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Dist. 24, Art. 3, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 24

Textus Latinus
p. 524

Articulus III. De obiecto fidei quoad nominis rationem.

Consequenter quaeritur de obiecto fidei quantum ad nominis rationem; consuevit enim nomine articuli censerip524b-1. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur secundum duplicem rationem articulip524b-2.

Primo quaeritur de ratione articuli, quae assignatur a Richardop524b-3.

Secundo de illa, quae assignatur ab Isidorop524b-4.

p. 525

Quaestio I. De definitione articuli, quam ponit Richardus.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de illa ratione Richardip525-1, quam ponit de articulo, definiens sic articulum: «Articulus est indivisibilis veritas de Deo, arctans nos ad credendum». Contra istam rationem obiicitur primo ratione primae partis, videlicet ratione huius, quod dicitur indivisibilis veritas de Deo.

1. Nullum enim verum complexum est verum indivisibile; sed articulus est verum complexum, ut enuntiabile, sicut in praecedentibusp525-2 fuit ostensum: ergo non est veritas indivisibilis.

2. Item, una tantum est veritas indivisibilis circa Deump525-3: ergo si articulus est veritas indivisibilis de Deo, unus tantum est articulus; sed hoc est falsum: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur.

3. Item, nihil quod est ipse Deus, est veritas de Deo; sed obiectum fidei est ipse Deus: ergo obiectum fidei non est veritas de Deo. Sed articulus est obiectum fidei: ergo inconvenienter dicitur articulusp525-4 veritas de Deo.

4. Item, resurrectionem esse futuram, est articulus; et hoc non est verum de Deo, sed est verum de carne: ergo illud non convenit generaliterp525-5: ergo non videtur, quod primum membrum praedictae definitionis conveniat ipsi articulo generaliter nec vere.

Contra secundam partem notificationis, qua dicitur arctansp525-6 ad credendum, opponitur sic.

5. Nihil quod est supra rationem et occultum rationi, arctat eam ad credendum; sed articulus latet rationem et est supra rationem: ergo non videtur, quod arctet eam.

6. Item, ad nihil, ad quod mera voluntate inclinamurp525-7, per aliquid arctamur; sed ad credendum mera voluntate inclinamur: ergo per nihil arctamur ad credendum: ergo articulus non arctat nos.

7. Item, sicut se habet obiectum fidei ad actum credendi, sic se habet obiectum caritatis ad actum amandi; sed obiectum caritatis non arctat nos ad amandum: ergo nec obiectum fidei ad credendum.

8. Item, sicut articuli ordinantur ad actum credendi, ita praecepta ordinantur ad effectump525-8 obediendi: et sicut arctamur ad credendum credibilia, ita arctamur ad exsequendum mandata: ergo sicut credibile dicitur articulus, ita praeceptum debet dici articulus: si ergo praeceptum non sortitur nomen articuli, videtur similiter, quod nec ipsum obiectum fidei debeat dici articulus.

Conclusio.

Definitio articuli a Richardo assignata est conveniens.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod articulus, quantum est de se ratione sui nominis, dicitur ab arctandop525-9; hoc autem dupliciter habet intelligi, active videlicet et passive. Dicitur enim articulus, quia est quid in se arctatum; et dicitur articulus, quia alios arctat. Prout passive dicitur articulus quid in se arctatump525-10, est terminus resolutionis; prout autem active dicitur, est principium distinctionis et discretionis. — Et primo quidem modo accipitur in scientia naturali, in qua dicuntur articuli membra sive partes, quae non resolvuntur in alias, sed in eis stat resolutio, sicut dicuntur articuli digitorump525-11. In quantum vero articulus dicitur principium distinctionis, consuevit

p. 526

item in accipi in scientia sermocinali, ut in grammatica et rhetorica. Articulus enim in grammatica est aliquid distinctum, faciens discretionem quantum ad genera et quantum ad casus et quantum ad suppositap526-1; et in rhetorica articulus appellatur distinctio, quae fit in sententia et in prolatione.

