Dist. 17, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 17
Articulus Unicus. De dono creati habitus caritatis, utrum existat, et quomodo diligi et cognosci possit.
### Quaestio I. Utrum praeter caritatem increatam poni debeat habitus caritatis creatus.
Circa primum, quod non sit ponere aliam caritatem a caritate increata, supposita probatione per auctoritates multas, quas adducit Magister in littera, probatur rationibus, et primo rationibus sumtis ab essentia caritatis, quae est bonitas, hoc modo.
1. Nullum accidens est melius substantia rationali; sed caritas est melior anima rationali, quia eam facit meliorem: ergo non est accidens, ergo est substantia. Sed constat, quod non irrationalis, ergo rationalis, ergo anima vel Angelus vel Deus; sed non anima vel Angelus: ergo Deus1.
2. Item, nulla bonitas creata aequivalet beatitudini2; sed caritas aequivalet beatitudini, quia per caritatem meretur homo, ut efficiatur dignus vita aeterna sive beatitudine: ergo caritas non est bonitas creata: ergo etc.
3. Item, omne bonum creatum est bonum per participationem; sed omne bonum alio bono bonum potest intelligi non bonum3, et sic caderet in ipso malum per diminutionem speciei, modi et ordinis: ergo si caritas est bona bonitate creata, caritas potest esse mala vel saltem intelligi mala vel etiam fieri informis; quod falsum est.
Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur rationibus sumtis a virtute sic.
4. Quanto aliquid virtuosius, tanto paucioribus mediis indiget. Ergo si aliquid est potentissimum, nulla alia a se virtute indiget: ergo si Spiritus sanctus est potentiae infinitae et ipse est caritas, ergo se ipso, non alio, inflammat affectum ad amorem: non est ergo ponere caritatem creatam necessario, quae sit habitus.
5. Item, plus distat virtus naturalis a Deo quam voluntas; sed Deus dirigit virtutem naturalem non alio quam sit ipse4: ergo si ibi non cadit medium, nec in voluntate cadet: ergo etc.
6. Item, ubi movet virtus motoris primi semper praesens et non potens errare, superfluit aliam virtutem superaddere, ut puta, si manus esset semper coniuncta temoni, non oporteret ibi esse aliam
virtutem; sed Spiritus sanctus est dirigens et adiuvans ipsam voluntatem et est coniunctus semper et non potens errare: ergo superfluit aliam caritatem ponere; sed omne superfluum est resecandum: ergo etc.
Item, rationibus sumtis ab actu ostenditur illud idem.
7. Quia actus caritatis est animam recreare; sed non minoris virtutis est recreare, quam creare5, ergo si creare solum est ab increato, quod est infinitae potentiae, ergo et recreare; sed hoc proprium est caritatis: ergo est increata.
8. Item, aliquis actus caritatis est unire; sed nulla creatura per vanitatem unitur veritati, sed6 omnis creatura vanitas: ergo nulla creatura est medium uniendi Deo: si ergo caritas est medium uniendi, ergo non est vanitas nec creatura.
9. Item, actus caritatis est unumquodque ordinate diligere: ergo si ordinate diligere est diligere unumquodque, secundum quod sibi convenit, cum bonum increatum sit melius creato in infinitum, ergo ipsum magis in infinitum diligibile: ergo si caritas facit Deum diligere, ut diligendus est, caritas facit Deum in infinitum diligere; sed quod exit in actum infinitum est increatum7: ergo etc.
Sed contra: 1. Caritas est principium reformandi animam quantum ad potentiam voluntatis; sed anima quantum ad alias potentias, scilicet irascibilem et rationalem, reformatur per virtutes creatas: ergo pari ratione et concupiscibilis; sed eius reformatio8 est caritas: ergo etc.
2. Item, ubi est reformatio, ibi est conformatio et informatio, et ubi est informatio, ibi est aliquid informans, quod se habet per modum formae; sed omnis forma rei creatae est creata; Deus enim nullius est forma perficiens: ergo etc.
3. Item, caritas est principium vivendi; unde Hugo de sancto Victore9: «Scio, anima mea, quod amor est vita tua»; sed omnis vita, existens per participationem in aliquo, est ab aliquo informante, ex quo et vivificabili fiat unum; sed ex Deo et anima non potest fieri unum: ergo necesse est ponere in anima aliquam caritatem creatam, quae vivificet.
4. Item, omne quod est in aliquo possibili ad mortem, est in10 illo per aliquod separabile; sed vita gratiae est in anima possibili ad moriendum morte culpae: ergo per aliquod separabile; hoc autem non est Deus, quia impossibile est Dei praesentiam separari ab aliquo: ergo est aliquid creatum.
5. Item, caritas est principium gratificandi; sed gratificatio est illud11, in quo distinguitur bonus a malo, iustus ab impio, non tantum in actu, sed etiam in quiete, ut parvulus vel adultus dormiens: ergo cum distinctio non sit boni a malo per bonitatem increatam, quia illa omnibus est communis, caritas dicit quid creatum12. Et iterum, cum distinctio quiescentium non sit per actum vel usum, sed habitum, patet quod caritas dicit habitum creatum.
6. Item, caritas est principium merendi; sed non quia bona facimus, ideo boni sumus, sed magis e converso: ergo13 caritas prius facit bonum, quam eliciat actum; sed cum aliquis de non bono fit bonus, necesse est aliquid poni in ipso de novo, et hoc non potest esse actus: ergo habitus.
7. Item, Deus alio modo cooperatur in operatione meritoria quam naturali, quia si non alio modo, tunc redit error Pelagii, quod ex naturalibus posset homo mereri; si ergo alio modo, cum per virtutem increatam omni naturae cooperetur, necesse est, quod in operatione creata meritoria cooperetur mediante alia virtute; sed haec non potest esse nisi creata: ergo etc.
