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Dist. 24, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 24

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio III. Utrum fides sit de his, de quibus habetur cognitio scientialis.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum fides sit de his, de quibus habetur cognitio scientialis. Et quod sic, videtur tali ratione.

1. Philosophus aliquis sciens rationibus cogentibus, Deum esse unum, creatoremp521-7 omnium, potest venire ad fidem, ita quod non obliviscatur illarum rationum; sed sciens illas rationes habet scientiam: ergo videtur, quod possit de eodem simul habere fidem et scientiam.

2. Item, aliquis cognoscens aliquid per demonstrationem quia sive per effectum, si incipiat nosse per causam sive per demonstrationem propter quid, non propter hoc amittit priorem cognitionem, quamvis haec secunda sit nobilior illap521-8: ergo duae cognitiones possunt haberi de eodem, quarum una nobilior est quam alia, et una non expellit aliam nec evacuat. Et si hoc verum est, tunc videtur, quod simul possit aliquid cognosci ratiocinatione acquisita et illuminatione infusa: ergo de eodem simul potest haberi fides et scientia.

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3. Item, cognitio intellectiva superadveniens non tollit cognitionem sensitivam, licet una illarum sit dignior et perfectior et nobilior alterap522-1: ergo pari ratione videtur de fide et scientia, quod simul possunt haberi de eodem et circa idem.

4. Item, «experientia est principium scientiae»; sed de uno et eodem potest haberi fides et experientia: ergo de uno et eodem potest haberi fides et scientia. Maior probatur per Philosophump522-2; minor probatur in beata Virgine Maria, quae fide et experientia cognovit, se concepisse de Spiritu sancto.

Sed contra: 1. Sicut caritas diligit Deum propter se et super omnia, sic fides assentit primae Veritati propter se et super omnia; sed quia caritas diligit Deum super omnia et propter se, impossibile est, quod ipsa compatiatur secum dilectionem, qua quis diligit Deum propter terrena principaliter: ergo pari ratione impossibile erit, quod fides secum compatiatur cognitionem, quae principaliter adhaeret ratiocinationi acquisitae. Sed talis est cognitio scientiae: ergo impossibile est, fidem circa idem esse cum scientia simul et semelp522-3.

2. Item, visio patriae tollit fidem propter certitudinem et evidentiam in cognoscendo: si igitur quod cognoscitur per scientiam est certum et apertum, videtur, quod impossibile sit, aliquid esse simul scitum et creditum.

3. Item, animus noster nullo modo potest dissentire ab eo quod novit habitu scientiae — non enim potest non credere, quod triangulus non habeat tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, si scit illud demonstrarep522-4 — sed quae fide creduntur voluntarie creduntur, et sicut possunt credi, ita et possunt discredi: ergo videtur, quod notitia scientiae non possit simul stare circa idem cum ipsa fide.

4. Item, quae scientia cognoscuntur subiacent rationi; sed quae fide creduntur sunt supra rationem, quoniam fides est illuminatio rationem elevans supra sep522-5: ergo si idem non potest esse infra rationem et supra rationem, non videtur, quod possit simul cognosci per scientiam et fidem.

Conclusio.

Scientia apertae comprehensionis non compatitur secum fidem; sed scientia, quae est a manuductione ratiocinationis, simul stat cum fide, ita ut fides sit principale et scientia subserviens.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod duplex est cognitiop522-6, scilicet apertae comprehensionis et manuductione ratiocinationis. — Si loquamur de scientia apertae comprehensionis, quo modo cognoscitur Deus in patria; sic non compatitur secum fidem, ut simul idem sit scitum et creditum, pro eo quod talis cognitio simpliciter excludit aenigma; et hoc melius apparebit infrap522-7, cum agetur de evacuatione virtutum, quare videlicet et qualiter fidei actus per visionem excludatur et evacuetur. Et de hac scientia Sanctorum auctoritates dicunt, et communis opinio magistrorum tenet, hoc esse verum, quod idem non potest esse simul scitum et creditum.

Si autem loquamur de scientia, quae est a manuductionep522-8 ratiocinationis, sic voluerunt quidam dicere, adhuc esse verum, quod non potest simul stare cum fide, quia per talem scientiam assentit intellectus ipsi rei cognitae propter ipsam rationem principaliter, assentit etiam necessario, assentit etiam sicut rei, quae est infra se; cuius contrarium reperitur in fide, quae assentit primae Veritati propter se et voluntarie, elevando rationem super se. Et ideo dixerunt, habitum fidei et scientiae mutuo sese excludere, secundum quod caritas illum amorem excludit, quo quis amat Deum propter temporalia principaliter.

