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Dist. 38, Dubia

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 38

Textus Latinus
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## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Voluntas ex fine suo cognoscitur, utrum sit recta, aut prava. Finis autem voluntatis est beatitudo. Sed contra: beatitudo est bonum nobis ignotum; unde hoc est illud, quod nec oculus vidit, nec auris audivit1 etc.: ergo si per ignotum non possumus aliud cognoscere, videtur, quod voluntas non possit cognosci, utrum sit bona, vel prava ex illo fine. — Item, certius est nobis quod est praesens nobis ipsis, quam quod est absens2; sed voluntas nostra est nobis praesens, beatitudo est absens: si ergo non cognoscimus praesentia per absentia, sed magis e converso; videtur, quod per beatitudinem non fiat cognitio bonitatis in voluntate.

(Duplex cognitio beatitudinis.) Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cognitio beatitudinis duplex est, videlicet in universali et in particulari. Cognitio beatitudinis in universali omnibus est innata; cognitio vero in particulari, videlicet ubi sit beatitudo ponenda, habetur a nobis per habitum fidei aliquo modo, et aliquo modo exspectatur habenda per deiformitatem gloriae. Nunc enim cognoscimus quasi speculando et a remotis et semiplene; tunc autem cognoscemus experiendo perfecte3. Licet autem nunc non cognoscamus perfecte, cognoscimus tamen certitudinaliter certitudine fidei, quod beatitudo est magnum et verum bonum. De voluntate nostra, utrum sit recta, vel prava, nos nescimus nisi per coniecturam; et ideo sicut certum est ratio veniendi4 in cognitionem dubii, sic cognitio beatitudinis facit venire in cognitionem bonitatis voluntatis, dum quis videt voluntatem suam ad beatitudinem tendere.

Quod ergo obiicitur, quod beatitudo nobis ignota est; iam patet5. Verum est enim, quod non est nobis nota per experientiam, est tamen nobis nota per fidem.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod rectitudo voluntatis est nobis praesens; dicendum, quod, sicut in primo libro6 fuit ostensum, licet caritas et gratia sint nobis praesentia, sunt tamen nobis ignota, in quantum gratuita, quia de eis nulla potest haberi experientia. Unde etsi certissimus sim de affectione mea, secundum quod est affectio, valde tamen dubius sum de affectione mea, utrum sit ordinata vel gratuita; et ita acquiro mihi probabilitatem per aliqua signa7.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de illo verbo Apostoli, quod Magister ponit in littera: Finis praecepti est caritas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta. Quoniam praecepta directius sunt ordinata ad obediendum quam ad amandum, ergo potius debuit dicere8: obedientia est finis praecepti, quam caritas. — Item, cum finis, quem assequimur ex observantia mandatorum, est ipsa vita aeterna, potius deberet dici: finis praecepti est vita aeterna quam caritas.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur de numero et differentia illarum conditionum appositarum, scilicet de corde

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puro etc. Cum enim caritas non sit de fide nec de conscientia, sed potius de affectione, non videtur recte notificari per illas conditiones.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum quod doctores exponunt, Apostolus hic definit caritatem. (Expositio 1.) Sed quidam sic exponunt, ut illae determinationes de corde puro etc. sint determinationes ex parte subiecti; et hoc quod dicitur finis praecepti, sit ipsa notificatio, ut sit sensus: caritas procedens de corde puro etc. est finis praecepti. — (Expositio 2, probabilior.) Alio modo exponitur, ut hoc totum sit notificatio finis praecepti de corde puro etc. Hic modus dicendi videtur congruentior. Et secundum hunc modum dicendi notandum, quod caritas hic definitur per actum suum. Actus autem caritatis, qui est amare, dupliciter habet notificari: et per comparationem ad illud a quo procedit tanquam a principio efficiente, et per comparationem ad illud quod ad ipsam caritatem terminatur sicut ad quietantem; et ideo in illa eius notificatione tangitur eius duplex comparatio, videlicet ad cor purum et ad ipsum praeceptum. Et quia puritas cordis, a qua immediate procedit actus dilectionis, praesupponit fiduciam fidei et certitudinem spei tanquam dispositiones praeambulas; ideo, ut manifestaret Apostolus, quod actus caritatis praesupponit actus aliarum virtutum theologicarum tanquam disponentes ad ipsum; hinc est, quod9 ista tria dicit: de corde puro, in quo tangit caritatis sanctitatem; conscientia bona, in quo tangit spei fiduciam; et fide non ficta, in quo tangit fidei constantiam. Et in his duobus Apostolus caritatem perfectissime commendat, in hoc quod ostendit, quod in actu caritatis consistit complementum omnis virtutis et finis omnis bonae operationis, quae intelligitur in nomine praecepti. Unde intellectus praedictae definitionis est iste: caritas est finis praecepti etc., id est, caritas est illud, in quo consistit omnis mandati adimpletio et omnium virtutum perfectio. Et hinc est, quod Scriptura adeo nobis commendat caritatem, et maxime Scriptura novi Testamenti, et Apostolus10 eam laudat elegantissime.

