Bonaventure

Quaestio III. Utrum quis certitudinaliter scire possit, se esse in caritate.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum caritas sit certitudinaliter cognoscibilis ab habente. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Auctoritate Augustini in octavo de Trinitate, et habetur in littera¹: «Qui fratrem diligit, magis novit dilectionem, qua diligit, quam fratrem, quem diligit»; sed fratrem novit certitudinaliter: ergo et caritatem.

2. Item, primae Ioannis secundo²: Qui diligit fratrem suum, in lumine manet: ergo si caritas est lumen, cum nihil certius videatur quam lumen, ergo etc.

3. Item, primae Ioannis secundo³: Unctio docebit vos de omnibus, non, inquam, de omnibus cognoscibilibus, sed de omnibus necessariis ad salutem: sed caritas est maxime necessaria ad salutem: ergo eam maxime nos docet unctio Spiritus sancti.

4. Item, quanto aliquid animae est⁴ praesentius, tanto certius videtur et cognoscitur; sed caritas animae est praesentissima, quia est in ipsa anima: ergo etc.

5. Item, habens fidem certus est, se habere fidem; nihil enim certius est homini sua fide, ut dicit Augustinus⁵: ergo pari ratione habens caritatem scit, se habere caritatem.

Contra:

1. Ecclesiastis nono⁶: Nemo scit, utrum sit odio, an amore dignus sit: ergo cum habens caritatem sit dignus amore, nescit se dignum, ergo etc.

2. Item, primae ad Corinthios quarto⁷: Nihil mihi conscius sum, sed non in hoc iustificatus sum: ergo videtur, quod homo non habens remorsum possit non esse iustificatus, ergo non habere caritatem; sed nullum signum evidentius est caritatis quam carentia omnis remorsus: ergo si illud est fallibile, cetera sunt fallibilia.

3. Item, caritatis⁸ est diligere Deum propter se et super omnia, ita quod nihil aeque vel supra vel contra; sed nemo scit, utrum prae omnibus diligat Deum: ergo nemo scit, utrum habeat certitudinaliter caritatem.

4. Item, habentis caritatem est Deo acceptus, et hoc⁹ constat nobis et omnibus, quod ista sunt con-

vertibilia; sed nemo scit, utrum Deo sit acceptus nisi per revelationem: ergo nemo scit, se habere caritatem nisi per revelationem.

5. Item, dicit Apostolus¹⁰, quod nesciebat, utrum haberet culpam, cum dicit: sed non in hoc iustificatus sum; ergo ab oppositis, nesciebat, se habere gratiam: ergo cum caritas non sit sine gratia, ergo etc.

Conclusio. Homo in statu viae, sed sine revelatione, nec de se nec de alio potest scire certitudinaliter, quod sit in caritate, tamen hoc per signa aliqua potest probabiliter cognoscere.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod caritatem cognosci certitudinaliter¹¹ est dupliciter: vel in universali, quid sit et qualis esse debeat, et sic utique cognosci potest; alio modo est cognosci caritatem in speciali sive in hoc, et hoc modo nec de se nec de alio, quamdiu homo vivit, potest certitudinaliter scire: de alio non, quia non novit, quae sunt in homine¹², nisi per signa, quae fallibilia sunt; de se non, et huius potest esse quadruplex ratio.

Una et praecipua est divinae acceptationis implicatio; quia caritas iuncta est gratiae gratum facienti, quae ideo dicitur gratum faciens, quia reddit hominem Deo acceptum; et ideo caritas sic vocatur, non tantum quia habet carum amatum, sed etiam quia facit hominem Deo carum. Et quia nescimus Dei acceptationem certitudinaliter nisi per revelationem, ideo nescimus, nos habere caritatem, nisi per revelationem doceamur.

Secunda ratio est similitudo ipsius ad dilectionem acquisitam. Potest enim contingere, aliquem inflammari ad amandum Deum per assuefactionem, qui corruet per aliquod peccatum spirituale, et tamen semper afficietur; sicut expresse patet per beatum Bernardum in libro de Amore Dei¹³, ubi reprehendit superbientes de devotione.