Aliorum vero positio est, quod de uno et eodem simul potest haberi scientia manuductione ratiocinationis cum habitu fidei, iuxta quod dicit Augustinus decimo quartop522-9 de Trinitate, exponens illud Apostoli: Alii datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae: «Huic scientiae tribuo illud quo fides saluberrima, quae ad veram beatitudinem ducit, gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, roboratur; qua scientia non pollent plurimi fideles, licet habeant fidem».

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Et Richardus de sancto Victorep523-1 dicit, quod «ad ea quae fidei sunt, non tantum possunt haberi rationes probabiles, sed etiam necessariae, licet eas interdum contingat nos latere». Unde aliquis credens, Deum esse unum, creatorem omnium, si ex rationibus necessariis incipiat ipsum idem nosse, non propter hoc desinit fidem habere; vel si etiam prius nosset, fides superveniens talem cognitionem non expelleret, sicut per experientiam patet.

Ratio autem, quare talis scientia simul potest esse de eodem cum ipsa fide, itap523-2 quod una cognitio alteram non expellat, est, quia scientia manuductione ratiocinationis, licet aliquam certitudinem faciat et evidentiam circa divina, illa tamen certitudo et evidentia non est omnino clara, quamdiu sumus in via. Quamvis enim aliquis possit rationibus necessariis probare, Deum esse, et Deum esse unum; tamen cernere ipsum divinum esse et ipsam Dei unitatem, et qualiter illa unitas non excludat personarum pluralitatem, non potest, nisi «per iustitiam fidei emundeturp523-3». Unde illuminatio et certitudo talis scientiae non est tanta, quod habita illa, superfluat illuminatio fidei, immo valde est cum illa pernecessaria. — Et huius signum est, quia, licet aliqui philosophi de Deo sciverint multa vera, tamen, quia fide caruerunt, in multis erraverunt, vel etiam defecerunt. — Unde sicut in praecedentibusp523-4 dictum est, quod fides potest stare cum visione exteriori, quia illa habet coniunctam latentiam circa personam Christi; sic intelligendum est circa habitum fidei et talem modum sciendi, quod possunt se simul in eodem et respectu eiusdem compati. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad istam partem.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod caritas non compatitur secum dilectionem, quae principaliter adhaeret alii rei; responderi potest, quod non est simile: quoniam amare Deum propter creaturam finaliter pertinet ad amorem iniquum et libidinosum, qui habet repugnantiam ad amorem rectum; sed assentire alicui vero probato propter rationem probantem, dum illatio sit vera et necessaria, nec hocp523-5 dicit peccatum nec dicit errorem, et ideo non sic habet repugnantiam ad fidem; propterea non est simile. — Sed adhuc illud non solvit plene, quia, quidquid sit de caritate, ista duo non videntur simul se posse compati, quod aliquis assentiat veritati creditae propter se, et quod assentiat ei propter aliud. — Propter quod notandum, quod haec praepositio propter dupliciter potest accipi: uno modo, prout notat causam finalem; alio modo, prout dicit rationem moventemp523-6. Si prout dicit causam finalem, sic non potest unum et idem credi propter se et propter aliud, sicut amari non potest propter se et propter aliud. Si dicat rationem moventem, cum plures possint esse rationes moventes ad assentiendum uni et eidem, sicut potest una conclusio probari per causam et per effectum, potest etiam probari per aliquid extrinsecus et per aliquid intrinsecus; sic non est inconveniens, quod aliquis assentiat alicui veritati propter se et propter aliud, diversis tamen habitibus et considerationibus. — Sed nec adhuc illud plene solvit, quia dicitur Ioannis quartop523-7: Et locuti sunt Samaritani credentes: Iam non propter verbum tuum credimus; quod est verbum fidei, et ita videtur, quod assensus fidei non compatiatur secum assensum scientiae, qui principaliter innititur rationi. — Et propterea voluerunt aliqui dicere, quod etsi non tollatur cognitio quantum ad habitum, tollitur tamen quantum ad actum, quia non habet iam illius usum, nec motum. — Istud tamen non oportet dicere, nec videtur esse conveniens, quod aliquis habet habitum, et non possit habere usum, maxime cum non habeat potentiam ligatam per aliquod impedimentum.

