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Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 27

Textus Latinus
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Articulus II. De gratia in comparatione ad meriti exercitium.

Consequenter quaeritur de gratia in comparatione ad meriti exercitium. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum per gratiam contingat mereri ipsum gratiae donum.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum contingat mereri gratiae augmentum1.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum per gratiam contingat mereri ipsius gratiae complementum, videlicet gloriae praemium.

Quaestio I. Utrum per gratiam contingat mereri ipsum gratiae donum iam habitum.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum per gratiam contingat mereri ipsum gratiae donum iam habitum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per simile in corporalibus. Bonus enim miles strenue2 militando meretur equum, a domino suo sibi gratis datum, per usum ipsius equi: ergo si tantae est efficaciae usus rei spiritualis in merendo rem spiritualem, sicut rei corporalis in merendo rem corporalem; videtur, quod per gratiae bonum usum mereatur quis donum gratiae iam acceptum.

2. Item, quod potest in maius potest in minus; sed per usum gratiae contingit mereri gloriam habendam: ergo multo fortius contingit mereri gratiam iam habitam.

3. Item, unusquisque magis est efficax ad merendum sibi quam alii; sed viri iusti, in quibus est gratia, orando merentur aliis primam gratiam, sicut dicit Augustinus de Praedestinatione Sanctorum3: ergo multo fortius homo bene utendo dono gratiae efficitur dignus habitu gratiae, quem accepit. — Quod autem unusquisque magis sit efficax ad merendum sibi quam alii, probatur per id quod dicitur super illud Matthaei nono4: Videns Iesus fidem illorum; ibi Glossa: « Quantum valet unicuique fides propria, si tantum profuit aliena », quasi dicat: multo plus.

4. Item, quantum placet Deo petitio et oratio pro habendo, tantum placet ei gratiarum actio pro iam habito; sed aliquis ex caritate orans meretur

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obtinere quod petit, si petit pie et pro se, perseveranter et ad salutem5: ergo pari ratione, qui gratias agit pie et perseveranter, ex caritate, dignus efficitur eo quod iam accepit.

5. Item, sicut se habet caritas ad amandum, sic se habet gratia ad merendum; sed per caritatem non solummodo contingit amare alia, sed etiam ipsam caritatem, sicut vult Augustinus, et in primo libro6 habitum est: ergo pari ratione per gratiam contingit mereri ipsum gratiae donum.

6. Item, tunc est perfectio in actibus et habilibus animae, quando agens reflectitur super se ipsum; tunc enim quis perfecte intelligit, quando intelligit se intelligere7: ergo non videtur esse perfectum meritum, nisi quis mereatur etiam illud, per quod meretur.

Sed contra: 1. Meritum et praemium relative dicuntur, sicut pater dicitur relative ad filium: ergo sicut idem non potest esse pater sui ipsius, sic unum et idem non potest esse meritum sui ipsius: ergo per gratiam non contingit mereri ipsius gratiae donum habitum.

2. Item, meritum et praemium habent ordinem, sicut via et terminus, et sicut dispositio respectu eius, ad quod disponit: ergo necesse est, quod meritum praecedat praemium vel tempore vel natura: ergo impossibile est, per gratiam mereri ipsum gratiae donum.

3. Item, gratuitum et debitum opponuntur; sed quanto aliquid magis cadit sub merito, tanto magis habet rationem debiti: si igitur usus gratiae non aufert ipsi gratiae esse donum gratuitum, immo potius addit; videtur, quod per ipsum usum gratiae nullo modo contingat mereri gratiae donum.

4. Item, quantum unumquodque placet Deo, tantum est meritorium; sed usus gratiae non placet Deo nisi propter ipsam gratiam: ergo non plus meretur usus gratiae cum gratia, quam gratia per se ipsam. Sed donum gratiae, eo ipso quod habetur, non meretur se: ergo pari ratione nec usu gratiae contingit mereri iam habitum gratiae donum.

