Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 27
Quaestio III. Utrum gratia gratum faciens et gloria essentialiter differant.
Tertio quaeritur de gratia in comparatione ad gloriam, et est quaestio, utrum differant per essentiam.
Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Gratia gratum faciens, etsi non sit fides, tamen nunquam est sine fide, quia sine fide impossibile est placere Deo1; gloria autem nullo modo compatitur secum fidem: ergo necesse est, gratiam et gloriam per essentiam differre.
2. Item, gratia gratum faciens se habet ad gloriam, sicut via ad terminum, et sicut id quod est ad finem, ad finem2. Si igitur terminus necessario distinguitur a via, et finis ab eo quod est ad finem, distinctione essentiali; pari ratione videtur, quod gratia et gloria.
3. Item, sicut se habet culpa ad supplicium, ita se habet gratia ad praemium; sed culpa et poena aeterna differunt essentialiter: ergo pari ratione gratia et gloria.
4. Item, corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt per essentiam; sed gratia est corruptibilis et amissibilis, sicut supra3 ostensum fuit, gloria vero omnino est incorruptibilis: ergo etc.
5. Item, quod est cognoscibile ab habente differt per essentiam ab eo quod non est cognoscibile; sed gloria ab omni eo qui habet eam, cognoscitur — nullus enim est gloriosus, qui nesciat, se esse gloriosum — gratia non4: ergo differt per essentiam a gloria.
Sed contra:
1. Sicut se habet caritas viae ad caritatem patriae, sic se habet gratia ad gloriam; sed caritas viae non differt per essentiam a caritate patriae, sicut enim dicitur primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio5, caritas nunquam excidit: ergo pari ratione gratia a gloria.
2. Item, Christus ab instanti suae conceptionis habuit gloriam et habuit gratiam; sed gratia illa, quam habuit, fuit ad cognoscendum et amandum Deum — statim enim cum conceptus fuit, cognovit et amavit cognitione et dilectione6 comprehensionis — igitur in ipso gratia non differebat a gloria.
3. Item, perfectum et imperfectum non variant rem secundum essentiam7; sed gratia dicit assimilationem animae ad Deum secundum statum imperfectionis, gloria vero secundum statum perfectionis: ergo etc.
4. Item, aut gloria reddit acceptum Deo, aut non. Si non: ergo non tantum placet Deo gloria, quantum gratia, ergo nec status patriae, quantum status viae; quod est inconveniens. Si sic: ergo cum iste sit proprius actus gratiae, necesse est, gloriam esse gratiam.
5. Item, quando aliquis de gratia transit ad gloriam, aut perdit gratiam, aut non. Si perdit gratiam: ergo videtur, quod desinat esse gratus Deo, et quod gloria et gratia habeant ad invicem repugnantiam; quorum utrumque falsum est. Si non perdit, cum gratia sit vita animae, sicut ostensum est supra8, et in una anima tantum sit una vita; aut gloria non erit vita, aut gratia et gloria erunt idem per essentiam. Sed constat, quod gloria est vita: ergo etc.
Quaestio est igitur, qualiter se habeat gratia ad gloriam. Si enim sunt idem, qualiter transitur9 ab una ad aliam, et quare sortiuntur diversa nomina? Si vero sunt diversa, ut quid gloria appellatur gratia? Unde est etiam ista diversitas, cum divina gratia omni statui conveniat, sive statui viae sive statui patriae? Utrosque enim Deus acceptat.