Et propterea potest dici, quod quando aliquis simul est sciens et credens, habitus fidei tenet in eo principatum; et ideo talisp523-8 assensu fidei assentit ipsi Veritati propter se, ita quod propter dicit rationem principaliter moventem. Assensu etiam scientiae assentit eidem propter rationem, ita quod propter non dicit rationem principaliter ipsum moventem. Quamvis autem non possit unum et idem credere propter se et propter aliud, ita quod sic et sic credat principaliter; tamen propter se et propter aliudp523-9 bene possunt se compati ad invicem, ita quod unum sit principale, et aliud sit subserviens. Unde illud

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quod dixerunt fideles: Iam non propter loquelam tuam credimus; intelligendum est principaliter.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de visione patriae, quod tollit fidem; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia, cump524-1 omnem excludit latentiam, iam credulitas fidei non est necessaria: non sic autem est de scientia, quae habetur per rationem manuductivam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sciens non potest dissentire ab eo quod scit; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad id quod de eo cognoscit, quantum tamen ad id quod latet, ex illo dissentire potest; et ratione illius est necessaria sibi credulitas fidei, sicut aliquis philosophus sciens probare, Deum esse unum, ratione necessaria, ab hocp524-2 non potest dissentire; dissentiret tamen ab hoc, si quis diceret, quod illa unitas potest compati secum pluralitatem; quod quidem eum latet et excedit vires cognitionis suae et scientiae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides est de his quae sunt supra rationem, et scientia de his quae sunt infra; dicendum, quod sicut nihil impedit, unum et idem esse latens et patens; sic nihil impedit, unum et idem secundum alium et alium cognoscendi modum esse infra et supra; et ita scitum et creditum. Licet enim sempiterna virtus et Divinitas nosci possit per scientiam acquisitam, vel etiam innatam, in sep524-3; tamen prout comparatur ad pluralitatem personarum, vel ad humilitatem humanitatis nostrae, quam Deus assumsit, omnino supra rationem est et supra scientiam. Si quis enim iudicio rationis et scientiae innitatur, nequaquam crederet possibile, quod summa Unitas secum compatiatur pluralitatem personarum; nec quod summa Maiestas uniri possit cum nostra humilitate; nec quod summa Virtus de non operante fiat operans sine sui mutabilitate, et cetera consimilia, quae videntur repugnare communibus animi conceptionibus secundum philosophiam. Unde valde parum attingit scientia cognitionem divinorum, nisi fidei innitatur; quia in una et eadem re apertissimum est fidei quod occultissimum est scientiae; sicut patet de altissimis et nobilissimis quaestionibus, quarum veritas latuit philosophos, scilicet de creatione mundi, de potentia et sapientia Dei, quae latuerunt philosophos et nunc manifestae sunt Christianis simplicibus. Propter quod dicit Apostolusp524-4, stultam fecisse Deum sapientiam huius mundi; quia omnis sapientia de Deo in via absque fide magis est stultitia quam vera scientia. Deprimit enim perscrutantem in errorem, nisi dirigatur et iuvetur per fidei illuminationem; unde per ipsam non expellitur, sed magis perficitur.

Scholion

I. Quod nec actus transiens visionis beatificae cum actu fidei componi possit, nec habitus eiusdem cum actu et habitu fidei, manifestum est (cfr. infra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1.). Utrum autem scitum «manuductione ratiocinationis» possit esse obiectum fidei, in utramque partem disputatur. S. Thom. constanter negativam sententiam tenet; unde etiam asserit, existentiam Dei ut auctoris naturae non esse obiectum fidei nisi per accidens, scilicet quoad eos, qui demonstrationem huius veritatis non capiunt. Consentiunt Scot. cum sua schola multique alii. Tamen etiam opposita sententia S. Bonaventurae, quod in statu viae scitum de divinis possit generatim esse creditum, sed secundum alium et alium modum, multis antiquis et recentioribus placet; quam profitentur Alex. Hal., B. Albert., Richard. a Med., Durand. et Petr. a Tar., qui breviter argumentum principale sic proponit: «Scientia viae de divinis propter admixtam obscuritatem ex improportione intellectus nostri ad obiectum et frequentem obnubilationem phantasmatum non excludit fidem; scientia vero patriae dupliciter potest haberi; vel habitualiter in perpetuum, sic excludit fidem; vel actualiter ad tempus, ut in raptu Pauli, sic non excludit fidem». Ceterum ex solutione argumentorum ad oppos., praesertim ad 3., apparet, dissensum inter Angelicum et Seraphicum non esse tam gravem, ut vulgo putatur. — Satis clare auctor noster cum Scoto aliisque plurimis docet, refragantibus nonnullis recentioribus, quod obscuritas obiecti materialis fidei non spectet ad rationem formalem fidei, sed sit tantum conditio concomitans actum eius (cfr. infra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4. 6.).