Conclusio. Per usum gratiae consequentem non potest quis mereri habitum gratiae praecedentem, nec per meritum congrui nec per meritum condigni.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod per usum gratiae consequentem non contingit mereri habitum gratiae praecedentem, nec quantum ad meritum congrui nec quantum ad meritum condigni. — Quantum ad meritum congrui non, pro eo quod usus gratiae ad ipsum habitum non comparatur sicut meritum ad praemium8; tum quia non ordinatur ad ipsum habitum promerendum, sed ad aliud; tum etiam, quia non habet ordinari ad illud, nisi sicut ad suum fundamentum et originem. Meritum autem omne, sive congrui sive condigni, ordinatur ad praemium tanquam quaedam via et dispositio praeambula. — Multo minus nec quantum ad meritum condigni per usum gratiae contingit mereri ipsum donum gratiae, quod est ipsius usus principium; tum, quia ipsa gratia, quantum est de sua prima ratione et primaria infusione, sic habet rationem gratuiti, ut nullo modo compatiatur rationem debiti — si enim esset ex meritis, iam non esset gratia9 — tum etiam, quia si usus gratiae ipsam gratiam mereretur, quanto magis10 ipsa bene uteretur, tanto minus pro ipsa teneretur Deo esse gratus. Quodsi hoc repugnat perfectioni meriti, planum est, quod gratiam non contingit mereri, nec merito condigni, quia tunc tolleretur perfectio gratiae et perfectio meriti; nec merito congrui, quia non salvatur ibi ordo, qui inter meritum et praemium debet attendi. — Unde rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud vero, quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de similitudine meriti in corporalibus, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia equus, quantum est de sui ratione, non dicit rationem gratuiti; ideo salva sua ratione potest quis eum iam habitum mereri. Primum autem gratiae donum, eo ipso quod tale est, dicit quid simpliciter gratuitum; ideo quidquid homo faciat, nunquam illud meretur, non solum quia sit iam habitum, sed quia gratuitum. Unde etsi aliqui dixerint, quod contingat mereri gloriam iam habitam, sicut in Angelis11; non tamen credo, aliquos recte intelligentes sensisse, quod contingat mereri gratiam iam habitam.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si aliquid potest in maius, potest in minus; dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem, nisi quando aliquid ordinatur ad maius et ad minus ordinatione consimili12; sic autem non est in proposito. Nam usus gratiae ordinatur ad merendum gloriam, non ad merendum gratiam, pro eo quod ipsam praesupponit tanquam fundamentum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliquis meretur alii primam gratiam; dicendum, quod non est simile;

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primum, quia gratia in viro iusto praecessit gratiam infundendam viro peccatori, usus autem gratiae in eodem homine sequi habet ipsum donum gratuitum. Praeterea, cum quis meretur alii gratiam, donum gratiae non perdit ex hoc rationem gratuiti, quoniam ratio gratuiti attenditur in habitu gratiae in comparatione ad eum cui datur. Quantumcumque autem vir iustus oret pro peccatore, quod peccatori detur habitus gratum faciens, non potest esse sine gratuita liberalitate divinae misericordiae. Et ideo non sequitur, quod si unus alii potest mereri gratiam habendam, quod ipse possit sibi mereri gratiam iam habitam. — Quod autem dicitur, quod plus valet unicuique fides propria quam fides aliena, hoc intelligitur respectu meriti propriae gratiae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratiarum actio ita est efficax pro habito, sicut oratio pro habendo; dicendum, quod etsi gratiarum actio ita sit Deo acceptabilis pro praeterito, sicut oratio pro futuro; ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod gratiarum actio sit ordinata ad merendum iam habitum, pro eo quod ipsa gratiarum actio et laus pro beneficiis acceptis plus tenet rationem praemii quam rationem meriti. Sed si tenet rationem meriti, ordinatur ex divina liberalitate potius ad donum13 promerendum quam ad promerendum iam habitum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de comparatione caritatis ad amorem, et gratiae ad meritum, dicendum, quod non est simile. Meritum enim de sua ratione importat ordinem et relationem, amor vero importat actum potentiae non alligatae materiae; et quia idem non habet ad se referri et ordinari, sed actus potentiae non alligatae materiae habet supra se reflecti; hinc est, quod amorem contingit amari, sed meritum non contingit mereri.

6. Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod ultimo obiiciebatur. Illud enim veritatem in eis actibus non habet, qui quidem important relationem et ordinem et simul cum hoc aliquam imperfectionem; actus autem merendi respectu actus gloriosi imperfectionem aliquam dicit et ordinem et relationem, sicut prius14 ostensum est; et ideo illud non valet.

