Bonaventure

I. Facta distinctione duplicis cognitionis, scil. experientiae (intuitivae) et speculationis (abstractivae), ipsam quaestionem, quae sane pro theoria de cognitione humana magni momenti est, duplici conclusione resolvit. Deinde modum huius cognitionis speculativae septem propositionibus explicat. Pro confirmatione responsionis hic subiungimus, quae de hac re dicunt Petr. a Tar. et Alex. Hal. Petrus (hic q. 1. a. 5. quaestiunc. 2.): «Cognitione experientiae non potest cognosci caritas nisi ab habente, sed cognitione speculativa potest, non per essentiam eius seu per speciem, quae sit idem quod ipsa — sic videtur solum ab habente — sed per speciem seu per similitudinem, quae non est idem quod ipsa; et hoc dupliciter: vel per speciem acquisitam, quae est similitudo eius vel potius actus ipsius, relicta in memoria ad eius praesentiam, et sic videtur ab illo, qui eam aliquando habuit, nisi speciem illam oblivio deleverit, et sic in patria videbit Sanctus, se fidem et spem habuisse, scil. per quoddam vestigium fidei, ut dicit Augustinus XIV. de Trinitate c. 3.; vel per speciem intuitam, et sic videri potest a quocumque, non quae sit species tantum, ut species lapidis in anima, quia talem speciem non habet anima concreatam caritatis, sed per speciem innatam, quae est res in se, et tamen habet similitudinem cum caritate. Habet enim anima apud se virtutum omnium quaedam semina et per illa habet desiderium et cognitionem quandam universalem virtutum, sicut per principia venit in cognitionem conclusionum». Idem ad obiectionem: anima creatur ut tabula rasa, sic respondet: «Hoc intelligitur quoad species, quae sunt intentiones tantum, non res; huiusmodi vero habitus innati in se quidem sunt res, in quantum vero per illos cognoscuntur alii (alia?) ut in simili, sunt quasi species». Haec omnia fere ad verbum concordant cum doctrina Seraphici. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 7. a. 1. haec habet: «Quilibet sive bonus sive malus a creatione habet inditam rationem boni et veri, secundum quod dicit Augustinus et Boethius. Sicut ergo in notione principiorum veri est notio conclusionum in universali, ita in notione boni nobis in universali impressa est notio gratiae in universali; et ex illa notione boni possumus scire, quid est gratia in universali, scilicet quod ipsa est quaedam qualitas in anima. Cum enim gratia sit bonum, et habeamus notionem boni in universali nobis impressam, ex illa possumus arguere, gratiam esse; sed haec erit notio in universali, non in ratione propria. Cfr. ibid. q. 28. m. 1. a. 2. Praeter hos cfr. Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 4. Ex his patet, quod intellectus ex innato lumine veritatis potest formare speciem intelligibilem, aciem intellectus informantem, quae simul habeat «rationem similitudinis, dum accipitur ab intellectu, et tamen rationem veritatis, prout est in anima», ut habetur hic in corp.

