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Dist. 24, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 24

Textus Latinus
p. 520

Quaestio II. Utrum fides sit de his, de quibus habetur opinio probabilis.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum fides sit de his, de quibus habetur opinio probabilis. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Primae Petri tertiop520-1: Parati omni poscenti reddere rationem de ea quae est in nobis fide et spe; sed ratio probabilis est generativa opinionis: si ergo fides compatitur secum probabilem rationem, compatitur ergo et probabilem opinionem.

2. Item, Petrus, archiepiscopus Ravennasp520-2: «Non est tutum credere sine ratione»; ergo ratio probabilis facit ad fidei utilitatem et securitatem: si igitur opinio generari habet ex probabili ratione, videtur etc.

3. Item, donum scientiae, intellectus et sapientiae simul potest stare cum fide; sed «quod credimus, debemus auctoritati, quod intelligimus, rationip520-3»: ergo ratiocinatio potest simul stare cum fide. Sed cum quocumque stat probabilis ratiocinatio, stat etiam et opinio: ergo etc.

4. Item, doctrina theologiae stat simul cum fide, cum sit fidei explicativa, et circa ea est, circa quae fides consistit: si ergo in doctrina theologiae multae fiunt probabiles rationes, videtur, quod rationis probabilitas simul cum fide maneatp520-4: ergo pari ratione et probabilitas opinionis ex rationibus generatae poterit esse in eodem et respectu eiusdem, in quo et respectu cuius est ipsa fides.

Sed contra: 1. Ad Hebraeos undecimop520-5: Fides est argumentum rerum non apparentium; sed ea, de quibus habetur opinio probabilis, sunt apparentia — «probabile enim est quod videtur omnibus, vel pluribus» — ergo videtur, quod opinio probabilis et fides circa idem simul esse non possunt.

2. Item, acceptio opinionis probabilis colligitur ex humana ratiocinatione; sed, sicut dicit Gregoriusp520-6, «fides non habet meritum, cui humana ratio praebet experimentum»: ergo videtur, quod probabilis acceptio auferat meritum ipsi fidei: ergo non potest se compati cum habitu ipsius fidei.

3. Item, «opinio est acceptio unius partis cum formidine alteriusp520-7», igitur ubi est opinio, ibi est vacillatio; sed fides excludit omnem vacillationem, dum facit firmiter adhaerere: ergo fides non potest simul stare cum opinione.

4. Item, opinio adhaeret rationip520-8 propter se, unde deficiente probabilitate rationis, deficit probabilitas opinionis; sed fides adhaeret ipsi Veritati propter se et super omnia: ergo fides et opinio habent repugnantiam: ergo non videtur, quod simul possint esse in anima circa eandem materiam.

Conclusio.

De eodem potest esse fides et opinio probabilis, non quatenus habet dubitationem annexam, sed quatenus dicit acceptionem generatam et derelictam ex rationibus probabilibus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod opinio probabilis dupliciter consuevit accipi: uno modo dicitur opinio «acceptio unius partis cum formidine alterius»; alio modo dicitur opinio acceptio animae generata ex rationibus probabilibus, secundum quod consuevit dici, quod syllogismus dialecticus generat opinionem, syllogismus vero demonstrativus generat scientiamp520-9.

p. 521

Si igitur opinio dicatur primo modo, prout habet secum annexam formidinem et vacillationem, sic non potest simul stare cum habitu fidei circa eandem materiam, pro eo quod fides facit plene consentire in alteram partem, ita quod omnino reputat eius oppositum falsum et erroneum, nec propter aliquam rationem supervenientem posset ad oppositum inclinari; et ideo, quia tollit fluctuationem opinionis, isto modo dicendi opinionem opinio simul cum fide non potest se compatip521-1. — Si autem opinio dicatur secundo modo, scilicet acceptio derelicta ex rationibus probabilibus; sic dicendum est, quod circa idem simul et semel potest esse opinio et fides, quoniam multi fideles habent ad ea quae credunt, multas verisimiles rationes et multas probabiles, quae habent generare opinionem quantum ad secundum modum dicendi opinionem; et illa quidem acceptio generata fidei non repugnat, immo subservit et famulatur. Est enim in fidei fomentum quantum ad infirmos et in oblectamentum quantum ad perfectos.

Ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, patet etiam responsio ad obiecta. Opinio enim probabilis secundum unum modum dicendi potest stare simul cum fide, sicut rationes ad primam partem ostendunt; immo multum confert fidei probabilitas rationum, sicut dictum fuit in principio primi librip521-2. Secundum alium modum dicendi, in quantum sonat in imperfectionem, videlicet prout dicit vacillationem et innitentiam ipsius assensus super probabilitatem rationis principaliter, sic habet repugnantiam cum fide; et sic procedunt rationes ad secundam partem, maxime duae ultimae, quarum una sumta est ex ipsius opinionis incertitudine, altera vero ex ipsius opinionis fulcimento, quia principaliter innititur rationi probantip521-3.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur de verbo Apostoli, quod fides est argumentum non apparentium; dicendum, quod Apostolus removet ibi a credibili apparentiam non quamcumque; non enim removet apparentiam probabilis opinionis, sed certitudinalis apprehensionis, sicut apparet Deus beatisp521-4.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de verbo Gregorii: Fides non habet meritum etc.; dicendum, quod hoc intelligit Gregorius, quando credulitas fidei omnino innititur experimento rationis probabilis; et hoc modo fides vera non stat cum opinione, ita quod innitatur opinioni tanquam fundamento, immo multo magis acceptio illa probabilis, ex rationibus acquisita, de qua dictum est, quod potest opinio dici, innititur ipsi fidei tanquam firmiori. Et huius signum est, quia multae rationes videntur nobis probabiles et valde rationabiles circa fidem, quae videntur esse abusiones quaedam hominibus infidelibus. Ideo magis illa acceptio innititur fidei quam e converso, licet aliquo modo illa fidem foveat et delectet, sicut dictum estp521-5.

3, 4. Ad duas ultimas rationes non oportet respondere; quia procedunt de ipsa opinione secundum alterum modum dicendi, secundum quem non potest simul stare cum fide, sicut prius tactum estp521-6.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether faith is of those things of which there is probable opinion.

Secondly it is asked whether faith is of those things of which there is probable opinion. And that it is, seems [to be the case].

1. First Peter, chapter threep520-1: Ready always to give a reason to everyone that asketh you of that hope and faith which is in you; but a probable reason is generative of opinion: if therefore faith is compatible with a probable reason, it is therefore compatible also with a probable opinion.

2. Likewise, Peter, archbishop of Ravennap520-2: «It is not safe to believe without a reason»; therefore a probable reason makes for the usefulness and security of faith: if therefore opinion is to be generated from a probable reason, it seems etc.

3. Likewise, the gift of knowledge, of understanding, and of wisdom can stand together with faith; but «what we believe, we owe to authority; what we understand, to reasonp520-3»: therefore reasoning can stand together with faith. But with whatever probable reasoning stands, opinion too stands: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the doctrine of theology stands together with faith, since it is explicative of faith, and is concerned with those things with which faith is concerned: if therefore in the doctrine of theology many probable reasons are made, it seems that the probability of reason remains together with faithp520-4: therefore by parity of reasoning the probability of opinion generated from reasons too will be able to be in the same [subject] and with respect to the same [thing] in which and with respect to which faith itself is.

On the contrary: 1. To the Hebrews, chapter elevenp520-5: Faith is the evidence of things that appear not; but those things of which there is probable opinion are things that appear — «for the probable is that which seems [so] to all, or to most» — therefore it seems that probable opinion and faith cannot be at once about the same thing.

2. Likewise, the acceptance of probable opinion is gathered from human reasoning; but, as Gregory saysp520-6, «faith has no merit, where human reason offers proof»: therefore it seems that probable acceptance takes away merit from faith itself: therefore it cannot be compatible with the habit of faith itself.

3. Likewise, «opinion is the acceptance of one part with fear of the otherp520-7», therefore where there is opinion, there is wavering; but faith excludes all wavering, since it causes [one] to adhere firmly: therefore faith cannot stand together with opinion at once.

4. Likewise, opinion adheres to a reasonp520-8 for its own sake, whence, the probability of the reason failing, the probability of the opinion fails; but faith adheres to the Truth itself for its own sake and above all things: therefore faith and opinion have repugnance [to each other]: therefore it does not seem that they can be at once in the soul about the same matter.

Conclusion.

Concerning the same [thing] there can be faith and probable opinion, not insofar as it has doubt annexed, but insofar as it expresses an acceptance generated and left behind from probable reasons.

I respond: It must be said that probable opinion is wont to be taken in two ways: in one way opinion is called «the acceptance of one part with fear of the other»; in another way opinion is called an acceptance of the soul generated from probable reasons, according to which it is wont to be said that the dialectical syllogism generates opinion, but the demonstrative syllogism generates knowledgep520-9.

