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Dist. 17, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 17

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II. Utrum caritas diligenda sit ex caritate.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum caritas sit amabilis ex caritate; et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Augustinus octavo de Trinitate1: «Nemo dicat: non novi, quid diligam: diligat fratrem et diligit ipsam dilectionem»: ergo dilectio est diligenda; ergo etc.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia non est perfecta cognitio nisi illa, qua quis novit se nosse sive novit ipsam notitiam, ergo nec perfectus amor nisi ille, quo quis amat se amare sive amorem; sed caritas est perfectus amor: ergo etc.

3. Item, aliquis diligit proximum et recte, quia videt, eum habere caritatem; sed «propter quod unumquodque et illud2 magis3»: ergo magis debet diligere caritatem sive dilectionem.

Contra:

1. Augustinus in libro primo de Doctrina christiana4 dicit, tantum quatuor esse diligenda ex caritate, scilicet Deum, se ipsum, proximum et corpus proprium; sed caritas sive dilectio non est aliquod horum: ergo non est diligenda ex caritate.

2. Item, duplex est dilectio, scilicet concupiscentiae et amicitiae; si ergo caritas sive dilectio diligitur, aut ergo dilectione concupiscentiae, aut amicitiae. Non amicitiae; constat, quia amicitia est inter similes et amor, quo aliquis optat alii bonum; caritati autem nemo optat bonum. Item, nec concupiscentiae; quia concupiscentia est rei non habitae: ergo cum ex caritate nemo diligat nisi5 habens caritatem, ergo ex caritate non potest quis concupiscere caritatem. — Si tu dicas, quod concupiscit augmentum caritatis, hoc non solvit, quia ego non quaero, nisi utrum caritas habita, secundum quod habita est, possit amari.

3. Item, sicut se habet fides ad credere, et spes ad actum sperandi, ita dilectio sive caritas ad actum diligendi; sed nullus habens fidem credit fidem vel in fidem; quia, sicut dicit Augustinus6: «Credens scit,

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se credere, et videt, se credere»; credulitas autem est de non visis; similiter autem nullus sperat ipsam spem: ergo a simili nec diligit caritatem; vel si non est simile, quaeritur: quare non?

4. Item, si diligens diligit dilectionem, aut eadem, aut alia. Si alia, tunc pari ratione et aliam dilectionem diligit alia; et sic erit abire in infinitum. Si ergo stare est et non contingit abire in infinitum, si diligit, diligit7 eadem. Sed si hoc; contra: nulla forma specialis super se ipsam reflectitur nisi de primis intentionibus, sicut unitas, veritas, bonitas; unde nullo modo dicitur albedo alba: ergo nec dilectio dilecta. et sic etc.

Conclusio. Caritas creata non amore amicitiae diligenda est, sed amore tum concupiscentiae tum complacentiae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod accipiendo dilectionem, secundum quod Deus dilectio est, constat utique, quod ex caritate est diligenda. Sed accipiendo dilectionem, secundum quod est habitus gratuitus, sic utique8 diligenda est, sed non super omnia.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum notandum, quod triplex est amor, scilicet amicitiae, quo aliquis optat alicui bonum9; concupiscentiae, quo aliquis sibi desiderat aliquid; et complacentiae, quo aliquis requiescit et delectatur in re desiderata, cum praesens est10.

Dico ergo, quod caritas amore amicitiae nullo modo est amabilis, quia non est beatificabilis; amore concupiscentiae est amabilis ex caritate, secundum quod diligens desiderat amplius diligere; amore vero11 complacentiae, scilicet quod diligens acceptat ipsam dilectionem, qua Deum diligit, hoc12 diligenda est caritas, secundum quod iam habetur, eo quod ipsa est bonum valde acceptabile.

Ad 1. His visis, patet responsio ad duo prima. Nam ratio illa ex auctoritate Augustini de Doctrina christiana currit solum quantum ad dilectionem amicitiae, quia Augustinus loquitur de amabili, cui aliquis optat bonum.