Quoniam igitur aliae scientiae deserviunt theologiae, sumit et ipsa proprietatem suorum vocabulorum iuxta illud, quod invenit in aliis scientiis recte dictum. Quoniam ergo fides nostra dicit plurium cognitionem, et illa quidem cognitio terminata est et distincta; necesse estp526-2, circa ipsum obiectum fidei, hoc est circa Deum, reperiri aliqua, ad quae reducantur omnia credenda tanquam ad illa, in quibus stet resolutio omnium credendorum, et tanquam ad illa quae sunt principia directiva in omnibus quae creduntur; et illa sunt, quae principaliter fides credit, et quae proprie sunt obiectum fidei. Et pro ista duplici ratione debent censeri nomine articuli, videlicet quia sunt terminus resolutionis, et quia principium distinctionis.

Et propterea Richardus ipsum articulum definiens vel describens notificat ab hac duplici proprietate. Nam in hoc quod dicit primo: «articulus est veritas indivisibilisp526-3 de Deo», insinuatur, quod articulus est terminus resolutionis; resolutio enim stat ad indivisibile. In hoc vero quod subiungitur: «arctans nos ad credendum», insinuatur, quod est principium discretionis et directionis; arctat enim sicut regula directiva respectu omnium eorum quae communiterp526-4 sunt credenda. — Et sic ista notificatio recte est assignata, quia non tantum est realis descriptio, sed etiam nominis interpretatio.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod nulla veritas complexa est indivisibilis; dicendum, quod indivisibile dictum de articulo non privat omnem divisionem, sed privat eam divisionem, quae quidem consistit in credibilium distinctione, quia articulus non distinguitur in alios articulos, ibi enim status est. — Potest etiam aliter dici, quod ipsi complexioni subiacet veritas indivisibilis. Sicut enim dictum fuit priusp526-5, intellectus circa ea quae Dei sunt et in Deo, quae sunt omnino simplicia, negotiatur et intelligit sub complexione quadam; et quamvis totum, quod est Deus, sit ipse Deus, tamen intellectus, dum intelligit aliquid de Deo, intelligit illud in ratione subiecti et attribuit ei aliquid in ratione praedicati. Et quia diversas ei attributiones facit, hinc est, quod ipsam Veritatem primam, quae una est, multis modis intelligit et multis modis enuntiat.

2. 3. Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo sequentia: licet enim indivisibilis Veritas sit una, tamen articuli sunt plures, quia articulus non solum est ipsa Veritas in se, sed prout comparatur ad aliquam attributionem, respectu cuius Deus est in ratione subiecti, sicut Deum esse creatorem, Deum esse trinum, Deum esse unum. Et ratione huius dicitur esse veritasp526-6 de Deo et plures articuli, quia plura enuntiabilia sunt de Deo et circa Deum, quae necessarium est credere ipsi fidei.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod carnis resurrectio non est de Deo; dicendum, quod immo, in quantum tenet rationem articuli; sic enim comparatur resurrectio nostra et carnis resuscitatio ad virtutem divinam. Unde credere carnis resurrectionem non est aliud quam credere, quod Deus corpora nostra resuscitabit, exigente hoc sua iustitia, et faciente sua potentia.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur contra secundam partem, quod articulus non arctat rationem, cum sit supra eam; dicendum, quod articulus definitur hic in comparatione ad intellectum non quemcumque, sed intellectum informatump526-7 fide; et hoc notatur, cum dicitur arctans nos, scilicet fideles. Quamvis autem articulus sit occultus intellectui, qui quidem non habet fidem, et etiam supra ipsum; non tamen est supra intellectum, in quantum fide illuminatur et elevatur.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod credere est per meram voluntatem, et ita non per arctationem; dicendum, quod est arctatio, quae repugnat libertati, et est arctatio, quae repugnat ambiguitati; et cum dicitur articulus, quia arctat ad credendum, hoc non dicitur per coactionem voluntatis, sed hoc dicitur per remotionem ambiguitatis, quia in ipsa veritate articuli determinate figitur mens credentis, ut nullatenus ad partem aliam inclinetur. Unde sicut dicitur vox articulata, quae ad significandum aliquid est determinata, cum prius in se indifferens

p. 527

esset ad significandum diversap527-1; sic articulus dicitur, quia ipsum oportet determinate credere et ei assentire, omni remota ambiguitate et vacillatione.

