur de male acquisitis, dicendum, quod quaedam sunt male acquisita, in quibus transfertur dominium, et non competit repetitio; et talia non est necesse restitui et possunt licite retineri, ut pretium prostibuli et lucrum histrionis. Et talia possunt dari in eleemosynam, sed tamen non debent recipi in oblationem, si sit publicum, propter reverentiam altaris et confusionem peccati, ut resipiscant. Et hoc est quod dicitur Deuteronomii vigesimo tertio13: Non offeres mercedem prostibuli. — Quaedam autem sunt, in quibus non transfertur dominium, sed competit repetitio, ut in furto et rapina; et de talibus non potest fieri nec oblatio nec eleemosyna, sed debet fieri restitutio. — Ad huiusmodi autem genus reducuntur omnia, quae iniusto titulo et mala fide possidentur, quia iniustus titulus pro nullo habendus est. Malae autem fidei possessor dicitur qui contra legum interdicta mercatur14; talia sunt quae habentur per simoniam et usuram; et ideo de talibus nullo modo nec potest nec debet fieri eleemosyna.
Si vero quaeratur de aleatore, dicendum est generaliter, quod malae fidei possessor est et iniusto possidet titulo; et ideo nullo modo potest nec debet sibi tenere quod lucratus est, cum talis ludus sit turpis et reprobatus et contra Deum et contra omnia iura15. — Utrum tamen teneatur restituere, distinguunt aliqui; quia aut ille, penes quem lucratus est, est talis persona, quae rebus suis praeesse non potest, ut puta minor sive pupillus, surdus, mutus, perpetuo morbo languidus; et sic tenetur restituere16. Si autem sit talis persona, quae potuit amittere; aut socius tractus est ab illo et inductus, aut non. Si tractus fuit ab illo, non tenetur illi restituere, quia illi non competit repetitio in vindictam peccati, sed potest inde facere eleemosynam. Si autem ipse traxit eum, non potest eleemosynam facere, sed tenetur restituere, saltem in foro conscientiae, quia, licet nullus velit amittere, tamen qui non vult amittere nec ludere, sed inducitur, minus culpabilis videtur, et alius, qui inducit, magis; et ideo iste non debet damnificari, nec auctor nec inductor in aliquo meliorari. Nulli tamen licet ex hoc aliquid lucri acquisiti in proprios usus convertere.
Similiter iudicandum de torneamentis et dicendum, quod in illis pactionibus, quas habent inter se, bona non transferuntur invicem, sed in usus pauperum convertuntur propter ludi inhonestatem et iuris interdictionem17.
Ex his patent obiecta. Quod enim dicitur, quod de iniquo non potest fieri eleemosyna; intelligitur de eo quod inique possidetur et iniusto titulo.
Quod obiicitur ad contrarium procedit secundum aliam viam.
Ad illud quod quaeritur18 de necessariis et superfluis, dicendum, quod necessarium dicitur dupliciter: vel secundum naturae arctitudinem vel secundum communem usum vivendi. Si secundum arctitudinem; non tenetur, nec oportet ei imponi, qui peccavit; quia hoc est perfectionis illorum qui totum victum exspectant a Christo, sicut sunt viri, qui sunt in statu perfecto; et ideo, si fiat eleemosyna, debet fieri de eo quod superest huic necessario, et bene est satisfactoria. — Alio modo dicitur necessarium, quod expedit homini secundum communem modum vivendi. De quo dicit Augustinus19, quod «multa superflua habere probabimur, si sola necessaria teneamus»; et de tali fit proprie eleemosyna satisfactoria; de superfluo vero non fit, quantum est de rigore iustitiae. — Tamen credo, quod divinae misericordiae benignitas tanta est, quod totum acceptat et quasi pro nihilo salvat nos20. — Et sic patet responsio ad utramque partem.