Ad 2. Quod secundo obiicitur13 similiter patet. Quamvis enim caritatis habitae, secundum quod habita, non sit concupiscentia, nihilominus tamen est complacentia. — Posset tamen dici, quod spiritualis dilectio14 et possessio excitat ad desiderandum, dum reficit, et reficit, dum excitat: ideo simul manent concupiscentia et complacentia.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio de fide et spe, dicendum, quod non est simile; quia actus15 fidei de se dicit imperfectionem, similiter et spei; alter enim est rei non visae, alter rei non habitae; et ideo si talis actus reflecteretur, diminueret de ratione habitus; unde qui credit credulitatem, non habet eam16, et spem similiter; et ideo hae virtutes evacuantur in patria. Sed dilectio est actus completionis et perfectionis, sicut scientia; unde sicut perfecte scit qui scit, se scire, ita perfecte diligit qui amat dilectionem.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, aut eadem, aut alia etc.; dicendum, quod eadem quantum ad habitum, sed alia quantum ad actum.

Et quod obiicitur, quod specialia17 non reflectuntur; dicendum, quod reflexio in forma aliquando venit ex natura18; et sic est in generalibus; aliquando venit ratione eius, in quo est; et sic est in formis, quae sunt in potentiis natis supra se converti, et in quantum supra se convertuntur. Et quoniam potentia cognitiva se ipsam cognoscit, «et voluntas est instrumentum se ipsum movens19», ideo per scientiam aliquis se et scientiam novit, et per caritatem se et ipsam diligit.

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Et si quaeratur20 ratio, quare potentia intellectiva nata est supra se redire et voluntas, alibi dicetur21: sed modo tantum sufficiat, quia sunt simplices potentiae et in substantia simplici fundatae et organo non alligatae; et ideo patet, quod non est simile illud quod obiici consuevit: in sensibus alia est potentia, quae22 videt, et alia, quae videt, se videre: quod similiter debeat esse in intellectu.

Scholion

I. Primo in genere quaestio resolvitur affirmative et per duplicem conclusionem, scilicet respectu caritatis increatae et creatae. Deinde quoad habitum creatum accuratius determinatur, qua specie amoris triplicis sit diligendus.

II. Solut. ad 1. praesupponit, quod obiectum caritatis in genere sumtae est duplex. Vel enim ipsum est capax beatitudinis, vel solummodo est medium, per quod possit quis adiuvari, ut beatificetur. Ad primum genus pertinent illa tria a S. Augustino enumerata, unde haec amore amicitiae diligi possunt; ad secundum genus omnis creatura pertinet, et sic omnis creatura ut medium ad summum bonum diligi potest. Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1.

Primae intentiones, de quibus sermo est in solut. ad 4. sunt notiones transcendentales: ens, unum, verum, bonum; quae «super se ipsas reflectuntur», i. e. de se praedicantur, ut v. g. veritas est una, vera, bona. Formae vero speciales sunt, quae constant ex genere et differentia. Ipsae ex natura sua non possunt aliter de se praedicari; interdum tamen hoc fieri potest ratione subiecti, in quo sunt, si hoc habet actus reflexos super se ipsum, sicut est in duabus potentiis voluntatis et intellectus; cfr. supra d. 3. p. 1. dub. 3.

