Dist. 31, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 31
Articulus II. De duratione caritatis per comparationem ad habitus aliarum virtutum.
Consequenter quaeritur de caritatis duratione per comparationem ad habitus aliarum virtutum, quae evacuari dicuntur. Et circa hoc tria quaeruntur secundum triplicem habitum, quem dicit Magister evacuandum.
Primo quaeritur de evacuatione fidei. Secundo de evacuatione ipsius spei. Tertio de evacuatione ipsius scientiae.
Quaestio I. Utrum fides in gloria evacuetur.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum fides in gloria evacuetur. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Quia, secundum quod dicit Apostolus1, fides est argumentum rerum non apparentium; super quod dicit Gregorius, quod «quae apparent fidem non habent, sed agnitionem»: si ergo in patria cuncta quae nunc credimus, erunt manifesta; videtur, quod fides simpliciter erit evacuanda.
2. Item, Augustinus decimo quarto de Trinitate2: «Mens quippe humana, cum fidem suam videt, qua credit quod non videt, non aliquid sempiternum videt. Quando enim ad speciem nos per fidem perductos esse gaudebimus, non iam fides erit, qua credantur quae non videntur, sed species, qua videantur quae credebantur»: ergo etc.
3. Item, ratio evacuationis, quam assignat Apostolus, est imperfectio — ait enim3: Cum venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est — sed constans est, quod cognitio fidei est ex parte, cum sit per speculum et in aenigmate: ergo necesse est, ipsam evacuari, superveniente visione speciei.
4. Item, credere manifestum non spectat ad habitum alicuius virtutis, cum simpliciter sit necessitatis; sed in patria cuncta quae credimus, manifestabuntur: ergo credere ibi non erit ab aliquo virtutis habitu. Sed habitus ipsius fidei, essentialiter loquendo, virtus est4: si ergo ibi auferetur ratio virtutis, necesse est, ipsum quantum ad essentiam suam evacuari et tolli.
Sed in contrarium arguitur primo a parte ipsius fidei evacuandae, deinde a parte eius, per quod res habet evacuari. Ex parte ipsius fidei arguitur:
1. Primo ratione sui5 generis sic. Fides est in genere virtutis simpliciter, et quod amplius est, in genere virtutis theologicae; sed virtus est perfectio potentiae, et theologica virtus est maior perfectio quam cardinalis; sed perfectio gloriae non tollit perfectionem potentiae nec evacuat eas quae sunt in genere virtutis cardinalis, quia virtutes illae, sicut dicit Augustinus6, manebunt in patria: ergo cum fides non solum sit virtus, sed etiam virtus theologica; videtur, quod nullo modo sit per gloriam evacuanda.
2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur a parte essentiae et definitionis ipsius fidei: quia fides secundum Apostolum7 est fundamentum rerum sperandarum, secundum Augustinum est «illuminatio mentis ad videndum Deum»; sed gloria adveniente, fundamentum spiritualis aedificii non destruitur, sed potius stabilitur, illuminatio non excluditur, sed potius perficitur et completur: ergo videtur, quod habitus fidei per gloriam non evacuetur.
3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur a parte actus principalis. Actus enim ipsius fidei principalis est assentire primae Veritati propter se et super omnia, et velle ei credere sive credidisse8 — quia eiusdem habitus est velle credere et velle credidisse — sed in patria assentiemus primae Veritati propter se et super omnia, volemus etiam credidisse Deo: habebimus igitur actum fidei principalem: ergo et ipsam fidem.
Item, hoc9 ostenditur a parte eius, per quod dicitur fides evacuari.
4. Plus enim repugnat ipse habitus fidei deformitati peccati quam perfectioni gloriae: sed habitus fidei non tollitur nec evacuatur per tenebram peccati10: ergo nec per completionem gloriae.
5. Item, cognitio matutina in Angelis non excludit cognitionem vespertinam, immo simul cognoscunt res in Verbo et in proprio genere11: ergo visio Dei in propria essentia et natura non excludit visionem ipsius in speculo et in creatura; sed visio fidei est visio specularis: ergo per visionem gloriae non habet evacuari.
6. Item, lumen cum lumine non habet oppositionem, nec in corporalibus nec in spiritualibus, sicut patet: quia in eodem medio plura possunt esse lumina impermixta, sicut dicit Dionysius in libro de Divinis Nominibus12; similiter et in spiritualibus lumen cognitionis per causam non excludit lumen cognitionis per effectum: ergo non videtur, quod lumen fidei evacuetur per lumen gloriosum; nec per aliud habet evacuari: restat igitur, quod habitus fidei non evacuatur.
Conclusio.
Habitus fidei per visionem gloriae simpliciter tolletur.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod hic est duplex modus dicendi.