I. In solutione quatuor quaestionum huius articuli antiqui Scholastici satis conveniunt, etiam quoad casus de restitutione in I. quaestione factos, si excipias ea quae paulo severius docet S. Bonav. de obligatione restituendi lucri in ludis et torneamentis facti. Nam Alex. Hal. (S. p. IV. q. 24. m. 3. a. 3. § 6.) aliique antiqui et recentiores casuistae cum S. Alphonso (Theol. moral. III. tr. 5. dub. 13. n. 887. seqq.) communissime docent, contractus ludorum vetitorum ante sententiam iudicis non esse per se irritos, nec lucrum inde perceptum esse restituendum. De his annexisque quaestionibus diffuse disputat Alex. Hal. S. p. IV. qq. 24-35, aliique Scholastici de tribus operum bonorum speciebus plures quaestiones solvunt.
II. De I. quaestione sive de eleemosyna vide hic dub. 2-7; super: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 33. m. 2. a. 1-6; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1-6; S. II. II. q. 32. a. 1-10. — IB. Albert., hic a. 14-26. — Petr. a Tar., de hac et 2 seqq. qq. hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic n. 2. q. 1-8; — Durand., hic q. 7. 8. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5. — De eadem: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 26. m. 1-5, praesertim m. 3. a. 4. — Scot., Quodl. q. 20. n. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 1-7; S. II. II. q. 33. a. 1-17. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1-8. — Durand., hic q. 12. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 7. — De 2. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 28. m. 1-5. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1-4; S. II. II. q. 147. a. 1-8. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 8. q. 1-8. — Durand., hic q. 9. 10. 11. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6. — In 3. quaestione solvenda Gulielm. Antissiod. (Sum. p. IV. tr. 6. q. 2.) a Ss. Bonav., Thoma aliisque dissentit, cum distinguat inter orationem doceatque: «Quaedam enim oratio totaliter delectabilis est, sicut oratio viri contemplativi, quae est immediate ad gaudia aeterna; et talis oratio non est poenalis, unde non est satisfactoria». Quoad 4. quaestionem etiam S. Thom. primum opinionem et praesertim rationem adiectam improbat, et similiter secundam; convenit autem cum S. Bonav., quod restitutio sit satisfactio improprie accepta et quoddam praeambulum ad eam. Sed Dionys. Carth. sustinet, actum restitutionis, dummodo fiat in caritate, semper habere vim satisfactoriam; quod, ut videtur, nec illi antiqui doctores penitus negare voluerunt. De 4. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 24. m. 3. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 4-3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. q. 1; cfr. q. 2-8. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. in principio.
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Article II. On the manner of making satisfaction in particular.
Consequently, as to the second article, the question is asked concerning the manner of making satisfaction in particular. And concerning this four things are asked.
First it is asked, from what goods almsgiving ought to be done.
Second, whether one may make satisfaction by fasting.
Third, whether one may make satisfaction by prayer.
Fourth and last, the question is asked concerning restitution.
Question I. From what goods almsgiving ought to be done.
Concerning the first the procedure is thus. It is commonly said that almsgiving ought to be done from one's own goods, justly acquired and necessary. And that it must be only from one's own goods, seems [the case]:
1. Because the law says1 that a possession cannot be alienated except by its proper owner; but when alms are given, the possession is alienated, since it becomes the property of the poor man receiving it: therefore no one can give alms except the one who has property and has ownership over the temporal thing.
2. Likewise, this is proved from the text of the Bible, Proverbs the third chapter2: Honor the Lord with thy substance, and give to the poor of the firstfruits of thy crops.
That it must be only from goods justly acquired is shown.
3. Ecclesiasticus the thirty-fourth chapter3: The offering of one who sacrifices from what is unjust is defiled; and below: The Most High does not approve the gifts of the unjust.
4. Likewise, Gregory in the Morals4: «That alms pleases the eyes of the Redeemer which is gathered not from unlawful things, or p. 370 from iniquity, but which is from things granted and justly acquired». And again he says: «It is not to be reckoned as alms, if what is acquired from unlawful things is dispensed to the poor».
Likewise, that it must be from necessary goods, seems [the case].