8. Item, videtur quod Magister erraverit, quia qui dividit opera Trinitatis haereticus est; sed Magister posuit, quod caritas, qua nos diligimus Deum, sit Spiritus sanctus proprie: ergo ponit, quod nostrum diligere, quod est effectus in creatura, sit solius Spiritus sancti; et ita dividit opera Trinitatis.
9. Item, qui dicit, quid creatum esse increatum, errat; sed caritas, qua diligimus Deum et proximum, ut communiter tenetur, est quid creatum: sed Magister dixit, hanc esse Spiritum sanctum: ergo erravit.
Conclusio. Praeter caritatem increatam poni debet caritas, quae est habitus creatus et animam informans.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc est et fuit ab antiquo duplex opinio. Quorundam enim, ut Magistri et sequacium suorum, est opinio, quod Spiritus sanctus est essentialiter caritas, qua Pater et Filius diligunt nos, et etiam qua nos diligimus Deum.
Et quidam voluerunt dicere, quod intellectus huius positionis hic est14: Dicunt enim, quod, sicut lux potest tripliciter considerari, scilicet in se et in transparenti et in extremitate perspicui terminati — primo modo est lux, secundo modo lumen, tertio modo hypostasis coloris15 — ita Spiritus sanctus potest considerari in se, et sic est amor Patris et Filii; potest rursum considerari ut in anima humana inhabitans, et sic Spiritus sanctus dicitur gratia; potest etiam considerari ut unitus voluntati, et sic est caritas, qua nos diligimus Deum. Unde dicunt, quod Spiritus sanctus est nostra caritas, non per appropriationem, sed per unionem. Quemadmodum enim solus Filius est homo vel est16 incarnatus; et tamen tota Trinitas est incarnationem operata, sed tamen solus Filius unitus: sic, quamvis tota Trinitas faciat unionem Spiritus sancti cum voluntate, solus tamen Spiritus sanctus unitur voluntati, et ideo solus est caritas.
Ratio autem movens ad ponendum hoc est auctoritas Apostoli, primae ad Corinthios sexto17: Qui adhaeret Deo unus Spiritus est, et etiam similitudo. Dicunt enim, quod, sicut Filius procedit per modum naturae et ita naturae unitur18, sic Spiritus sanctus per modum voluntatis, et ideo voluntati unibilis et unitus. Et quia voluntas vertibilis est, non sic natura, ideo Spiritus sanctus unitur separabiliter, sed Filius inseparabiliter, et ideo longe inferiori modo quam Filius; et quibus sic unitur, se ipso facit diligere.
Sed haec positio non potest stare, quia Spiritus sanctus non est unibilis; et praeterea, si esset unibilis, aut per naturam, aut per gratiam. Non per naturam, ergo per gratiam: ergo adhuc oporteret19 esse habitum gratiae disponentem animam ad susceptionem talis unionis; et ita redit contrarium. Ideo non credo, quod Magister hoc modo fuerit huius opinionis.
Et propter hoc aliter dicendum, quod illud: quo diligimus Deum, tripliciter est accipere: aut quod diligimus effective, et sic caritas sive amor est totius20 Trinitatis et Spiritus sancti appropriate; aut quo diligimus exemplariter, et sic Spiritus sanctus, qui est unio Patris et Filii et nexus amborum, est21 unitas, ad cuius imitationem caritas nos nectit, secundum quod dicit Dominus, Ioannis decimo septimo22: Ut sint unum, sicut et nos unum sumus; aut quo diligimus formaliter, et sic secundum opinionem Magistri est animi affectio.
Et in his omnibus verum dixit nec erravit, sed defecit; quia praeter hoc est ponere caritatem secundum communem opinionem, quae sit23 habitus creatus animam informans. Et ratio huius sumitur a parte essentiae eius, virtutis et operationis.
A parte essentiae, quia caritas est bonitas creaturae rationalis, ipsam perficiens et distinguens et ordinans et disponens ad vitam aeternam: ergo necesse est, quod sit eius24 formalis perfectio.
Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo, quod caritas est melior anima rationali; dicendum, quod non est ibi comparatio, quia ubi unum propter alterum,
ibi tantum unum25; unde habens caritatem bonus est propter caritatem. Vel non cadit ibi comparatio, quia non uniformiter dicitur bonum. Nam substantia rationalis dicitur bona, quia ordinabilis in finem, caritas bona, quia ordinans.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aequivalet beatitudini; dicendum, quod aequivalet secundum divinam aestimationem, quae26 opus caritatis aestimat dignum vita aeterna sive tanta remuneratione.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si est bonum per participationem, tunc eius bonitas est permutabilis in informitatem; dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur bonum per participationem dupliciter: aut quia participans et ordinatum, aut quia participatio et ordinatio. Primo modo est bonum habens caritatem, secundo modo27 caritas: et ideo potest non esse, quia non est ipsa essentia bonitatis, sed participatio; tamen ens28 non potest non esse bona vel ordinata, quia est ipse ordo amoris. Unde solvendum ad29 illud per distinctionem; et in hoc patent rationes sumtae ab essentia.