7. 8. Ad illud quod obiicitur de obiecto aliarum virtutum, et etiam de praecepto, quod arctat ad obediendum; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia, sicut prius dictum est, articulus non tantum dicitur, quia arctat obligando, sed quia arctat distinguendo et discernendo, et quia ad ipsum stat resolutio; et quoniam hoc proprie convenit ipsi fidei, quae est virtus perficiens ipsum intellectum, ad quem spectat principium et regula discretionisp527-2: hinc est, quod solum obiectum fidei vindicat sibi nomen articuli.

Scholion

I. Alii antiqui commentatores Magistri una quaestione solent absolvere quae in hac et seq. quaest. de duabus articuli definitionibus disputantur; insuper, duce Alexandro Hal., ipsi duabus hic notatis definitionibus tertiam Hugonis a S. Vict. adiungunt: «Articulus est natura cum gratia»; quam Petr. a Tar. (III. Sent. d. 25. q. 1. a. 1.) sic interpretatur: «Duo in quolibet articulo simplici inveniuntur: unum quasi formale, scilicet Veritas primo; alterum quasi materiale, scilicet aliquod attributum temporale, quod Deo attribuitur vel per inhaerentiam, ut in articulis de humanitate, vel per causam, ut in articulis de Divinitate». De opinionibus circa ipsam rem cfr. supra pag. 515, nota 6. — Etymologiam nominis articuli, quam S. Bonav. sumsit ex Latino, S. Thomas derivat ex Graeco vocabulo ἄρθρον (S. II. II. q. 1. n. 6.), et in Comment. (III. Sent. d. 23. q. 1. n. 1. quaestiunc. 1.) dicit: Articulus nomen Graecum est et importat indivisionem; unde membra, quae non dividuntur in alia, articuli dicuntur. Sed in Summa dicit de eodem secundum Albertum: «significat quandam coaptationem aliquarum partium distinctarum»; et ibid. vult, credibilia fidei distingui in articulos, «in quantum in quasdam partes dividuntur, habentes aliquam coaptationem ad invicem». Ibid. ad 3. de definitione Richardi dicit, quod «datur magis secundum quandam etymologiam nominis, prout habet derivationem latinam, quam secundum eius veram significationem, prout a Graeco derivatur». In Comment. idem docet: «Illud quod habet specialem difficultatem in fide, et cuius suppositio non dependet ab alio supposito, proprie dicitur articulus fidei». — Plura de articulis fidei vide infra d. 25. a. 1. q. 1.

II. De hac et seq. quaestione praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 69. m. 1; in Supplemento coll. 39. n. 1-4. (artt. 1-3. partim ex Alexandro, partim ex Bonav. transcripti sunt). — B. Albert., hic a. 1, et d. 25. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., III. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 1. — Durand., III. Sent. d. 25. q. 2.

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English Translation

Article III. On the object of faith as to the meaning of the name.

Next there is inquiry concerning the object of faith as to the meaning of the name; for it is wont to be reckoned under the name of articlep524b-1. And concerning this two things are asked according to the twofold account of an articlep524b-2.

First it is asked concerning the account of an article which is assigned by Richardp524b-3.

Second, concerning that which is assigned by Isidorep524b-4.

Question I. On the definition of an article which Richard sets down.