If therefore opinion be taken in the first way, insofar as it has annexed to itself fear and wavering, thus it cannot stand together with the habit of faith about the same matter, for the reason that faith causes [one] to consent fully to one part, in such a way that it altogether reckons its opposite false and erroneous, nor could it through any supervening reason be inclined to the opposite; and therefore, because it removes the fluctuation of opinion, in this way of speaking of opinion, opinion together with faith cannot be compatiblep521-1. — But if opinion be taken in the second way, namely as an acceptance left behind from probable reasons; thus it must be said that about the same [thing] there can be at once and together opinion and faith, since many of the faithful have, for the things which they believe, many likely reasons and many probable ones, which are apt to generate opinion as regards the second way of speaking of opinion; and that acceptance, indeed, when generated, is not repugnant to faith, but rather serves and ministers to it. For it is in faith a kindling as regards the weak, and a delight as regards the perfect.

From these things the response to the question proposed is clear, and the response to the objections is also clear. For probable opinion, according to one way of speaking, can stand together with faith, as the reasons for the first part show; rather, the probability of reasons confers much upon faith, as was said in the beginning of the first bookp521-2. According to the other way of speaking, insofar as it sounds toward imperfection, namely as it expresses wavering and the reliance of the assent itself upon the probability of a reason principally, thus it has repugnance with faith; and thus the reasons for the second part proceed, especially the last two, of which one is taken from the uncertainty of the opinion itself, and the other from the support of the opinion itself, because it relies principally upon a proving reasonp521-3.

To the arguments for the affirmative part:

1. To that which is objected first about the word of the Apostle, that faith is the evidence of things that appear not; it must be said that the Apostle removes there from the object of belief not just any appearance; for he does not remove the appearance of probable opinion, but of certitudinal apprehension, as God appears to the blessedp521-4.

2. To that which is objected from the word of Gregory: Faith has no merit etc.; it must be said that Gregory understands this [to mean] when the believing of faith relies altogether upon the proof of a probable reason; and in this way true faith does not stand with opinion, in such a way that it relies upon opinion as upon a foundation; rather, much more does that probable acceptance, acquired from reasons, of which it was said that it can be called opinion, rely upon faith itself as upon something firmer. And the sign of this is that many reasons seem to us probable and very reasonable concerning faith, which seem to be certain abuses to unbelieving men. Therefore that acceptance relies upon faith more than conversely, although in some way it fosters and delights faith, as has been saidp521-5.