5. For that is not satisfactory to which one is otherwise bound; but everyone is bound to give his superfluous goods to the poor, however much this is without sin, Luke the eleventh chapter5: That which remaineth, give alms: therefore etc.
6. Likewise, Gregory in the homily6 upon that text: Bring forth fruits worthy of penance: «He who knows that he has committed certain unlawful things ought to abstain from things lawful»: therefore if the satisfactory abstinence is not that which is from unlawful things, but that which is from lawful things; it seems likewise that the satisfactory almsgiving is that, not which is from superfluous goods, but which is from necessary goods.
On the contrary, that it ought not to be from necessary goods — that we may begin by resolving or destroying — it seems:
1. Because each one is bound to love himself more than another7: therefore he is bound to keep necessary goods for himself.
2. Likewise, to give the necessities of human life is a matter of supererogation; but no priest can impose works of supererogation: therefore neither such almsgiving. If, then, that almsgiving which is imposed by a priest is satisfactory, it is not required that it be from necessary goods.
Likewise, it seems that it can be from goods unjustly acquired.
3. Because in Luke the sixteenth chapter8 it is said: Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of iniquity; the Gloss: «Iniquity well dispensed is turned into justice».
4. Likewise Augustine, in Cause fourteen, question five9: «You who have something from evil, make from it good».
Likewise, here it is asked, whether a harlot, or a usurer, or a gambler can make alms from his gain, since all these acquire by an evil manner.
Likewise, it seems that it need not be done from one's own goods.
5. Because the children of Israel took away the vessels of the Egyptians, Exodus the twelfth chapter10, and afterward offered them for the use of the tabernacle, Exodus the thirty-fifth chapter.
6. Likewise, if this were true, since a wife and a son and a monk have no ownership; it seems that they can make no alms; which is false, since they are the more bound to be hospitable, and wives frequently give11 more than husbands.
Conclusion. Almsgiving, in order that it be properly satisfactory, ought to be done from one's own goods, justly acquired and necessary according to the common manner of living.
I respond: It must be said that this is necessary for almsgiving to be satisfactory, namely that the one who bestows it should hold it by a just title and be able to keep and possess it; for if he has it otherwise, he is bound rather to restore it than to give it.
As to what is asked, then, whether it is necessary to give alms from one's own: it must be said that a thing is called one's own either because one has the principal ownership of alienating it, or because from another one has entrusted to oneself the office of administering it. In the first way the one who has property can simply do it; in the second way he cannot do it when his superior forbids, as a monk, who administers the goods and property of the monastery by the abbot's mandate, can indeed give alms; but if the abbot forbids it, he cannot and ought not. Hence Cause twelve, question one12: «It is certain that a monk ought to have nothing, or give, or receive without the superior's leave», unless perhaps the one who is in need is in extreme necessity; for then he ought not to obey the abbot, since he would manifestly act against God. Similarly it must be judged concerning a wife — if she has no dowry, or anything in lieu of a dowry — that against her husband's mandate she cannot make alms, if her conscience dictates to her that he in no way wills it; but she ought not to form for herself the conscience that her husband forbids what is moderate, but [only] what is superfluous, unless she manifestly sees the husband's will to the contrary.
5. If, then, the objection is made concerning the children of Israel, who stole; it must be said that the Lord transferred the ownership, and in truth there was no theft there.
6. To the objection that monks are of an evil condition; it must be said that they are not, because by the single renunciation of temporal things, if they have truly renounced temporal goods, they have merited as much as in many things; and besides, good will supplies what is lacking from the hand. p. 371
To what is asked concerning ill-gotten goods, it must be said that some things are ill-gotten in which ownership is transferred and there is no right of recovery; and such things need not be restored and can lawfully be retained, like the wage of prostitution and the gain of a stage-player. And such things can be given in alms, but nevertheless ought not to be received as an offering, if it is public, on account of reverence for the altar and the shame of the sin, that they may come to their senses. And this is what is said in Deuteronomy the twenty-third chapter13: Thou shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet. — But some things are such in which ownership is not transferred, but there is a right of recovery, as in theft and robbery; and from such things neither an offering nor an alms can be made, but restitution must be made. — And to this kind are reduced all things that are possessed by an unjust title and in bad faith, since an unjust title is to be held as nothing. But a possessor in bad faith is said to be one who trades contrary to the prohibitions of the laws14; such are the things had through simony and usury; and therefore from such things in no way can or ought alms be made.