Scholion

I. Haec quaestio distinguenda est a sequente, quae agit de gratiae augmento, haec autem est de prima gratia, non quidem acquirenda (de quo vide infra d. 28. a. 2. q. I.), sed iam habita; et quaeritur, utrum per bonum usum eiusdem postea possit ipsa cadere sub merito. In hoc sensu quaestio ab aliis non tractatur explicite nisi ab Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 61. m. 5. a. 2. § 2.) et Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.). — Breviter et in eodem sensu cum nostro Doctore ad eam respondent S. Thom. (hic q. unica a. 5. ad 3; S. I. II. q. 114. a. 8. in fine corp.) et B. Albert. (II. Sent. d. 28. a. 2.).

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English Translation

Article II. On grace in comparison to the exercise of meriting.

Consequently inquiry is made concerning grace in comparison to the exercise of meriting. And concerning this three things are asked.

First it is asked, whether through grace one may merit the very gift of grace.

Second it is asked, whether one may merit an increase of grace1.

Third it is asked, whether through grace one may merit the completion of grace itself, namely the reward of glory.

Question I. Whether through grace one may merit the very gift of grace already possessed.

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether through grace one may merit the very gift of grace already possessed. And that it is so, it seems:

1. First, through a likeness in bodily things. For a good soldier, by serving valiantly2, merits a horse, freely given to him by his lord, through the use of that horse: therefore if the use of a spiritual thing is of such efficacy in meriting a spiritual thing as [the use] of a bodily thing in meriting a bodily thing; it seems that through the good use of grace one may merit the gift of grace already received.

2. Likewise, that which has power for the greater has power for the lesser; but through the use of grace it happens that one merits glory to be had: therefore much more strongly does it happen that one merits grace already had.

3. Likewise, each one is more effective at meriting for himself than for another; but the just, in whom there is grace, by praying merit for others their first grace, as Augustine says in On the Predestination of the Saints3: therefore much more strongly is a man, by using well the gift of grace, made worthy of the habit of grace which he has received. — And that each one is more effective at meriting for himself than for another, is proved through what is said upon that text of Matthew the ninth4: Jesus, seeing their faith; there the Gloss: « How much one's own faith avails for each, if another's availed so much », as if to say: much more.

4. Likewise, as much as petition and prayer for what is to be had pleases God, so much does thanksgiving for what is already had please him; but someone praying out of charity merits

to obtain what he asks, if he asks devoutly and for himself, perseveringly and unto salvation5: therefore by parity of reasoning, one who gives thanks devoutly and perseveringly, out of charity, is made worthy of that which he has already received.

5. Likewise, as charity stands to loving, so grace stands to meriting; but through charity it happens not only to love other things, but also charity itself, as Augustine holds, and as was established in the first book6: therefore by parity of reasoning, through grace it happens that one merits the very gift of grace.

6. Likewise, there is perfection in the acts and capacities of the soul when the agent is reflected upon itself; for then one understands perfectly, when he understands that he understands7: therefore meriting does not seem to be perfect, unless one merits also that through which he merits.

On the contrary: 1. Merit and reward are spoken of relatively, as a father is spoken of relatively to a son: therefore just as the same [thing] cannot be the father of itself, so one and the same [thing] cannot be the merit of itself: therefore through grace it does not happen that one merits the gift of grace itself once had.

2. Likewise, merit and reward have an order, as a way and a terminus, and as a disposition with respect to that to which it disposes: therefore it is necessary that merit precede reward either in time or in nature: therefore it is impossible, through grace, to merit the very gift of grace.

3. Likewise, the gratuitous and the owed are opposed; but the more something falls under merit, the more it has the character of the owed: if therefore the use of grace does not take away from grace itself its being a gratuitous gift, but rather adds [to it]; it seems that through the use of grace itself it in no way happens that one merits the gift of grace.

4. Likewise, as much as each thing pleases God, so much is it meritorious; but the use of grace does not please God except on account of grace itself: therefore the use of grace with grace does not merit more than grace by itself. But the gift of grace, by the very fact that it is had, does not merit itself: therefore by parity of reasoning, neither through the use of grace does it happen that one merits the already-had gift of grace.

Conclusion. Through the subsequent use of grace one cannot merit the preceding habit of grace, neither by the merit of congruity nor by the merit of condignity.