Concerning the first one proceeds thus and there is inquiry concerning that account of Richardp525-1, which he sets down concerning an article, defining an article thus: «An article is an indivisible truth concerning God, constraining us to believe». Against this account there is objected first by reason of the first part, namely by reason of this, that it is called an indivisible truth concerning God.

1. For no complex true thing is an indivisible true thing; but an article is a complex true thing, as an enunciable, as was shown in the precedingp525-2: therefore it is not an indivisible truth.

2. Likewise, there is only one indivisible truth concerning Godp525-3: therefore if an article is an indivisible truth concerning God, there is only one article; but this is false: therefore also that from which it follows.

3. Likewise, nothing which is God himself is a truth concerning God; but the object of faith is God himself: therefore the object of faith is not a truth concerning God. But an article is the object of faith: therefore it is unfittingly called an articlep525-4 a truth concerning God.

4. Likewise, that the resurrection is to come is an article; and this is not true of God, but is true of the flesh: therefore that does not belong [to an article] generallyp525-5: therefore it does not seem that the first member of the aforesaid definition belongs to an article generally nor truly.

Against the second part of the notification, by which it is said constrainingp525-6 to believe, it is opposed thus.

5. Nothing which is above reason and hidden from reason constrains it to believe; but an article lies hidden from reason and is above reason: therefore it does not seem that it constrains it.

6. Likewise, to nothing toward which we are inclined by mere willp525-7 are we constrained by anything; but toward believing we are inclined by mere will: therefore by nothing are we constrained to believe: therefore an article does not constrain us.

7. Likewise, as the object of faith stands to the act of believing, so the object of charity stands to the act of loving; but the object of charity does not constrain us to love: therefore neither [does] the object of faith [constrain us] to believe.

8. Likewise, as articles are ordained to the act of believing, so precepts are ordained to the effectp525-8 of obeying: and as we are constrained to believe the things to be believed, so we are constrained to carry out the commandments: therefore as a thing-to-be-believed is called an article, so a precept ought to be called an article: if therefore a precept does not obtain the name of an article, it seems likewise that neither ought the object of faith itself to be called an article.

Conclusion.

The definition of an article assigned by Richard is fitting.

I respond: For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that an article, insofar as of itself by reason of its name, is so called from constraining [arctando]p525-9; but this can be understood in two ways, namely actively and passively. For it is called an article because it is something constrained in itself; and it is called an article because it constrains others. Insofar as it is said passively, an article is something constrained in itselfp525-10, [and] is the terminus of resolution; but insofar as it is said actively, it is the principle of distinction and discretion. — And in the first way it is taken in natural science, in which are called articles the members or parts which are not resolved into others, but in them the resolution stands, as are called the articles [joints] of the fingersp525-11. But insofar as an article is called the principle of distinction, it is wont

to be taken also in the discursive sciences, as in grammar and rhetoric. For an article in grammar is something distinct, making a discretion as to genders and as to cases and as to suppositsp526-1; and in rhetoric an article is called the distinction which is made in a sentence and in utterance.

Since therefore the other sciences serve theology, it too takes the property of its words according to that which it finds rightly said in the other sciences. Since therefore our faith bespeaks the cognition of many things, and that cognition is indeed terminated and distinct; it is necessaryp526-2, concerning the object of faith itself, that is, concerning God, that there be found certain things to which all the things to be believed are reduced as to those in which the resolution of all the things to be believed stands, and as to those which are the directive principles in all things which are believed; and these are the things which faith principally believes, and which are properly the object of faith. And by reason of this twofold account they ought to be reckoned under the name of article, namely because they are the terminus of resolution, and because [they are] the principle of distinction.

And therefore Richard, defining or describing the article itself, makes it known from this twofold property. For in this that he says first: «an article is an indivisible truthp526-3 concerning God», it is insinuated that an article is the terminus of resolution; for resolution stops at the indivisible. But in this that is subjoined: «constraining us to believe», it is insinuated that it is the principle of discretion and direction; for it constrains as a directive rule in respect of all those things which are commonlyp526-4 to be believed. — And thus this notification is rightly assigned, because it is not only a real description, but also an interpretation of the name.