A parte etiam virtutis necesse est ponere caritatem habitum creatum. Nam caritas, qua diligimus Deum, est virtus, non tantum quia30 Deus cooperatur nobis, sed etiam quia nostra voluntas cooperatur Deo: Adiutores enim Dei sumus31; et quia, cum cooperamur Deo, necesse est nos sibi conformari, necesse est, quod ab illa summa caritate relinquatur in nobis aliquod exemplatum in nostro affectu, per quod moveatur32 illi conformiter. Voluntas enim libera est et nata moveri ad opposita: et ideo ponitur virtus caritatis creatae in nobis, non propter defectum a parte Dei nobiscum operantis, sed voluntatis nostrae sibi cooperantis.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus potentissima non indiget virtute media, verum est; sed caritas non est propter illius virtutis indigentiam, sed potius voluntatis suscipientis, quae indiget aliquo habitu disponente.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus cooperatur naturae sine virtute creata; dicendum, quod Deus regit naturam, sicut instituit, et natura uniformiter currit; et ideo non indiget aliquo33 regulante. Non sic est de voluntate, quae movetur difformiter; et ideo indiget aliquo habitu regulante et disponente ipsam. Vel dicendum, quod aliud est de natura et voluntate; quia natura non habet moveri nisi iuxta se, vel infra, sed voluntas supra: et ideo indiget aliquo elevante ipsam.
Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus primi motoris est praesens; dicendum, quod non sufficit praesentia, sed necesse est, quod recipiens influentiam habeat habilitatem et conformitatem; et hoc est per virtutem creatam.
A parte etiam operationis ponitur necessitas, quia reformatio sive34 recreatio, unio et dilectio non tantum sunt ab aliquo ut ab efficiente, sed etiam ut ab informante. Informans autem caritas creata est; et ex hoc patent obiecta ex parte actus sive operationis.
Ad 7. Nam quod obiicitur, quod recreatio35 est ab increato; verum est per modum efficientis, sicut et creatio; sed reformatio ulterius relinquit36 formam; et ideo necesse est ponere habitum informantem.
Ad 8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vanitas non unit37 veritati; dicendum, quod gratia potest considerari secundum quod ex nihilo, et sic est vanitas, et sic non unit; vel secundum quod est influentia secundum divinam praesentiam, et sic habet veritatis expressam similitudinem, et tali modo unit.
Ad 9. Ad illud quod obiicitur38, quod caritas facit diligere Deum quantum est diligendus etc.; dicendum, quod hoc potest intelligi dupliciter: vel quantum Deus deberet diligi in se, et sic falsum est, quia cum sit bonum infinitum, deberet in infinitum diligi, et tali modo Deus solus se ipsum diligit; vel in quantum est diligendus ab hoc39, et sic verum est, et tunc diligit in infinitum, non simpliciter, sed secundum aestimationem habentis caritatem. Tantum enim diligit caritas Deum plus quam bonum creatum, quod, si bonum creatum in infinitum multiplicaretur, adhuc magis diligeret Deum.
Ad argumenta in contrarium: Quod autem obiicitur in contrarium, concedendum est praeter duo ultima, quae ostendunt Magistrum errasse.
Ad 8. Quod ergo40 obiicitur, quia dividit opera Trinitatis; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia quod Spiritus sanctus sit caritas, qua diligimus Deum, aut dictum est per appropriationem, aut per unionem, aut certe per exemplaritatem; et sic intelliguntur omnes auctoritates, quas Magister adducit pro se;
formaliter autem loquendo non intelliguntur verae, nec credo, quod Magister sic intellexerit.
Ad 9. Et per hoc patet aliud41, quod Magister non dicit, quod creatum sit increatum, sed quod sufficiat donum increatum sine creato; et in hoc non fuit error, sed defectus tantum.
I. Obsoleta et communiter reprobata est opinio Magistri, quod non sit in anima caritas creata secundum habitum, sed tantum secundum actum. Iuxta ipsum enim, ut communiter explicatur, Spiritus sanctus voluntatem creatam perficit per se ipsum, non tamen ut forma inhaerens, sed ut finis, exemplar et motor, ita ut actus caritatis ab anima elicitus nullum habitum creatum habeat. Scotus paulo mitius verba Magistri nititur explicare, scilicet quod Spiritus sanctus non formaliter, sed tantum exemplariter et causaliter sit nostra caritas, quod verissimum est. (Cfr. infra dub. 6).
II. Novem obiectiones Magistri ita sunt ordinatae, ut tres ex parte essentiae, tres ex parte virtutis et tres ex parte actus accipiantur. Unde etiam S. Bonav. sub eadem triplici respectu contrarias apponit rationes, quas, relicto solito ordine, statim applicat ad solvendas difficultates. Primo loco exhibet falsam quorundam explicationem Magistri, quod Spiritus sanctus solus sibi uniat voluntatem creatam, sicut Filius solus univit sibi naturam humanam. Hunc sensum reprobat merito ut falsissimum, cum unitas operationis non possit esse nisi ab unitate suppositi, immo naturae; talis autem hypostatica vel naturalis unio voluntatis creatae cum Spiritu sancto est ficta, immo haeretica.
III. In solut. ad 1. argumentatio fit ex axiomate Aristotelis: «Ubi unum propter alterum, ibi tantum unum»; inde sequitur, quod, si homo propter caritatem est Deo acceptus, una tantum est hic bonitas; ideo non potest fieri comparatio utriusque bonitatis separatae.
IV. In solut. ad 2. verba: «secundum divinam aestimationem» idem dicunt ac: «secundum acceptationem Dei», quae iuxta sententiam communem inter conditiones ad meritum de condigno requisitas numeratur. De hoc videsis II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 3, et Breviloq. p. V. c. 2.
V. De caritate creata: Breviloq. p. V. c. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 2. a. 1. 2. 3. — Scot., in utroque scripto hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. II. II. q. 23. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. I. tr. 8. q. 36. m. 3, et p. II. tr. 16. q. 98. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. et 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 1.
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Article Unique. On the gift of the created habit of charity, whether it exists, and how it can be loved and known.
