Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 1
Quaestio III. De Sacramentorum continentia.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum Sacramenta sint gratiae contentiva. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Super illud Psalmi1: Posuit tenebras latibulum; Glossa: «Latuit Divinitas in carne, remissio peccatorum in baptismo»; sed Divinitas erat in carne secundum veritatem: ergo et remissio peccatorum in baptismo. Sed illa est per gratiam: ergo gratia est in baptismo.
2. Item, Hugo in parte nona2 aperte dicit, quod quinque concurrunt ad sanandum hominem, scilicet «Deus medicus, homo aegrotus, sacerdos minister vel nuntius, gratia antidotum»; et ultimo dicit, quod «vas est Sacramentum», et subiungit: «Quare? quia continet gratiam, sicut vas servat medicinam».
3. Item, idem Hugo3 in definitione Sacramenti aperte dicit, quod Sacramentum «ex sanctificatione continet aliquam invisibilem et spiritualem gratiam»: ergo gratia est in Sacramento sicut in continente.
4. Item, idem ratione videtur, quia in Sacramento altaris corpus Christi verum, quod signatur, non solum ibi est tanquam in signo, sed secundum veritatem continetur ibi; alioquin non differret a sacrificiis veteris legis4: ergo similiter, si baptismus est Sacramentum novae legis, non solum est ibi gratia tanquam in signo, sed etiam ibi essentialiter continetur.
5. Item, si dicas, quod illud non conveniret, quia gratia est accidens5 et debet esse perfectio creaturae nobilissimae, scilicet rationalis, et ita non debet contineri in creatura irrationali; contra: nobilior est divina essentia, quam sit gratia, quae procedit ab ipsa; sed creatura non rationalis est capax divinae essentiae: ergo multo fortius gratiae.
6. Item, accidens, quod non habet ortum a principiis subiecti, non determinat sibi materiam; sed gratia est huiusmodi: ergo non determinat sibi materiam: ergo potest esse in qualibet creatura: ergo etc.
7. Item, in Sacramento altaris videmus, quod sunt accidentia materialia, sed tamen virtute Sacramenti suspenduntur a materia, ita quod non sunt in aliquo subiecto6: ergo cum gratia sit multo spiritualior, videtur, quod magis sit apta, ut sit in aliis Sacramentis secundum essentiam et veritatem, non tamen ut in subiecto: ergo videtur, quod sit ponendum, quod gratia sit in Sacramento sicut in continente.
Contra: 1. Gratia est media inter naturam et gloriam: ergo nihil est capax gratiae, quod non est capax gloriae, cum ipsa sit tanquam ultima dispositio7; sed nullum Sacramentum est capax gloriae: ergo nec gratiae.
2. Item, si gratia esset prius in Sacramento; cum accidentia non mutent subiectum8, nunquam illa gratia transiret ad animam: ergo frustra esset; sed hoc non est ponendum, ergo nec primum.
3. Item, gratia, cum sit perfectio animae et perfectio, quae est accidens, dependet ab anima multo magis, quam anima a corpore; sed anima nunquam creatur nisi in corpore, sed simul creatur et est cum corpore9: ergo multo fortius gratia simul creatur et est in anima: ergo non est in Sacramento.
4. Item, si gratia est in Sacramento tanquam in vase continente; hoc constat, quod non est ob aliud, nisi ut a Sacramento transfundatur in ipsam animam: ergo si non transfunditur, frustra est ibi. Sed possibile est, quod aliquis ficte accedat ad Sacramentum; tunc constat, quod gratia non transfunditur10: ergo frustra fuit gratia in hoc Sacramento.
5. Item, gratia immediate reducit et reformat ad Deum animam: ergo a Deo exit immediate fluente in ipsam animam11: non ergo transfunditur, mediante alio vase.
Conclusio.
Sacramenta continent gratiam, quia eam significant et non indispositis conferunt, non tamen ita, quod ea essentialiter sit in ipsis.
Respondeo: Intelligendum est ad hoc secundum quosdam, quod ipsa Sacramenta sunt vasa gratiae, cum sint in ultima dispositione, quae est sanctificatio per verbum, et mediantibus illis transfunditur in ipsam animam12, et in ipsam animam transfusa abluit sive ungit interius, sicut in signo visibili significatur exterius. Et pro tanto dicunt, quod Sacramenta novae legis sunt causa gratiae et efficiunt quod figurant.