II. De hac quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 7. a. 3. — Scot., hic q. unica n. 17. — S. Thom., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 2; S. II. II. q. 1. a. 5; de Verit. q. 14. a. 9. — B. Albert., III. Sent. d. 15. a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. q. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 5. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether faith is of those things of which there is scientific cognition.

Third it is asked whether faith is of those things of which there is scientific cognition. And that it is, seems [so] by this reasoning.

1. Some philosopher, knowing by compelling reasons that God is one, the creatorp521-7 of all things, can come to faith, in such a way that he does not forget those reasons; but one who knows those reasons has science: therefore it seems that he can have at once concerning the same thing both faith and science.

2. Likewise, someone knowing something by a demonstration quia or through the effect, if he begins to know it through the cause or by a demonstration propter quid, does not on this account lose the prior cognition, although this second be nobler than thatp521-8: therefore two cognitions can be had concerning the same thing, of which one is nobler than the other, and the one does not expel the other nor empty it out. And if this is true, then it seems that something can at once be known by acquired ratiocination and by infused illumination: therefore concerning the same thing faith and science can at once be had.

3. Likewise, intellective cognition supervening does not take away sensitive cognition, although one of them be more worthy and more perfect and nobler than the otherp522-1: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [so] concerning faith and science, that they can at once be had concerning the same thing and about the same thing.

4. Likewise, «experience is the principle of science»; but concerning one and the same thing faith and experience can be had: therefore concerning one and the same thing faith and science can be had. The major is proved through the Philosopherp522-2; the minor is proved in the Blessed Virgin Mary, who knew by faith and by experience that she had conceived of the Holy Spirit.

On the contrary: 1. As charity loves God for his own sake and above all things, so faith assents to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things; but because charity loves God above all things and for his own sake, it is impossible that it be compatible with the love by which one loves God principally for the sake of earthly things: therefore by parity of reasoning it will be impossible that faith be compatible with a cognition which principally adheres to acquired ratiocination. But such is the cognition of science: therefore it is impossible that faith be concerning the same thing together with science at once and at the same timep522-3.

2. Likewise, the vision of the fatherland takes away faith on account of the certitude and evidence in knowing: if therefore what is known through science is certain and open, it seems that it is impossible for anything to be at once known and believed.

3. Likewise, our mind can in no way dissent from that which it knows by the habit of science — for it cannot not believe that a triangle has three angles equal to two right [angles], if it knows how to demonstrate thisp522-4 — but the things that are believed by faith are believed voluntarily, and as they can be believed, so also they can be disbelieved: therefore it seems that the knowledge of science cannot stand together about the same thing with faith itself.

4. Likewise, the things that are known by science are subject to reason; but the things that are believed by faith are above reason, since faith is an illumination raising reason above itselfp522-5: therefore if the same thing cannot be below reason and above reason, it does not seem that it can be at once known through science and faith.

Conclusion.

The science of open comprehension is not compatible with faith; but the science which is from the leading-by-the-hand of ratiocination stands together with faith, in such a way that faith is the principal and science the subservient.

I respond: For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that cognition is twofoldp522-6, namely of open comprehension and by the leading-by-the-hand of ratiocination. — If we speak of the science of open comprehension, by which God is known in the fatherland; thus it is not compatible with faith, so that the same thing be at once known and believed, for the reason that such cognition simply excludes enigma; and this will better appear belowp522-7, when treatment is made of the emptying-out of the virtues, namely why and how the act of faith is excluded and emptied out through vision. And concerning this science the authorities of the Saints speak, and the common opinion of the masters holds, that this is true, that the same thing cannot be at once known and believed.

But if we speak of the science which is from the leading-by-the-handp522-8 of ratiocination, thus some have wished to say that it is still true that it cannot stand together with faith, because through such science the intellect assents to the known thing itself principally on account of the reason itself, assents also necessarily, assents also as to a thing which is below itself; the contrary of which is found in faith, which assents to the first Truth for its own sake and voluntarily, raising reason above itself. And therefore they said that the habit of faith and of science mutually exclude one another, just as charity excludes that love by which one loves God principally for the sake of temporal things.