Quod ergo obiicitur de obedientia et vita aeterna, quod debeant dici finis praecepti; dicendum, quod obedientia ordinata est ad caritatem habendam, et vita aeterna non est aliud quam caritas consummata11.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod finis est Deus Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, neque hi tres sunt tres fines. Sed contra: finis est res, qua fruendum est; sed «hi tres sunt tres res, quibus fruendum est», sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Doctrina christiana12: ergo sunt tres fines. — Item, intentio finis dirigitur per fidem13; sed fides ponit tres articulos in credendo Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum: ergo pari ratione intentio intendit in eum, statuens sibi tres fines.

(Quaestio incidens.) Quaeritur ergo, quare non sit diversitas finium, sicut pluralitas articulorum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod rationis est distinguere, et voluntatis unire. Rursus, sicut dicit Damascenus14, «personae distinguuntur ratione et conveniunt re et natura». Secundum hoc ergo intelligendum est, quod nomina illa, quae sunt communia ad rem et rationem, illa possunt plurificari; illa vero, quae sunt realia, plurificari non possunt. Ideo potest dici, quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt tres res; non tamen potest dici, quod sint tres bonitates. — Rursus, quia articulus dicit quod est in mente (Ad quaest. incidentem.) ex parte rationis, finis vero dicit quod respicit voluntatem; ideo possumus dicere plures articulos, non tamen possumus dicere plures fines. Licet tamen plures sint articuli, una tamen est in eis veritas, quia, cum veritas complexa, secundum quod aliquid ponit, reducatur ad veritatem incomplexam; et una sit veritas incomplexa in Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto, secundum quod sunt una entitas et una veritas: illi tres articuli super unam veritatem realem fundari habent15.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod sunt tres res: dicendum, quod ratio illa non valet: sunt tres res: ergo tres fines; quia proceditur a pluralitate personali ad pluralitatem essentialem; et differenter accipitur res, cum dicitur: finis est res, et cum dicitur: tres sunt res16.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides distinguit; dicendum, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod intentio distinguat plures fines, sicut fides plures articulos; nam cum intentio in caritate consummetur, et caritatis sit unire, plus habet intentio rationem uniendi quam rationem distinguendi17.

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Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de quaestione ultimo proposita in littera, quam Magister non determinat in partem alteram, utrum scilicet voluntas finis et eius quod est ad finem sint duae voluntates, vel una. Nam quod duae sint, videtur per hoc, quod una est creati et alia increati, una temporalis et alia aeterni. Quod autem una sit, videtur per hoc, quod ibi est unum propter alterum; ubi autem hoc est, ibi tantum unum est18, ut cum diligo vinum dulce, non diligo duo, sed unum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister hic ponit duas responsiones, nec tamen aliquam earum reprobat nec aliquam magis approbat. — Et ratio huius est, quia secundum diversas considerationes verum dicit utraque, et utrumque oportet dicere. Una enim dicit, quod sunt voluntates duae; alia dicit, quod est voluntas una. (Notanda distinctio.) Hoc autem dixerunt aspicientes ad diversa. Voluntas enim finis dupliciter potest esse: aut sicut obiecti, aut sicut finis in ratione finis. Si sit voluntas finis sicut obiecti, sic cum aliud sit obiectum creatum, et aliud increatum, alia est voluntas, qua volo finem, et alia, qua volo id quod est ad finem, sicut alius est motus affectionis, quo amo Deum in se, et alius motus, quo amo creaturam. Si autem sit voluntas finis sub ratione finis, in quantum scilicet aliud habet ad ipsum ordinari, sic una voluntate et uno decursu volo utrumque, quamvis voluntas simul et semel non possit ferri super utrumque, sed successive; ut patet, cum amo comestionem propter salutem, quia in amore comestionis includo amorem salutis. — Et secundum has duas vias duo sunt modi dicendi probabiles et veri, si recte fuerint intellecti19.