III. Quoad ipsam quaestionem cfr. Summa de Virtutibus, sub nomine Alexandri de Hales Parisiis 1509 ap. Ioan. Petit impressa, coll. 64. a. 7. De hac Summa controversia exorta est occasione eorum, quae a Waddingo (Annales ad an. 1245) aliisque Ord. Min. auctoribus scripta sunt, scil. quod S. Thom. multa inde in suam Summam theolog., praesertim in secundam partem secundae acceperit. Ex adverso Natalis Alexander, Echardus, de Rubeis eo progressi sunt, ut hanc Summam existere sive manuscriptam sive impressam negarent, de quo videri potest de Rubeis, Dissertat. criticae, diss. 15, quae etiam in modernis Summae S. Thom. editionibus impressa est. Sed in hoc falluntur viri doctissimi, cum plura huius Summae exemplaria impressa adhuc supersint, ut in bibliotheca regali Monachii et Conventus nostri Trudonopolitano (St. Trond) in Belgio. Ex ipso autem initio huius operis apparet, quod non sit liber distinctus, sed pars alterius operis, scil. magnae Summae Alex. Hal., ut videtur. Attamen huius Summae auctor ipse Alex. Hal. esse non potest, quia multae quaestiones verbotenus sumtae sunt ex hoc Commentario S. Bonaventurae. Videtur potius esse Gulielmi de Melitona, qui 1236, iubente Summo Pontifice Alexandro IV., incompletam Alexandri Hal. Summam continuare incepit; sed et ipse post quatuor annos, morte correptus, opus incompletum reliquit. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 5; S. II. II. q. 26. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; de hac et seq. q. S. p. I. tr. 8. q. 36. m. 3. q. incid. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 3. princ. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether charity is to be loved out of charity.

Secondly it is asked, whether charity is lovable out of charity; and that it is, is shown in this manner.

1. Augustine, in book eight On the Trinity1: «Let no one say: I do not know what I love: let him love his brother and he loves love itself»: therefore love is to be loved; therefore etc.

2. Likewise, this same point seems to follow by reason, since there is no perfect knowledge except that by which one knows that he knows or knows knowledge itself; therefore neither is there perfect love except that by which one loves that he loves or love itself; but charity is the perfect love: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, someone loves his neighbor, and rightly, because he sees that he has charity; but «that on account of which a thing is so, that thing is so the more23»: therefore he ought the more to love charity or love.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine in book one On Christian Doctrine4 says that there are only four things to be loved out of charity, namely God, oneself, one's neighbor, and one's own body; but charity or love is none of these: therefore it is not to be loved out of charity.

2. Likewise, love is twofold, namely of concupiscence and of friendship; if therefore charity or love is loved, it is loved either with the love of concupiscence or with that of friendship. Not with that of friendship; for it is plain that friendship is between equals and is the love by which someone wishes another's good; but no one wishes a good for charity. Likewise, neither with that of concupiscence; for concupiscence is of a thing not possessed: therefore since out of charity no one loves except5 one having charity, therefore out of charity one cannot have concupiscence for charity. — If you say that one has concupiscence for the increase of charity, this does not solve it, because I am not asking anything except whether charity, when possessed, can, insofar as it is possessed, be loved.

3. Likewise, as faith is to believing, and hope to the act of hoping, so love or charity is to the act of loving; but no one having faith believes faith or believes in faith; for, as Augustine says6: «The believer knows that he believes, and sees that he believes»; but credulity is of things not seen; likewise no one hopes for hope itself: therefore, by parity of reasoning, neither does anyone love charity; or, if it is not parallel, the question is asked: why not?

4. Likewise, if the lover loves love, either it is the same love or another. If another, then by parity of reasoning he loves that other love by yet another; and so it will be a regress to infinity. If, then, one must stop somewhere and it is impossible to go to infinity, if he loves, he loves with the same love7. But if this is so; on the contrary: no special form is reflected upon itself except those of the first intentions, such as unity, truth, goodness; whence whiteness is in no way called white: therefore neither is love loved. And so on.

Conclusio. Created charity is to be loved not with the love of friendship, but with the love both of concupiscence and of complacency.

I respond: It must be said that, taking love insofar as God is love, it is certain that it is to be loved out of charity. But taking love insofar as it is a gratuitous habit, in this way too8 it is to be loved, but not above all things.

For the understanding of the objections it must be noted that love is threefold, namely of friendship, by which someone wishes a good for another9; of concupiscence, by which someone desires something for himself; and of complacency, by which someone rests and takes delight in a thing desired, when it is present10.

