Dist. 34, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 34
Quaestio II. De donorum ordinatione et combinatione.
Secundo quaeritur de donorum ordine et combinatione, quae duo valde signanter innuit Isaias in praedictorum donorum enumeratione, undecimo capitulo1, ubi sic ait de Christo: Requiescet super eum spiritus Domini: spiritus sapientiae et intellectus, spiritus consilii et fortitudinis, spiritus scientiae et pietatis; et replebit eum spiritus timoris Domini.
Argumenta contra ordinem:
1. Primo obiicitur contra ordinem: quia, cum progressus ordinatus debeat esse2 ab inferiori ad superius, et donum sapientiae sit maximum, donum vero timoris minimum: cum ergo donum sapientiae ponat primo loco, donum vero timoris postremo; non videtur dona ordinare ordine recto.
2. Item, habitus spectans ad cognitionem praecedit habitum, qui spectat ad affectionem: cum ergo sapientia, a sapore3 dicta, spectet ad potentiam affectivam, intellectus vero spectet ad potentiam cognitivam; videtur, quod donum intellectus esset dono sapientiae praeponendum.
3. Item, aut dona ordinantur secundum ordinem dignitatis maioris et minoris, aut secundum ordinem prioritatis et posterioritatis4. Si primo modo: ergo cum maioris perfectionis sit fortitudo quam consilium, et pietas quam scientia, deberent ei praeponi et non postponi. Si secundum ordinem prioritatis et posterioritatis; sic, cum illud quod est ex parte cognitivae praecedat illud quod est ex parte affectivae; videtur, quod intellectus praeponi debeat sapientiae. Quodsi tu dicas, quod intellectus praeponitur sapientiae in ascendendo; tunc similiter quaeritur: quare non praeponitur scientia pietati, et consilium fortitudini in ascendendo, sed magis e contrario?
Argumenta contra combinationem:
4. Item, obiicitur contra combinationem: quia habitus virtutum ad invicem non combinantur, immo singillatim distinguuntur: ergo pari ratione nec habitus donorum.
5. Item, si dona combinantur ad invicem; cum combinatio non sit nisi in numero pari, ergo videtur, quod deberent esse plura quam septem.
6. Item, cum quodlibet donum spectans ad affectionem habeat suum directivum5, videtur, quod et donum timoris deberet suum directivum habere, cum quo combinaretur; quod si non habet, videtur, quod nec alia deberent habere.
Quaeritur ergo, quae sit ratio combinandi et ordinandi6 dona; et quare magis huiusmodi combinatio et ordo assignantur in habitibus donorum quam in differentiis aliorum habituum gratuitorum.
CONCLUSIO.
Dona Spiritus sancti recte ordinantur et combinantur secundum assignationem Isaiae.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod in donis est ordo secundum gradum excellentiae et dignitatis; et hoc quantum ad ipsorum donorum usus, secundum quos anima habet collocari in statu perfectiori et digniori, utpote secundum usum doni sapientiae altius elevatur quam secundum usum doni timoris. Ad usum enim illius doni a nemine pervenitur, nisi prius in usu timoris exercitium praemittatur. Cum ergo in eis sit ordo secundum gradus excellentiae et dignitatis; non casu et fortuna, sed valde rationabiliter quaedam dona quibusdam aliis praemittuntur; et modo sic, modo contrarie ordinantur, non propter praeposterationem ordinis, sed propter diversam rationem ordinandi. Sicut enim dicit Augustinus de sermone Domini in monte7, aliquando enumeratio donorum incipit a primo, utpote a timore, sicut innuit Dominus in Matthaeo; aliquando a summo, utpote a sapientia, sicut scribitur in Isaia.