I respond: It must be said that through the subsequent use of grace it does not happen that one merits the preceding habit of grace, neither as to the merit of congruity nor as to the merit of condignity. — Not as to the merit of congruity, for the reason that the use of grace is not compared to the habit itself as merit to reward8; both because it is not ordered to meriting the habit itself, but to something else; and also because it does not have to be ordered to it, except as to its foundation and origin. But every merit, whether of congruity or of condignity, is ordered to reward as a kind of way and preparatory disposition. — Much less does it happen, as to the merit of condignity, that through the use of grace one merits the very gift of grace, which is the principle of that very use; both because grace itself, as to its first character and primary infusion, has the character of the gratuitous in such a way that it in no way admits the character of the owed — for if it were from merits, it would no longer be grace9 — and also because, if the use of grace were to merit grace itself, the more one used it well10, the less he would be bound to be grateful to God for it. And if this is repugnant to the perfection of merit, it is plain that grace cannot be merited, neither by the merit of condignity, because then the perfection of grace and the perfection of merit would be taken away; nor by the merit of congruity, because the order which ought to be observed between merit and reward is not preserved there. — Hence the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. But to that which is objected first to the contrary, concerning the likeness of merit in bodily things, it must be said that it is not alike, because a horse, as to its own character, does not bespeak the character of the gratuitous; therefore, with its character preserved, one can merit it even when already had. But the first gift of grace, by the very fact that it is such, bespeaks something simply gratuitous; therefore whatever a man may do, he never merits it, not only because it is already had, but because it is gratuitous. Hence even if some have said that it happens that one merits glory already had, as in the Angels11; nevertheless I do not believe that any who rightly understand have held that it happens that one merits grace already had.

2. To that which is objected, that if something has power for the greater, it has power for the lesser; it must be said that this does not hold true, except when something is ordered to the greater and to the lesser by a like ordering12; but it is not so in the case at hand. For the use of grace is ordered to meriting glory, not to meriting grace, for the reason that it presupposes it as a foundation.

3. To that which is objected, that someone merits for another the first grace; it must be said that it is not alike;

first, because the grace in the just man preceded the grace to be infused into the sinner, whereas the use of grace in the same man has to follow the gratuitous gift itself. Furthermore, when someone merits grace for another, the gift of grace does not on this account lose the character of the gratuitous, since the character of the gratuitous is regarded in the habit of grace in comparison to him to whom it is given. But however much a just man may pray for a sinner, that the habit making [him] pleasing be given to the sinner, it cannot be without the gratuitous liberality of the divine mercy. And therefore it does not follow that, if one can merit for another grace to be had, that he can merit for himself grace already had. — And as to what is said, that one's own faith avails more for each than another's faith, this is understood with respect to the merit of one's own grace.

4. To that which is objected, that thanksgiving is as effective for what is had as prayer for what is to be had; it must be said that even if thanksgiving is as acceptable to God for the past as prayer for the future; nevertheless from this it does not follow that thanksgiving is ordered to meriting what is already had, for the reason that thanksgiving itself and praise for benefits received holds more the character of reward than the character of merit. But if it holds the character of merit, it is ordered, out of divine liberality, rather to meriting the gift13 than to meriting what is already had.

5. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of charity to love, and of grace to merit, it must be said that it is not alike. For merit, of its own character, implies order and relation, but love implies the act of a power not bound to matter; and because the same [thing] does not have to be referred and ordered to itself, but the act of a power not bound to matter has [the power] to reflect upon itself; hence it is that love happens to be loved, but merit does not happen to be merited.

6. And through this the response to that which was objected last is clear. For that [argument] does not have truth in those acts which indeed imply relation and order and together with this some imperfection; but the act of meriting, with respect to the glorious act, bespeaks some imperfection and order and relation, as was shown before14; and therefore that [argument] does not avail.