I say therefore that charity is in no way lovable with the love of friendship, because it is not capable of being beatified; with the love of concupiscence it is lovable out of charity, insofar as the lover desires to love more amply; but with the love11 of complacency, namely insofar as the lover accepts the very love by which he loves God, in this way12 charity is to be loved, insofar as it is already possessed, since it itself is a good highly to be welcomed.

To 1. With these things seen, the response to the first two is plain. For that argument from the authority of Augustine On Christian Doctrine runs only with respect to the love of friendship, since Augustine is speaking of a lovable object for which someone wishes a good.

To 2. What is objected in the second place13 is plain in like manner. For although there is no concupiscence of charity-already-possessed, considered as possessed, nevertheless there is complacency. — It might however also be said that spiritual love14 and possession excite to desiring, while they refresh, and refresh, while they excite: therefore concupiscence and complacency remain together.

To 3. To what is objected in the third place concerning faith and hope, it must be said that it is not parallel; because the act15 of faith of itself bespeaks an imperfection, and likewise the act of hope; for the one is of a thing not seen, the other of a thing not possessed; and therefore if such an act were reflected upon itself, it would diminish from the character of the habit; whence he who believes credulity does not have it16, and likewise hope; and therefore these virtues are emptied out in the homeland. But love is an act of completion and perfection, like knowledge; whence just as he knows perfectly who knows that he knows, so he loves perfectly who loves love.

To 4. To what is objected, "either the same or another etc.": it must be said, the same as to habit, but another as to act.

And to the objection that special17 forms are not reflected back: it must be said that reflection in a form sometimes comes from nature18; and so it is in general [forms]; sometimes it comes by reason of that in which it is; and so it is in forms which are in potencies born to be turned back upon themselves, and insofar as they are turned back upon themselves. And since the cognitive power knows itself, «and the will is an instrument moving itself19», therefore through knowledge one knows oneself and one's knowledge, and through charity one loves oneself and charity itself.

And if it be asked20 why the intellective power is born to return upon itself, and likewise the will, this will be said elsewhere21; but for the present let it suffice that they are simple powers, founded in a simple substance, and not bound to an organ; and therefore it is plain that the case which is wont to be objected is not parallel: in the senses, one power22 sees, and another sees that it sees: [the objection being] that the like ought to obtain in the intellect.

Scholion

I. First, in general, the question is resolved affirmatively and through a twofold conclusion, namely with respect to uncreated charity and to created [charity]. Then, as to the created habit, it is more accurately determined by which species of the threefold love it is to be loved.

II. The reply To 1 presupposes that the object of charity, taken in general, is twofold. For either it is itself capable of beatitude, or it is only a means by which someone can be helped to be beatified. To the first kind belong those three enumerated by St. Augustine, whence these can be loved with the love of friendship; to the second kind every creature belongs, and so every creature can be loved as a means to the highest good. Cf. above d. 1, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1.

The first intentions, of which there is mention in the reply to 4, are the transcendental notions: being, one, true, good; which «are reflected upon themselves», i.e. are predicated of themselves, as for example: truth is one, true, good. But the special forms are those which consist of genus and difference. They by their nature cannot otherwise be predicated of themselves; sometimes however this can occur by reason of the subject in which they are, if this has acts reflexive upon itself, as is the case in the two powers of will and intellect; cf. above d. 3, p. 1, dub. 3.