1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary, that no complex truth is indivisible; it must be said that "indivisible" said of an article does not deny every division, but denies that division which consists in the distinction of the things to be believed, because an article is not distinguished into other articles, for there the stopping-point is. — It can also be said otherwise, that an indivisible truth underlies the very complexion. For as was said beforep526-5, the intellect, concerning those things which are God's and in God, which are altogether simple, busies itself and understands [them] under a certain complexion; and although the whole, which is God, is God himself, yet the intellect, while it understands something concerning God, understands it in the account of a subject and attributes to it something in the account of a predicate. And because it makes diverse attributions to it, hence it is that it understands the First Truth itself, which is one, in many ways and enunciates [it] in many ways.

2. 3. And by this is clear the response to the two following [objections]: for although the indivisible Truth is one, yet the articles are many, because an article is not only the Truth itself in itself, but as it is compared to some attribution, in respect of which God is in the account of a subject, as God's being creator, God's being triune, God's being one. And by reason of this it is said to be a truthp526-6 concerning God and many articles, because there are many enunciables concerning God and about God, which it is necessary for faith itself to believe.

4. To that which is objected, that the resurrection of the flesh is not concerning God; it must be said that on the contrary [it is], insofar as it holds the account of an article; for thus our resurrection and the resuscitation of the flesh are compared to the divine power. Hence to believe the resurrection of the flesh is nothing other than to believe that God will resuscitate our bodies, his justice requiring this, and his power effecting it.

5. To that which is objected against the second part, that an article does not constrain reason, since it is above it; it must be said that an article is here defined in comparison to the intellect, not just any intellect, but the intellect informedp526-7 by faith; and this is noted when it is said constraining us, namely the faithful. But although an article is hidden to the intellect, which indeed does not have faith, and even above it; nevertheless it is not above the intellect insofar as it is illumined and elevated by faith.

6. To that which is objected, that to believe is by mere will, and thus not by constraint; it must be said that there is a constraint which is repugnant to liberty, and there is a constraint which is repugnant to ambiguity; and when it is said an article, because it constrains to believe, this is not said by a coercion of the will, but this is said by the removal of ambiguity, because in the very truth of the article the mind of the believer is determinately fixed, so that it in no way be inclined to the other side. Hence just as that voice is called articulate which is determined to signify something, when before it was indifferent in itself to signify

diverse thingsp527-1; so an article is so called, because it behooves [one] to believe it determinately and to assent to it, with all ambiguity and wavering removed.

7. 8. To that which is objected concerning the object of the other virtues, and also concerning a precept, which constrains to obey; it must be said that it is not similar: because, as was said before, an article is so called not only because it constrains by obliging, but because it constrains by distinguishing and discerning, and because to it the resolution stops; and since this properly belongs to faith itself, which is the virtue perfecting the intellect itself, to which pertains the principle and rule of discretionp527-2: hence it is that the object of faith alone vindicates to itself the name of article.

Scholion

I. Other ancient commentators of the Master are wont to settle in one question what in this and the following question is disputed concerning the two definitions of an article; moreover, with Alexander of Hales leading, they themselves add to the two definitions here noted a third of Hugh of St. Victor: «An article is a nature with grace»; which Peter of Tarentaise (III. Sent. d. 25. q. 1. a. 1.) interprets thus: «Two things are found in any simple article: one as it were formal, namely Truth first; the other as it were material, namely some temporal attribute which is attributed to God either by inherence, as in the articles concerning the humanity, or by cause, as in the articles concerning the Divinity». On the opinions concerning the matter itself, cf. above, p. 515, note 6. — The etymology of the name article, which St. Bonaventure took from the Latin, St. Thomas derives from the Greek word ἄρθρον (Summa II–II q. 1. n. 6.), and in his Commentary (III. Sent. d. 23. q. 1. n. 1. quaestiunc. 1.) says: Article is a Greek name and imports indivision; whence members which are not divided into others are called articles. But in the Summa he says of the same according to Albert: «it signifies a certain coaptation of certain distinct parts»; and ibid. he holds that the things-to-be-believed of faith are distinguished into articles «insofar as they are divided into certain parts, having some coaptation to one another». Ibid. ad 3, concerning Richard's definition, he says that «it is given rather according to a certain etymology of the name, as it has a Latin derivation, than according to its true signification, as it is derived from the Greek». In the Commentary he teaches the same: «That which has a special difficulty in faith, and whose supposition does not depend on another supposit, is properly called an article of faith». — More concerning the articles of faith see below, d. 25. a. 1. q. 1.