Aliquibus enim videtur esse dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum fides evacuetur, non est simpliciter respondendum affirmando, vel negando: quantum enim ad aliquid evacuatur et quantum ad aliquid, non. In ipsa enim fide duo est reperire, videlicet illuminationis habilitatem et aenigmatis obscuritatem. Quantum ad luminis habitum fides non evacuatur, sed perficitur et consummatur; quantum vero ad aenigmatis obscuritatem, cum sit ex parte, simpliciter tollitur. — Et iste modus dicendi confirmari posse videtur per illud quod dicitur in Glossa super illud primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio13: Cum venerit quod perfectum est etc.; Glossa: «Destruetur imperfectio, non id quod verum est, evacuabitur; desitio imperfectionis est, quando id quod imperfectionis est, impletur». — Et secundum istum modum dicendi facile est declinare rationes ad utramque partem. Nam primae, quae probant, quod habitus fidei evacuatur, concludunt ratione aenigmatis et imperfectionis; rationes vero ad oppositum concludunt de ipsa fide quantum ad perfectionem habitus et complementum luminis.
Licet autem hic modus dicendi satis videatur esse probabilis, non tamen consonat verbis Augustini. Augustinus enim dicit in decimo quarto de Trinitate14: «Fides, quae nunc in animo nostro est velut corpus in loco, dum tenetur, aspicitur et amatur, quandam efficit trinitatem. Sed non ipsa erit, quando fides haec in animo non erit; quae vero tunc erit, quando iam recordabimur in nobis fuisse et non esse, alia perfectio erit». In quibus verbis vult dicere, sicut patet per exemplum, quod praemittit paulo ante hoc, quod sicut corrumpitur aliquod corpus, quod homo sensibiliter intuetur, et ipso corrupto, memoratur ipsius corporis non per ipsius corporis veritatem, sed per similitudinem in animo remanentem; sic et in ipsa fide. Unde vult, quod habitum fidei nostrae, quem interius intuemur, inter temporalia computemus; et quia aliquando deficit, non potest quantum ad illius intuitum ratio imaginis, quae perpetua est in anima, attendi. Constat autem, quod de ipso habitu fidei loquitur, secundum id quod habet positionis et perfectionis, quia secundum illud intra se ipsam anima illum habitum intuetur; aliter non valeret tota ratiocinatio illa, quam ibidem facit satis prolixe. — Non etiam videtur consonare verbis Glossae et Apostoli: quia, si fides evacuaretur solummodo secundum id quod habet imperfectionis, et maneret secundum id quod est in ea complementi et positionis: sicut non dicuntur evacuari virtutes cardinales nec habitus caritatis15, sic nec diceretur evacuari habitus fidei, quin potius perfici et compleri.
Et propterea est alius modus dicendi magis communis et usitatus, quod si loquamur de habitu fidei, secundum quod fides est virtus specialis, sic per gloriam habet simpliciter evacuari: pro eo quod fides est habitus virtutis, in quantum intellectus inclinatur ab affectu, sicut in praecedentibus16 fuit ostensum; hoc autem non potest esse, nisi quamdiu intellectus de se incertus est de his quae credere debet. Et quoniam in patria illuminatio et claritas visionis praecedet motum affectionis; nec ab ipsa inclinabitur intellectus propter ipsius summi luminis claritatem, a qua intellectus nullo modo poterit dissentire: hinc est, quod habitus fidei simpliciter per visionem gloriae habet tolli, secundum quod auctoritates Sanctorum et Glossa dicunt satis expresse. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad istam partem.