Uterque modus ordinandi rectus et congruus est, et hoc triplici ratione: tum propter diversum modum accipiendi prius et posterius; tum propter diversitatem modi ascendendi et descendendi a superiori ad inferius; tum propter diversitatem principiorum respectu ipsius habitus. — Primo propter diversum modum accipiendi prius et posterius; quoniam sicut vult Philosophus8, aliquid est prius generatione et tempore; aliquid est prius complemento et definitione sive dignitate. Primo modo donum timoris est primum quantum ad usum, secundo vero modo donum sapientiae. Et secundum hanc duplicem acceptionem eius quod est prius, ordo donorum duplex est9, et utroque modo rationabiliter inchoatur. — Secundo propter diversum modum ascendendi et descendendi habent diversimode ordinari. Quia enim in donis attenduntur gradus excellentiae et dignitatis; et ordo in ascendendo est ab inferiori ad superius, in descendendo vero est a superiori ad inferius: hinc est, quod aliquando praemittitur donum supremum, aliquando infimum. Utrumque tamen fit secundum ordinem rectum et congruum. — Tertio propter diversitatem autem principii efficientis et subiecti suscipientis similiter habent diversimode ordinari; quia principium producens est ipse Spiritus sanctus, in quo est summa perfectio; subiectum suscipiens est ipsum liberum arbitrium, in quo est imperfectio. Potest ergo in ordine praeponi donum, quod magis approximat perfectioni Spiritus sancti; et sic praemittitur donum sapientiae, quod est perfectissimum. Potest etiam nihilominus praemitti donum, quod magis approximat imperfectioni liberi arbitrii, et hoc quidem est donum timoris.
Et sic patet, quod ordo est in donis, et quod etiam ordo in enumerando servatur, sive quis incipiat a dono timoris, sive quis incipiat a dono sapientiae. Nec tantum est in eis ordo, verum etiam cum ordine est in eis combinatio. Quia enim dona sunt ad expediendum, sicut in praecedentibus10 fuit dictum; et qui vult expedite procedere, necesse est, ut praecognoscat et praevideat viam: hinc est, quod dona habent sua directiva sibi per appropriationem deputata, et quod quaedam in donis sunt regentia, quaedam recta, sive quaedam regulantia, quaedam exsequentia. In cuius rei signum Propheta dona enumeravit cum quadam combinatione et distinctione, sancto Spiritu instigante. — Concedendum est igitur, quod dona recte ordinantur et combinantur secundum assignationem propheticam. Et per haec quae dicta sunt, patet pro magna11 parte responsio ad obiecta.
Ad argumenta:
Ad 1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur, quod progressus ordinatus debet esse ab inferiori ad superius; dicendum, quod illud est verum in ascendendo, et quando aliqua ordinantur secundum ordinem generationis; hoc autem non est verum in descendendo, et quando aliqua ordinantur secundum dignitatis ordinem; et hoc secundo modo est ordo in donis, sicut iam tactum est in praedictis.
Ad 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod habitus spectans ad cognitionem praecedit habitum, qui spectat ad affectionem; dicendum, quod illud est verum de habitibus pure affectivis, qui indigent alio regulante, sicut patet in pietate et fortitudine; hoc autem non habet locum in habitu sapientiae, quoniam ipsa habet intra se cognitionem experientiae, quae adeo dirigit et allicit, quod circa usum illius doni vix aut nunquam habet error accidere. Et propter hoc dicit quaedam Glossa12, quod donum sapientiae donum intellectus habet dirigere; quod ideo dictum est, quia cognitio experimentalis de divina suavitate amplificat cognitionem speculativam de divina veri-
tate; secreta enim Dei amicis et familiaribus consueverunt revelari.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod ulterius quaeritur, quod aut ordinantur secundum ordinem dignitatis etc.; dicendum, quod Isaias ordinat ea secundum ordinem dignitatis, sicut tactum est supra; nec valet illa instantia, quam adducit de pietate respectu scientiae, et fortitudine13 respectu consilii. Nam illa duo merito praeponuntur aliis duobus ordine dignitatis, sicut regens praeponitur exsequenti.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de combinatione, quod virtutes non combinantur, ergo nec dona; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia maior exigitur concursus habituum ad operationis rectificationem et expeditionem quam ad rectificationem solum. Rectitudo enim consistit in ordine potentiae ad obiectum, sed expeditio non tantum in hoc consistit, sed etiam in hoc et in adiutorio habitus annexi.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tunc deberent esse octo; dicendum, quod illud est verum, si quodlibet donum haberet cui combinaretur; sed donum timoris alii non combinatur, quia non habet donum directivum sibi appropriatum.