Conclusio. Gratia et gloria non secundum essentiam differunt, sed tum secundum status sibi succedentes, tum secundum diversam comparationem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod tam gratia gratum faciens quam gloria nominat divinam influentiam, per quam anima habet Deum, et Deus habitat in anima. Habere autem10 contingit dupliciter: vel perfecte, et sic habet homo Deum in ratione quiescentis; vel semiplene, et sic habet homo Deum in ratione tendentis. Primum, scilicet quies, competit statui patriae; secundum, scilicet tendentia, competit statui viae; et ideo primum est gloriae, secundum est gratiae. Et quia primum est praemii, secundum est meriti; ideo gratiae attribuitur actus merendi, gloriae vero actus regnandi11. Quoniam igitur idem potest esse per essentiam magis perfectum et minus perfectum; hinc est, quod gratia et gloria, secundum quod distinguuntur secundum modum habendi Deum, differunt solum secundum statum. — Et quoniam nos habere Deum non est aliud, quam Deum habitare in nobis; ideo gratia et gloria non solummodo distinguuntur secundum modum habendi Deum, sed etiam secundum rationem habitandi Deum in nobis. Cum tamen dico, Deum habitare in homine, duo ex hoc dico, scilicet divinam dignationem, qua hominem acceptat et sibi confoederat, et per consequens humanam exaltationem, ex qua homo ea quae Dei sunt, excellenter participat. Et ideo illa influentia, per quam Deus in nobis habitat, dicitur esse gratia secundum primam comparationem, videlicet in quantum Deus homini condescendit; et dicitur esse gloria quantum12 ad secundam comparationem, secundum hoc videlicet, quod homo per illam inhabitationem sublimatur et ad magna conscendit. Secundum istam considerationem et secundum istum modum gratia et gloria non differunt nisi sola comparatione. Unde vita aeterna nominatur gloria, et nominatur etiam gratia, ad Romanos sexto13: Gratia autem Dei vita aeterna.
Et sic patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam. Concedendum est enim, quod gratia gratum faciens et gloria non differunt per essentiam: sed si differunt aliquo modo, hoc est secundum comparationem aliam et aliam — et sic simul sunt in eodem, sicut in Beatis et in Christo, qui dicuntur habere gratiam et gloriam — vel secundum statum alium et alium, secundum quod successive eidem insunt, quia primo inest gratia in statu viae, et postmodum gloria in statu patriae. Primo enim gratia inchoatur, et postmodum consummatur14.
Ad argumenta:
1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod gratia simul est cum fide; dicendum, quod hoc est ratione status. Fides enim, quae dicit aenigmaticam visionem, simul potest stare cum gratia secundum statum imperfectionis; non autem potest stare cum gratia secundum statum plenitudinis, qui excludit omne quod est ex parte15. Unde ex illa ratione non potest concludi, quod gratia et gloria differant per essentiam sive secundum habitum, sed solum secundum statum.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia se habet ad gloriam, sicut via ad terminum; dicendum, quod hoc dicitur ratione status et additionis eius quod gloria superaddit gratiae, sicut perfectum additur imperfecto, cum ipsum perducit ad complementum; et quantum ad statum bene concedendum est16, quod diversitas esse potest inter gratiam et gloriam.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut se habet culpa ad supplicium etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia culpa principaliter inest ex parte animae, supplicium vero aliquod ex parte corporis; gratia autem et gloria insunt animae ab eodem et secundum idem et ad idem, videlicet in comparatione ad Deum. — Posset tamen dici, quod aliqua culpa poena est, sicut videbitur infra17, et ita aliqua poena non differt a culpa, et aliqua differt; sic etiam et in gloria. Illa enim, in qua consistit praemium substantiale, eadem est cum gratia; sed gloria, quae consistit in stola corporis, erit ab ea diversa.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod corruptibile et incorruptibile variant essentiam; dicendum, quod illud non habet locum, nisi ubi corruptibilitas et incorruptibilitas venit ex natura principiorum componentium. Hoc autem non est in proposito, quia immutabilitas gloriae venit desursum, corruptibilitas autem gratiae de deorsum, videlicet a liberi arbitrii vertibilitate18.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de cognoscente19, dicendum, quod illud non concludit differentiam secundum essentiam. Sola enim differentia secundum statum potest facere, ut videatur quod prius videri non poterat; sicut aliquis non cognoscit affectionem suam, quando non est intensa, sed quando postmodum intenditur, tunc de facili deprehenditur et cognoscitur. Item, color in tenebris non est visibilis, et in lumine est visibilis, et tamen color non differt essentialiter; sic nec diversitas modi cognoscendi respectu gratiae et gloriae habet eas essentialiter diversificare. — Et sic patet responsio ad omnia quaesita.