1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium ex parte generis, quia est virtus theologica, quae perficit potentiam animae secundum digniorem eius partem; dicendum, quod fides est perfectio potentiae non qualiscumque, sed secundum statum imperfectionis et viae, in quo intellectus potest aberrare a veritate et in via captivari. Unde non evacuatur, quia perfectio simpliciter, sed quia perfectio secundum talem statum. Nec est simile de virtutibus cardinalibus, quia actus earum principaliores
non solum perficiunt ipsas potentias secundum statum viae, sed etiam secundum statum patriae17.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur ex parte definitionis, dicendum, quod fides non est substantia sive fundamentum simpliciter rerum sperandarum, sed solum secundum illum statum, in quo aeterna bona exspectantur18; similiter non est illuminatio ad videndum Deum simpliciter, sed ad videndum Deum per speculum. Et quoniam huic statui succedet alius status, in quo erit stabilius fundamentum et perfectior illuminatio; hinc est, quod fides evacuatur non propter fundamenti destructionem, sed propter stabilioris constructionem; non propter luminis privationem, sed propter luminis perfectionem, quae excludit specularem et imperfectam cognitionem.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de actu fidei, qui est assentire primae Veritati et velle credere sive credidisse; dicendum, quod neuter19 est actus fidei, nisi in quantum homo assentit veritati non visae, in quo quidem assensu et credulitate intellectus inclinatur a voluntate; quod quia non est in patria reperire, non sunt illi actus in patria ab habitu fidei, sed a virtute excellentiori.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis repugnat ipsi fidei tenebra peccati quam excellentia praemii; dicendum, quod de habitu fidei est dupliciter loqui: aut in quantum est habitus ab aliis virtutibus distinctus, aut in quantum est gratia informatus. Si in quantum est gratia informatus, sic veritatem habet verbum propositum; gratia enim ipsius habitus informativa tollitur per culpam, non autem per gloriam. Si vero loquamur de ipsa fide, secundum quod est habitus distinctus, habilitans ad credendum non visum; sic propter suam imperfectionem maiorem oppositionem habet ad statum gloriae quam ad statum peccati; et ideo per gloriam habet evacuari, quamvis non habeat per peccatum tolli20.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cognitio matutina non excludit vespertinam, nec visio in specie excludit visionem in speculo; dicendum, quod differt dicere, videre rem in speculo et per speculum. Per speculum enim dicitur videre Deum qui ascendit a cognitione creaturae ad cognitionem Creatoris; in speculo vero videt qui Deum in ipsa creatura clare intuetur. Prima visio non erit in gloria, quia non erit ibi necessaria scala; secunda vero erit, quia Deus videbitur aperte in omnibus creaturis, ut dicit Augustinus in libro ultimo de Civitate Dei21. Et illa visio, quae est per speculum, spectat ad ipsam fidem; illa vero, quae est in speculo creaturae, spectat ad cognitionem vespertinam, quae bene poterit servari in patria. Et ideo non est simile de fide et de cognitione illa.
Et attendendum est hic, quod plus differt visio per speciem a visione per speculum quantum ad cognitionem ipsius Dei, quam quantum ad cognitionem alicuius creaturae sensibilis. Si enim aliqua creatura sensibilis videatur in propria natura et videatur per aliquod speculum, in quo resultat; non est differentia inter istam visionem et illam nisi in hoc, quod una est per speciem secundum directionem simplicem, alia est per speciem secundum directionem reflexam; et ideo ab uno et eodem oculo et secundum omnem statum de eadem re visa visio haberi potest. In visione autem ipsius Dei, quae est per speciem et per speculum, maior est differentia: tum a parte videntis, quia in una illarum est cognitiva potentia obumbrata, in altera vero illuminata; similiter a parte medii, quia in una videtur Deus per sui essentiam, in altera vero per effectum creatum. Et ideo una istarum cognitionum est in quiete et statu, altera vero in progressu, secundum quod dicit Apostolus22: Per fidem ambulamus; et ideo una per alteram tollitur.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod lumen lumini non repugnat; dicendum, quod illud verum est, quantum est de luminis natura. Verumtamen bene contingit, unum lumen per alterum evacuari ratione alicuius annexi inseparabilis, vel dispositionis praecedentis, vel effectus consequentis. Et sic est in lumine fidei, quod habet aenigma annexum; et ex hoc oritur, quod intellectus inclinatur ab affectu et dirigit hominem ad cognoscendum non visum. Et quoniam tollitur illius aenigmatis interpositio, tollitur etiam et illa inclinatio, tollitur nihilominus habilitatio ad cognoscendum non visa — quoniam impossibile erit ab illa superna luce absentari — hinc est, quod lumen fidei, quod est proprium illius habitus, licet non ratione sui, ratione tamen annexorum a superveniente gloria habet evacuari. Hoc autem dico de lumine, quod est proprium fidei; nam de lumine gratiae gratum facientis tenendum est, quod non habet per gloriam evacuari, sed potius consummari23.