Sed tunc restat quaestio, unde hoc sit, sicut ultimo quaerebatur. Ad hoc autem dicendum, quod non est simile de dono timoris et de aliis, quia, cum sit infimum inter dona, satis habet dirigi per habitum fidei14; non sic autem est de donis excellentioribus. — Praeterea, licet respectu oppositorum sit alia et alia affectio, una tamen potest esse oppositorum cognitio; ideo per habitus cognitivos, per quos diriguntur et regulantur alii habitus affectivi expedientes ad bonum, dirigi et regulari habet donum timoris, quod expedit ad fugiendum malum: et hac de causa non habet donum directivum distinctum a directivis aliorum donorum.
I. Haec quaestio versatur circa duo, scilicet tum circa ordinem dignitatis donorum, et de hoc agit S. Thom. (S. I. II. q. 68. a. 7.) quaerens: Utrum dignitas donorum attendatur secundum enumerationem Isaiae 11; tum circa eorum combinationem, cum in loco Isaiae bina dona copulentur voci Spiritus, excepto dono timoris; de qua exceptione in fine quaestionis specialiter agitur (cfr. S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. ad 3.). De eadem quaestione: B. Albert., hic a. 4; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2.
II. Circa seq. (3.) quaestionem communiter docetur, quod omnia ista dona in patria sint quoad habitum perfectissimum, et etiam quoad eos actus, qui non sunt circa materiam repugnantem statui gloriae. Ex quo S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 3.) ad mentem nostri Doctoris infert, quod dona, quae pertinent ad vitam activam, non remanebunt quoad actus, quos habent circa propriam materiam; remanebunt tamen quoad «actus, quos habent circa Deum, qui est mensura operationis in illis». — Sed Durand. (hic q. 3.) asserit, nullum remanere actum quatuor donorum, nempe consilii, fortitudinis, pietatis et timoris, quia ipse putat, nihil impedire, quin habitus ibi remaneat sine actu (cfr. supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1, scholion). De hac (3.) quaestione praeter locos citt.: S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 68. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.
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Question II. On the ordering and combination of the gifts.
Secondly it is asked concerning the order and combination of the gifts, which two things Isaiah very pointedly intimates in the enumeration of the aforesaid gifts, in chapter eleven1, where he thus speaks of Christ: The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him: the spirit of wisdom and of understanding, the spirit of counsel and of fortitude, the spirit of knowledge and of piety; and the spirit of the fear of the Lord shall fill him.
Arguments against the order:
1. First it is objected against the order: for, since an ordered progress should be2 from the lower to the higher, and the gift of wisdom is the greatest, but the gift of fear the least: since therefore it places the gift of wisdom in the first place, but the gift of fear last; it does not seem to order the gifts in right order.
2. Likewise, a habit regarding cognition precedes a habit which regards affection: since therefore wisdom, called from "savor"3, regards the affective power, but understanding regards the cognitive power; it seems that the gift of understanding should be set before the gift of wisdom.
3. Likewise, either the gifts are ordered according to the order of greater and lesser dignity, or according to the order of priority and posteriority4. If in the first way: therefore since fortitude is of greater perfection than counsel, and piety than knowledge, they ought to be set before them and not after. If according to the order of priority and posteriority; thus, since that which is on the side of the cognitive precedes that which is on the side of the affective; it seems that understanding should be set before wisdom. But if you say that understanding is set before wisdom in ascending; then likewise it is asked: why is knowledge not set before piety, and counsel before fortitude, in ascending, but rather the contrary?