But if the question is raised concerning a gambler, it must be said generally that he is a possessor in bad faith and possesses by an unjust title; and therefore in no way can or ought he keep for himself what he has won, since such play is base and reprobated and against God and against all laws15. — Yet whether he is bound to make restitution, some distinguish; because either the person with whom he won is such a person as cannot manage his own affairs, such as a minor or ward, deaf, dumb, perpetually wasted by sickness; and thus he is bound to restore16. But if it is such a person as could have lost; then either the companion was drawn in and induced by him, or not. If he was drawn in by him, he is not bound to restore to him, since there is no right of recovery for him in punishment of his sin, but he can make alms from it. But if he himself drew him in, he cannot make alms, but is bound to restore, at least in the court of conscience, since, although no one wishes to lose, yet he who does not wish to lose nor to play but is induced seems less culpable, and the other, who induces, more so; and therefore the latter ought not to be harmed, nor the author nor the inducer in any respect bettered. To no one, however, is it lawful from this to convert any of the gain acquired to his own uses.
Similarly it must be judged concerning tournaments, and it must be said that in those agreements which they make among themselves, goods are not transferred to one another but are converted to the uses of the poor, on account of the dishonor of the play and the interdiction of the law17.
From these things the objections are clear. For what is said, that alms cannot be made from what is unjust, is understood of that which is possessed unjustly and by an unjust title.
What is objected to the contrary proceeds by another way.
To what is asked18 concerning necessary and superfluous goods, it must be said that the necessary is spoken of in two ways: either according to the strictness of nature, or according to the common manner of living. If according to strictness; one is not bound, nor ought it to be imposed on the one who has sinned; because this belongs to the perfection of those who await their whole sustenance from Christ, such as are men who are in the state of perfection; and therefore, if alms be made, it ought to be made from what is over and above this necessary, and it is indeed satisfactory. — In another way the necessary is spoken of, namely what is expedient for a man according to the common manner of living. Of which Augustine says19, that «we shall be shown to have much superfluous, if we keep only the necessary»; and from such goods properly satisfactory alms is made; but from the superfluous it is not made, so far as concerns the rigor of justice. — Yet I believe that the kindness of the divine mercy is so great that it accepts the whole and saves us as if for nothing20. — And thus the reply to both parts is clear.
I. In the solution of the four questions of this article the ancient Scholastics agree well enough, even as to the cases of restitution treated in the first question, if you except those things which St. Bonaventure teaches somewhat more severely concerning the obligation of restoring gain made in games and tournaments. For Alexander of Hales (Summa p. IV. q. 24. m. 3. a. 3. § 6.) and other ancient and more recent casuists, together with St. Alphonsus (Theol. moral. III. tr. 5. dub. 13. n. 887. ff.) most commonly teach that the contracts of forbidden games before the judge's sentence are not of themselves void, nor is the gain thence received to be restored. On these and connected questions Alexander of Hales disputes at length, Summa p. IV. qq. 24-35, and other Scholastics solve several questions concerning the three kinds of good works.