I. Verbum gloria in vario sensu accipi potest, sed hoc loco, ut vult Richard. a Med. (II. Sent. d. 29. a. 1. q. 2.), accipitur «pro habitu, cuius est actus ipsa actualis coniunctio creaturae rationalis, vel intellectualis cum Deo per claram visionem et perfectam dilectionem». Communiter docetur a magistris, excepto Durando, quod gratia ad gloriam se habeat, ut semen ad fructum. S. Thom. (S. II. II. q. 24. a. 3. ad 2.) dicit: «Gratia et gloria ad idem genus referuntur, quia gratia nihil est aliud quam quaedam inchoatio gloriae in nobis». — Qui tenent, gratiam non distingui realiter a caritate, dicunt, lumen gloriae a gratia essentialiter distingui, cum secundum ipsos alio modo se habeat gratia ad gloriam, quam caritas viae ad caritatem patriae. Gloria enim praeter perfectam caritatem comprehendit quoddam lumen habituale, quo intellectus elevatur ad Deum videndum, quod lumen differt a lumine fidei (ita Richard. a Med., loc. cit. ad 2.). Praeter Richardum explicite de hac quaestione tractat solus Dionys. Carth., referens verba tantum nostri Doctoris.
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Question III. Whether grace that makes pleasing and glory differ essentially.
Thirdly there is inquiry concerning grace in comparison to glory, and the question is whether they differ by essence.
And that they do so seems to be the case.
1. Grace that makes pleasing, though it is not faith, nevertheless is never without faith, because without faith it is impossible to please God1; but glory in no way coexists with faith: therefore it is necessary that grace and glory differ by essence.
2. Likewise, grace that makes pleasing stands to glory as the way to the terminus, and as that which is ordered to the end to the end2. If, then, the terminus is necessarily distinguished from the way, and the end from that which is ordered to the end, by an essential distinction; by parity of reasoning it seems that grace and glory [are too].
3. Likewise, as fault stands to punishment, so grace stands to reward; but fault and eternal punishment differ essentially: therefore by parity of reasoning grace and glory [do too].
4. Likewise, the corruptible and the incorruptible differ by essence; but grace is corruptible and losable, as was shown above3, whereas glory is altogether incorruptible: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, that which is knowable by the one who has it differs by essence from that which is not knowable; but glory is known by everyone who has it — for no one is glorious who does not know himself to be glorious — grace is not4: therefore it differs by essence from glory.
On the contrary:
1. As the charity of the way stands to the charity of the homeland, so grace stands to glory; but the charity of the way does not differ by essence from the charity of the homeland, for as it is said in the first letter to the Corinthians, chapter thirteen5, charity never falls away: therefore by parity of reasoning grace [does not differ] from glory.
2. Likewise, Christ from the instant of his conception had glory and had grace; but that grace which he had was for knowing and loving God — for as soon as he was conceived, he knew and loved with the knowledge and love6 of comprehension — therefore in him grace did not differ from glory.
3. Likewise, the perfect and the imperfect do not vary a thing according to essence7; but grace bespeaks the assimilation of the soul to God according to the state of imperfection, whereas glory [bespeaks it] according to the state of perfection: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, either glory renders [the soul] acceptable to God, or it does not. If it does not: then glory does not please God as much as grace does, and so neither does the state of the homeland [please him] as much as the state of the way; which is unfitting. If it does: then, since this is the proper act of grace, it is necessary that glory be grace.
5. Likewise, when someone passes from grace to glory, either he loses grace, or he does not. If he loses grace: then it seems that he ceases to be pleasing to God, and that glory and grace have a mutual repugnance; both of which are false. If he does not lose it, since grace is the life of the soul, as was shown above8, and in one soul there is only one life; either glory will not be life, or grace and glory will be the same by essence. But it is established that glory is life: therefore etc.
The question therefore is how grace stands to glory. For if they are the same, how is the passage made9 from the one to the other, and why do they obtain different names? But if they are different, why is glory called grace? And whence too is this diversity, since the divine grace befits every state, whether the state of the way or the state of the homeland? For God accepts both.
Conclusion. Grace and glory do not differ according to essence, but both according to the states that succeed one another, and according to a different comparison.