II. Quae in hac quaestione a Seraphico dicuntur non parvi sunt momenti, ut sententia eius de modo cognitionis humanae recte intelligatur. Quid sit cognoscere in veritate aeterna, iam explicatum est supra d. 3. p. 1. q. 1. in Scholio. — Quid sit secundum S. Bonaventuram species innata, et quo sensu ipsa animae humanae innata dici possit, hic manifeste docetur, scil. quod hoc secundum habitum sive lumen animae concreatum, quod vocatur naturale iudicatorium, non secundum actuales species sive ideas innatas intelligendum sit. Quod amplius confirmatur et explicatur ab ipso Seraphico Doctore, II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2, ubi quaeritur, utrum conscientia sit habitus innatus, an acquisitus. Reiecta opinione Platonis, quod habitus cognitivi animae sint simpliciter innati, sed oblivioni dati ad tempus, ipse asserit, tres de hac re esse opiniones, in hoc consentientes, quod habitus cognitivi nec sint omnino innati, nec omnino acquisiti, sed quodam modo innati, quodam modo acquisiti; tamen has dissidere in assignando modum, secundum quem hi habitus sint acquisiti vel innati. Reiectis duabus opinionibus tanquam insufficientibus, concludit, quod «habitus cognitivi sunt quodam modo nobis innati ratione luminis animae inditi, sunt etiam quodam modo acquisiti ratione speciei. Et hoc quidem verbis Philosophi et Augustini concordat. Omnes enim in hoc concordant, quod potentiae cognitivae sit lumen inditum, quod vocatur naturale iudicatorium; species autem et similitudines rerum acquiruntur nobis mediante sensu, sicut expresse dicit Philosophus in multis locis; et hoc etiam experientia docet». Tum attendendam esse ait distinctionem inter prima principia valde evidentia, quorum «cognitio ratione illius luminis dicitur esse nobis innata, quia lumen illud sufficit ad illa cognoscenda post receptionem specierum sine aliqua persuasione superaddita propter sui evidentiam», et inter cognitionem particularium conclusionum, quarum cognitio acquisita est pro eo, quod lumen nobis innatum non plene sufficit ad illa cognoscenda, sed indiget aliqua persuasione et habilitatione nova etc. — Denique respondendo ad illam quaestionem, utrum omnis cognitio sit a sensu, sic concludit: «Dicendum est, quod non. Necessario enim oportet ponere, quod anima novit Deum et se ipsam et quae sunt in se ipsa sine adminiculo sensuum exteriorum. Unde si aliquando dicat Philosophus, quod nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu, et quod omnis cognitio ortum habeat a sensu, intelligendum est de illis quae quidem habent esse in anima per similitudinem abstractam; et illa dicuntur esse in anima ad modum scripturae. Et propterea valde notabiliter dicit Philosophus, quod in anima nihil scriptum est, non quia nulla est in ea notitia, sed quia nulla est in ea pictura vel similitudo abstracta. Et hoc est, quod dicit August. in libro de Civit. Dei: Inseruit nobis Deus nobile iudicatorium, ubi quid sit lucis, quid tenebrarum, cognoscitur in libro lucis, qui veritas est, quia veritas in corde hominum naturaliter est impressa». — Hanc sententiam verbotenus sive in hoc sive in alio libro S. Augustini non invenimus. Ipsa autem breviter complectitur, quae S. August. longiore discursu pluries luculenter probat, praesertim XI. de Civ. Dei c. 27. n. 2, ubi inter alia ait: «Sed lucem illam incorpoream (animalia) contingere nequeunt, qua mens nostra quodam modo irradiatur, ut de his omnibus recte iudicare possimus. Nam in quantum eam capimus, in tantum id possumus. Verumtamen inest sensibus irrationalium animantium, etsi scientia nullo modo, at certe quaedam scientiae similitudo... Sed nos ea (corporalia) sensu corporis ita capimus, ut de his non sensu corporis iudicemus. Habemus enim alium interioris hominis sensum isto longe praestantiorem, quo iusta et iniusta sentimus: iusta per intelligibilem speciem, iniusta per eius privationem. Ad huius sensus officium non acies pupillae, non foramen auriculae, non spiramenta narium, non gustus faucium, non ullus corporeus tactus accedit. Ibi me et esse et hoc nosse certus sum, et haec amo atque amare me similiter certus sum».

III. S. Bonaventura fidelissimum S. Augustini discipulum, sicut in aliis quaestionibus, sic in tota sua de cognitione humana doctrina se comprobat. Unde quae circa hanc materiam in hac quaest. disputat non nisi summarium exhibent eorum, quae S. August. more suo et diffuse tractat in pluribus libris v. g. II. de Libero Arb.; de Vera Religione, c. 29. seqq.; XII. de Gen. ad lit. Operae pretium esse duximus exemplo hoc probare, proponendo ex libris VIII. et IX. de Trinitate ea S. Augustini de cognitione humana fundamenta, quae S. Bonaventura hic vel praesupponit, vel explicite asserit.

1. Apertissime ibi distinguit S. Augustinus inter cognitionem sensuum (phantasiae) et intellectus: «Et Carthaginem quidem cum eloqui volo, apud me ipsum quaero, ut eloquar, et apud me ipsum invenio phantasiam Carthaginis, sed eam per corpus accepi, i. e. per corporis sensum... Non autem ita quaero, quid sit iustus, nec ita invenio, nec ita intueor, cum id eloquor» etc. (VIII. c. 6. n. 9.).

2. Distinguit in cognitione intellectuali conceptus formatos per abstractionem a rebus sensibilibus et non formatos per abstractionem: «Neque enim oculis corporeis multas mentes videndo per similitudinem colligimus generalem vel specialem mentis humanae notitiam, sed intuemur inviolabilem veritatem» (IX. c. 6. n. 9.).

3. Asserit, aliquos conceptus intellectuales, quos habemus, supponere experientiam sive externam sive internam: «Sed quid sit mori, et quid sit vivere, utique scimus; quia et vivimus, et mortuos ac morientes aliquando vidimus et experti sumus» (VIII. c. 5. n. 8.).

4. Dicit, animae humanae impressam esse notitiam quarundam rerum: «Neque enim in his omnibus bonis, vel quae commemoravi vel quae alia cernuntur sive cogitantur, diceremus aliud alio melius, cum vere iudicamus, nisi esset nobis impressa notio ipsius boni, secundum quod et probaremus aliquid et aliud illi praeponeremus» (VIII. c. 3. n. 4.). Habemus enim quasi regulariter infixam humanae naturae notitiam... Secundum species et genera rerum vel natura insita vel experientia collecta, de factis huiuscemodi (miraculis et resurrectione Christi) cogitamus, ut non ficta sit fides nostra (ibid. c. 4. 5. n. 7.). «Quid igitur de illa excellentia Trinitatis sive specialiter sive generaliter novimus, quasi multae sint tales trinitates, quarum aliquas experti sumus, ut per regulam similitudinis impressam, vel specialem vel generalem notitiam, illam quoque talem esse credamus» etc. (ibid. c. 5. n. 8.).