I. Circa hanc et seq. quaestionem cfr. infra d. 33. q. 6, d. 31. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. et p. II. a. 2. q. 3, ubi de evacuatione virtutum cardinalium et donorum agitur. His quaestionibus illustrantur et confirmantur plura, quae de fide et spe supra dd. 23-26 tradita sunt. Ipsa autem quaestio de fide evacuanda non intelligitur de convenientia fidei et luminis gloriae in genere, scilicet cognitionis. Omnes enim confitentur, quod fides secundum genus cognitionis maneat in patria; et in hoc sensu cum Guliel. Antissiod. (Sum. p. III. tr. 5. q. 5.) dici potest, quod fides non omnino evacuabitur. Sed quaestio intelligitur de habitu secundum speciem et numerum. — Primam opinionem hic relatam inter posteriores Scholasticos defendit Durand (hic q. 3-5.), dum similem quandam opinionem prolixa disputatione nititur probare, scilicet primo, quod non sit contra fidem ponere, quod habitus fidei possit remanere, vel remaneat in patria; deinde positive, quod reapse fides secundum habitum tum infusum tum acquisitum possit stare cum visione beatifica, «quidquid sit de facto, an remaneat, an non, de quo non potest plena certitudo haberi; tamen de possibilitate teneo, quod potest manere, etiam sine actu» (q. 3.). — Sed alii antiqui Scholastici cum S. Bonav. negant, quod aliquid de substantia habitus fidei et actus idem numero remaneat in patria, vel possit remanere. Hoc S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3; S. I. II. q. 67. a. 5; cfr. a. 3. i.) speciali quaestione probat; et ad rem opportune ibi distinguit duplicem imperfectionem: alteram, quae est de ratione rei et ad speciem ipsius pertinet, alteram, quae non pertinet ad rationem rei, sed accidit individuo secundum aliquid aliud. Quod aliis verbis in Comment. (loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2.) sic explanat: «Est autem duplex actus, scilicet actus, qui est actus imperfecti, in quantum huiusmodi, sicut motus; et actus, qui est actus perfecti, in quantum huiusmodi, sicut operatio consequens formam. Contingit autem quandoque, quod actus perfecti inveniantur in imperfecto, secundum quod iam participat aliquid de perfectione» etc. In quo casu docet posse tolli quod imperfectum est, remanente eo quod est de substantia actus; «sicut loquela balbutientis pueri tollitur, quando venit ad perfectam aetatem, quantum ad id quod imperfectionis erat in ipso; manet autem quidquid erat de perfectione et de substantia loquelae. Sed motus, qui est actus imperfecti, quando pervenitur ad terminum motus, non manet quantum ad aliquid substantiae actus» etc. Eandem sententiam insinuat S. Bonav. hic q. I. ad 5. in fine, et infra a. 3. q. 1. in corp.
II. De hac et seq. (2.) quaestione praeter laudatos: Scot., hic q. unica n. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de his et seq. q. hic q. 5. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.
---
Article II. On the duration of charity in comparison with the habits of the other virtues.
Consequently it is asked about the duration of charity in comparison with the habits of the other virtues, which are said to be voided. And concerning this three things are asked according to the threefold habit which the Master says is to be voided.
First it is asked about the voiding of faith. Second about the voiding of hope itself. Third about the voiding of knowledge itself.
Question I. Whether faith is voided in glory.
Concerning the first one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether faith is voided in glory. And that it is, seems true:
1. Because, according to what the Apostle says1, faith is the argument of things that do not appear; on which Gregory says that "the things which appear do not have faith, but recognition": if therefore in the fatherland all the things which we now believe will be manifest, it seems that faith will simply be voided.
2. Likewise, Augustine in On the Trinity fourteen2: "For when the human mind sees its own faith, by which it believes what it does not see, it does not see anything everlasting. For when we shall rejoice that we have been led through faith to vision, then there will no longer be faith, by which things not seen are believed, but vision, by which things believed are seen": therefore etc.
3. Likewise, the ground of voiding which the Apostle assigns is imperfection — for he says3: When that which is perfect has come, that which is in part will be voided — but it is established that the cognition of faith is in part, since it is through a mirror and in an enigma: therefore it is necessary that it be voided, when the vision of vision supervenes.
4. Likewise, to believe what is manifest does not pertain to the habit of any virtue, since it is simply a matter of necessity; but in the fatherland all the things which we believe will be made manifest: therefore to believe there will not proceed from any habit of virtue. But the habit of faith itself, speaking essentially, is a virtue4: if therefore the character of virtue is there taken away, it is necessary that it be voided and removed as to its essence.
On the contrary it is argued first on the part of faith itself, which is to be voided, then on the part of that through which the thing comes to be voided. On the part of faith itself it is argued:
1. First by reason of its5 genus, thus. Faith is in the genus of virtue simply, and what is more, in the genus of theological virtue; but virtue is the perfection of a power, and a theological virtue is a greater perfection than a cardinal one; but the perfection of glory does not remove the perfection of a power nor void those things which are in the genus of cardinal virtue, because those virtues, as Augustine says6, will remain in the fatherland: therefore since faith is not only a virtue, but also a theological virtue, it seems that it is in no way to be voided through glory.
2. Likewise, this same thing is shown on the part of the essence and definition of faith itself: because faith according to the Apostle7 is the foundation of things to be hoped for, according to Augustine it is "the illumination of the mind for seeing God"; but when glory comes, the foundation of the spiritual edifice is not destroyed, but rather made firm, the illumination is not excluded, but rather perfected and completed: therefore it seems that the habit of faith is not voided through glory.