### Question I. Whether besides uncreated charity a created habit of charity must be posited.
Concerning the first point, that no charity other than uncreated charity is to be posited — supposing the proof through the many authorities which the Master adduces in the littera — is shown by reasons; and first, by reasons drawn from the essence of charity, which is goodness, in this manner.
1. No accident is better than a rational substance; but charity is better than the rational soul, since it makes it better: therefore it is not an accident, therefore it is a substance. But it is established that it is not irrational, therefore rational, therefore either soul or angel or God; but neither soul nor angel: therefore God1.
2. Likewise, no created goodness is equivalent to beatitude2; but charity is equivalent to beatitude, because through charity a man merits, so as to be made worthy of eternal life or beatitude: therefore charity is not a created goodness: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, every created good is good by participation; but every good which is good by another good can be understood as not good3, and thus evil would fall upon it through the diminution of species, mode and order: therefore if charity is good with a created goodness, charity can be evil, or at least be understood as evil, or even become unformed; which is false.
Likewise, the same is shown by reasons drawn from virtue, thus.
4. The more virtuous a thing is, the fewer means it needs. Therefore if anything is most powerful, it needs no virtue other than itself: therefore if the Holy Spirit is of infinite power and is himself charity, then by himself, not by another, he inflames the affection to love: therefore there is no need to posit a created charity which would be a habit.
5. Likewise, natural virtue is more distant from God than the will; but God directs natural virtue by no other than himself4: therefore if no medium falls there, neither will it fall in the will: therefore etc.
6. Likewise, where the virtue of the first mover, ever present and unable to err, moves, it is superfluous to add another virtue — as, for instance, if a hand were always joined to the rudder, there would be no need for another
virtue there; but the Holy Spirit is directing and assisting the will itself, and is always conjoined and unable to err: therefore it is superfluous to posit another charity; but everything superfluous is to be cut away: therefore etc.
Likewise, by reasons drawn from the act, the same is shown.
7. Because the act of charity is to recreate the soul; but it is no less a work of virtue to recreate than to create5, therefore if to create is from the uncreated alone, which is of infinite power, then to recreate is also; but this is proper to charity: therefore charity is uncreated.
8. Likewise, an act of charity is to unite; but no creature is united to truth through vanity, but6 every creature is vanity: therefore no creature is the medium of uniting [us] to God: if therefore charity is the medium of uniting, then it is neither vanity nor a creature.
9. Likewise, the act of charity is to love each thing in due order: therefore if to love in due order is to love each thing according to what befits it, since the uncreated good is better than the created infinitely, then it is itself infinitely more lovable: therefore if charity makes one love God as he is to be loved, charity makes one love God infinitely; but what goes out into an infinite act is uncreated7: therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. Charity is the principle of reforming the soul as to the power of the will; but the soul, as to the other powers — namely the irascible and the rational — is reformed through created virtues: therefore by parity of reasoning so also is the concupiscible; but its reformation8 is charity: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, where there is reformation, there is conformation and information; and where there is information, there is something informing, which has itself after the manner of a form; but every form of a created thing is created; for God is the perfecting form of nothing: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, charity is the principle of living; whence Hugh of St. Victor9: «I know, my soul, that love is your life»; but every life, existing by participation in something, is from something informing, out of which and the vivifiable a unity is made; but out of God and the soul a unity cannot be made: therefore it is necessary to posit in the soul some created charity, which vivifies.
4. Likewise, everything that is in something capable of dying is in10 it through some separable thing; but the life of grace is in the soul which is capable of dying the death of fault: therefore through some separable thing; but this is not God, since it is impossible for God's presence to be separated from anything: therefore it is something created.
5. Likewise, charity is the principle of making pleasing; but making-pleasing is that11 in which the good is distinguished from the evil, the just from the impious, not only in act, but also in rest, as a child or an adult sleeping: therefore, since the distinction of good from evil is not through uncreated goodness, because that is common to all, charity bespeaks something created12. And again, since the distinction of those at rest is not through act or use, but through habit, it is plain that charity bespeaks a created habit.
6. Likewise, charity is the principle of meriting; but it is not because we do good things that we are good, but rather conversely: therefore13 charity first makes [a man] good, before it elicits an act; but when someone from not-good becomes good, it is necessary that something be placed in him anew, and this cannot be the act: therefore a habit.
7. Likewise, God cooperates in a meritorious operation in another mode than in a natural one, because if not in another mode, then the error of Pelagius returns, that man could merit from his natural [powers]; if therefore in another mode — since by uncreated virtue he cooperates with every nature — it is necessary that in a created meritorious operation he cooperate by means of another virtue; but this can only be created: therefore etc.
8. Likewise, it seems that the Master erred, because he who divides the works of the Trinity is a heretic; but the Master held that the charity by which we love God is the Holy Spirit properly: therefore he holds that our loving — which is an effect in the creature — is of the Holy Spirit alone; and thus he divides the works of the Trinity.
9. Likewise, he who says that something created is uncreated errs; but the charity by which we love God and neighbor, as is commonly held, is something created: yet the Master said this to be the Holy Spirit: therefore he erred.
Conclusio. Besides uncreated charity there must be posited a charity which is a created habit informing the soul.
Respondeo: It must be said that for the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that on this matter there is and from of old has been a twofold opinion. The opinion of certain ones — the Master and his followers — is that the Holy Spirit is essentially the charity by which the Father and the Son love us, and also by which we love God.