II. On this and the following question, besides those praised: Alex. of Hales, Summa p. III. q. 69. m. 1; in the Supplement, coll. 39. n. 1–4 (articles 1–3 have been transcribed partly from Alexander, partly from Bonaventure). — B. Albert, here a. 1, and d. 25. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, III. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 1. — Durand., III. Sent. d. 25. q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cod. F supplet visio ista. Paulo inferius pro manuductivam edd. 1, 2 manuductione, Vat. manuductione ratiocinationis.
    Codex F supplies visio ista. A little below, for manuductivam editions 1, 2 [read] manuductione, the Vatican edition manuductione ratiocinationis.
  2. Codd. plurimi ad hoc, sed cod. A hic, et paulo post cum cod. A etiam codd. C O bb ab hoc, Vat. bis ab hac. Edd. 1, 2 in secundo loco pro ad hoc posuerunt adhuc.
    Most codices [read] ad hoc, but codex A here, and a little after, with codex A also codices C O bb [read] ab hoc, the Vatican edition twice ab hac. Editions 1, 2 in the second place put adhuc for ad hoc.
  3. Respicitur illud Rom. 1, 19. 20: Quia quod notum est Dei manifestum est in illis, Deus enim illis manifestavit. Invisibilia enim ipsius… conspiciuntur; sempiterna quoque eius virtus et Divinitas etc. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. 1. q. 1. seq. et II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo superius post et supra Vat. supplet rationem.
    There is regarded that text of Rom. 1, 19. 20: Because that which is known of God is manifest in them, for God hath manifested it unto them. For the invisible things of him… are clearly seen; his eternal power also and Divinity etc. Cf. I. Sent. d. 3. p. 1. q. 1 and following, and II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — A little above, after et supra, the Vatican edition supplies rationem.
  4. Epist. 1. Cor. 1, 20: Nonne stultam fecit Deus sapientiam huius mundi? — Paulo superius pro latuerunt edd. latuit, complures codd. latuerit.
    Epistle 1 Cor. 1, 20: Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? — A little above, for latuerunt the editions [read] latuit, several codices latuerit.
  5. Definitio articuli hic proposita et (ut communiter a Scholasticis) Richardo tributa, in dicti magistri operibus non occurrit; quod observavit P. Nicolai in ed. Comment. S. Thomae, III. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. S. Thom., II. II. q. 1. n. 6. arg. 3. ait: «Sicut a quibusdam dicitur, articulus est indivisibilis» etc. Doctoribus hoc docentibus annumerandus est Guliel. Antissiod., qui S. p. III. tr. 3. c. 2. q. 1. dicit: «Articulus dicitur ab arctando, quia arctat nos ad se credendum», et «tria exiguntur ad hoc quod aliquid sit articulus, scil. quod sit de Deo, quod in nobis secundum se et directe generet timorem, vel amorem Dei, quoniam per timorem Dei vitamus malum, per amorem facimus bonum, in quibus duobus consistit perfecta iustitia, quam facit in nobis fides» etc.
    The definition of an article here proposed and (as commonly by the Scholastics) attributed to Richard does not occur in the works of the said master; which P. Nicolai observed in the edition of St. Thomas's Commentary, III. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. St. Thomas, II–II q. 1. n. 6. arg. 3, says: «As it is said by certain ones, an article is indivisible» etc. Among the doctors teaching this is to be numbered William of Auxerre, who Summa p. III. tr. 3. c. 2. q. 1. says: «An article is so called from constraining, because it constrains us to believe it», and «three things are required for something to be an article, namely that it be concerning God, that it generate in us in itself and directly fear, or love of God, since through the fear of God we shun evil, through love we do good, in which two consists perfect justice, which faith makes in us» etc.