But the position of others is that concerning one and the same thing there can at once be had science by the leading-by-the-hand of ratiocination together with the habit of faith, according to what Augustine says in the fourteenth [book]p522-9 On the Trinity, expounding that [saying] of the Apostle: To one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of science: «To this science I attribute that by which the most salutary faith, which leads to true beatitude, is begotten, nourished, defended, strengthened; in which science very many of the faithful are not strong, although they have faith».

And Richard of St. Victorp523-1 says that «for the things which are of faith there can be had not only probable reasons, but also necessary ones, although it happen that they sometimes escape us». Hence someone believing that God is one, the creator of all things, if he begin from necessary reasons to know that same thing, does not on this account cease to have faith; or if he also knew it before, faith supervening would not expel such cognition, as is plain through experience.

But the reason why such science can at once be concerning the same thing together with faith itself, sop523-2 that the one cognition does not expel the other, is that science by the leading-by-the-hand of ratiocination, although it makes some certitude and evidence concerning divine things, yet that certitude and evidence is not entirely clear, so long as we are in the way. For although someone can by necessary reasons prove that God is, and that God is one; yet to discern the divine being itself and the unity of God itself, and how that unity does not exclude the plurality of persons, he cannot, unless he be «cleansed by the justice of faithp523-3». Hence the illumination and certitude of such science is not so great that, when it is had, the illumination of faith would be superfluous, nay rather it is very necessary together with it. — And a sign of this is, that, although some philosophers knew many true things concerning God, yet, because they lacked faith, in many things they erred, or even failed. — Hence as in the preceding [questions]p523-4 it was said that faith can stand together with exterior vision, because that has joined to it a hiddenness concerning the person of Christ; so it is to be understood concerning the habit of faith and such a mode of knowing, that they can be at once compatible in the same thing and in respect of the same thing. — Hence the reasons which are for this side are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary, that charity is not compatible with the love which principally adheres to another thing; it can be responded that it is not similar: since to love God for the sake of a creature finally pertains to the iniquitous and libidinous love, which has a repugnance to right love; but to assent to some truth proved on account of a proving reason, while the inference is true and necessary, neither does thisp523-5 bespeak sin nor bespeak error, and therefore it does not thus have a repugnance to faith; therefore it is not similar. — But this still does not solve [it] fully, because, whatever be [the case] concerning charity, these two do not seem able to be at once compatible, that someone assent to the believed truth for its own sake, and that he assent to it for the sake of another. — On account of which it is to be noted that this preposition propter («for the sake of») can be taken in two ways: in one way, as it denotes the final cause; in another way, as it bespeaks the moving reasonp523-6. If as it bespeaks the final cause, thus one and the same cannot be believed for its own sake and for the sake of another, just as it cannot be loved for its own sake and for the sake of another. If it bespeaks the moving reason, since there can be several moving reasons for assenting to one and the same thing, just as one conclusion can be proved through the cause and through the effect, it can also be proved through something extrinsic and through something intrinsic; thus it is not unfitting that someone assent to some truth for its own sake and for the sake of another, yet by diverse habits and considerations. — But not even this still solves [it] fully, because it is said in John, chapter fourp523-7: And the Samaritans believing spoke: Now we believe not on account of thy word; which is the word of faith, and thus it seems that the assent of faith is not compatible with the assent of science, which principally relies upon reason. — And therefore some have wished to say that, even if cognition be not taken away as to the habit, it is taken away as to the act, because it no longer has the use of it, nor the motion. — Yet this need not be said, nor does it seem fitting, that someone should have the habit, and not be able to have the use, especially since he does not have the power bound by any impediment.

And therefore it can be said that when someone is at once knowing and believing, the habit of faith holds in him the primacy; and therefore by suchp523-8 an assent of faith he assents to the Truth itself for its own sake, in such a way that propter bespeaks the principally moving reason. By the assent of science also he assents to the same thing on account of reason, in such a way that propter does not bespeak the reason principally moving it. But although one and the same cannot be believed for its own sake and for the sake of another, in such a way that he believe principally thus and thus; yet for its own sake and for the sake of anotherp523-9 they can well be compatible with one another, in such a way that the one be principal, and the other be subservient. Hence that

which the faithful said: Now we believe not on account of thy word; is to be understood principally.

2. To that which is objected concerning the vision of the fatherland, that it takes away faith; it must be said that it is not similar: because, whenp524-1 it excludes all hiddenness, then the belief of faith is not necessary: but it is not so concerning the science which is had through leading-by-the-hand reason.