Arguments against the combination:
4. Likewise, it is objected against the combination: for the habits of the virtues are not combined with one another, but rather are distinguished singly: therefore by parity of reason neither are the habits of the gifts.
5. Likewise, if the gifts are combined with one another; since combination is only in an even number, therefore it seems that there should be more than seven.
6. Likewise, since every gift regarding affection has its own directive5, it seems that the gift of fear too should have its own directive, with which it would be combined; but if it does not have one, it seems that neither should the others have one.
It is asked therefore, what is the reason for combining and ordering6 the gifts; and why this sort of combination and order is assigned in the habits of the gifts rather than in the differences of other gratuitous habits.
Conclusion
The gifts of the Holy Spirit are rightly ordered and combined according to the assignment of Isaiah.
I respond: For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that in the gifts there is an order according to the degree of excellence and dignity; and this as regards the uses of the gifts themselves, according to which the soul comes to be placed in a more perfect and worthier state, inasmuch as according to the use of the gift of wisdom it is more loftily elevated than according to the use of the gift of fear. For to the use of that gift no one attains, unless first an exercise in the use of fear be sent before. Since therefore there is in them an order according to the degrees of excellence and dignity; not by chance and fortune, but very reasonably are certain gifts set before certain others; and now thus, now contrariwise are they ordered, not on account of a reversal of order, but on account of a diverse reason of ordering. For as Augustine says On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount7, sometimes the enumeration of the gifts begins from the first, namely from fear, as the Lord intimates in Matthew; sometimes from the highest, namely from wisdom, as is written in Isaiah.
Each manner of ordering is right and fitting, and this for a threefold reason: both on account of the diverse manner of taking the prior and the posterior; and on account of the diversity of the manner of ascending and descending from the higher to the lower; and on account of the diversity of principles with respect to the habit itself. — First, on account of the diverse manner of taking the prior and the posterior; for, as the Philosopher holds8, a thing is prior in generation and time; a thing is prior in completion and definition or dignity. In the first way the gift of fear is first as regards use, but in the second way the gift of wisdom. And according to this twofold acceptation of that which is prior, the order of the gifts is twofold9, and in either way it is reasonably begun. — Secondly, on account of the diverse manner of ascending and descending they have to be ordered in diverse ways. For since in the gifts the degrees of excellence and dignity are attended to; and the order in ascending is from the lower to the higher, but in descending is from the higher to the lower: hence it is that sometimes the highest gift is set first, sometimes the lowest. Yet each comes about according to a right and fitting order. — Thirdly, on account of the diversity of the efficient principle and of the receiving subject they likewise have to be ordered in diverse ways; for the producing principle is the Holy Spirit himself, in whom is the highest perfection; the receiving subject is free choice itself, in which is imperfection. Therefore in the order the gift can be set first which more nearly approaches the perfection of the Holy Spirit; and thus the gift of wisdom is set first, which is most perfect. The gift can also nonetheless be set first which more nearly approaches the imperfection of free choice, and this indeed is the gift of fear.
And thus it is plain that there is an order in the gifts, and that the order is also preserved in enumerating, whether one begins from the gift of fear, or begins from the gift of wisdom. Nor only is there order in them, but together with the order there is in them combination. For since the gifts are for making apt, as was said in what precedes10; and whoever wishes to proceed readily, it is necessary that he foreknow and foresee the way: hence it is that the gifts have their directives appointed to them by appropriation, and that certain of the gifts are ruling, certain ruled, or certain regulating, certain executing. In sign of which thing the Prophet enumerated the gifts with a certain combination and distinction, the Holy Spirit prompting him. — It must therefore be granted that the gifts are rightly ordered and combined according to the prophetic assignment. And by these things which have been said, the answer to the objections is for the great11 part plain.