Sed tamen, sicut ostensum est per plures rationes, non est aliquo modo dicendum, quod gratia contineatur essentialiter in ipsis Sacramentis, tanquam aqua in vase, vel medicina in pyxide; immo hoc intelligere est erroneum. Sed dicuntur continere gratiam, quia ipsam significant13, et quia semper, nisi ibi sit defectus ex parte suscipientis, confertur in ipsis gratia, ita intelligendo, quod gratia sit in anima, non in signis visibilibus. — Pro tanto etiam dicuntur vasa gratiae. Possunt etiam dici vasa alia ratione: quia, sicut quod est in vase non est de ipso nec ex ipso, sed tamen cum ipso hauritur; sic gratia non est a Sacramentis nec de Sacramentis, sed oritur a fonte aeterno et ab illo hauritur ab ipsa anima in ipsis Sacramentis14. Et sicut quis recurrit ad vas, cum requirit liquorem; sic quaerenti liquorem gratiae et non habenti recurrendum est ad ipsa Sacramenta. Et ita patet responsio ad illa duo verba Hugonis.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod latet remissio peccatorum in baptismo; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur de latentia signati in signo, quod quidem habet ulteriorem rationem quam rationem significandi, non tamen essentialiter continendi in se, sed quia ipsum quod significat, continetur in anima15.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Sacramento altaris, dicendum, quod Deus posset similiter facere, si vellet; sed tamen non ita congruit hic, sicut ibi, quia in illo Sacramento est transsubstantiatio16. Unde illud quod significatur ibi, vere est substantia, quam congruit esse per se, congruit etiam illis speciebus velari ad nostram utilitatem; sed gratiam non sic congruit esse per se, cum non sit substantia; nec contineri in illis Sacramentis corporalibus, cum de sui natura sit creata, ut sit in multo nobiliori17. Quia ergo potentia non derogat sapientiae et ordinationi, ideo, quamvis Deus possit facere, non tamen facit; nec est simile, sicut monstratum est. — Si ergo obiicias, quod non differt a Sacramentis veteris legis, quia ibi erat tanquam in signo; dicendum, quod illud signum habet aliquam rationem causandi, sicut postea18 patebit, non tamen habet rationem continendi materialiter.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod divina essentia est in qualibet creatura, ergo gratia potest esse; dicendum, quod non est simile nec locus a minori19; et ratio est, quia esse per gratiam inhabitantem praesupponit esse per essentiam et addit ad illud multo maiorem nobilitatem a parte eius quod recipit; et ideo est consequens in illo argumento. Bene enim concluderet, si esse per gratiam non includeret in se esse per essentiam; sed includit, sicut bene esse includit esse.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia non determinat sibi subiectum, quia non habet in illo causam; dicendum, quod etsi non habet causam, habet tamen occasionem, quia anima creata est, ut gratia perficiatur, et ad hoc est habilis de sui natura; non sic aliae creaturae irrationales.
7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in Sacramento altaris manent accidentia sine subiecto, ergo similiter in aliis Sacramentis gratia; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia ibi manent accidentia et propter nostri sensus infirmitatem et propter fidei utilitatem20. Sed si gratia illa esset in Sacramentis, nulla esset utilitas propter hoc, quia Deus semper est praesens, ut det gratiam digne accedenti; immo esset ibi deordinatio, et derogaretur iam ipsi gratiae; quod non debet fieri divino miraculo, quia ipsa gratia nata est perficere animam et in ea esse.
I. Ad 3. et 4. quaestionem praenotanda sunt verba Eugenii IV. in Decreto pro Armenis: «(Sacramenta novae legis) multum a Sacramentis differunt antiquae legis. Illa enim non causabant gratiam, sed eam solum per passionem Christi dandam esse figurabant, haec vero nostra et continent gratiam et ipsam digne suscipientibus conferunt». Item, Concilium Tridentinum (Sess. VII. can. 6.) decrevit: «Si quis dixerit, Sacramenta novae legis non continere gratiam, quam significant, aut gratiam ipsam non ponentibus obicem non conferre, quasi signa tantum externa sint acceptae per fidem gratiae vel iustitiae et notae quaedam christianae professionis, quibus apud homines discernuntur fideles ab infidelibus, a. s.» Omnes Catholici hoc tenent, et quod Sacramenta non habeant nisi causalitatem instrumentalem. Tamen in modo hoc explicandi, quae est quaestio pure speculativa, a tempore Hugonis a S. Victore et Gulielmi episc. Parisiensis usque huc doctores viam rationemque diversam inierunt, ut hic et accuratius a S. Bonav. explicatur. S. Thom. defendit sententiam profundam et mysticam, quae tribuit Sacramentis novae legis efficaciam physicam, ut nunc dicunt, quemadmodum etiam circa humanitatem Christi eadem principia tenet (cfr. III. Sent. d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. scholion). Discipuli igitur eiusdem communiter docent, Sacramenta novae legis concurrere ad causandam gratiam aliosque effectus sacramentales tanquam divinae virtutis instrumenta physice influentia, non tantum moraliter. Pro influentia vero tantum morali (ut non satis apte dicitur) stat Scotus (hic q. 4. 3.) cum suis et non paucis aliis. Hi asserunt, a solo Deo immediate produci gratiam et characterem imprimi, quin aliqua virtus supernaturalis ipsi instrumento sacramentali communicetur; a Deo tamen quodam pacto institutum esse tale signum sacramentale, quo applicato, ipse faciat effectus omnes in anima.