  6. Art. 1. q. 3. — Superius pro Contra istam rationem edd. Contra istam definitionem; et deinde non ita multo post pro verum complexum, quam lectionem codd. A K P V et edd. 1, 2 tuentur, alii codd. complexum tantum, Vat. mentis complexum. In conclus. post ergo codd. A K supplent articulus.
    Art. 1. q. 3. — Above, for Contra istam rationem the editions [read] Contra istam definitionem; and then not so much later, for verum complexum, which reading codices A K P V and editions 1, 2 maintain, other codices [read] complexum tantum, the Vatican edition mentis complexum. In the conclusion, after ergo, codices A K supply articulus.
  7. Immo, ut Anselm., Dialog. de veritate, c. 13. vult, est una tantum veritas, i. e. rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis, in omnibus veris.
    Nay, as Anselm, Dialogue on truth, c. 13, holds, there is only one truth, that is, a rectitude perceptible by the mind alone, in all true things.
  8. Codd. A V supplent est.
    Codices A V supply est.
  9. Vel aliis verbis: illud, scil. articulum esse veritatem de Deo, non convenit omnibus articulis. — Pro ergo illud non convenit generaliter, quam conclusionem edd. 1, 2 omittunt, Vat. ergo articulus non est generaliter indivisibilis veritas de Deo.
    Or in other words: that, namely an article's being a truth concerning God, does not belong to all articles. — For ergo illud non convenit generaliter, which conclusion editions 1, 2 omit, the Vatican edition [reads] ergo articulus non est generaliter indivisibilis veritas de Deo ("therefore an article is not generally an indivisible truth concerning God").
  10. Edd. cum nonnullis codd. adiiciunt nos.
    The editions, with some codices, add nos.
  11. Vide supra pag. 475, nota 3.
    See above, p. 475, note 3.
  12. Pro effectum edd. actum.
    For effectum the editions [read] actum ("act").
  13. Isidor., XI. Etymolog. c. 1. n. 82: «Artus, quibus colligantur membra, ab arctando dicti»; et n. 84: Artus dicti, quod colligati invicem nervis arctentur i. e. stringantur, quorum diminutiva sunt articuli. Nam artus dicimus membra maiora, ut brachia; articulos minora membra, ut digitos. — Paulo ante pro quantum est de se ratione etc. edd. quantum est de ratione etc.
    Isidore, XI. Etymologies c. 1. n. 82: «Artus [joints], by which the members are bound together, are so called from arctando [constraining]»; and n. 84: Artus are so called because, bound together by one another's sinews, they are constrained, that is, tightened, of which the diminutives are articuli. For we call artus the larger members, as the arms; articuli [we call] the smaller members, as the fingers. — A little before, for quantum est de se ratione etc. the editions [read] quantum est de ratione etc.
  14. Edd. articulus quod in se arctatum est.
    The editions [read] articulus quod in se arctatum est.
  15. Cfr. Aristot., I. de Histor. animal. c. 15, et de Lineis insecab., ubi circa finem discrimen ostenditur, quod interest inter punctum et articulum. B. Albert. in VI. Phys., circa finem, laudatum opusc. de Lineis insecab. commentans, articulum (in ult. cap.) sic definit: Articulus enim dicitur minimum in corpore composito, in quo diversa articulantur et quasi colliguntur.
    Cf. Aristotle, I. on the History of Animals c. 15, and on Indivisible Lines, where near the end is shown the difference which lies between a point and an article. B. Albert in VI. Physics, near the end, commenting on the praised little work on Indivisible Lines, defines an article (in the last chapter) thus: For an article is called the least thing in a composite body, in which diverse things are articulated and as it were bound together.