3. Likewise, this same thing is shown on the part of its principal act. For the principal act of faith itself is to assent to the first Truth on account of itself and above all things, and to will to believe it or to have believed it8 — for it belongs to the same habit to will to believe and to will to have believed — but in the fatherland we shall assent to the first Truth on account of itself and above all things, we shall also will to have believed God: we shall therefore have the principal act of faith: therefore also faith itself.
Likewise, this9 is shown on the part of that through which faith is said to be voided.
4. For the habit of faith itself is more repugnant to the deformity of sin than to the perfection of glory: but the habit of faith is not removed nor voided through the darkness of sin10: therefore neither through the completion of glory.
5. Likewise, morning cognition in the angels does not exclude evening cognition, but rather they know things at the same time in the Word and in their proper genus11: therefore the vision of God in his proper essence and nature does not exclude the vision of him in a mirror and in the creature; but the vision of faith is a specular vision: therefore it does not come to be voided through the vision of glory.
6. Likewise, light with light has no opposition, neither in bodily things nor in spiritual, as is plain: because in the same medium many lights can be unmingled, as Dionysius says in the book On the Divine Names12; likewise also in spiritual things the light of cognition through a cause does not exclude the light of cognition through an effect: therefore it does not seem that the light of faith is voided through the glorious light; nor does it come to be voided through anything else: it remains therefore that the habit of faith is not voided.
Conclusion.
The habit of faith will be simply removed through the vision of glory.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that here there is a twofold manner of speaking.
For to some it seems that it must be said that when it is asked whether faith is voided, one must not answer simply by affirming or by denying: for in a certain respect it is voided and in a certain respect it is not. For in faith itself two things are to be found, namely the aptitude of illumination and the obscurity of enigma. As to the habit of light faith is not voided, but perfected and consummated; but as to the obscurity of enigma, since it is in part, it is simply removed. — And this manner of speaking seems able to be confirmed by that which is said in the Gloss on that text of the first to the Corinthians, thirteen13: When that which is perfect has come etc.; the Gloss: "The imperfection will be destroyed, not that which is true will be voided; there is a ceasing of imperfection, when that which is of imperfection is fulfilled." — And according to this manner of speaking it is easy to turn aside the arguments on both sides. For the first, which prove that the habit of faith is voided, conclude by reason of enigma and imperfection; but the arguments to the opposite conclude about faith itself as to the perfection of the habit and the completion of the light.
But although this manner of speaking seems probable enough, nevertheless it does not agree with the words of Augustine. For Augustine says in On the Trinity fourteen14: "Faith, which is now in our mind as a body in a place, while it is held, is beheld and loved, effects a certain trinity. But it will not be itself, when this faith will not be in the mind; but that which will then be, when we shall now remember that it was in us and is not, will be another perfection." In which words he means, as is plain from the example which he sets out a little before this, that just as some body which a man beholds with the senses is corrupted, and, it being corrupted, he remembers that body not through the truth of the body itself, but through the likeness remaining in the mind; so also in faith itself. Hence he means that we should reckon the habit of our faith, which we behold inwardly, among temporal things; and because it sometimes fails, the character of the image, which is perpetual in the soul, cannot be attended to as to the beholding of that habit. But it is established that he is speaking of the habit of faith itself, according to that which it has of position and perfection, because according to that the soul beholds that habit within itself; otherwise that whole reasoning, which he carries on there quite at length, would have no force. — Neither does it seem to agree with the words of the Gloss and of the Apostle: because, if faith were voided only according to that which it has of imperfection, and remained according to that which is in it of completion and position: just as the cardinal virtues are not said to be voided nor the habit of charity15, so neither would the habit of faith be said to be voided, but rather perfected and completed.
And therefore there is another manner of speaking, more common and customary, that if we speak of the habit of faith, according as faith is a special virtue, so it comes to be simply voided through glory: for the reason that faith is a habit of virtue, inasmuch as the intellect is inclined by the affect, as was shown in the preceding16; but this cannot be, except so long as the intellect is of itself uncertain about those things which it ought to believe. And since in the fatherland the illumination and clarity of vision will precede the motion of the affection; nor will the intellect be inclined by it on account of the clarity of that supreme light itself, from which the intellect will in no way be able to dissent: hence it is that the habit of faith comes simply to be removed through the vision of glory, according as the authorities of the Saints and the Gloss say quite expressly. — Hence the arguments which are for this side are to be granted.
1. To that which is objected first to the contrary on the part of genus, that it is a theological virtue, which perfects the power of the soul according to its more worthy part; it must be said that faith is the perfection of a power not of any kind whatever, but according to the state of imperfection and of the way, in which the intellect can stray from the truth and be taken captive on the way. Hence it is not voided because it is perfection simply, but because it is perfection according to such a state. Nor is it alike with the cardinal virtues, because their more principal acts
not only perfect the powers themselves according to the state of the way, but also according to the state of the fatherland17.