II. Ut disputatio S. Bonaventurae melius intelligatur, etiam observandum est, quod antequam Summa S. Thomae scripta esset, status quaestionis aliquatenus diversus erat a posteriore. Nunc enim principaliter quaeritur de concursu Sacramenti effectivo (licet per modum instrumenti tantum) ad ipsius gratiae infusionem; sed tunc temporis potius supponebatur fere ab omnibus, nullam virtutem instrumentalem directe et immediate posse pertingere ad tam sublimem effectum. Quaerebatur igitur potius de causalitate Sacramentorum respectu inferiorum effectuum receptorum in anima, scilicet de ornatu ipsius, ut dicebant, sive de charactere et dispositione ad gratiam. Ita statum quaestionis accipiunt Alex. Hal., S. Thom. in Commentario, Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Durandus et ipse Bonaventura. Hinc est, quod ab auctore nostro tribus distinctis quaestionibus inquiritur: 1. utrum Sacramenta sint gratiae effectiva; et pro affirmativa resp. huius quaestionis, si agitur de causalitate proprie dicta sive efficiente, in corp. neminem affert; 2. utrum sint causae disponentes scilicet ad gratiam; 3. generatim, utrum habeant aliquam virtutem influentem in ipsam animam. Ad secundam et tertiam quaestionem Alex. Hal. (S. p. IV. q. 5. m. 3. a. 5.) et S. Thom. in Comment. respondebant affirmative, non vero ita ad primam. In praedicto enim Commentario S. Thom. perfecte convenit cum Alexandro, licet hic a scriptoribus communissime citetur tanquam S. Thomae in hac re contrarius.
III. Audiamus igitur utrumque. Alex. (loc. cit. § 1.) dicit de virtute instrumentali Sacramentorum: «Sine praeiudicio melioris sententiae opinando dico, nihil asserendo, quod Sacramenta sunt causae alicuius effectus in anima, non dico solum disponendo, sed efficiendo; efficiunt enim simpliciter characterizando et ornando. Unde dico, quod singula Sacramenta aliquo modo ornant animam, vel imprimendo characterem, vel alio modo signando». Pluribus deinde rationibus declarare nititur, quomodo agenti corporali communicari possit talis mirabilis virtus spiritualis. Idem tamen quoad infusionem ipsius gratiae (ibid. § 2.) dicit: «Solus Deus gratiam operatur et animae infundit; sed Sacramenta novae legis disponunt ipsum susceptibile, efficiendo aptiorem ad gratiae susceptionem et faciunt, quod gratia efficax sit». Multa pro explicatione et probatione huius sententiae idem affert in hac § et § 3-6. Principalia haec argumenta quasi in compendium redacta S. Bonav. exhibet in adiunctis duabus quaestionibus lateralibus cum solutionibus. Unde patet, quod S. Bonav. sub nomine magnorum, qui primam opinionem defendunt, praecipue intelligat magistrum suum Alexandrum. Cum autem ab eo recedere visus sit, in fine tertii libri iterum opinionem suam melius explicavit, seque minime praedictam opinionem reprobare ostendit; quemadmodum etiam respectu quarundam propositionum I. libri fecit in praelocutione ad II. librum. S. Thomas in Commentario (hic q. 1. a. 4.) approbat doctrinam Alexandri, docens, quod Sacramenta, quatenus sunt «instrumenta divinae misericordiae iustificantis, pertingunt quidem instrumentaliter ad aliquem effectum in ipsa anima, qui primo respondet Sacramentis, sicut est character, vel aliquid huiusmodi [quod superius ipse vocat ornatum animae]. Ad ultimum autem effectum, qui est gratia, non pertingunt etiam instrumentaliter nisi dispositive in quantum hoc, ad quod instrumentaliter effective pertingunt, est dispositio, quae est necessitas, quantum est in se, ad gratiae susceptionem». Aliter tamen idem loquitur in Summa (III. q. 62. a. 1. 2. 3.), ubi disertis verbis docet, Sacramenta novae legis ut instrumenta divinae virtutis causare etiam gratiam. Haec extensio iactis principiis magis convenit quam illa restrictio facta ab Alexandro. Eandem sententiam Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 4.) censet esse probabiliorem; quod etiam tenet Petr. a Tar. respectu sententiae, quam S. Thom. ponit in Commentario, dum Richard. a Med. (hic a. 4. q. 2.) eandem sententiam Scoti simili probabilitate gaudere iudicat.