I respond: It must be said that both grace that makes pleasing and glory name the divine influence by which the soul has God, and God dwells in the soul. Now to have [God] happens in two ways10: either perfectly, and thus a man has God under the character of one at rest; or half-fully, and thus a man has God under the character of one tending toward [him]. The first, namely rest, belongs to the state of the homeland; the second, namely tending, belongs to the state of the way; and therefore the first is of glory, the second is of grace. And because the first is of reward, the second is of merit; therefore to grace is attributed the act of meriting, but to glory the act of reigning11. Since, then, the same thing can be by essence more perfect and less perfect; hence it is that grace and glory, insofar as they are distinguished according to the mode of having God, differ only according to state. — And since our having God is nothing other than God's dwelling in us; therefore grace and glory are distinguished not only according to the mode of having God, but also according to the account of God's dwelling in us. Yet when I say that God dwells in a man, I say two things by this, namely the divine condescension, by which he accepts the man and confederates him to himself, and consequently the human exaltation, by which the man excellently participates in those things which are God's. And therefore that influence by which God dwells in us is called grace according to the first comparison, namely insofar as God condescends to the man; and it is called glory as12 regards the second comparison, namely according to this, that the man is sublimated through that indwelling and ascends to great things. According to this consideration and according to this mode, grace and glory differ only by comparison. Hence eternal life is named glory, and is also named grace, in the letter to the Romans, chapter six13: But the grace of God is eternal life.
And thus the response to the question proposed is clear. For it must be granted that grace that makes pleasing and glory do not differ by essence: but if they differ in any way, this is according to one comparison and another — and thus they are simultaneously in the same [subject], as in the Blessed and in Christ, who are said to have grace and glory — or according to one state and another, insofar as they are present successively in the same [subject], because first grace is present in the state of the way, and afterward glory in the state of the homeland. For first grace is begun, and afterward consummated14.
To the arguments:
1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that grace is simultaneous with faith; it must be said that this is by reason of state. For faith, which bespeaks an enigmatic vision, can stand simultaneously with grace according to the state of imperfection; but it cannot stand with grace according to the state of fullness, which excludes everything that is in part15. Hence from that reasoning it cannot be concluded that grace and glory differ by essence or according to habit, but only according to state.
2. To that which is objected, that grace stands to glory as the way to the terminus; it must be said that this is said by reason of state and of the addition of that which glory superadds to grace, as the perfect is added to the imperfect, when it leads it to completion; and as regards state it is rightly to be granted16 that there can be a diversity between grace and glory.
3. To that which is objected, that as fault stands to punishment etc.; it must be said that it is not similar, because fault is present principally on the part of the soul, whereas punishment [is present] in some part on the part of the body; but grace and glory are present in the soul from the same [source] and according to the same and toward the same, namely in comparison to God. — Yet it could be said that some fault is a punishment, as will be seen below17, and so some punishment does not differ from fault, and some does differ; so too in the case of glory. For that [glory] in which the substantial reward consists is the same as grace; but the glory which consists in the stole of the body will be diverse from it.
4. To that which is objected, that the corruptible and the incorruptible vary essence; it must be said that this does not hold except where corruptibility and incorruptibility come from the nature of the constituent principles. But this is not so in the case at hand, because the immutability of glory comes from above, whereas the corruptibility of grace [comes] from below, namely from the mutability of free choice18.
5. To that which is objected concerning the one who knows19, it must be said that this does not conclude to a difference according to essence. For a difference according to state alone can bring it about that what could not be seen before is seen; just as someone does not know his own affection when it is not intense, but when afterward it is intensified, then it is easily detected and known. Likewise, color in darkness is not visible, and in light it is visible, and yet color does not differ essentially; so neither does the diversity of the mode of knowing with respect to grace and glory have [the power] to make them essentially diverse. — And thus the response to all the points sought is clear.
I. The word glory can be taken in various senses, but in this place, as Richard of Mediavilla holds (II Sent. d. 29, a. 1, q. 2), it is taken «for a habit whose act is the actual conjunction itself of the rational or intellectual creature with God through clear vision and perfect love». It is commonly taught by the masters, except Durandus, that grace stands to glory as seed to fruit. St. Thomas (S. II–II, q. 24, a. 3, ad 2) says: «Grace and glory are referred to the same genus, because grace is nothing other than a certain inchoation of glory in us». — Those who hold that grace is not really distinguished from charity say that the light of glory is essentially distinguished from grace, since according to them grace stands to glory in a different way than the charity of the way stands to the charity of the homeland. For glory, besides perfect charity, comprehends a certain habitual light by which the intellect is elevated to seeing God, which light differs from the light of faith (so Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. ad 2). Besides Richard, only Dionysius the Carthusian treats explicitly of this question, reporting only the words of our Doctor.