To the arguments:
To 1. As to what is first objected, that an ordered progress ought to be from the lower to the higher; it must be said that this is true in ascending, and when things are ordered according to the order of generation; but this is not true in descending, and when things are ordered according to the order of dignity; and in this second way is the order in the gifts, as has already been touched on in the foregoing.
To 2. As to what is objected, that a habit regarding cognition precedes a habit which regards affection; it must be said that this is true of purely affective habits, which need another to regulate them, as is plain in piety and fortitude; but this has no place in the habit of wisdom, since it has within itself the cognition of experience, which so directs and allures, that about the use of that gift error scarcely or never happens to occur. And on account of this a certain Gloss says12 that the gift of wisdom has to direct the gift of understanding; which is therefore said because experimental cognition of the divine sweetness amplifies the speculative cognition of the divine truth;
for the secrets of God are wont to be revealed to friends and intimates.
To 3. As to what is further asked, that either they are ordered according to the order of dignity etc.; it must be said that Isaiah orders them according to the order of dignity, as was touched on above; nor does that instance avail which it adduces concerning piety with respect to knowledge, and fortitude13 with respect to counsel. For those two are deservedly set before the other two by the order of dignity, just as a ruler is set before one who executes.
To 4. As to what is objected concerning combination, that the virtues are not combined, therefore neither are the gifts; it must be said that it is not alike, because a greater concurrence of habits is required for the setting-right and making-apt of an operation than for the setting-right alone. For rectitude consists in the order of a power to its object, but the making-apt consists not only in this, but also in this and in the help of an annexed habit.
To 5. As to what is objected, that there should then be eight; it must be said that this is true, if every gift had one to which it would be combined; but the gift of fear is not combined with another, because it does not have a directive gift appropriated to itself.
But then there remains a question, whence this is, as was asked last. To this, however, it must be said that it is not alike concerning the gift of fear and concerning the others, because, since it is the lowest among the gifts, it is sufficiently directed by the habit of faith14; but it is not so concerning the more excellent gifts. — Moreover, although with respect to opposites there is one and another affection, yet there can be one cognition of opposites; and therefore through the cognitive habits, through which the other affective habits making apt for good are directed and regulated, the gift of fear, which makes apt for fleeing evil, has to be directed and regulated: and for this cause it does not have a directive gift distinct from the directives of the other gifts.
I. This question turns upon two things, namely both upon the order of dignity of the gifts, and concerning this St. Thomas treats (S. I. II. q. 68, a. 7.) asking: Whether the dignity of the gifts is attended to according to the enumeration of Isaiah 11; and upon their combination, since in the passage of Isaiah the gifts are coupled two by two to the word Spirit, except for the gift of fear; concerning which exception it is specially treated at the end of the question (cfr. St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2, ad 3.). On the same question: B. Albert, here a. 4; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3, quaestiuncula 2.
II. Concerning the following (3rd) question it is commonly taught that all these gifts are in the fatherland as to the most perfect habit, and also as to those acts which are not about matter repugnant to the state of glory. From which St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 3.) infers, in keeping with the mind of our Doctor, that the gifts which pertain to the active life will not remain as to the acts which they have about their proper matter; yet they will remain as to «the acts which they have about God, who is the measure of operation in them». — But Durandus (here q. 3.) asserts that no act of the four gifts remains, namely of counsel, fortitude, piety, and fear, because he thinks that nothing prevents the habit from remaining there without act (cfr. above d. 31, a. 2, q. 1, scholion). On this (3rd) question, besides the places cited: St. Thomas, S. I. II. q. 68, a. 6. — B. Albert, here a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.
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- Vers. 2. 3.Verses 2–3 (Isa. 11:2–3).
- Cod. Z incipere.Cod. Z reads incipere.
- Cfr. supra pag. 612, nota 3. — Edd. perperam sapere.Cfr. above pag. 612, nota 3. — The editions wrongly read sapere.