II. On the first question, that is, on almsgiving, see here dub. 2-7; above: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. q. 33. m. 2. a. 1-6; St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1-6; Summa II-II q. 32. a. 1-10. — Likewise Albert, here a. 14-26. — Peter of Tarentaise, on this and the two following questions, here q. 2. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here n. 2. q. 1-8; — Durandus, here q. 7. 8. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 5. — On the same: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. q. 26. m. 1-5, especially m. 3. a. 4. — Scotus, Quodl. q. 20. n. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 4. a. 1-7; Summa II-II q. 33. a. 1-17. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4. q. 1-8. — Durandus, here q. 12. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 7. — On the second question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. q. 28. m. 1-5. — St. Thomas, here q. 3. a. 1-4; Summa II-II q. 147. a. 1-8. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 8. q. 1-8. — Durandus, here q. 9. 10. 11. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 6. — In solving the third question William of Auxerre (Summa p. IV. tr. 6. q. 2.) dissents from Saints Bonaventure, Thomas, and others, since he distinguishes among kinds of prayer and teaches: «For some prayer is wholly delightful, such as the prayer of a contemplative man, which is directly toward eternal joys; and such prayer is not penal, hence it is not satisfactory». As to the fourth question, St. Thomas too disapproves first the opinion and especially the reason added to it, and likewise the second; but he agrees with St. Bonaventure that restitution is satisfaction improperly understood and a certain preamble to it. But Dionysius the Carthusian holds that the act of restitution, provided it be done in charity, always has satisfactory force; which, as it seems, not even those ancient doctors wished altogether to deny. On the fourth question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. q. 24. m. 3. a. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4-3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 5. q. 1; cfr. q. 2-8. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4. at the beginning.
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- 1Respicitur Luc. 16, 9: Facite vobis amicos etc. — In fine solut. cod. B addit: Secundum ergo [hoc] dicendum, quod considerando dignitatem eius quod est satisfactorium, magis est satisfactoria oratio quam eleemosyna vel ieiunium; sed respiciendo fructum eius quod est satisfactorium, magis satisfactoria est eleemosyna, quia fructuosior; et hoc patet. Per largitionem enim eleemosynae acquirit homo sibi multos debitores, quos obligat ad orandum pro se; ipsi vero, quia plures sunt et in caritate, possunt ei gratiam impetrare, si non habet, vel si habet, augmentum gratiae. Licet enim oratio existentis in mortali non sit Deo accepta pro se, tamen exauditur quandoque, quando plures orant pro ipso, qui in caritate sunt, et possunt ei gratiam impetrare ex merito congrui, non condigni [cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2.]. Sicut enim eleemosyna corporalis attenditur in largitione istarum rerum materialium, sic oratio facta pro alio est eleemosyna spiritualis; et congruum est, quod sicut ille reficit eos corporaliter per largitionem eleemosynae corporalis, sic ille reficiatur spiritualiter pro orationibus eorum, et hoc vel ad impetrationem gratiae vel augmenti in gratia. In istis vero attenditur magnus fructus; et ideo fructuosior est eleemosyna quam ieiunium vel oratio; et hoc patet; quia ieiunium et oratio valent praecipue facienti ea, sed eleemosyna valet non solum facienti eam, sed etiam aliis. — S. Bonav. non respondet ad ultimam obiectionem, quia solutio eius colligitur ex solut. ad 4.Reference is to Luke 16:9: Make to yourselves friends etc. — At the end of the solution codex B adds: «Therefore, accordingly, it must be said that, considering the dignity of that which is satisfactory, prayer is more satisfactory than alms or fasting; but considering the fruit of that which is satisfactory, alms is more satisfactory, because more fruitful; and this is clear. For by the bestowal of alms a man acquires for himself many debtors, whom he obligates to pray for him; and they, since they are many and in charity, can obtain grace for him, if he has it not, or, if he has it, an increase of grace. For although the prayer of one existing in mortal sin is not accepted by God on his own behalf, yet it is sometimes heard, when many who are in charity pray for him and can obtain grace for him by the merit of congruity, not of condignity [cf. II Sent. d. 27, a. 2, q. 2]. For just as corporal almsgiving is regarded in the bestowal of those material things, so prayer made for another is a spiritual alms; and it is fitting that, as one refreshes them corporally by the bestowal of corporal alms, so he is refreshed spiritually by their prayers, and this either toward the obtaining of grace or of increase in grace. In these things indeed a great fruit is regarded; and therefore alms is more fruitful than fasting or prayer; and this is clear; because fasting and prayer avail chiefly the one doing them, but alms avails not only the one doing it but also others. — St. Bonaventure does not reply to the last objection, since its solution is gathered from the reply to [argument] 4.»