IV. Opinioni secundae praeter Scotum et Durandum (hic q. 4.) favet etiam Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 4. q. 37.), aliis tamen verbis usus. Docet enim, quod Sacramenta sint «causa gratiae instrumentaliter, non quia aliquid agunt in producendo gratiam plus quam Sacramenta veteris legis, sed quia Deus, ut existens in ipsis, ad tactum eorum circa illos quibus administrantur, confert gratiam creando eam in ipsis... Et similiter sunt vasa gratiae, in quantum continent eum qui est fons et origo, a quo manat gratia, ut est in eis». — Ab his verbis parum recedit S. Bonav. in Breviloquio (p. VI. c. 1, sicut hic q. 3. in fine responsionis) dicens, quod «in illis et per illa gratiam curationis a summo medico Christo ex divino decreto oportet hauriri, licet Deus non alligaverit suam gratiam Sacramentis». Quomodo autem hanc sententiam ita temperaverit in III. Sent. d. 40. dub. 3, ut non contradicat alteri sententiae, sed ei campum reservet liberum, iam notatum est in scholio ultimo eiusdem III. libri. Quod autem virtus efficaciter Sacramentis annexa non sit qualitas absoluta, sed relativa, repetit noster auctor infra q. 5, d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2, d. 10. p. II. a. 1. q. 3; II. Sent. d. 19. dub. 4.
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Question III. On the containing power of the Sacraments.
In the third place inquiry is made whether the Sacraments are containers of grace. And that they are is shown as follows.
1. Upon that text of the Psalm1: He made darkness His hiding-place; the Gloss: "The Divinity lay hidden in the flesh, the remission of sins in baptism"; but the Divinity was in the flesh according to truth: therefore also the remission of sins in baptism. But that remission is through grace: therefore grace is in baptism.
2. Likewise, Hugh in the ninth part2 openly says that five things concur to heal a man, namely "God the physician, man the sick one, the priest as minister or messenger, grace as the antidote"; and lastly he says that "the Sacrament is a vessel," and he adds: "Why? because it contains grace, as a vessel keeps medicine."
3. Likewise, the same Hugh3 in the definition of a Sacrament openly says that a Sacrament "from sanctification contains some invisible and spiritual grace": therefore grace is in a Sacrament as in a container.
4. Likewise, the same seems true by reason, because in the Sacrament of the altar the true body of Christ, which is signified, is not only there as in a sign, but according to truth is contained there; otherwise it would not differ from the sacrifices of the old Law4: therefore likewise, if baptism is a Sacrament of the new Law, grace is not only there as in a sign, but is also essentially contained there.
5. Likewise, if you should say that this would not be fitting, because grace is an accident5 and ought to be the perfection of the noblest creature, namely the rational one, and so ought not to be contained in an irrational creature; on the contrary: the divine essence is nobler than grace, which proceeds from it; but the non-rational creature is capable of the divine essence: therefore much more so of grace.
6. Likewise, an accident that does not have its origin from the principles of the subject does not determine matter for itself; but grace is of this kind: therefore it does not determine matter for itself: therefore it can be in any creature whatever: therefore etc.
7. Likewise, in the Sacrament of the altar we see that there are material accidents, but nevertheless by the power of the Sacrament they are suspended from matter, so that they are not in any subject6: therefore since grace is much more spiritual, it seems that it is the more apt to be in the other Sacraments according to essence and truth, yet not as in a subject: therefore it seems that it must be posited that grace is in a Sacrament as in a container.