Tertia ratio est nostri oculi lippitudo, quia oculus noster est sicut oculus noctuae ad manifestissima naturae, sicut dicit Philosophus¹⁴. Unde sicut oculus lippus nesciret distinguere inter lumen diei et lumen flammae vel lunae, ita oculus noster spiritualis inter lumen gratiae gratis datae et gratum facientis.

Quarta ratio est divinorum iudiciorum dispensatio. Deus enim claudit oculos servorum suorum quantum ad ea quae spectant ad eorum dignitatem, et de quibus possunt efferri. Unde gratia contraria est superbiae. Superbia enim aperit oculos ad videndum praerogativas et claudit ad videndum indigentias et defectus, iuxta illud Apocalypsis tertio¹⁵: Dicis, quia dives sum et locupletatus et nullius indigeo, et nescis, quia pauper es et caecus etc. Sed e contra vir sanctus dicit, se nihil esse, quia claudit¹⁶ oculos suos Deus ad bona et aperit ad videnda mala. Et haec est ratio, quare homo non cognoscit caritatem, quae quamvis per se non sufficiat, tamen cum aliis bona est. Credo tamen, quod illa est praecipua, quae primo dicta est.

Quamvis autem caritas non possit certitudinaliter cognosci esse in aliquo etiam ab habente¹⁷ re-

spectu sui, tamen potest per signa probabilia cognosci, maxime per mortificationem concupiscentiae et amoris vani sive mundani et per multa alia signa, quae Sancti dicunt et ponunt¹⁸.

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod certior est dilectio quam frater; dicendum, quod caritas non tantum dicit dilectionem, sed ultra hoc addit, scilicet¹⁹, quod gratuita est. Et quantum ad habitum dilectionis certitudinaliter est cognoscibilis, quantum vero ad illud quod dicit gratuitum, non.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas est lumen: dicendum, quod quamvis de se caritas sit cognoscibilis, tamen non cognoscitur a nobis, quia oculus noster lippus est.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unctio docet nos de omnibus necessariis ad salutem; dicendum, quod verum est eo modo, quo necessaria sunt; sed scire, se habere caritatem, non est necessarium ad salutem, sed solum habere.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de praesentia caritatis, dicendum, quod quamvis substantia habitus sit praesens, tamen conditio, quae concomitatur habitum, scilicet divina acceptatio, non est praesens, immo latens in Dei cognitione et iudicio.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de fide, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia fides dicit habitum purum, non superaddendo acceptationem, sicut caritas, et ideo patet, quod non est simile.

Question III. Whether one can know with certainty that he is in charity.

Thirdly it is asked, whether charity is knowable with certainty by the one who has it. And that it is, seems so:

1. By the authority of Augustine in book eight On the Trinity, also found in the Master's text¹: «He who loves his brother knows the love by which he loves more than the brother whom he loves»; but he knows the brother with certainty: therefore charity also.

2. Likewise, the first [letter] of John, [chapter] two²: He who loves his brother abides in the light: therefore if charity is light, since nothing seems more certain than light, therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the first [letter] of John, [chapter] two³: The anointing will teach you concerning all things, not, I say, concerning all things knowable, but concerning all things necessary for salvation: but charity is most necessary for salvation: therefore most of all does the anointing of the Holy Spirit teach us about it.

4. Likewise, the more anything is⁴ present to the soul, the more certainly it is seen and known; but charity is most present to the soul, since it is in the soul itself: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, one having faith is certain that he has faith; for nothing is more certain to a man than his own faith, as Augustine says⁵: therefore by parity of reasoning the one having charity knows that he has charity.

On the contrary:

1. Ecclesiastes nine⁶: No one knows whether he is worthy of hatred or love: therefore since the one having charity is worthy of love, he does not know himself worthy, therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the first [letter] to the Corinthians, [chapter] four⁷: I am conscious of nothing in myself, yet I am not justified by this: therefore it seems that a man not having any remorse can fail to be justified, and so fail to have charity; but no sign is more evident of charity than the absence of all remorse: therefore if that is fallible, the rest are fallible.