- 2Vers. 9, ubi Vulgata finem textus exhibet sic: et de primitiis omnium [ita etiam cod. H] frugum tuarum ita ei.Verse 9, where the Vulgate gives the end of the text thus: «and of the firstfruits of all [so also cod. H] thy crops» and so on.
- 3Vers. 21. — Seq. textus ibid. v. 23.Verse 21. — The following text [is] ibid. v. 23.
- 4Potius in Registro epist. lib. IX. Indict. 2. epist. 106: Eleemosyna Redemptoris nostri oculis illa placet, quae non de illicitis et iniquitate... et bene acquisitis impenditur [cfr. Gratian. C. Eleemosyna (7.), C. 14. q. 5]. In secundo loco, qui habetur ibid. paulo superius et in Gratian. C. Non est putanda (27.), C. 1. q. 1, textus originalis substituit reputanda pro computanda et accipitur pro acquiritur.Rather in the Register of letters, bk. IX, Indiction 2, epist. 106: «That alms pleases the eyes of our Redeemer which is bestowed not from unlawful things and iniquity... and from goods well acquired» [cf. Gratian, c. Eleemosyna (7.), C. 14 q. 5]. In the second place, which is found ibid. a little above and in Gratian, c. Non est putanda (27.), C. 1 q. 1, the original text substitutes reputanda for computanda and takes [it] for acquiritur.
- 5Vers. 41.Verse 41.
- 6Libr. 1. Homil. in Evang. homil. 20. (super Luc. 3, 8.) n. 8, non iisdem verbis, quae potius inveniuntur ibid. lib. 11. homil. 34. n. 16: Quia enim se illicita perpetrasse meminerat, etiam a licitis abstinebat.Bk. 1 of the Homilies on the Gospels, homily 20 (on Luke 3:8) n. 8, not in the same words, which are rather found ibid. bk. 11, homily 34, n. 16: «For because he remembered that he had perpetrated unlawful things, he abstained even from lawful ones.»
- 7Cfr. III. Sent. d. 29. q. 3.Cf. III Sent. d. 29, q. 3.
- 8Vers. 9. — Glossa, quae ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum, sumta est ex Hieron., Epist. 121. (alias 151.) c. 6. (sive q. 6.). Cfr. Beda, in hunc loc.Verse 9. — The Gloss, which is the ordinary one in Strabo and Lyra, is taken from Jerome, Epist. 121 (otherwise 151) c. 6 (or q. 6). Cf. Bede, on this passage.
- 9Can. Qui habet (M.), sumtus ex Serm. 113. (alias 35. de verbis Domini...), n. 3. — Codd. et edd. Augustinus in lib. quaest. L. q. 33. m. 2. a. 2: Praeterea Augustinus, habetur ibid. q. XIV; secuti sumus Alex. et Ital.Canon Qui habet (M.), taken from Sermon 113 (otherwise 35, On the words of the Lord...), n. 3. — The codices and editions [read] Augustine in the book of Questions L., q. 33, m. 2, a. 2: «Moreover Augustine,» found ibid. q. XIV; we followed Alexander and the Italian [edition]. [?]
- 10Vers. 35. seq. — Seq. locus ibid. 35, 22.Verse 35 ff. — The following passage [is] ibid. 35, 22.
- 11Edd. debent.The editions [read] debent (ought).
- 12Can. Non dicatis (M.), § 2; quod sumtum est ex S. August., Regulae clericis traditae fragmentum (inter opera). Cfr. C. Quia tua (8.). Subinde respicitur C. Non satis est (14.), d. 86, in quo de praecepto succurrendi alteri in extrema necessitate constituto, et C. Quae contra mores (2.), d. 8, ubi docetur, nulli licere contra ius naturale agere, et Dei praeceptum praevalere mandatis hominum.Canon Non dicatis (M.), § 2; which is taken from St. Augustine, Fragment of the Rule handed down to clerics (among his works). Cf. c. Quia tua (8.). Thereupon reference is made to c. Non satis est (14.), d. 86, in which [it treats] of the precept of succoring another set in extreme necessity, and c. Quae contra mores (2.), d. 8, where it is taught that it is lawful to none to act against the natural law, and that God's precept prevails over the mandates of men.