2. To that which is objected on the part of the definition, it must be said that faith is not the substance or foundation simply of things to be hoped for, but only according to that state in which eternal goods are awaited18; likewise it is not the illumination for seeing God simply, but for seeing God through a mirror. And since to this state there will succeed another state, in which there will be a more stable foundation and a more perfect illumination; hence it is that faith is voided not on account of the destruction of the foundation, but on account of the construction of something more stable; not on account of the privation of light, but on account of the perfection of light, which excludes specular and imperfect cognition.
3. To that which is objected concerning the act of faith, which is to assent to the first Truth and to will to believe or to have believed; it must be said that neither19 is an act of faith, except inasmuch as a man assents to a truth not seen, in which assent and credence the intellect is inclined by the will; and because this is not to be found in the fatherland, those acts are not in the fatherland from the habit of faith, but from a more excellent virtue.
4. To that which is objected, that the darkness of sin is more repugnant to faith itself than the excellence of the reward; it must be said that there are two ways of speaking of the habit of faith: either inasmuch as it is a habit distinct from the other virtues, or inasmuch as it is informed by grace. If inasmuch as it is informed by grace, so the proposed statement holds true; for the grace informative of that habit is removed through fault, but not through glory. But if we speak of faith itself, according as it is a distinct habit, fitting one to believe what is not seen; so on account of its imperfection it has a greater opposition to the state of glory than to the state of sin; and therefore it comes to be voided through glory, although it does not come to be removed through sin20.
5. To that which is objected, that morning cognition does not exclude evening cognition, nor does vision in vision exclude vision in a mirror; it must be said that it is one thing to say, to see a thing in a mirror and through a mirror. For he is said to see God through a mirror who ascends from the cognition of the creature to the cognition of the Creator; but he sees in a mirror who beholds God clearly in the creature itself. The first vision will not be in glory, because there will not be there a necessary ladder; but the second will be, because God will be seen openly in all creatures, as Augustine says in the last book On the City of God21. And that vision which is through a mirror pertains to faith itself; but that which is in a mirror of the creature pertains to evening cognition, which will be well able to be preserved in the fatherland. And therefore it is not alike with faith and with that cognition.
And it must be attended to here that vision through vision differs more from vision through a mirror as to the cognition of God himself than as to the cognition of any sensible creature. For if some sensible creature be seen in its proper nature and be seen through some mirror in which it is reflected; there is no difference between this vision and that except in this, that the one is through vision according to a simple direction, the other is through vision according to a reflex direction; and therefore from one and the same eye and according to every state a vision can be had of the same thing seen. But in the vision of God himself, which is through vision and through a mirror, the difference is greater: both on the part of the seer, because in one of them the cognitive power is shadowed, in the other illumined; likewise on the part of the medium, because in the one God is seen through his essence, in the other through a created effect. And therefore one of these cognitions is in rest and station, the other in progress, according as the Apostle says22: Through faith we walk; and therefore the one is removed through the other.
6. To that which is objected, that light is not repugnant to light; it must be said that this is true, as far as concerns the nature of light. Nevertheless it well happens that one light is voided by another by reason of some inseparable appendage, or of a preceding disposition, or of a consequent effect. And so it is in the light of faith, which has an enigma appended; and from this it arises that the intellect is inclined by the affect and directs a man to knowing what is not seen. And since the interposition of that enigma is removed, that inclination too is removed, no less is removed the fitting toward knowing things not seen — since it will be impossible to be absent from that supernal light — hence it is that the light of faith, which is proper to that habit, although not by reason of itself, yet by reason of its appendages comes to be voided when glory supervenes. But this I say of the light which is proper to faith; for of the light of sanctifying grace it must be held that it does not come to be voided through glory, but rather consummated23.