3. Likewise, it belongs to charity⁸ to love God for his own sake and above all things, in such a way that nothing is loved equally or above or contrary; but no one knows whether he loves God before all things: therefore no one knows whether he has charity with certainty.

4. Likewise, the one having charity is acceptable to God, and this⁹ is plain to us and to all, that these are convertible; but no one knows whether he is acceptable to God except by revelation: therefore no one knows that he has charity except by revelation.

5. Likewise, the Apostle says¹⁰ that he did not know whether he had guilt, when he says: yet I am not justified by this; therefore by the opposite, he did not know that he had grace: therefore since charity is not without grace, therefore etc.

Conclusio. A man in the state of the wayfarer, apart from revelation, can know with certainty neither concerning himself nor concerning another that he is in charity; nevertheless he can probably know it through certain signs.

I respond: It must be said that to know charity with certainty¹¹ is twofold: either in universal — what it is and what kind it ought to be — and in this way it certainly can be known; the other way is to know charity in particular, that is, in this individual, and in this way neither concerning himself nor concerning another, as long as a man lives, can he know it with certainty: concerning another, no, because he does not know what is in a man¹², except through signs, which are fallible; concerning himself, no, and of this there can be a fourfold reason.

The first and chief is the implication of divine acceptation; for charity is joined to grace gratum-faciens (grace making one pleasing), which is therefore called gratum faciens because it renders a man acceptable to God; and therefore charity is so called, not only because it has the loved one as dear, but also because it makes the man dear to God. And because we do not know God's acceptation with certainty except through revelation, therefore we do not know that we have charity unless we are taught through revelation.

The second reason is its likeness to acquired love. For it can happen that someone be inflamed to loving God through habituation, who will fall through some spiritual sin, and yet will always be moved [in feeling]; as plainly appears through blessed Bernard in the book On the Love of God¹³, where he reproves those who pride themselves on their devotion.

The third reason is the bleariness of our eye, since our eye is like the owl's eye toward the most manifest things in nature, as the Philosopher says¹⁴. Whence, just as a bleary eye could not distinguish between the light of day and the light of a flame or of the moon, so neither can our spiritual eye [distinguish] between the light of grace freely given (gratis data) and that of grace making one pleasing (gratum faciens).

The fourth reason is the dispensation of the divine judgments. For God closes the eyes of his servants with respect to those things which pertain to their dignity, and concerning which they could be puffed up. Whence grace is contrary to pride. For pride opens the eyes to seeing prerogatives and closes them to seeing wants and defects, according to that of Apocalypse three¹⁵: You say, "I am rich and grown wealthy and have need of nothing," and you do not know that you are poor and blind etc. But on the contrary the holy man says that he is nothing, because God closes¹⁶ his eyes to the goods and opens them to the seeing of evils. And this is the reason why a man does not know charity, which, although by itself it does not suffice, nevertheless is good with the others. I believe, however, that the chief [reason] is the one stated first.

Although charity cannot be known with certainty to be in anyone, even by the one having¹⁷ it with respect to himself, nevertheless it can be known through probable signs, especially through the mortification of concupiscence and of vain or worldly love, and through many other signs which the Saints state and set forth¹⁸.

Ad 1. To that which is objected to the contrary, that love is more certain than the brother; it must be said that charity does not only signify love, but adds beyond this, namely¹⁹, that it is gratuitous. And as to the habit of love it is knowable with certainty, but as to that which it expresses by gratuitous, no.

Ad 2. To that which is objected, that charity is light: it must be said that, although charity is in itself knowable, nevertheless it is not known by us, because our eye is bleary.

Ad 3. To that which is objected, that the anointing teaches us concerning all things necessary for salvation; it must be said that this is true in the manner in which they are necessary; but to know that one has charity is not necessary for salvation, but only to have it.

Ad 4. To that which is objected concerning the presence of charity, it must be said that, although the substance of the habit is present, nevertheless the condition that accompanies the habit, namely the divine acceptation, is not present, but is rather hidden in God's knowledge and judgment.

Ad 5. To that which is objected concerning faith, it must be said that it is not similar, because faith signifies a habit pure and simple, without superadding an acceptation as charity does, and so it is plain that it is not similar.