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English Translation

## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning what he says: The will is known from its end, whether it be right or perverse. Now the end of the will is beatitude. On the contrary: beatitude is a good unknown to us; whence this is that which neither eye has seen nor ear heard1 etc.: therefore, if through what is unknown we cannot know anything else, it seems that the will cannot be known, whether it be good or perverse, from that end. — Likewise, what is present to ourselves is more certain to us than what is absent2; but our will is present to us, beatitude is absent: if therefore we do not know things present through things absent, but rather the converse; it seems that through beatitude there comes about no knowledge of goodness in the will.

(Twofold knowledge of beatitude.) I respond: It must be said that the knowledge of beatitude is twofold, namely in the universal and in the particular. The knowledge of beatitude in the universal is innate in all; but the knowledge in the particular, namely where beatitude is to be placed, is had by us through the habit of faith in some way, and in some way is awaited to be had through the deiformity of glory. For now we know as it were by speculation and from afar and half-fully; but then we shall know by experience perfectly3. Although now we do not know perfectly, we nevertheless know with certitude, by the certitude of faith, that beatitude is a great and true good. Concerning our will, whether it be right or perverse, we know nothing except by conjecture; and therefore, just as a certain thing is a ground of coming4 into the knowledge of a doubtful thing, so the knowledge of beatitude brings one into the knowledge of the goodness of the will, when one sees his will tending toward beatitude.

As for what is objected, that beatitude is unknown to us; this is now clear5. For it is true that it is not known to us by experience, yet it is known to us by faith.

To that which is objected, that the rightness of the will is present to us; it must be said that, as was shown in the first book6, although charity and grace are present to us, they are nevertheless unknown to us, insofar as they are gratuitous, because no experience can be had of them. Hence, even though I am most certain of my affection, insofar as it is an affection, I am nevertheless very doubtful concerning my affection, whether it be ordered or gratuitous; and so I acquire for myself probability through certain signs7.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that word of the Apostle, which the Master sets down in the text: The end of the precept is charity, from a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned. Since precepts are more directly ordered to obeying than to loving, therefore he ought rather to have said8: obedience is the end of the precept, than charity. — Likewise, since the end which we attain from the observance of the commandments is eternal life itself, it ought rather to be said: the end of the precept is eternal life than charity.

In connection with this it is asked concerning the number and difference of those conditions appended, namely concerning a pure

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heart etc. For since charity is not of faith nor of conscience, but rather of affection, it does not seem rightly described by those conditions.

I respond: It must be said that, according to how the doctors expound it, the Apostle here defines charity. (Exposition 1.) But some so expound it that those determinations from a pure heart etc. are determinations on the part of the subject; and that what is called the end of the precept is the description itself, so that the sense is: charity proceeding from a pure heart etc. is the end of the precept. — (Exposition 2, more probable.) In another way it is expounded, so that this whole is the description of the end of the precept, from a pure heart etc. This manner of speaking seems more fitting. And according to this manner of speaking it must be noted that charity is here defined through its act. Now the act of charity, which is to love, has to be described in two ways: both by comparison to that from which it proceeds as from an efficient principle, and by comparison to that in which charity itself is terminated as in what brings rest; and therefore in that description of it its twofold comparison is touched upon, namely to the pure heart and to the precept itself. And because purity of heart, from which the act of love immediately proceeds, presupposes the confidence of faith and the certitude of hope as preambular dispositions; therefore, that the Apostle might manifest that the act of charity presupposes the acts of the other theological virtues as disposing toward it; hence it is that9 he says these three things: from a pure heart, in which he touches the sanctity of charity; a good conscience, in which he touches the confidence of hope; and faith unfeigned, in which he touches the constancy of faith. And in these two the Apostle most perfectly commends charity, in this, that he shows that in the act of charity consists the completion of every virtue and the end of every good operation, which is understood in the name of the precept. Hence the meaning of the aforesaid definition is this: charity is the end of the precept etc., that is, charity is that in which consists the fulfillment of every commandment and the perfection of all the virtues. And hence it is that Scripture so commends charity to us, and especially the Scripture of the New Testament, and the Apostle10 praises it most elegantly.