3, 4. To the last two reasons there is no need to respond; because they proceed concerning opinion itself according to the other way of speaking, according to which it cannot stand together with faith at once, as was touched upon beforep521-6.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 15. — De minori cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 26. (c. 33.) et I. Topic. c. I.
    Verse 15. — On the minor [premise] cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 26 (c. 33), and Topics I, c. 1.
  2. Scil. S. Petrus Chrysologus. Eius sententia hic allata erui potest ex eius Serm. 79. n. 6. seq., ubi, defendens Apostolos, qui mulieribus resurrectionem Christi annuntiantibus non crediderunt, dicit: Decipi non potest qui non est facilis [auditor]... Sic Adam novus cito cecidit, dum cito credidit, et dum facile dat aures ad mulieris auditum, se suosque posteros pessimo addixit inimico etc. — Pro Ravennas cod. aa Rhemensis, Vat. Ravennensis, edd. 1, 2 Levonensis.
    That is, St. Peter Chrysologus. His statement adduced here can be drawn from his Sermon 79, n. 6 ff., where, defending the Apostles who did not believe the women announcing Christ's resurrection, he says: He who is not an easy [hearer] cannot be deceived... Thus the new Adam fell quickly, while he believed quickly, and while he easily gave ear to the woman's hearing, he handed over himself and his posterity to the worst enemy etc. — For Ravennas codex aa [reads] Rhemensis, the Vatican [codex] Ravennensis, editions 1, 2 Levonensis.
  3. August., de Utilit. credendi, c. 11. n. 25. — De maiori cfr. infra d. 34. p. I. a. I. q. I. seqq. — Inter sed et quod credimus cod. A interiicit quia.
    Augustine, On the Usefulness of Believing, c. 11, n. 25. — On the major [premise] cf. below, d. 34, p. I, a. I, q. I ff. — Between sed and quod credimus codex A inserts quia.
  4. Cfr. I. Sent. prooem. q. 2. — Pro fiunt codd. A K bb sunt, cod. Z fuerunt.
    Cf. I Sentences, prologue, q. 2. — For fiunt codices A K bb [read] sunt, codex Z fuerunt.
  5. Vers. 1. — Definitio termini probabilis sumta est ex Aristot., I. Topic. c. I: Probabilia autem sunt quae videntur omnibus, aut plurimis, aut sapientibus etc. Cfr. supra pag. 505, nota 2.
    Verse 1. — The definition of the term probable is taken from Aristotle, Topics I, c. 1: Probable, however, are those things which seem [so] to all, or to most, or to the wise etc. Cf. above, page 505, note 2.
  6. Libr. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 26. n. 1. — Vat. tam in hoc arg. quam in seqq. pro acceptio constanter exhibet assensio.
    Book II of the Homilies on the Gospels, homily 26, n. 1. — The Vatican [edition], both in this argument and in those following, consistently presents assensio in place of acceptio.
  7. Avicenna, lib. de Anima (qui dicitur Sextus naturalium), p. V. c. I: Opinio vero est conceptio, ad quam acceditur cum formidine alterius partis. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 26. (c. 33.) dicit, quod opinio «est acceptio immediatae propositionis et non necessariae». — Subinde pro igitur edd. sed, et mox cod. A voci vacillationem praemittit formidinem et.
    Avicenna, On the Soul (which is called the Sixth [book] of the Natural [Philosophy]), p. V, c. 1: Opinion, however, is a conception, to which one approaches with fear of the other part. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 26 (c. 33), says that opinion «is the acceptance of an immediate and non-necessary proposition». — Thereafter for igitur the editions [read] sed, and presently codex A prefixes formidinem et to the word vacillationem.
  8. Vat. subdit probabili.
    The Vatican [edition] adds probabili [a probable reason].
  9. Cfr. Aristot., I. Prior. c. 1; I. Poster. c. 2, et I. Topic. c. 1.
    Cf. Aristotle, Prior Analytics I, c. 1; Posterior Analytics I, c. 2; and Topics I, c. 1.
  10. Bernard., V. de Consider. c. 3. n. 6: Fides est voluntaria quaedam et certa praelibatio necdum propalatae veritatis. Intellectus est rei cuiuscumque invisibilis certa et manifesta notitia. Opinio est quasi pro vero habere aliquid, quod falsum esse nescias. Ergo, ut dixi, fides ambiguum non habet; aut si habet, fides non est, sed opinio. — Paulo superius pro posset (sic codd. A K et bb a secunda manu) alii codd. possit, edd. potest. Mox pro derelicta cod. Z relicta.
    Bernard, On Consideration V, c. 3, n. 6: Faith is a certain voluntary and sure foretasting of a truth not yet made manifest. Understanding is the sure and manifest knowledge of any invisible thing. Opinion is, as it were, to hold something for true which you do not know to be false. Therefore, as I said, faith has nothing ambiguous; or if it has, it is not faith, but opinion. — A little above, for posset (thus codices A K and bb by a second hand) other codices [read] possit, the editions potest. Presently for derelicta codex Z [reads] relicta.
  11. Prooem. q. 2. — Subinde post Secundum cod. G subiungit autem.
    [I Sentences,] prologue, q. 2. — Thereafter, after Secundum, codex G adds autem.
  12. Codd. G H M O probabili, codd. I bb et edd. 1, 2 probabiliori; cod. Z innititur rationis probabilitate. Pro quia cod. F et.
    Codices G H M O [read] probabili, codices I bb and editions 1, 2 probabiliori; codex Z innititur rationis probabilitate [relies on the probability of the reason]. For quia codex F [reads] et.
  13. Cfr. supra d. 23. a. I. q. 3. ad 2. — Codd. M O W apparet de Beatis. Pro apprehensionis codd. A K comprehensionis. Superius post non apparentium edd. supplent rerum.
    Cf. above, d. 23, a. I, q. 3, ad 2. — Codices M O W [read] apparet de Beatis [appears concerning the blessed]. For apprehensionis codices A K [read] comprehensionis. Above, after non apparentium the editions supply rerum.
  14. Vide I. Sent. prooem. q. 2. ad 6. — Pro fidem edd. perperam fides. Cod. F voci fidei praefigit ipsi.
    See I Sentences, prologue, q. 2, ad 6. — For fidem the editions wrongly [read] fides. Codex F prefixes ipsi to the word fidei.
  15. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion on the preceding question.
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