And some have wished to say that the meaning of this position is this14: For they say that, just as light can be considered in three ways, namely in itself, and in the transparent, and at the boundary of a terminated translucent body — in the first mode it is lux, in the second lumen, in the third the hypostasis of color15 — so the Holy Spirit can be considered in himself, and thus he is the love of the Father and of the Son; he can again be considered as inhabiting the human soul, and thus the Holy Spirit is called grace; he can also be considered as united to the will, and thus he is the charity by which we love God. Whence they say that the Holy Spirit is our charity, not by appropriation, but by union. For just as the Son alone is man, or is16 incarnate, and yet the whole Trinity wrought the incarnation, but only the Son was united: so, although the whole Trinity makes the union of the Holy Spirit with the will, yet the Holy Spirit alone is united to the will, and therefore he alone is charity.
The reason moving them to posit this is the authority of the Apostle, in the first to the Corinthians, [chapter] six17: He who clings to God is one Spirit; and also a likeness. For they say that, just as the Son proceeds by way of nature and so is united to nature18, so the Holy Spirit by way of will, and therefore is unitable and united to the will. And because the will is changeable, not so nature, therefore the Holy Spirit is united separably, but the Son inseparably, and thus in a far inferior mode than the Son; and to those to whom he is so united, he by himself makes [them] love.
But this position cannot stand, because the Holy Spirit is not unitable; and besides, if he were unitable, it would be either by nature or by grace. Not by nature, therefore by grace: therefore there would still need19 to be a habit of grace disposing the soul to the reception of such a union; and so the contrary returns. For this reason I do not believe that the Master held this opinion in this way.
And on this account it must rather be said that the [phrase] that by which we love God can be taken in three ways: either as that by which we love effectively, and thus charity or love is of the whole20 Trinity, and of the Holy Spirit by appropriation; or as that by which we love exemplarily, and thus the Holy Spirit, who is the union of the Father and the Son and the bond of both, is21 the unity to the imitation of which charity binds us, according to what the Lord says, John seventeen22: That they may be one, as we also are one; or as that by which we love formally, and thus, according to the opinion of the Master, it is the affection of the soul.
And in all these things he spoke truly and did not err, but fell short; because besides this there is to be posited a charity according to the common opinion, which is23 a created habit informing the soul. And the reason for this is taken from the side of its essence, of its virtue, and of its operation.
From the side of essence, because charity is the goodness of the rational creature, perfecting and distinguishing it, ordering and disposing it to eternal life: therefore it is necessary that it be its24 formal perfection.
Ad 1. To that which is objected first, that charity is better than the rational soul; it must be said that there is no comparison there, because where one [thing exists] for the sake of another,
there is only one25; whence the one having charity is good on account of charity. Or there is no comparison there, because "good" is not said uniformly. For the rational substance is called good because it is orderable to an end, and charity is called good because it orders.
Ad 2. To that which is objected, that it is equivalent to beatitude; it must be said that it is equivalent according to divine estimation, which26 reckons the work of charity worthy of eternal life or of so great a reward.
Ad 3. To that which is objected, that if it is good by participation, then its goodness is changeable into unformedness; it must be said that something is called good by participation in two ways: either because it is participating and ordered, or because it is the participation and the ordering. In the first way, the one having charity is good; in the second way27 charity itself: and therefore it can not-be, because it is not the very essence of goodness, but a participation; nevertheless, as a being28 it cannot fail to be good or ordered, because it is itself the order of love. Whence it is to be solved with regard to29 that point by a distinction; and thereby the reasons drawn from essence stand answered.
From the side of virtue also it is necessary to posit charity as a created habit. For the charity by which we love God is a virtue, not only because30 God cooperates with us, but also because our will cooperates with God: for we are God's fellow-workers31; and because, when we cooperate with God, we must be conformed to him, it is necessary that from that supreme charity there be left in us some exemplate in our affection, by which it may be moved32 in conformity to it. For the will is free and naturally moved to opposites: and so the virtue of created charity is posited in us, not because of any defect on the side of God working with us, but on the side of our will cooperating with him.
Ad 4. To that which is objected, that the most powerful virtue does not need a mediating virtue, this is true; but charity is not [posited] because of any need of that virtue, but rather of the receiving will, which needs some disposing habit.
Ad 5. To that which is objected, that God cooperates with nature without created virtue; it must be said that God governs nature as he instituted it, and nature runs uniformly; and therefore it does not need anything33 to regulate it. It is not so with the will, which is moved unevenly; and therefore it needs some habit regulating and disposing it. Or it must be said that the case of nature and of will differs; because nature is moved only on its own level, or below, but the will above: and therefore it needs something elevating it.
Ad 6. To that which is objected, that the virtue of the first mover is present; it must be said that presence does not suffice, but it is necessary that the recipient of the influence have aptitude and conformity; and this is through created virtue.
From the side of operation also a necessity is posited, because reformation or34 recreation, union and love are not only from something as from an efficient [cause], but also as from an informing [cause]. But the informing charity is created; and from this the objections from the side of act or operation stand answered.
Ad 7. For as to what is objected, that recreation35 is from the uncreated; this is true by way of efficient [cause], as is creation also; but reformation furthermore leaves36 a form behind; and therefore it is necessary to posit an informing habit.
Ad 8. To that which is objected, that vanity does not unite37 to truth; it must be said that grace can be considered insofar as [it is] from nothing, and thus it is vanity, and thus does not unite; or insofar as it is an influence according to the divine presence, and thus it has an express likeness of truth, and in that mode unites.
Ad 9. To that which is objected38, that charity makes [one] love God as far as he is to be loved, etc.; it must be said that this can be understood in two ways: either as far as God ought to be loved in himself, and thus it is false, since, since he is an infinite good, he ought to be loved infinitely, and in that mode God alone loves himself; or as far as he is to be loved by this [creature]39, and thus it is true, and then [charity] loves infinitely, not simply, but according to the estimation of the one having charity. For charity loves God so much more than created good, that even if created good were multiplied to infinity, it would still love God more.