I. Concerning this and the following question cf. below d. 33, q. 6, d. 31, p. I, a. 2, q. 3, and p. II, a. 2, q. 3, where the voiding of the cardinal virtues and of the gifts is treated. By these questions many things are illustrated and confirmed which were handed down concerning faith and hope above in dd. 23-26. But the question itself about faith being voided is not understood of the agreement of faith and the light of glory in genus, namely of cognition. For all confess that faith according to the genus of cognition remains in the fatherland; and in this sense, with William of Auxerre (Sum. p. III, tr. 5, q. 5), it can be said that faith will not be altogether voided. But the question is understood of the habit according to species and number. — Among the later Scholastics Durandus (here q. 3-5) defends the first opinion here related, while he strives to prove by a prolix disputation a certain similar opinion, namely first, that it is not against faith to hold that the habit of faith can remain, or remains, in the fatherland; then positively, that faith according to its habit, both infused and acquired, can actually stand with the beatific vision, "whatever be the case as to fact, whether it remains or not, about which full certainty cannot be had; nevertheless as to possibility I hold that it can remain, even without act" (q. 3). — But other ancient Scholastics with St. Bonaventure deny that anything of the substance of the habit and act of faith one in number remains in the fatherland, or can remain. This St. Thomas (here q. 2, a. 1, sub-question 3; S. I-II, q. 67, a. 5; cf. a. 3, i) proves by a special question; and to the point he there opportunely distinguishes a twofold imperfection: one which is of the nature of the thing and pertains to its species, the other which does not pertain to the nature of the thing, but befalls the individual according to something else. Which in other words he explains thus in the Commentary (loc. cit., sub-question 2): "But there is a twofold act, namely an act which is an act of the imperfect, inasmuch as such, like motion; and an act which is an act of the perfect, inasmuch as such, like an operation following upon form. But it happens sometimes that acts of the perfect are found in the imperfect, according as it already participates something of perfection" etc. In which case he teaches that what is imperfect can be removed, that which is of the substance of the act remaining; "just as the speech of a stammering boy is removed, when he comes to perfect age, as to that which was of imperfection in him; but there remains whatever was of the perfection and of the substance of the speech. But motion, which is an act of the imperfect, when one arrives at the terminus of the motion, does not remain as to anything of the substance of the act" etc. The same opinion St. Bonaventure intimates here, q. I, to the 5th [objection] at the end, and below a. 3, q. 1, in the body.
II. Concerning this and the following (2nd) question, besides those praised: Scotus, here q. unica, n. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 7, 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on these and the following question, here q. 5. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.
---
- Hebr. 11, 1. — Gregor., II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 26. n. 8. — Inferius pro cuncta (sic cod. U) codd. et edd. 1, 2 cetera, Vat. secreta et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 74. a. 1. omnia. Idem occurrit in fundam. 4.Hebrews 11, 1. — Gregory, Homilies on the Gospel II, hom. 26, n. 8. — Below, for cuncta (so codex U) the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 read cetera, the Vatican edition secreta, and the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 74, a. 1, omnia. The same occurs in the 4th fundamentum.
- Cap. 2. n. 4. In textu origin. post sempiternum videt plura sunt addita.Chapter 2, n. 4. In the original text after sempiternum videt more is added.
- Epist. I. Cor. 13, 10; inferius respicitur v. 12.First Epistle to the Corinthians 13, 10; below verse 12 is regarded.
- Ut ostensum est supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. Cfr. etiam d. 24. a. 2. q. 1. arg. 4. ad oppos.As was shown above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 1. Cf. also d. 24, a. 2, q. 1, arg. 4 to the opposite.
- Edd. ipsius.The editions read ipsius.
- Epist. 155. (alias 52.) c. 4. n. 16; VI. Music. c. 16. n. 51 seqq.; XII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 31. n. 59, et XIV. de Trin. c. 9. n. 12. — Quoad maiorem cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. seqq., de minori vide ibid. et II. Sent. d. 27. dub. 3. — Paulo superius pro evacuat eas [supple: virtutes] cod. U evacuat ea.Letter 155 (alias 52), c. 4, n. 16; On Music VI, c. 16, n. 51 ff.; On Genesis to the Letter XII, c. 31, n. 59, and On the Trinity XIV, c. 9, n. 12. — As to the major cf. above d. 23, a. 1, q. 1 ff.; on the minor see ibid. and II Sent. d. 27, dub. 3. — A little above, for evacuat eas [supply: the virtues] codex U reads evacuat ea.
- Hebr. 11, 1: Est autem fides sperandarum substantia rerum. — De altera definitione fidei, quae Augustinum habet auctorem, vide supra pag. 501, nota 5.Hebrews 11, 1: But faith is the substance of things to be hoped for. — On the other definition of faith, which has Augustine as its author, see above p. 501, note 5.
- Vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 24. a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo inferius pro volemus, ut legitur in codd. Z bb et in Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal., alii codd. et edd. vellemus, quae lectio improbanda est.See above d. 23, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 24, a. 1, q. 2. — A little below, for volemus, as is read in codices Z bb and in the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, other manuscripts and editions read vellemus, which reading is to be rejected.
- Cod. L I Z adiiciunt ipsum.Codices L I Z add ipsum.
- Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. seq.Cf. above d. 23, a. 2, q. 1 f.
- Vide II. Sent. d. 4. a. 3. q. 2. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 319, nota 115.See II Sent. d. 4, a. 3, q. 2. Cf. also above p. 319, note 115.
- Cap. 2. § 4. Verba ipsa videsis tom. II. pag. 329, nota 4. — De propos. seq. cfr. supra pag. 521, nota 8. — Superius pro oppositionem edd. opponi.Chapter 2, § 4. The words themselves you may see in tom. II, p. 329, note 4. — On the following proposition cf. above p. 521, note 8. — Above, for oppositionem the editions read opponi.