3. To that which is objected, that one who knows cannot dissent from that which he knows; it must be said that it is true as to that which he knows concerning it, yet as to that which lies hidden, he can dissent from it; and by reason of that the belief of faith is necessary to him, just as some philosopher who knows how to prove, by necessary reason, that God is one, cannot dissent from thisp524-2; yet he would dissent from this, if someone should say that that unity can be compatible with plurality; which indeed escapes him and exceeds the powers of his cognition and science.

4. To that which is objected, that faith is of those things which are above reason, and science of those which are below; it must be said that, just as nothing prevents one and the same from being hidden and open; so nothing prevents one and the same, according to one and another mode of knowing, from being below and above; and so known and believed. For although the everlasting power and Divinity can be known through acquired science, or even innate, in itselfp524-3; yet as it is compared to the plurality of persons, or to the humility of our humanity, which God assumed, it is entirely above reason and above science. For if someone relies on the judgment of reason and science, he would by no means believe it possible that the highest Unity be compatible with itself the plurality of persons; nor that the highest Majesty could be united with our lowliness; nor that the highest Power should from non-operating become operating without its own mutability, and other like things, which seem to be repugnant to the common conceptions of the mind according to philosophy. Hence very little does science attain the cognition of divine things, unless it rely on faith; because in one and the same thing that is most open to faith which is most hidden to science; as is plain concerning the highest and noblest questions, whose truth escaped the philosophers, namely concerning the creation of the world, concerning the power and wisdom of God, which escaped the philosophers and are now manifest to simple Christians. On account of which the Apostle saysp524-4 that God has made foolish the wisdom of this world; because all wisdom concerning God in the way without faith is more folly than true science. For it casts down the one searching into error, unless he be directed and aided through the illumination of faith; whence through it [science] is not expelled, but rather perfected.

Scholion

I. That neither the transient act of the beatific vision can be composed with the act of faith, nor the habit of the same with the act and habit of faith, is manifest (cf. below, d. 31. a. 2. q. 1.). But whether what is known «by the leading-by-the-hand of ratiocination» can be the object of faith, is disputed on both sides. St. Thomas constantly holds the negative opinion; whence he also asserts that the existence of God as author of nature is not the object of faith except per accidens, namely as to those who do not grasp the demonstration of this truth. Scotus with his school and many others agree. Yet also the opposite opinion of St. Bonaventure, that in the state of the way what is known concerning divine things can generally be believed, but according to one and another mode, pleases many of the ancients and of the more recent; which Alex. of Hales, B. Albert, Richard of Middleton, Durandus, and Petr. a Tar. profess, who briefly proposes the principal argument thus: «The science of the way concerning divine things, on account of the admixed obscurity from the disproportion of our intellect to the object and the frequent clouding-over of phantasms, does not exclude faith; but the science of the fatherland can be had in two ways: either habitually in perpetuity, thus it excludes faith; or actually for a time, as in the rapture of Paul, thus it does not exclude faith». For the rest, from the solution of the arguments to the contrary, especially to [argument] 3, it appears that the dissent between the Angelic and the Seraphic [Doctor] is not so grave as is commonly thought. — Sufficiently clearly our author teaches, with Scotus and very many others, some more recent [authors] dissenting, that the obscurity of the material object of faith does not pertain to the formal character of faith, but is only a condition concomitant with its act (cf. below, d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4. 6.).