To the arguments to the contrary: What is objected to the contrary is to be conceded, except for the last two, which show that the Master erred.
Ad 8. As to what then40 is objected, that he divides the works of the Trinity; it must be said that this is false, because [the saying] that the Holy Spirit is the charity by which we love God, was either said by appropriation, or by union, or certainly by exemplarity; and thus all the authorities which the Master adduces for himself are to be understood;
speaking formally, however, they are not to be understood as true, nor do I believe that the Master so understood them.
Ad 9. And by this the other point also stands clear41, namely that the Master does not say that the created is uncreated, but that the uncreated gift suffices without the created; and in this there was not error, but only a defect.
I. Obsolete and commonly rejected is the opinion of the Master, that there is in the soul no created charity according to habit, but only according to act. According to him, that is — as it is commonly explained — the Holy Spirit perfects the created will through himself, yet not as an inhering form, but as end, exemplar, and mover, in such a way that the act of charity elicited by the soul has no created habit. Scotus tries to explain the words of the Master a little more mildly, namely that the Holy Spirit is our charity not formally, but only exemplarily and causally — which is most true. (Cf. below, dub. 6).
II. The Master's nine objections are so ordered that three are taken on the side of essence, three on the side of virtue, and three on the side of act. Hence St. Bonaventure too, under the same threefold respect, sets out the contrary reasons; and, leaving the usual order, he immediately applies them to the solving of the difficulties. In the first place he sets forth a false explanation of the Master given by certain men — namely that the Holy Spirit alone unites to himself the created will, just as the Son alone united to himself the human nature. He rightly rejects this sense as most false, since unity of operation can only be from unity of suppositum, indeed of nature; and such a hypostatic or natural union of the created will with the Holy Spirit is feigned, indeed heretical.
III. In the solution to the 1st [objection] the argument is from the axiom of Aristotle: «Where one [is] for the sake of the other, there is only one»; whence it follows that, if a man is acceptable to God on account of charity, there is here only one goodness; and therefore no comparison can be made of the two goodnesses taken separately.
IV. In the solution to the 2nd [objection] the words: «according to divine estimation» say the same as: «according to the acceptation of God», which, according to the common opinion, is numbered among the conditions required for merit de condigno. On this see II Sent., d. 27, a. 2, q. 3, and Breviloquium p. V, c. 2.
V. On created charity: Breviloquium p. V, c. 1. — Alex. of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 1, 2, 3. — Scotus, in both writings, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; Summa II–II, q. 23, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1; Summa p. I, tr. 8, q. 36, m. 3, and p. II, tr. 16, q. 98, m. 1. — Petrus a Tar[antasia], here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius R[omanus], here, 1st principium, q. 1 and 2. — Durandus, here q. 1, 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. 1.
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- Sub hoc respectu ait August., libr. 83 QQ. q. 51: Nec quidquam est melius rationali anima, nisi Deus. — Paulo ante verbo irrationalis praefigitur in cod. V est. Praeferimus lectionem nonnullorum codd. ut M T Z (cod. H omittit particulam et), in qua additur Deus et, quae intentioni Magistri ad amussim correspondet.Under this respect Augustine says, in the Book of 83 Questions, q. 51: Nor is anything better than the rational soul, except God. — A little before, in cod. V the word est is prefixed to irrationalis. We prefer the reading of certain codices (M T Z; cod. H omits the particle et), in which Deus et is added — a reading which exactly corresponds to the Master's intention.
- Beatitudo enim secundum Boeth., III de Consol. Prosa 2, est status bonorum omnium congregatione perfectus. — Mox sequimur plures codd. ut B H K O T Z Π substituendo ut efficiatur loco et efficitur, quod Vat. cum ed. 1 et aliis codd. habet. — Vat. cum cod. cc ostendit, sed contra antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1.Beatitude, according to Boethius, Consolation III, prose 2, is the state perfected by the gathering together of all goods. — Next we follow several codices (B H K O T Z Π) in substituting ut efficiatur for et efficitur, which the Vatican edition with ed. 1 and other codices has. — The Vatican, with cod. cc, reads ostendit, but against the older codices with ed. 1.
- Boeth., de Hebdomad. ait: Si participatione (bona sunt), per se ipsa nullo modo bona sunt; nam quod participatione album est, per se in eo quod ipsum est, album non est, et de ceteris qualitatibus eodem modo. — Mox post creata in Vat. et cod. cc deest caritas, quod tamen invenitur in ceteris mss. et ed. 1. — Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 ab aliquo.Boethius, On the Hebdomads, says: If they are good by participation, of themselves they are in no way good; for what is white by participation is not, in respect of what it is in itself, white, and likewise for other qualities. — Next, after creata, in the Vatican and cod. cc the word caritas is missing, though it is found in the other manuscripts and ed. 1. — The Vatican, against very many codices and ed. 1, reads ab aliquo.
- Vat. cum ed. 1, sed contra fere omnes codd. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 se ipso pro sit ipse; ed. 1 insuper omittit quum. Paulo ante multi codd. cum ed. 1 perperam diligit loco dirigit. — Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 restituimus caritate. — Hic, c. 1–4 et c. 6.The Vatican with ed. 1, but against nearly all the codices and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, reads se ipso for sit ipse; ed. 1 also omits quum. A little before, many codices with ed. 1 wrongly read diligit for dirigit. — On the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we restored caritate. — [See] here, cap. 1–4 and cap. 6.