- 13Vers. 18. — Superius pro peccati cod. H peccatoris.Verse 18. — Above, for peccati (of the sin) cod. H [reads] peccatoris (of the sinner).
- 14Regula iuris 82. in VI: Qui contra iura mercatur bonam fidem praesumitur non habere.Rule of law 82 in the [Liber] Sextus: «He who trades contrary to the laws is presumed not to have good faith».
- 15Cfr. C. Episcopus aut presbyter (1.), d. 35; C. Clerici officia (13.), X. de Vita et honest. cleric. (lib. III. tit. 1.), et C. Inter dilectos (M.), X. de Excessibus praelat. (lib. V. tit. 31.). De lege civili cfr. Lex fi. de relig. et sumt. fun. lib. III. C. tit. 44. Vide etiam Aristot., IV. Ethic. c. 1, ubi ait: At aleator, fur seu spoliator et latro ex illiberalibus etiam ipsi sunt, cum turpi lucro dediti sint; utrique enim lucri causa negotiantur et opprobria sustinent; et hi quidem pericula maxima acceptionis causa subeunt, illi ab amicis, quibus dare deberent, lucrantur; utrique igitur, cum unde non oportet velint lucrum comparare, turpi lucro dediti sunt, atque omnes huiuscemodi acceptiones sunt illiberales.Cf. c. Episcopus aut presbyter (1.), d. 35; c. Clerici officia (13.), X. On the life and honesty of clerics (bk. III, tit. 1), and c. Inter dilectos (M.), X. On the excesses of prelates (bk. V, tit. 31). On civil law cf. the last Law On religion and funeral expenses, bk. III of the Code, tit. 44. See also Aristotle, Ethics IV, c. 1, where he says: «But the gambler, the thief or despoiler and the robber are also of the illiberal, since they are given to base gain; for both sorts trade for the sake of gain and endure reproaches; and the latter undergo the greatest dangers for the sake of their takings, while the former make gain from friends, to whom they ought rather to give; both therefore, since they wish to procure gain whence one ought not, are given to base gain, and all takings of this kind are illiberal.»
- 16Hoc constat ex Paul. leg. P. de aleae lusu et aleat. lib. II. P. tit. 3. — Paulo inferius ex codd. B E H Y supplevimus socius, pro quo alii codd. potius.This is established from Paul, Law P., On the playing of dice and gamblers, bk. II, P. tit. 3. — A little below, from codices B E H Y we supplied socius (companion), for which other codices [read] potius (rather).
- 17Torneamenta (cfr. supra pag. 36, nota 8.) prohibentur a Concilio Lateran. sub Alexandro III.; vide C. Felicis memoriae Innocentii (1.), X. de Torneamentis (lib. V. tit. 13.), et C. Porro si clericus (1.), X. de Clericis pugnant. in duello (lib. V. tit. 14.).Tournaments (cf. above p. 36, note 8) are forbidden by the Lateran Council under Alexander III; see c. Felicis memoriae of Innocent (1.), X. On tournaments (bk. V, tit. 13), and c. Porro si clericus (1.), X. On clerics fighting in a duel (bk. V, tit. 14).
- 18Edd. obiicitur.The editions [read] obiicitur (is objected).
- 19Enarrat. in Ps. 147. n. 12: Multa autem superflua habemus, si nonnisi necessaria teneamus; nam si inania quaeramus, nihil sufficit.Exposition on Psalm 147, n. 12: «But we have much superfluous, if we keep only the necessary; for if we seek empty things, nothing suffices.»
- 20Psalm. 55, 8: Pro nihilo salvos facies illos.Psalm 55:8: «Thou shalt save them for nothing.» [Vulg. 55:8 / Heb. 56:7]