III. Concerning the question itself cf. the Summa de Virtutibus, printed under the name of Alexander of Hales at Paris in 1509 by Jean Petit, col. 64, a. 7. Concerning this Summa a controversy arose on the occasion of what was written by Wadding (Annales, at the year 1245) and other authors of the Order of Friars Minor, namely that St. Thomas took many things from it into his Summa theol., especially into the second part of the second. On the other side, Natalis Alexander, Echard, and de Rubeis went so far as to deny that this Summa existed either in manuscript or in print, on which one may consult de Rubeis, Critical Dissertations, diss. 15, which is also printed in modern editions of St. Thomas's Summa. But in this these very learned men are deceived, since several printed copies of this Summa still survive, as in the royal library of Munich and in our convent at Trudonopolis (St. Trond) in Belgium. From the very beginning of this work, however, it appears that it is not a separate book, but part of another work, namely of the great Summa of Alexander of Hales, as it seems. Yet the author of this Summa cannot himself be Alexander of Hales, since many questions are taken word-for-word from this Commentary of St. Bonaventure. Rather it seems to be by William of Melitona, who in 1236, at the bidding of the Supreme Pontiff Alexander IV, began to continue the unfinished Summa of Alexander of Hales; but he too, after four years, overtaken by death, left the work unfinished. — S. Thom., here q. 1, a. 5; S. II. II. q. 26, a. 2. — B. Albert., here a. 3; on this and the next question, S. p. I. tr. 8. q. 36. m. 3. q. incid. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 4. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 2. — Aegid. R., here 3. princ. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. August., de Trin. l. VIII. c. 8. n. 12. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.
    Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. VIII, c. 8, n. 12. See here the Master's text, c. 1.
  2. Vat., plurimis mss. et ed. I obnitentibus, illud pro aliud.
    The Vatican edition, against most manuscripts and the first edition, reads illud in place of aliud.
  3. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2; in quo textu Vat. cum aliquibus codd. post unumquodque addit tale. Cfr. supra d. 12. q. 2. arg. 1. ad opp.
    Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] I, c. 2; in which text the Vatican edition with some manuscripts adds tale after unumquodque. Cf. above d. 12, q. 2, arg. 1, ad oppositum.
  4. Cap. 23. n. 22: Cum ergo quatuor sint diligenda: unum quod supra nos est, alterum quod nos sumus, tertium quod iuxta nos est, quartum quod infra nos est. In quo textu, uti a S. Bonaventura refertur, Vat. post proximum addit et corpus proximi, quod et multi codd. habent, omissis tamen verbis et corpus proprium; aliqui tandem codd. ut F H V Z cc cum ed. I exhibent lectionem in textum receptam, quae confirmatur etiam ex d. 1. a. 1. q. 2. arg. 1. ad opp., ubi eadem sententia allegatur. Mox cod. V aliqui pro aliquod.
    Ch. 23, n. 22: Since therefore there are four things to be loved: one which is above us, another which we ourselves are, a third which is alongside us, a fourth which is below us. In this text, as cited by St. Bonaventure, the Vatican edition adds et corpus proximi after proximum, which many manuscripts also have, the words et corpus proprium however being omitted; some manuscripts finally, such as F, H, V, Z, cc, with the first edition exhibit the reading received into the text, which is confirmed also from d. 1, a. 1, q. 2, arg. 1, ad oppositum, where the same opinion is alleged. Next codex V reads aliqui for aliquod.
  5. Ed. I non loco nisi, eodem sensu.
    The first edition reads non in place of nisi, with the same sense.
  6. Libr. XIII. de Trin. c. 1. n. 3., ubi agit de modo, quo fidem, quae in nobis est, cognoscimus et concludit: Eam (fidem) tenet certissima scientia clamatque conscientia. Et ibid. c. 2. n. 3: Suam igitur quisque fidem apud se ipsum videt. — Mox cod. K post est addit de rebus, et paulo infra post spem Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. I adiungit sed habet.
    Bk. XIII On the Trinity, c. 1, n. 3., where he treats of the manner in which we know the faith that is in us, and concludes: Most certain knowledge holds it (faith), and conscience proclaims it. And in the same place, c. 2, n. 3: Each one therefore sees his own faith within himself. — Next codex K, after est, adds de rebus, and a little below, after spem, the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first edition, adds sed habet.