- Cfr. supra d. 14. a. 2. q. 2. fundam. 7. — Paulo ante codd. W Y post virtutis est repetunt animam.Cf. above, d. 14, a. 2, q. 2, fundamentum 7. — A little before, codices W Y, after virtutis est, repeat animam.
- Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 substituimus sed loco et. Mox post omnis creatura cod. X addit est.From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6 we substituted sed for et. Next, after omnis creatura, cod. X adds est.
- Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus infinitum et, quod Vat. praemittit verbo increatum.On the authority of very many manuscripts and ed. 1 we struck out infinitum et, which the Vatican prefixes to the word increatum.
- Ed. 1 reformativum.Ed. 1 reads reformativum.
- De Arrha animae, in princ.: Scio, quod vita tua dilectio est. In quo textu Vat., multis codd. cum edd. 1, 6 refragantibus, Scito.[Hugh of St. Victor,] On the Arrha of the Soul, at the beginning: I know that your life is love. In which text the Vatican reads Scito, with many codices and editions 1 and 6 disagreeing.
- Ex fere omnibus codd. et sex primis edd. supplevimus male omissum in.From nearly all the codices and the first six editions we supplied the wrongly omitted in.
- Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 id loco illud, et paulo infra et adultus pro vel adultus dormiens.The Vatican, against the older codices and ed. 1, reads id for illud, and a little below et adultus for vel adultus dormiens.
- Codd. inter se dissentiunt; plures cum Vat. et ed. 1 non falso caritas non dicit quid commune; alii falso caritas dicit quid commune, ex quo tamen lectio codd. O U Z, quam in textum recepimus, quaeque distinctior est, confirmari videtur. Cod. T a manu secunda in margine caritas enim increata dicit quid commune, sed superflue, utpote repetitio propositionis praecedentis; lectio vero eiusdem primitiva, in qua verba, de quibus agitur, prorsus omittuntur, non est spernenda, immo magis placeret quam ceterae, si firmiore auctoritate fulciretur; quod si haec praeferatur, interpunctio esset mutanda ita, ut proxime sequens propositio coniungatur cum praecedenti.The codices disagree among themselves: very many, with the Vatican and ed. 1, read non falso caritas non dicit quid commune; others falso caritas dicit quid commune, from which, however, the reading of codices O U Z — which we have received into the text, and which is the more distinct — seems to be confirmed. Cod. T, by a second hand in the margin, has caritas enim increata dicit quid commune, but superfluously, since it is a repetition of the preceding proposition; the primitive reading of the same codex, however, in which the words at issue are wholly omitted, is not to be despised — indeed it would please us more than the others, if it were supported by stronger authority; and if this be preferred, the punctuation would have to be changed so that the next-following proposition is joined with the preceding one.
- In Vat. incongrue omittitur ergo, quod in mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 invenitur.In the Vatican ergo is incongruously omitted, which is found in the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3.
- Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 potest demonstrari per similitudinem loco hic est. Paulo ante cod. O omittit quidam; cod. V autem ibi addit etiam.The Vatican, against the witness of the manuscripts and ed. 1, reads potest demonstrari per similitudinem for hic est. A little before, cod. O omits quidam; cod. V there adds etiam.
- Hoc explicatur verbis S. Thomae, hic q. 1. a. 1: Quia hypostasis coloris est lux, et color nihil aliud est quam lux incorporata. — Plura de hoc habet S. Bonaventura, II. Sent. d. 13. a. 2. q. 2; et III. Sent. d. 23. dub. 1. Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 3. p. 1. dub. 7.This is explained in the words of St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1: Because the hypostasis of color is light, and color is nothing other than incorporated light. — St. Bonaventure has more on this, II Sent., d. 13, a. 2, q. 2, and III Sent., d. 23, dub. 1. Cf. also I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, dub. 7.
- Ex antiquioribus mss. supplevimus est.From the older manuscripts we supplied est.
- Vers. 17, ubi Vulgata: Qui autem adhaeret Domino, unus etc. — Mox post etiam Vat. absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 adiungit movet eos.Verse 17, where the Vulgate has: But he who clings to the Lord is one, etc. — Next, after etiam, the Vatican, without any authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, adds movet eos.
- Aliqui codd. ut A 3 T aa cum ed. 1 unitus, cui cod. aa addit est.Some codices (A 3 T aa) with ed. 1 read unitus, to which cod. aa adds est.
- Vat. cum cod. cc, antiquioribus tamen codd. cum ed. 1 refragantibus, oportet.The Vatican, with cod. cc — though the older codices with ed. 1 disagree — reads oportet.
- Fide vetustiorum mss. restituimus non bene omissum totius.On the authority of the older manuscripts we restored the wrongly omitted totius.
- Corrupta lectio Vat. et cod. cc, in qua, paulo ante omisso qui, hic loco est ponitur et, deinde post unitas nova incipit propositio, resarcitur ope antiquiorum codd. et ed. 1. — Cod. Z quoniam loco qui, et plures codd. falso ponunt aliorum pro amborum.The corrupt reading of the Vatican and cod. cc — in which, qui having been omitted a little before, et is here put in place of est, and then after unitas a new clause begins — is repaired by the help of the older codices and ed. 1. — Cod. Z reads quoniam for qui, and several codices wrongly place aliorum for amborum.
- Vers. 21.Verse 21.
- Postulantibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, substituimus sit loco est.At the demand of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we substituted sit for est.
- In Vat. et cod. cc desideratur eius, quod alii codd. cum ed. 1 bene exhibent.In the Vatican and cod. cc eius is missing, which the other codices with ed. 1 rightly exhibit.