  16. Priscian., XVII. Grammat. c. 4: Articulus secundam notitiam suppositorum demonstrat. Si enim dicam: ἄνθρωπος ἦλθεν [homo venit], primam notitiam ostendo; sin ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦλθεν, secundam. — Cicero, IV. Rhetor. ad Herenn. c. 19. articulum in rhetorica sic definit: Articulus dicitur, cum singula verba intervallis distinguuntur caesa oratione, hoc modo: acrimonia, voce, vultu adversarios perterruisti etc. — Mox pro in sententia Vat. in scientia.
    Priscian, XVII. Grammar c. 4: An article demonstrates the second notice of supposits. For if I say: ἄνθρωπος ἦλθεν [a man came], I show the first notice; but if [I say] ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦλθεν [the man came], the second. — Cicero, IV. Rhetoric to Herennius c. 19, defines an article in rhetoric thus: It is called an article, when single words are distinguished by intervals in a clipped discourse, in this manner: by sharpness, by voice, by countenance you terrified the adversaries etc. — Soon, for in sententia the Vatican edition [reads] in scientia.
  17. Multi codd. hic inepte inserunt quod, et subinde non pauci codd. nec non edd. omittunt ipsum ante obiectum. Aliquanto inferius pro et illa sunt, quae Vat. et illa, quae sunt, et post pauca cum edd. 1, 2 dicuntur pro debent ac termini pro terminus.
    Many codices here ineptly insert quod, and thereupon not a few codices and also the editions omit ipsum before obiectum. Somewhat below, for et illa sunt, quae the Vatican edition [reads] et illa, quae sunt, and after a little, with editions 1, 2, dicuntur for debent and termini for terminus.
  18. Vat. veritas mentis indivisibilis.
    The Vatican edition [reads] veritas mentis indivisibilis ("indivisible truth of the mind").
  19. Pro communiter in codd. T V et aliis etiam legi posset consequenter. Guliel. Paris., de Fide, c. 2. dicit, quod communiter credenda «usualiter articuli fidei vocantur».
    For communiter in codices T V and others one could also read consequenter. William of Paris, on Faith, c. 2, says that the things commonly to be believed «are usually called articles of faith».
  20. Art. 1. q. 3. ad 2. — Paulo superius pro quia cod. H qua, Vat. quoniam. Infra pro intellectus circa ea codd. Q U intellectus est circa ea, et subinde pro et in Deo codd. F U et ideo. Post pauca pro in ratione subiecti codd. A K U sub ratione subiecti.
    Art. 1. q. 3. ad 2. — A little above, for quia codex H [reads] qua, the Vatican edition quoniam. Below, for intellectus circa ea codices Q U [read] intellectus est circa ea, and thereupon for et in Deo codices F U et ideo. After a little, for in ratione subiecti codices A K U [read] sub ratione subiecti.
  21. Edd. cum paucis codd. subiungunt indivisibilis. Mox pro enuntiabilia cod. A et edd. 1, 2 essentialia.
    The editions, with a few codices, subjoin indivisibilis. Soon, for enuntiabilia codex A and editions 1, 2 [read] essentialia.
  22. Codd. A G K bb formatum.
    Codices A G K bb [read] formatum ("formed").
  23. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 509, nota 2. — Paulo superius post cum prius codd. B C inserunt etiam.
    Cf. tom. II, p. 509, note 2. — A little above, after cum prius codices B C insert etiam.
  24. Vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. et q. 2.
    See above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, in the body, and q. 2. ---
← Dist. 24, Art. 2, Q. 3Dist. 24, Art. 3, Q. 2→