- Vide Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Priori, et V. Metaph. text. 16. (IV. c. 11.).See Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On the Prior, and Metaphysics V, text 16 (IV, c. 11).
- Edd. adiiciunt cum quo combinetur.The editions add with which it would be combined.
- Cod. A subdit potius.Cod. A adds potius (rather).
- Libr. I. c. 4. n. 11: Sed interest ordinis; nam ibi [in Isaia] enumeratio ab excellentioribus coepit, hic [in Matth. 5, 3.] vero ab inferioribus. Ibi namque incipit a sapientia et desinit ad timorem Dei; sed initium sapientiae timor Domini [Eccli. 1, 16.] est etc. Cfr. Gregor., II. Homil. in Ezech. homil. 7. n. 7. — Mox pro a primo Vat. substituit ab infimo et paulo inferius post Uterque interserit cum edd. 1, 2 tamen.Book I, c. 4, n. 11: But it makes a difference of order; for there [in Isaiah] the enumeration began from the more excellent, but here [in Matt. 5:3] from the lower. For there it begins from wisdom and ends at the fear of God; but the beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord [Eccli. 1:16], etc. Cfr. Gregory, Homilies on Ezechiel II, homily 7, n. 7. — Shortly, for a primo the Vatican edition substitutes ab infimo, and a little below after Uterque it inserts with edd. 1, 2 tamen.
- Vide supra pag. 747, nota 6.See above pag. 747, nota 6.
- Vat. dupliciter assignatur vel est duplex.The Vatican edition reads dupliciter assignatur or est duplex.
- Quaest. praeced. et a. 1. q. 1.The preceding question and a. 1, q. 1.
- Edd. maiori.The editions read maiori.
- B. Albert., hic a. 4: Glossa quaedam super Isaiam; sed Glossa ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum in Isai. 11, 2. (sumta ex Hieronymo) nihil huiusmodi dicit. A re autem non multum aliena esse videntur illa verba Gregorii, I. Moral. c. 32. n. 45: «Valde inutilis intellectus est, si ex sapientia non subsistat, quia, cum altiora sine sapientiae pondere penetrat, sua illum levitas gravius ruiturum levat». Idem Gregorius, II. Homil. in Ezech. homil. 7. n. 7. verba Isai. 11, 2. exponens, de intellectu et sapientia dicit: Ab intellectu ergo ascendatur ad sapientiam, ut hoc quod acute intellectus invenit, sapientia mature disponat. Cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXV. c. 2. et ibid. Comment. q. 1. et 3. — Superius pro alio regulante codd. H K Z aliquo regulante.B. Albert, here a. 4: A certain Gloss on Isaiah; but the Ordinary Gloss in Strabo and Lyra on Isa. 11:2 (taken from Jerome) says nothing of this kind. Yet not much foreign to the matter seem those words of Gregory, Morals I, c. 32, n. 45: «Understanding is altogether useless, if it does not subsist from wisdom, because, when it penetrates loftier things without the weight of wisdom, its own lightness raises it the more grievously to fall». The same Gregory, Homilies on Ezechiel II, homily 7, n. 7, expounding the words of Isa. 11:2, says of understanding and wisdom: From understanding therefore let one ascend to wisdom, that what understanding has keenly found, wisdom may maturely dispose. Cfr. below the text of the Master, d. XXXV, c. 2, and there the Commentary, q. 1 and 3. — Above, for alio regulante codd. H K Z read aliquo regulante.
- Sic Vat. rectius quam codd. et edd. 1, 2, qui exhibent fortitudinis.So the Vatican edition, more correctly than the codices and edd. 1, 2, which present fortitudinis.
- Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. — De ratione seq. vide supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1. et 2. — Inferius pro habitus cognitivos codd. A F H I L V Z aa bb habitus cognitionis.Cfr. here the text of the Master, c. 5. — On the reason of what follows see above d. 26, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1 and 2. — Below, for habitus cognitivos codd. A F H I L V Z aa bb read habitus cognitionis.