  7. Nonnulli codd. ut G H K T bb diligei. Paulo infra post primis cod. O adiicit est. De hac primarum intentionum reflexione vide supra d. 3. p. 1. dub. 3.
    Some manuscripts, such as G, H, K, T, bb, read diligei. A little below, after primis, codex O adds est. On this reflection of the first intentions see above d. 3, p. 1, dub. 3.
  8. Plures codd. cum ed. I omittunt utique.
    Several manuscripts with the first edition omit utique.
  9. Aliqui codd. ut A T etc. et ed. I addunt et.
    Some manuscripts, such as A, T, etc., and the first edition, add et.
  10. De triplici hoc amore cfr. III. Sent. d. 29. dub. 4.
    On this threefold love cf. III. Sentences, d. 29, dub. 4.
  11. Mss. antiquiores cum ed. I exhibent particulam vero in Vat. omissam.
    The older manuscripts with the first edition exhibit the particle vero, omitted in the Vatican edition.
  12. Scil. amore complacentiae. — Multi codd. cum ed. I haec loco hoc, sed perperam, quia agitur de idem, caritate respectu triplicis amoris; cod. Y sic pro hoc; Vat. hoc modo.
    Namely with the love of complacency. — Many manuscripts with the first edition read haec in place of hoc, but wrongly, since the discussion concerns the same, namely charity in respect of the threefold love; codex Y reads sic in place of hoc; the Vatican edition reads hoc modo.
  13. Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc quaeritur.
    The Vatican edition, with the more recent codex cc, reads quaeritur.
  14. Nonnulli codd., ut B G T Y ff cum ed. I, minus congrue delectatio pro dilectio.
    Some manuscripts, such as B, G, T, Y, ff, with the first edition, less aptly read delectatio in place of dilectio.
  15. Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. I Actus enim loco quia actus.
    The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and the first edition, reads Actus enim in place of quia actus.
  16. Cod. O hic prosequitur: ut fidem, similiter qui sperat spem, non habet eam ut spem; similiter ut videtur hae virtutes evacuantur etc.
    Codex O continues here: as faith; likewise he who hopes for hope does not have it as hope; likewise, as it seems, these virtues are emptied out, etc.
  17. Cod. Y formae speciales.
    Codex Y reads formae speciales.
  18. In cod. O additur formae in se.
    In codex O the words formae in se are added.
  19. Anselmus, libr. de Concord. praesc. et lib. arb. q. 3. c. 11, in quibus verbis Vat. cum uno alteroque codice minus apte se ipsam, loco se ipsum. Mox sequimur cod. T post aliquis ponendo se loco scit, quae lectio ex immediate praecedentibus et sequentibus probatur ut unice admittenda; in aliorum codicum siquidem lectione cognitio reflexiva, de qua hic agitur, non attingitur. Dein cum Vat. pauci codd. post et scientiam addunt suam.
    Anselm, book On the Concord of Foreknowledge and Free Will, q. 3, c. 11, in which words the Vatican edition with one or two codices less aptly reads se ipsam in place of se ipsum. Next we follow codex T, putting se in place of scit after aliquis, which reading is proved to be the only one to be admitted from what immediately precedes and follows; for in the reading of the other codices the reflexive cognition here at issue is not touched on. Then with the Vatican edition a few codices after et scientiam add suam.
  20. Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. I substituimus quaeratur loco quaeritur.
    On the testimony of the older manuscripts and the first edition we have substituted quaeratur in place of quaeritur.
  21. Libr. II. Sent. d. 23. p. 1. q. 1–3; vide etiam ibid. d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 4, et III. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — Mox post sed in Vat. et cod. cc adiicitur hoc.
    Bk. II Sentences, d. 23, p. 1, q. 1–3; see also in the same place d. 19, a. 1, q. 1, fundam. 4, and III. Sentences, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, in the body. — Next, after sed, the Vatican edition and codex cc add hoc.
  22. Vat. et cod. cc non bene qua contra plurimos codd. ut A B D F G H N q T Z ee ff cum ed. I. Paulo ante ed. I post sensibus adiungit quia ex quo.
    The Vatican edition and codex cc, not well, read qua against many manuscripts such as A, B, D, F, G, H, N, q, T, Z, ee, ff, with the first edition. A little before, the first edition after sensibus adds quia ex quo.
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