II. On this question: Alex. of Hales, Summa p. III. q. 68. m. 7. a. 3. — Scotus, here q. unica n. 17. — St. Thomas, here a. 2. quaestiunc. 2; Summa II–II q. 1. a. 5; de Verit. q. 14. a. 9. — B. Albert, III. Sent. d. 15. a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., here a. 5. q. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 5. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cod. V hic inserit esse.
    Codex V here inserts esse.
  2. Vide Aristot., I. Poster. c. 10. (c. 13.) et II. c. 1. seqq. Demonstratio, quae hic distinguitur in demonstrationem quia et demonstrationem propter quid, si stricte accipitur, non est idem ac demonstratio a priori et a posteriori, siquidem omnis demonstratio propter quid est a priori, sed non vice versa, cum demonstratio propter quid sit illa tantum, in qua causa immediata affertur. — Pro nobilior edd. 1, 2 notior, Vat. notior vel nobilior.
    See Aristotle, I. Posterior [Analytics] c. 10. (c. 13.) and II. c. 1. seqq. The demonstration, which is here distinguished into the demonstration quia and the demonstration propter quid, if strictly taken, is not the same as the demonstration a priori and a posteriori, since every demonstration propter quid is a priori, but not conversely, since the demonstration propter quid is only that in which the immediate cause is adduced. — For nobilior editions 1, 2 [read] notior ("more known"), the Vatican edition notior vel nobilior.
  3. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 30. (c. 7.): Nunquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima. Et ibid. text. 39. (c. 8.): Qui non sentit aliquid, nihil utique addiscet nec intelliget. Et cum speculetur, necesse est, simul phantasma aliquod speculari etc.
    Aristotle, III. On the Soul, text 30. (c. 7.): The soul never understands without a phantasm. And ibid. text 39. (c. 8.): He who does not sense anything will surely learn nothing nor understand. And when it speculates, it is necessary that it speculate at the same time some phantasm etc.
  4. Vide supra d. 14. a. 3. q. 2. arg. 3. ad oppos.
    See above, d. 14. a. 3. q. 2. arg. 3 to the contrary.
  5. Guliel. Antissiod., S. p. III. tr. 3. c. 1. q. 4. hoc significatum esse vult illis verbis Samaritanorum, Ioan. 4, 42: Et mulieri dicebant: quia iam non propter tuam loquelam credimus; ipsi enim audivimus et vidimus. «Samaritana», inquit, «significat rationem naturalem, Samaritani [significant] venientes ad fidem noviter; quoniam venientes ad fidem noviter dicunt rationi naturali: iam non propter te credimus, sed quia ipsi vidimus per fidem». Iste locus Script. respicitur etiam infra in solut.
    William of Auxerre, Summa p. III. tr. 3. c. 1. q. 4. wishes this to be signified by those words of the Samaritans, John 4, 42: And they said to the woman: now [we believe] not on account of thy word; for we ourselves have heard and seen. «The Samaritan woman», he says, «signifies natural reason, the Samaritans [signify] those coming to faith newly; since those coming to faith newly say to natural reason: now we believe not on account of thee, but because we ourselves have seen through faith». This passage of Scripture is referred to also below in the solution.
  6. Cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 4. seqq. — Paulo inferius pro notitia scientiae edd. scientia notitiae.
    Cf. Aristotle, I. Posterior [Analytics] c. 4. seqq. — A little below, for notitia scientiae the editions [read] scientia notitiae.
  7. Vide supra pag. 501, nota 5.
    See above, page 501, note 5.
  8. Vat. addit scientialis de Deo, et deinde cum edd. 1, 2 bis substituit a parte pro apertae.
    The Vatican edition adds scientialis de Deo, and then with editions 1, 2 twice substitutes a parte for apertae.
  9. Dist. 31. a. 2. q. 1, ubi hoc ex auctoritate Augustini, Gregorii probatur.
    D. 31. a. 2. q. 1, where this is proved from the authority of Augustine [and] Gregory.
  10. Cod. bb (a secunda manu) per manuductionem; reliqui codd. manuductione tantum, omissis verbis praecedentibus quae est a.
    Codex bb (by a second hand) [reads] per manuductionem; the rest of the codices manuductione only, the preceding words quae est a omitted.
  11. Cap. 1. n. 3, ubi, secundum verbum allegatum Apostoli (1. Cor. 12, 8.) distinguens sapientiam (i. e. rerum divinarum scientiam) a scientia (scil. rerum humanarum), docet, sapientiae non esse tribuendum quidquid sciri ab homine possit in rebus humanis, «sed illud tantummodo, quo fides saluberrima... qua scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant ipsa fide plurimum». — Pro quo fides multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 perperam quod fide.
    Chapter 1. n. 3, where, according to the cited word of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12, 8.), distinguishing wisdom (i.e. the science of divine things) from science (namely of human things), he teaches that to wisdom is not to be attributed whatever can be known by man in human things, «but only that by which the most salutary faith... in which science very many of the faithful are not strong, although they are very strong in faith itself». — For quo fides many codices and editions 1, 2 wrongly [read] quod fide.