As for what is objected concerning obedience and eternal life, that they ought to be called the end of the precept; it must be said that obedience is ordered to the having of charity, and eternal life is nothing other than charity consummated11.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the end is God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and yet these three are not three ends. On the contrary: the end is a thing to be enjoyed; but «these three are three things to be enjoyed», as Augustine says in the book On Christian Doctrine12: therefore they are three ends. — Likewise, the intention of the end is directed by faith13; but faith posits three articles in believing in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit: therefore by parity of reason the intention is directed toward Him, setting up for itself three ends.

(Incidental question.) It is asked therefore why there is not a diversity of ends, just as there is a plurality of articles.

I respond: It must be said that it belongs to reason to distinguish, and to the will to unite. Again, as Damascene says14, «the persons are distinguished by reason and agree in reality and nature». According to this, then, it must be understood that those names which are common to reality and reason, those can be pluralized; but those which are real, cannot be pluralized. Therefore it can be said that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three things; yet it cannot be said that they are three goodnesses. — Again, because an article states what is in the mind (To the incidental question.) on the part of reason, whereas the end states what regards the will; therefore we can say several articles, yet we cannot say several ends. Although, however, there are several articles, there is nevertheless one truth in them, because, since complex truth, insofar as it posits something, is reduced to incomplex truth; and there is one incomplex truth in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, insofar as they are one entity and one truth: those three articles have to be founded upon one real truth15.

To that, then, which is objected, that they are three things: it must be said that that argument is not valid: they are three things: therefore three ends; because it proceeds from a personal plurality to an essential plurality; and thing is taken differently when it is said: the end is a thing, and when it is said: they are three things16.

To that which is objected, that faith distinguishes; it must be said that from this it does not follow that the intention distinguishes several ends, just as faith distinguishes several articles; for since the intention is consummated in charity, and it belongs to charity to unite, the intention has more the character of uniting than the character of distinguishing17.

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Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning the question last proposed in the text, which the Master does not determine in either direction, namely whether the will of the end and of that which is toward the end are two wills, or one. For that they are two seems to be the case from this, that one is of the created and the other of the uncreated, one temporal and the other of the eternal. But that it is one seems to be the case from this, that there one thing is for the sake of another; and where this is so, there only one thing is willed18, as when I love sweet wine, I do not love two things, but one.