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- Hebr. 11, 6. — De propos. seq. vide III. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. 1, ubi ostenditur, quod fides in gloria evacuetur.Hebrews 11:6. — On the following proposition see III Sent. d. 31, a. 2, q. 1, where it is shown that faith is done away with in glory.
- Ex cod. cc et ed. 1 supplevimus ad finem.From codex cc and ed. 1 we have supplied [the words] ad finem (to the end).
- Dist. 26. q. 4. et q. praeced. in corp.Distinction 26, q. 4 and the preceding q. in the body.
- Sicut ostensum est I. Sent. d. 17. p. 1. q. 3.As was shown in I Sent. d. 17, p. 1, q. 3.
- Vers. 8.Verse 8.
- Edd., excepta 1, delectatione.The editions, except the first, [read] delectatione (delight).
- Cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 5. (c. 1.) et XI. Metaph. c. 8. (X. c. 9.), ubi dicit, unumquodque dupliciter secundum quantitatem [quae supponit rei essentiam illamque non mutat] posse inesse, perfecte et imperfecte. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 358, nota 2. in fine.Cf. Aristotle, Physics III, text 5 (c. 1) and Metaphysics XI, c. 8 (X, c. 9), where he says that each thing can be present in two ways according to quantity [which presupposes the essence of the thing and does not change it], perfectly and imperfectly. Cf. also above, p. 358, note 2, at the end.
- Quaest. 1. et d. 26. q. 2.Question 1 and d. 26, q. 2.
- Vat. transit, ed. 3 transeunt; in fine arg. pro utrosque cod. L utrobique, codd. F O utrumque.The Vatican [edition reads] transit, ed. 3 transeunt; at the end of the argument, for utrosque codex L [reads] utrobique, codices F O utrumque.
- Habere autem contingit dupliciter. — Codd. H X Y Z aa bb ee et nonnulli alii addunt Deum."Now to have happens in two ways." — Codices H X Y Z aa bb ee and some others add Deum (God).
- Apoc. 22, 5: Et regnabunt in saecula saeculorum.Revelation 22:5: And they shall reign for ever and ever.
- Codd. C U R S (T a prima manu) adiiciunt ad substantiam.Codices C U R S (T by the first hand) add ad substantiam (to the substance).
- Vers. 23.Verse 23.
- Cfr. supra d. 19. a. 3. q. 2, ubi idem demonstratur de immortalitate in statu innocentiae et gloriae.Cf. above, d. 19, a. 3, q. 2, where the same is demonstrated concerning immortality in the state of innocence and of glory.
- Epist. I. Cor. 13, 10. seqq.: Cum autem venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est… Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem.First letter to the Corinthians 13:10ff.: But when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away… We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face.
- In codd. K ee et nonnullis aliis nec non in ed. 1, mutata interpunctione, sic legitur: ad complementum et quantum ad statum; unde concedendum est.In codices K ee and some others, as well as in ed. 1, with the punctuation changed, it reads thus: ad complementum et quantum ad statum; unde concedendum est (…to completion, and as regards state; whence it must be granted).
- Dist. 36. a. 1. q. 1. — De ratione praeced. cfr. infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 2. seq. — Plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 mox post poena omittunt non et etiam cum cod. bb et aliqua differt, quibus verbis omissis, textus evidenter mutilatur; Vat. verbis et aliqua differt addit et est diversa a culpa.Distinction 36, a. 1, q. 1. — On the preceding reasoning cf. below, d. 41, a. 2, q. 2 and following. — Very many codices, together with editions 1, 2, 3, omit non immediately after poena, and also, with codex bb, omit et aliqua differt (and some differs); with these words omitted the text is evidently mutilated; the Vatican [edition] adds to the words et aliqua differt the words et est diversa a culpa (and is diverse from fault).
- Cfr. supra d. 26. q. 5.Cf. above, d. 26, q. 5.
- Cod. K cognitione; Vat. cognoscibilitate. Aliquanto inferius post Item cod. P interserit sicut.Codex K [reads] cognitione; the Vatican [edition] cognoscibilitate. Somewhat below, after Item, codex P inserts sicut.