On the contrary: 1. Grace is a mean between nature and glory: therefore nothing is capable of grace which is not capable of glory, since grace itself is as it were the ultimate disposition7; but no Sacrament is capable of glory: therefore neither of grace.
2. Likewise, if grace were prior in the Sacrament; since accidents do not change their subject8, that grace would never pass over to the soul: therefore it would be in vain; but this is not to be posited, therefore neither the former.
3. Likewise, grace, since it is a perfection of the soul and a perfection that is an accident, depends upon the soul much more than the soul upon the body; but the soul is never created except in the body, but is created simultaneously and exists together with the body9: therefore much more so is grace created simultaneously and exists in the soul: therefore it is not in the Sacrament.
4. Likewise, if grace is in the Sacrament as in a containing vessel; this is established, that it is for no other reason than that it be poured over from the Sacrament into the soul itself: therefore if it is not poured over, it is in vain there. But it is possible that someone approach the Sacrament feignedly; then it is established that the grace is not poured over10: therefore the grace was in vain in this Sacrament.
5. Likewise, grace immediately leads back and reforms the soul to God: therefore it goes forth from God immediately flowing into the soul itself11: therefore it is not poured over by means of another vessel.
Conclusion.
The Sacraments contain grace, because they signify it and confer it on those who are not ill-disposed, yet not in such a way that it is essentially in them.
I respond: It must be understood with respect to this, according to some, that the Sacraments themselves are vessels of grace, since they are in the ultimate disposition, which is sanctification through the word, and through their mediation it is poured over into the soul itself12, and once poured into the soul it washes or anoints inwardly, as is signified outwardly in the visible sign. And so far do they say that the Sacraments of the new Law are the cause of grace and effect what they figure.
Yet nevertheless, as has been shown by several reasons, it is in no way to be said that grace is contained essentially in the Sacraments themselves, as water in a vessel, or medicine in a pyxis; indeed to understand it thus is erroneous. But they are said to contain grace, because they signify it13, and because always, unless there be a defect on the part of the recipient, grace is conferred in them, understanding it thus, that grace is in the soul, not in the visible signs. — And so far also are they called vessels of grace. They can also be called vessels for another reason: that, just as what is in a vessel is not of it nor from it, but nevertheless is drawn with it; so grace is not from the Sacraments nor of the Sacraments, but arises from the eternal fount and from it is drawn by the soul itself in the Sacraments14. And just as one has recourse to a vessel when he requires liquid; so to one who seeks the liquid of grace and does not have it, recourse must be had to the Sacraments themselves. And thus is evident the response to those two sayings of Hugh.
1. To that which is objected, that the remission of sins lies hidden in baptism; it must be said that this is understood of the hiddenness of the thing signified in the sign, which indeed has a further account than the account of signifying, yet not of essentially containing in itself, but because that which it signifies is contained in the soul15.
4. To that which is objected concerning the Sacrament of the altar, it must be said that God could do likewise, if He willed; but nevertheless it is not so fitting here as there, because in that Sacrament there is transubstantiation16. Hence that which is signified there is truly a substance, which it is fitting should exist of itself, and fitting also that it be veiled under those species for our benefit; but grace it is not so fitting should exist of itself, since it is not a substance; nor that it be contained in those corporeal Sacraments, since by its nature it is created to be in something much nobler17. Since therefore power does not derogate from wisdom and ordination, therefore, although God could do it, nevertheless He does not; nor is it similar, as has been shown. — If therefore you object that it does not differ from the Sacraments of the old Law, because there [the thing] was as in a sign; it must be said that that sign has some account of causing, as will afterward18 be evident, yet it does not have the account of containing materially.
5. To that which is objected, that the divine essence is in any creature whatever, therefore grace can be; it must be said that it is not similar nor is it an argument from the lesser19; and the reason is that to be through indwelling grace presupposes to be through essence and adds to it a much greater nobility on the part of that which receives; and therefore it is a consequent in that argument. For it would indeed conclude rightly, if to be through grace did not include in itself to be through essence; but it does include it, just as to be well includes to be.
6. To that which is objected, that grace does not determine a subject for itself, because it does not have a cause in it; it must be said that although it does not have a cause, it nevertheless has an occasion, because the soul is created in order that grace might perfect it, and for this it is apt by its nature; not so the other irrational creatures.