Scholion

I. This question must be distinguished from the following one, which treats of the increase of grace, whereas this one is about the first grace, not indeed to be acquired (concerning which see below d. 28. a. 2. q. I.), but already had; and it is asked whether through the good use of the same it can afterward fall under merit. In this sense the question is not treated explicitly by others except by Alexander of Hales (Summa p. II. q. 61. m. 5. a. 2. § 2.) and Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 2. a. 2. little-question 2.). — Briefly and in the same sense as our Doctor, St. Thomas (here q. unica a. 5. ad 3; Summa I.–II. q. 114. a. 8. at the end of the corpus) and Blessed Albert (II. Sent. d. 28. a. 2.) respond to it.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 utrum per gratiam contingat mereri ipsum gratiae augmentum.
    The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, reads whether through grace one may merit the very increase of grace.
  2. Cod. T et strenuus, ed. 1 in strenue, Vat. cum edd. 2, 4 et aliquibus codd. et strenue.
    Codex T [reads] et strenuus, edition 1 in strenue, the Vatican edition with editions 2, 4 and some codices et strenue.
  3. Cap. 8. n. 13. Cfr. de Dono persev. c. 22. n. 60. et Enarrat. in Ps. 105, 23. n. 21, de quo vide tom. I. pag. 728, nota 3. — Paulo superius pro efficax cod. F sufficiens.
    Chapter 8, n. 13. Cf. On the Gift of Perseverance c. 22, n. 60, and Commentary on Psalm 105:23, n. 21, concerning which see vol. I, p. 728, note 3. — A little above, for efficax codex F [reads] sufficiens.
  4. Vers. 2. — Glossa, quae a Beda facta est super Luc. 3, 20, apud Strabum et Lyranum sic sonat: Quantum valet apud Deum fides propria, apud quem sic valuit aliena, ut intra et extra sanaret hominem!
    Verse 2. — The Gloss, which was made by Bede on Luke 3:20, in Strabus and Lyranus runs thus: How much one's own faith avails before God, before whom another's so availed that it healed a man within and without!
  5. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 26. m. 5. a. 3, ubi hae quatuor conditiones probantur et explicantur.
    Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. IV. q. 26. m. 5. a. 3, where these four conditions are proved and explained.
  6. Dist. 17. p. I. q. 2. — August., VIII. de Trin. c. 7. n. 10. et c. 8. n. 12.
    Distinction 17, p. I, q. 2. — Augustine, On the Trinity VIII, c. 7, n. 10, and c. 8, n. 12.
  7. Vide supra d. 23. p. I. q. 3. in corp.
    See above, d. 23, p. I, q. 3, in the corpus.
  8. Meritum enim est prius praemio, gratia vero prior usu gratiae. Usus gratiae de se ordinatur ad quid sequens usum gratiae, cuiusmodi est augmentum gratiae et vita aeterna; cfr. infra solut. ad 2. et q. 2. seq. — Aliquanto inferius pro Multo minus nec Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 Multo minus vero.
    For merit is prior to reward, but grace [is] prior to the use of grace. The use of grace of itself is ordered to something following the use of grace, of which kind is the increase of grace and eternal life; cf. below in the solution to 2 and the following q. 2. — Somewhat below, for Multo minus nec the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 [reads] Multo minus vero.
  9. Rom. 11, 6: Si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus; alioquin gratia iam non est gratia.
    Romans 11:6: But if by grace, then [it is] no longer from works; otherwise grace is no longer grace.
  10. Supple cum cod. aa (a secunda manu) aliquis.
    Supply, with codex aa (by a second hand), aliquis [someone].
  11. Huius sententiae fuit Magister. Cfr. supra d. V. c. 6. et ibid. in Comment. a. 3. q. 2. Praepositivus, S. p. II. loquens de meritis Angelorum ait: Sed quaeritur, utrum meruerint ante confirmationem, vel tunc i. e. in confirmatione, vel postea. Magister Petrus Lombardus dicit, quod tantum postea, et supponit exemplum de laborante in vinea; prius enim datur pretium, quam laboret. — Codd. I N V X Z et aliqui alii subiungunt contingit.
    Of this opinion was the Master. Cf. above d. V, c. 6, and ibid. in the Commentary a. 3, q. 2. Prepositinus, Summa p. II, speaking of the merits of the Angels, says: But it is asked whether they merited before [their] confirmation, or then, i.e. in [their] confirmation, or afterward. Master Peter Lombard says that [they merited] only afterward, and supposes the example of the laborer in the vineyard; for the wage is given before he labors. — Codices I N V X Z and some others append contingit.
  12. Cfr. supra d. 21. a. 3. q. I. ad 5.
    Cf. above d. 21, a. 3, q. I, ad 5.
  13. Codd. A F I Y aa voci donum bene praefigunt novum. Subinde post promerendum codd. L O adiungunt habendum.
    Codices A F I Y aa rightly prefix novum [new] to the word donum [gift]. Then, after promerendum, codices L O add habendum.
  14. Hic in corp. et a. 1. q. 3.
    Here in the corpus and a. 1, q. 3. ---
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