I respond: It must be said that the Master here sets down two responses, yet does not reject either of them nor approve the one more than the other. — And the reason for this is that according to diverse considerations each says what is true, and both must be said. For one says that there are two wills; the other says that there is one will. (A distinction to be noted.) Now they said this looking to different things. For the will of the end can be in two ways: either as of an object, or as of an end in the character of an end. If it be the will of the end as of an object, then, since the object created is one thing and the uncreated another, the will by which I will the end is one, and that by which I will what is toward the end is another, just as the motion of affection by which I love God in Himself is one, and the motion by which I love a creature is another. But if it be the will of the end under the character of an end, namely insofar as something else has to be ordered to it, then by one will and one course I will both, although the will cannot at one and the same time be borne upon both, but successively; as is clear, when I love eating for the sake of health, because in the love of eating I include the love of health. — And according to these two ways there are two manners of speaking that are probable and true, if they be rightly understood19.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Isai. 64, 4; I. Cor. 2, 9. — De proposit. seq. cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 1; VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.); I. Phys. text. 2. (c. 1.), iam supra pag. 441, nota 1. allatus. — Paulo ante pro unde ed. 1 substituit nam, et deinde pro ergo si posito sed, ante videtur exhibet ergo.
    Isaiah 64:4; 1 Corinthians 2:9. — On the proposition that follows cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 1; Topics VI, c. 3 (c. 4); Physics I, text 2 (c. 1), already adduced above on p. 441, note 1. — A little before, for unde (whence) edition 1 substitutes nam (for), and then, with sed placed for ergo si, exhibits ergo before videtur.
  2. Vide supra pag. 194, nota 2. — In edd., excepta 1, desideratur proposit. minor: sed voluntas... est absens.
    See above p. 194, note 2. — In the editions, except 1, the minor proposition is wanting: but the will... is absent.
  3. Epist. 1. Cor. 13, 12: Videmus nunc per speculum etc. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. q. 2.
    Epistle 1 Corinthians 13:12: We see now through a glass etc. Cf. IV Sentences d. 49, p. 1, q. 2.
  4. Codd. N. Z deveniendi.
    Codices N and Z read deveniendi (of arriving).
  5. Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 adiiciunt responsio.
    The Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 add responsio (response).
  6. Dist. 17. p. I. q. 3.
    Distinction 17, p. 1, q. 3.
  7. De hoc dubio cfr. Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. I.
    On this doubt cf. Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text I.
  8. Cod. K dici. In seq. proposit. pro dici, quae lectio est multorum codd. et edd. 1, 2, Vat. substituit ftere. In eodem arg. pro est ipsa cod. cc, ed. 1 et Vat. sit ipsa.
    Codex K reads dici. In the following proposition, for dici, which is the reading of many codices and of editions 1, 2, the Vatican edition substitutes ftere. In the same argument, for est ipsa codex cc, edition 1 and the Vatican edition read sit ipsa.
  9. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 omittit hinc est, quod. Cod. dd et ed. 1 ad ipsam pro ad ipsum.
    The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 omits hinc est, quod (hence it is, that). Codex dd and edition 1 read ad ipsam for ad ipsum.
  10. Epist. 1. Cor. 13, 1. seqq. Cfr. Gal. 5, 6; Ephes. 3, 17. seqq.; Coloss. 3, 14; I. Petr. 1, 22; 1. Ioan. 4, 16.
    Epistle 1 Corinthians 13:1 ff. Cf. Galatians 5:6; Ephesians 3:17 ff.; Colossians 3:14; 1 Peter 1:22; 1 John 4:16.
  11. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2. cfr. etiam Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
    Cf. above a. 1, q. 2; cf. also Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.
  12. Libr. I. c. 5. n. 5. Vide etiam lit. Magistri, I. Sent. d. 1. c. 2. seq.
    Book I, c. 5, n. 5. See also the text of the Master, I Sentences d. 1, c. 2 f.
  13. Cfr. infra lit. Magistri d. XLI. c. 1. 2.
    Cf. below the text of the Master, d. 41, c. 1, 2.
  14. Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 8. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 26. q. 1. ad 2. — De ratione praeced. cfr. supra pag. 655, nota 5. et pag. 124, nota 4.
    Book I, On the Orthodox Faith, c. 8. Cf. I Sentences d. 26, q. 1, ad 2. — On the preceding argument cf. above p. 655, note 5, and p. 124, note 4.
  15. Plura de articulis fidei habentur III. Sent. d. 24. a. 3. q. 1. seq. — Aliquanto superius pro Licet tamen Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 Licet enim, et postea eaedem edd. nec non ed. 2 una caritas pro una entitas.
    More on the articles of faith is found in III Sentences d. 24, a. 3, q. 1 f. — Somewhat above, for Licet tamen (although however) the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads Licet enim (although for), and afterwards the same editions, as well as edition 2, read una caritas (one charity) for una entitas (one entity).
  16. Haec obiectio solvitur etiam I. Sent. d. 1. dub. 7. et d. 25. dub. 3.
    This objection is also solved in I Sentences d. 1, dub. 7, and d. 25, dub. 3.
  17. De hoc dubio cfr. Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
    On this doubt cf. Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.
  18. Vide supra pag. 639, nota 2. De exemplo allato cfr. supra pag. 614, nota 3. — Post vinum Vat. interiicit quia.
    See above p. 639, note 2. On the example adduced cf. above p. 614, note 3. — After vinum (wine) the Vatican edition inserts quia (because).
  19. Eandem solutionem exhibet S. Thom., hic a. 4. et circa lit. Cfr. etiam Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 6.
    S. Thomas presents the same solution, here a. 4 and on the text. Cf. also Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text 6. ---
← Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 2