7. To that which is objected, that in the Sacrament of the altar accidents remain without a subject, therefore likewise in the other Sacraments grace [remains]; it must be said that it is not similar: because there the accidents remain both on account of the weakness of our sense and on account of the benefit of faith20. But if that grace were in the Sacraments, there would be no benefit on this account, because God is always present, to give grace to one who approaches worthily; indeed there would be a disorder there, and derogation would already be done to grace itself; which ought not to be done by a divine miracle, since grace itself is by nature fitted to perfect the soul and to be in it.
I. For the third and fourth questions are to be premised the words of Eugene IV in the Decree for the Armenians: "(The Sacraments of the new Law) differ much from the Sacraments of the ancient Law. For those did not cause grace, but only figured that it was to be given through the Passion of Christ, whereas these our own both contain grace and confer it upon those who worthily receive it." Likewise, the Council of Trent (Sess. VII, can. 6) decreed: "If anyone shall say that the Sacraments of the new Law do not contain the grace which they signify, or do not confer that grace upon those who place no obstacle, as though they were only external signs of grace or justice received through faith and certain marks of Christian profession, by which the faithful are distinguished from the unbelievers among men: let him be anathema." All Catholics hold this, and that the Sacraments have only an instrumental causality. Yet in the manner of explaining this, which is a purely speculative question, from the time of Hugh of St. Victor and William bishop of Paris up to now the doctors have entered upon a diverse way and reasoning, as is here and more accurately explained by St. Bonaventure. St. Thomas defends a profound and mystical opinion, which attributes to the Sacraments of the new Law a physical efficacy, as they now say, just as he holds the same principles concerning the humanity of Christ (cf. III Sent., d. 19, a. 1, q. 1, scholion). His disciples therefore commonly teach that the Sacraments of the new Law concur in causing grace and the other sacramental effects as instruments of the divine power physically influencing, not only morally. But for an influence that is only moral (as it is not very aptly said) stands Scotus (here q. 4. 3.) with his followers and not a few others. These assert that by God alone is grace immediately produced and the character imprinted, without any supernatural power being communicated to the sacramental instrument itself; yet by God by a certain pact such a sacramental sign has been instituted, so that, once it is applied, He Himself works all the effects in the soul.
II. That the disputation of St. Bonaventure may be better understood, it must also be observed that before the Summa of St. Thomas was written, the state of the question was somewhat different from the later one. For now it is principally asked concerning the effective concurrence of the Sacrament (although only by way of an instrument) toward the infusion of grace itself; but at that time it was rather supposed by nearly all that no instrumental power could directly and immediately attain so sublime an effect. The question therefore was rather about the causality of the Sacraments with respect to the inferior effects received in the soul, namely about its adornment, as they said, or about the character and the disposition toward grace. Thus do Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas in the Commentary, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, Durandus, and Bonaventure himself take up the state of the question. Hence it is that by our author inquiry is made in three distinct questions: 1. whether the Sacraments are effective of grace; and for the affirmative answer to this question, if it concerns causality properly so called or efficient, he brings forward no one in the body; 2. whether they are disposing causes, namely toward grace; 3. generally, whether they have any power influencing the soul itself. To the second and third question Alexander of Hales (S. p. IV, q. 5, m. 3, a. 5) and St. Thomas in the Commentary answered affirmatively, but not so to the first. For in the aforesaid Commentary St. Thomas perfectly agrees with Alexander, although here he is most commonly cited by writers as contrary to St. Thomas in this matter.
III. Let us hear, therefore, both. Alexander (loc. cit. § 1) says of the instrumental power of the Sacraments: "Without prejudice to a better opinion, opining I say, asserting nothing, that the Sacraments are causes of some effect in the soul — I do not say only by disposing, but by effecting; for they effect simply by characterizing and adorning. Hence I say that the individual Sacraments adorn the soul in some way, whether by imprinting a character, or by signing in another way." Then by many reasons he strives to declare how such a marvelous spiritual power can be communicated to a corporeal agent. Yet the same, as to the infusion of grace itself (ibid. § 2), says: "God alone works grace and infuses it into the soul; but the Sacraments of the new Law dispose the receptive thing itself, by making it more apt for the reception of grace, and they bring it about that grace is efficacious." Many things in explanation and proof of this opinion the same author brings forward in this § and §§ 3-6. These principal arguments, reduced as it were into a compendium, St. Bonaventure sets forth in the two adjoined lateral questions with their solutions. Hence it is evident that St. Bonaventure under the name of the great ones, who defend the first opinion, understands principally his master Alexander. But since he seemed to depart from him, at the end of the third book he again explained his opinion better, and showed that he by no means rejected the aforesaid opinion; just as he did also with respect to certain propositions of the first book in the prologue to the second book. St. Thomas in the Commentary (here q. 1, a. 4) approves the doctrine of Alexander, teaching that the Sacraments, insofar as they are "instruments of the justifying divine mercy, do indeed attain instrumentally to some effect in the soul itself, which first corresponds to the Sacraments, such as the character, or something of this kind [which above he himself calls the adornment of the soul]. But to the ultimate effect, which is grace, they do not attain even instrumentally except dispositively, inasmuch as that to which they attain instrumentally and effectively is a disposition, which is a necessity, so far as it is in itself, for the reception of grace." Yet the same speaks otherwise in the Summa (III, q. 62, a. 1, 2, 3), where in express words he teaches that the Sacraments of the new Law as instruments of the divine power cause grace also. This extension better agrees with the principles laid down than that restriction made by Alexander. The same opinion Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 4) judges to be more probable; which also Peter of Tarentaise holds with respect to the opinion which St. Thomas sets down in the Commentary, while Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 4, q. 2) judges that opinion of Scotus to enjoy a like probability.