  12. Libr. I. de Trin. c. 4, quod testimonium, hic abbreviatum, integrum habetur I. Sent. prooem. q. 2. fundam. 2.
    Book I. On the Trinity c. 4, which testimony, here abbreviated, is had in full I Sent. prooem. q. 2. fundam. 2.
  13. Pro ita edd. et.
    For ita the editions [read] et.
  14. Secundum August., I. de Trin. c. 2. n. 4, prout eius verba a Magistro referuntur I. Sent. d. 11. c. 1.; cfr. ibid. Comment. dub. 1. et 2. — Pro emundetur edd. 1, 2 cum pluribus codd. emendetur. Paulo inferius codd. A K Z omittunt cum ante illa pernecessaria.
    According to Augustine, I. On the Trinity c. 2. n. 4, as his words are reported by the Master, I Sent. d. 11. c. 1.; cf. ibid. the Commentary, dub. 1 and 2. — For emundetur the editions 1, 2 with several codices [read] emendetur. A little below, codices A K Z omit cum before illa pernecessaria.
  15. Quaest. 1. — Circa finem corp. Vat. post compati adiungit quamvis non secundum idem.
    Question 1. — Near the end of the body the Vatican edition after compati adds quamvis non secundum idem ("although not according to the same").
  16. Pro nec hoc codd. A K hoc non. Paulo ante pro dum Vat. quo modo. Paulo inferius non pauci codd. omittunt simul ante se posse compati.
    For nec hoc codices A K [read] hoc non. A little before, for dum the Vatican edition [reads] quo modo. A little below, not a few codices omit simul before se posse compati.
  17. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 3. ad 1.
    Cf. II Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 3. ad 1.
  18. Vers. 42, ubi Vulgata pro verbum tuum exhibet tuam loquelam, quam lectionem et infra circa finem solut. S. Bonav. recepit. — Non ita multo post pro aliqui dicere cod. K aliqui ostendere. Subinde multi codd. omittunt quod ante etsi et mox pro tollitur tamen scriptum habent tollitur autem.
    Verse 42, where the Vulgate for verbum tuum sets forth tuam loquelam, which reading St. Bonaventure also adopted below near the end of the solution. — Not much after, for aliqui dicere codex K [reads] aliqui ostendere. Then many codices omit quod before etsi and presently for tollitur tamen have written tollitur autem.
  19. Ita codd. H I L T etc.; codd. A G K Z bb nec non edd. 1, 2 talis assensus. Vat. cum paucis codd. tali assensu.
    So codices H I L T etc.; codices A G K Z bb as well as editions 1, 2 [read] talis assensus. The Vatican edition with a few codices [reads] tali assensu.
  20. Vat. tamen propter se principaliter et propter aliud minus principaliter. In fine solut. edd. addunt Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum argumentum. — Haec solutio in re non differt a 2. solutione, quae in hoc deficit, quod obiectum locum Scripturae (cfr. pag. 522, nota 3.) non solvat.
    The Vatican edition [reads] tamen propter se principaliter et propter aliud minus principaliter. At the end of the solution the editions add Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum argumentum ("And by this the response to the first argument is plain"). — This solution does not in substance differ from the 2nd solution, which is deficient in this, that it does not solve the objected passage of Scripture (cf. page 522, note 3.).
  21. Cod. F supplet visio ista. Paulo inferius pro manuductivam edd. 1, 2 manuductione, Vat. manuductione ratiocinationis.
    Codex F supplies visio ista ("that vision"). A little below, for manuductivam editions 1, 2 [read] manuductione, the Vatican edition manuductione ratiocinationis.
  22. Codd. plurimi ad hoc, sed cod. A hic, et paulo post cum cod. A etiam codd. C O bb ab hoc, Vat. bis ab hac. Edd. 1, 2 in secundo loco pro ad hoc posuerunt adhuc.
    Most codices [read] ad hoc, but codex A hic, and a little after, with codex A also codices C O bb [read] ab hoc, the Vatican edition twice ab hac. Editions 1, 2 in the second place for ad hoc have put adhuc.
  23. Respicitur illud Rom. 1, 19. 20: Quia quod notum est Dei manifestum est in illis, Deus enim illis manifestavit. Invisibilia enim ipsius... conspiciuntur; sempiterna quoque eius virtus et Divinitas etc. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. 1. q. 1. seq. et II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo superius post et supra Vat. supplet rationem.
    Reference is made to that [text] Rom. 1, 19. 20: Because that which is known of God is manifest in them, for God hath manifested it to them. For the invisible things of him... are clearly seen; his eternal power also and Divinity etc. Cf. I Sent. d. 3. p. 1. q. 1. seq. and II Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — A little above, after et supra the Vatican edition supplies rationem.
  24. Epist. 1. Cor. 1, 20: Nonne stultam fecit Deus sapientiam huius mundi? — Paulo superius pro latuerunt edd. latuit, complures codd. latuerit.
    First Epistle to the Corinthians 1, 20: Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? — A little above, for latuerunt the editions [read] latuit, several codices latuerit. ---
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