- Vers. 10. — Verba Glossae ordinariae in hunc loc., quae sumpta sunt ex Commentario, olim Ambrosio tributo, in originali sic sonant: Destruetur... evacuabitur, sed dum additur imperfecto, quod deest, destruetur. Destructio [sic et cod. Z pro desitio] enim imperfectionis est... impletur in verum.Verse 10. — The words of the ordinary Gloss on this passage, which are taken from the Commentary once attributed to Ambrose, in the original run thus: It will be destroyed... it will be voided, but while there is added to the imperfect that which is lacking, it will be destroyed. For destruction [so also codex Z for desitio] of imperfection it is... it is fulfilled into the true.
- Cap. 3. n. 5: Fides, quae nunc, quando fides haec in animo, sicut corpus tenetur in loco, iam non erit. Quae vero tunc erit, quando iam recordabimur... alia perfectio erit. Cfr. XII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 11. n. 89. — Aliquanto superius pro ad perfectionem habitus edd. ad perfectionis habitus.Chapter 3, n. 5: Faith, which is now, when this faith is in the mind as a body is held in a place, will now no longer be. But that which will then be, when we shall now remember... will be another perfection. Cf. On Genesis to the Letter XII, c. 11, n. 89. — Somewhat above, for ad perfectionem habitus the editions read ad perfectionis habitus.
- August., loc. cit., ad rem ait: Sed qui hoc dicit, non discernit, etiam nunc esse trinitatem, quando praesentem fidem tenemus, videmus, amamus in nobis, aliam tunc futuram, quando non ipsam, sed eius velut imaginarium vestigium in memoria reconditum recordatione contuebimur etc. — Paulo inferius pro ad illius intuitum cod. A ad illum intuitum.Augustine, loc. cit., to the point says: But he who says this does not discern that even now there is a trinity, when we hold, see, love the present faith in us, another that will then be, when we shall behold not it, but as it were an imaginary trace of it stored up in the memory by recollection etc. — A little below, for ad illius intuitum codex A reads ad illum intuitum.
- Dist. 23. a. 1. q. 2.Distinction 23, a. 1, q. 2.
- Vide infra d. 33. q. 6.See below d. 33, q. 6.
- Vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 5. — Inferius pro stabilioris codd. BCDFILN stabilitatis.See above d. 23, a. 1, q. 5. — Below, for stabilioris codices BCDFILN read stabilitatis.
- Edd. cum aliquot codd. neutrum. In fine solut. cod. Z adiungit: Nota, quod tribus modis inclinatur intellectus ad assentiendum. Primo ex praesentia intelligibilis, ut cognito, quid sit totum, et quid sit pars, statim assentit: omne totum est maius sua parte. Secundo ex via resolutionis, ut omnis triangulus habet tres aequales duobus rectis. Tertio imperio voluntatis, ut quando captivatur ingenium ad assentiendum primae Veritati propter se et super omnia.The editions with some manuscripts read neutrum. At the end of the solution codex Z adds: Note that the intellect is inclined to assent in three ways. First from the presence of the intelligible, as, the whole and the part being known, it at once assents: every whole is greater than its part. Second from the way of resolution, as every triangle has three [angles] equal to two right angles. Third by the command of the will, as when the wit is taken captive to assenting to the first Truth on account of itself and above all things.
- Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 4. ad 1. — Superius pro informativa cod. C formativa, cod. D reformativa, Vat. informata; cod. Z verbo informativa adtexit in via.Cf. above d. 23, a. 2, q. 4, to the 1st. — Above, for informativa codex C reads formativa, codex D reformativa, the Vatican edition informata; codex Z appends to the word informativa the words in via.
- Cap. 29. n. 6, ubi explicat, quomodo videbimus per ipsa corpora Deum ubique praesentem omniaque gubernantem; at non, sicut nunc, per speculum et in aenigmate, sed «in omni quae tunc fuerit creatura». Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 3.Chapter 29, n. 6, where he explains how we shall see, through bodies themselves, God present everywhere and governing all things; but not, as now, through a mirror and in an enigma, but "in every creature that shall then be." Cf. I Sent. d. 3, p. I, q. 3.
- Epist. II. Cor. 5, 7. — Superius pro similiter edd. tum.Second Epistle to the Corinthians 5, 7. — Above, for similiter the editions read tum.
- Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro a superveniente gloria cod. A in superveniente gloria; pro gloria plurimi codd., edd. 1, 2 et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. gratia.Cf. II Sent. d. 27, a. 1, q. 3. — A little above, for a superveniente gloria codex A reads in superveniente gloria; for gloria very many manuscripts, editions 1, 2, and the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales read gratia.