IV. The second opinion, besides Scotus and Durandus (here q. 4), is favored also by Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 4, q. 37), though he uses other words. For he teaches that the Sacraments are "a cause of grace instrumentally, not because they do anything in producing grace more than the Sacraments of the old Law, but because God, as existing in them, at the touch of them, with regard to those to whom they are administered, confers grace by creating it in them... And likewise they are vessels of grace, inasmuch as they contain Him who is the fount and origin, from whom grace flows, as it is in them." — From these words St. Bonaventure departs little in the Breviloquium (p. VI, c. 1, as here in q. 3, at the end of the response), saying that "in them and through them the grace of healing must be drawn from the supreme physician Christ by the divine decree, although God has not bound His grace to the Sacraments." But how he so tempered this opinion in III Sent., d. 40, dub. 3, that it does not contradict the other opinion, but reserves free ground for it, has already been noted in the last scholion of the same third book. But that the power efficaciously annexed to the Sacraments is not an absolute quality, but a relative one, our author repeats below at q. 5, d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, d. 10, p. II, a. 1, q. 3; II Sent., d. 19, dub. 4.
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- 1Psalm. 17, 12. — Glossa, quam exhibet Petr. Lombard. in hunc locum, expositioni August. (latibulum i. e. occultam spem in corde credentium vel obscuritatem Sacramentorum) tanquam ratio additur: Latuit enim Divinitas etc.Psalm 17:12. — The Gloss, which Peter Lombard gives on this passage, is added to the exposition of Augustine (hiding-place, i.e. the hidden hope in the heart of believers, or the obscurity of the Sacraments) as a reason: "For the Divinity lay hidden," etc.
- 2Libr. I. de Sacram. c. 4: Postremo quinque discreta et distincta ab invicem ad cognitionem procedunt: Deus medicus... gratia antidotum, vas Sacramentum. Medicus donat, minister dispensat, vas servat quae sanat percipientem aegrotum gratiam spiritualem. — Edd. perperam septem pro quinque. In ipso testimonio plurimi codd., omisso sacerdos minister vel nuntius, post antidotum ponunt etc.; pro quo cod. F sacerdos minister.On the Sacraments, Book I, c. 4: "Lastly, five things, discrete and distinct from one another, proceed to knowledge: God the physician... grace the antidote, the Sacrament the vessel. The physician bestows, the minister dispenses, the vessel keeps the spiritual grace which heals the receiving sick one." — The editions wrongly read seven for five. In the testimony itself most codices, omitting the priest as minister or messenger, place after antidote the word etc.; for quo codex F reads the priest as minister.
- 3Lib. I. de Sacram. p. IX. c. 2.; vide supra pag. 13, nota 2. — Pro in definitione permulti codd. in distinctione.On the Sacraments, Book I, p. IX, c. 2; see above, p. 13, note 2. — For in the definition very many codices [read] in the distinction.
- 4Cfr. infra d. 10. p. I. q. 1. — Superius pro ratione, quod multi codd. omittunt, codd. F H I (V a secunda manu) per rationem.Cf. below, d. 10, p. I, q. 1. — Above, for by reason, which many codices omit, codices F H I (V by a second hand) [read] through reason.
- 5Ut monstratum est II. Sent. d. 26. q. 3, ubi etiam seq. arg. insinuatur. — Inferius post irrationali cod. Z addit sed rationali, et subinde post divinae essentiae subiungit scilicet in eucharistia.As was shown in II Sent., d. 26, q. 3, where the following argument also is intimated. — Below, after irrational codex Z adds but rational, and accordingly after the divine essence adjoins namely in the Eucharist.