- Aristot., III Topic. c. 2: Si alicubi alterum alterius gratia; nihil enim eligibiliora utraque quam unum: ut sanum fieri et sanitas, quam sanitas etc.Aristotle, Topics III, c. 2: If anywhere one [is] for the sake of the other; for the two together are nowise more choiceworthy than the one: as becoming-healthy and health, [are not more choiceworthy] than health, etc.
- Nonnulli codd. ut A 3 T W cc minus congrue qui, ed. 1 cum uno alteroque cod. ut 1 quia. Mox cod. bb reputat pro aestimat.Some codices (A 3 T W cc) read, less fittingly, qui; ed. 1, with one or two codices (e.g. 1), reads quia. Next, cod. bb has reputat for aestimat.
- In aliquibus mss. ut B bb adiungitur est.In some manuscripts (B bb) est is added.
- Fide multorum codd. ut A C G K L O S T U V X Z ee Π et ed. 1 supplevimus ens, cuius sensus explicatur lectione cod. R cum est loco tamen ens; plures codd. minus apte cum ens. Paulo ante codd. aa bb essentialiter bonitas pro essentia bonitatis; cod. 1 et primo modo potest esse bonum loco et ideo potest non esse, ac mox secundo modo pro tamen ens.On the authority of many codices (A C G K L O S T U V X Z ee Π) and ed. 1 we supplied ens, whose sense is explained by the reading of cod. R with est in place of tamen ens; several codices, less aptly, [read] cum ens. A little before, codices aa bb read essentialiter bonitas for essentia bonitatis; cod. 1 reads et primo modo potest esse bonum for et ideo potest non esse, and next secundo modo for tamen ens.
- Vat. contra mss. et quinque primas edd. est loco ad.The Vatican, against the manuscripts and the first five editions, reads est for ad.
- Vat. cum paucis mss. bis qua loco quia.The Vatican, with a few manuscripts, twice reads qua for quia.
- I. Cor. 3, 9. — Mox praeferimus lectionem paucorum mss. Q T et ec (a poster. manu) ponendo sibi loco similiter, utpote quae conclusionem plenius exhibet; error aliorum mss. explicatur ex eo, quod verbum similiter, si abbreviatur, formae verbi sibi appropinquet.1 Cor. 3:9. — Next we prefer the reading of a few manuscripts (Q T and ec, by a later hand) by putting sibi in place of similiter, since this exhibits the conclusion more fully; the error of the other manuscripts is explained by the fact that the word similiter, when abbreviated, approaches the form of the word sibi.
- Codd. non conveniunt inter se; alii cum Vat. moveat, sed iam grammatice minus bene; ed. 1 moverat; alii codd. ut E H I O T Y Z ee exhibent lectionem a nobis receptam, quae contextui respondet.The codices do not agree among themselves: some, with the Vatican, read moveat, but already grammatically less well; ed. 1 reads moverat; other codices (E H I O T Y Z ee) exhibit the reading we have received, which corresponds to the context.
- Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 alio pro aliquo. Paulo ante cod. X movetur loco currit. In sequenti propositione Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. movet pro movetur.Very many codices, with ed. 1, read alio for aliquo. A little before, cod. X reads movetur for currit. In the following clause the Vatican, against the witness of the manuscripts and the first six editions, reads movet for movetur.
- Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 restituimus sive loco vel, et paulo infra post etiam adiecimus ut.From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we restored sive in place of vel, and a little below after etiam we added ut.
- Vat. cum cod. cc hic creatio loco recreatio et paulo infra recreatio pro creatio, sed obstat auctoritas aliorum mss. et ed. 1; pauci tamen codd. ut M aa bb cum ed. 2, formaliter loquendo, melius reformatio loco recreatio.The Vatican, with cod. cc, here reads creatio for recreatio, and a little below recreatio for creatio — but the authority of the other manuscripts and of ed. 1 stands against this; a few codices, however (M aa bb), with ed. 2, read more correctly, formally speaking, reformatio for recreatio.
- Ita plurimi et meliores codd.; Vat. requirit. Lectio a nobis recepta explicatur supra post solut. ad 3, ubi arguitur ex parte virtutis et dicitur: Necesse est, quod ab illa summa caritate relinquatur in nobis aliquod exemplatum in nostro affectu, per quod moveatur illi conformiter.So very many and better codices; the Vatican reads requirit. The reading received by us is explained above, after the solution to the 3rd, where the argument is from the side of virtue, and it is said: It is necessary that from that supreme charity there be left in us some exemplate in our affection, by which it may be moved in conformity to it.
- Fide plurimorum mss. et sex primarum edd. pro unitur substituimus unit, quod obiectioni magis respondet. Mox post secundum quod supple cum cod. bb est.On the authority of very many manuscripts and the first six editions, in place of unitur we substituted unit, which answers more aptly to the objection. Next, after secundum quod, supply with cod. bb est.
- Plurimis postulantibus mss. et ed. 1, substituimus obiicitur pro obiicit. Dein in multis codd. et ed. 1 minus apte deest caritas.At the demand of very many manuscripts and ed. 1, we substituted obiicitur for obiicit. Then in many codices and ed. 1 caritas is, less aptly, missing.
- Plures codd. ut C S V W X falso ad hoc.Several codices (C S V W X) wrongly read ad hoc.
- Vat. cum nonnullis mss. autem; ed. 1 enim. Mox plures codd. ut G H I K T etc. post obiicitur ponunt quod loco quia.The Vatican, with some manuscripts, reads autem; ed. 1 reads enim. Next, several codices (G H I K T, etc.) after obiicitur place quod in place of quia.
- Vat., plurimis mss. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, illud pro aliud.The Vatican, against the resistance of very many manuscripts and ed. 1, reads illud for aliud.