- 6Quaere infra d. 12. p. I. q. 1 seqq.Inquire below, d. 12, p. I, q. 1 and following.
- 7Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. — Pro non est cod. G non sit.Cf. II Sent., d. 27, a. 1, q. 3. — For non est codex G [reads] non sit.
- 8Vide verba Boeth. tom. I. pag. 462, nota 11. allata.See the words of Boethius cited in tom. I, p. 462, note 11.
- 9Ut probatum est II. Sent. d. 18. a. 2. q. 2. — Inferius pro in anima cod. F cum anima.As was proved in II Sent., d. 18, a. 2, q. 2. — Below, for in the soul codex F [reads] with the soul.
- 10Cfr. infra d. 1. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. seq.Cf. below, d. 1, p. I, a. 2, q. 2 and following.
- 11Psalm. 83, 12: Gratiam et gloriam dabit Dominus. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 888, nota 3. — Inferius pro alio vase codd. E H aliquo vase.Psalm 83:12: "The Lord will give grace and glory." Cf. tom. III, p. 888, note 3. — Below, for another vessel codices E H [read] some vessel.
- 12Vat. supplet gratia. Mox post et in ipsam plures codd. non repetunt animam, codd. A E aa (I primitus, K a secunda manu) cum ed. 1 et in ipsa anima.The Vatican edition supplies grace. Soon after et in ipsam several codices do not repeat animam; codices A E aa (I originally, K by a second hand) with ed. 1 [read] et in ipsa anima.
- 13Cod. Z significant et efficiunt et hoc semper. Subinde codd. F G H L Z aa bb omittunt ibi. Aliquanto inferius pro tanto etiam codd. F H I V tanto ergo.Codex Z [reads] they signify and effect, and this always. Accordingly codices F G H L Z aa bb omit ibi. Somewhat below, for tanto etiam codices F H I V [read] tanto ergo.
- 14Hug. a S. Vict., I. de Sacram. p. IX. c. 4: Si ergo vasa sunt spiritualis gratiae Sacramenta, non ex suo sanant, quia vasa aegrotum non curant, sed medicina. Non ergo ad hoc instituta sunt Sacramenta, ut ex eis esset quod in eis esset; sed ut peritiam suam medicus ostenderet, in illo remedium praeparavit, a quo languidus occasionem morbi accepit. — Superius posuimus auctoritate codd. A E G I et ed. 1 sed tamen cum ipso; codd. F K L V W sed tamen ipso, alii sed tamen ab ipso, cod. H sed de ipso. Subinde pro a fonte codd. G II de fonte.Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments, Book I, p. IX, c. 4: "If therefore the Sacraments are vessels of spiritual grace, they do not heal from their own [power], because vessels do not cure the sick man, but the medicine does. The Sacraments were therefore not instituted so that what was in them should be from them; but, that the physician might display his skill, he prepared a remedy in that [thing] from which the sick man took the occasion of his disease." — Above we have placed, on the authority of codices A E G I and ed. 1, yet drawn with it; codices F K L V W [read] yet with it, others yet from it, codex H but of it. Accordingly for from the fount codices G II [read] of the fount.
- 15Vide infra d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.See below, d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2.
- 16Quaere infra d. 11. p. I. q. 1. seqq.Inquire below, d. 11, p. I, q. 1 and following.
- 17Codd. G I Y (K a secunda manu) supplent subiecto, cod. Z loco.Codices G I Y (K by a second hand) supply subject, codex Z [reads] place.
- 18Quaest. seq. — Superius pro non differt cod. F non differret.The following question. — Above, for does not differ codex F [reads] would not differ.
- 19De quo vide tom. I. pag. 835, nota 5, et de fallacia secundum consequens cfr. ibidem pag. 691, nota 5. — Inferius pro ad illud, quod exhibent codd. F H, alii ad illum, edd. ad illa. Subinde pro quod recipit codd. F I qui recipit (cod. F recipit).Concerning which see tom. I, p. 835, note 5, and concerning the fallacy of the consequent cf. the same place, p. 691, note 5. — Below, for to that, which codices F H give, others [read] to him, the editions to those things. Accordingly for which receives codices F I [read] who receives (codex F recipit).
- 20Vide infra d. 12. p. I. a. 1. q. 2.See below, d. 12, p. I, a. 1, q. 2.