5. Asserit, quaedam cognosci ab homine in veritate, et etiam in veritate aeterna. Minime autem dicit, hoc fieri per immediatum aeternarum rationum conspectum, ut Ontologistae volunt; sed intelligi debet secundum illam interpretationem, quam meliores Scholastici exhibent; cfr. supra d. 3. p. 1. q. 1. Scholion. Libr. VIII. c. 6. n. 9. proponit quaestionem, quae cum illa quae a S. Bonav. hic pertractatur, maxime convenit, scil. quomodo homo iniustus cognoscat animum iustum, quem diligit, eamque ita solvit: «Quid sit animus, ut dictum est, novimus ex nobis; inest enim animus nobis. Quid autem sit iustus, unde novimus, si iusti non sumus?... An signa quaedam per motum corporis emicant, quibus ille aut ille homo esse iustus apparet? Sed unde novit, illa signa esse animi iusti, nesciens, quid omnino sit iustus? Novit ergo. Sed unde novimus, quid sit iustus, etiam cum iusti nondum sumus? Si extra nos novimus, in corpore aliquo novimus. Sed non est ista res corporis. In nobis igitur novimus, quid sit iustus. Non enim alibi hoc invenio, cum quaero, ut hoc eloquar, nisi apud me ipsum... Et Carthaginem quidem cum eloqui volo, apud me ipsum quaero, ut eloquar, et apud me ipsum invenio phantasiam Carthaginis, sed eam per corpus accepi, i. e. per corporis sensum... Non autem ita quaero, quid sit iustus, nec ita invenio nec ita intueor, cum id eloquor... Illud mirabile est, ut apud se animus videat, quod alibi nusquam vidit, et verum videat, ipsum verum iustum animum videat, et sit ipse animus, et non sit iustus animus, quem apud se ipsum videt. Num est alius animus iustus in animo nondum iusto?... An illud quod videt, veritas est interior, praesens animo, qui eam valet intueri? Neque omnes valent; et qui intueri valent, hoc etiam, quod intuentur, non omnes sunt, hoc est, non sunt etiam ipsi iusti animi, sicut possunt videre ac dicere, quid sit iustus animus. Quod unde esse potuerunt, nisi inhaerendo eidem ipsi formae, quam intuentur, ut inde formentur et sint iusti animi, non tantum cernentes... Et unde inhaeretur illi formae, nisi amando?... Homo ergo, qui creditur iustus, ex ea forma et veritate diligitur, quam cernit et intelligit apud se ille qui diligit; ipsa vero forma et veritas non est, quomodo aliunde diligatur. Neque enim invenimus aliquid tale praeter ipsam, ut eam, cum incognita est, credendo diligamus, ex eo quod iam tale aliquid novimus. Quidquid enim tale aspexeris, ipsa est; et non est quidquam tale, quoniam sola ipsa talis est, qualis ipsa est». Ibid. c. 9. n. 13: «Vivendum tamen sic esse Dei ministris, non de aliquibus auditum credimus, sed intus apud nos, vel potius supra nos in ipsa veritate conspicimus. Illum ergo, quem sic vixisse credimus, ex hoc quod videmus diligimus. Et nisi hanc formam, quam semper stabilem atque incommutabilem cernimus, praecipue diligeremus, non ideo diligeremus illum, quia eius vitam, cum in carne viveret, huic formae coaptatam et congruentem fuisse fide retinemus». Libr. IX. c. 6. n. 9: «Intuemur inviolabilem veritatem, ex qua perfecte, quantum possumus, definiamus, non qualis sit uniuscuiusque hominis mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat». Ibid. n. 11: «Ipsa vera forma inconcussae ac stabilis veritatis, et in qua fruerer homine, bonum eum credens, et in qua consulo, ut bonus sit, eadem luce incorruptibilis sincerissimaeque rationis et meae mentis aspectum et illam phantasiae nubem, quam desuper cerno, cum eundem hominem, quem videram, cogito, imperturbabili aeternitate perfundit». Ibid. c. 7. n. 12: «In illa igitur aeterna veritate, ex qua temporalia facta sunt omnia, formam, secundum quam sumus et secundum quam vel in nobis vel in corporibus vera et recta ratione aliquid operamur, visu mentis aspicimus, atque inde conceptam rerum veracem notitiam tanquam verbum apud nos habemus et dicendo intus gignimus, nec a nobis na[scendo discedit]».

6. Ultima haec verba aliam Augustinianae sententiae partem indicant, quam S. Bonav. in fine huius quaestionis attingit, scil. quod habitus animae, qui cognoscuntur in ipsa veritate et per similitudines, quae idem sunt quod ipsae (res i. e. habitus), non cognoscantur absque aliqua specie in intellectu cognoscentis formata. Libr. IX. c. 3. n. 3. ait: «Mens ergo ipsa, sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic incorporearum per semetipsam. Ergo et semetipsam per se ipsam novit, quoniam est incorporea». — Ibid. c. 11. n. 16. loquendo de cognitione Dei ostendit, quod in ipsa «fit aliqua Dei similitudo illa notitia; tamen inferior est, quia in inferiore natura est; creatura quippe animus, Creator autem Deus. Ex quo colligitur, quia cum se mens ipsa novit atque approbat, sic est eadem notitia verbum eius, ut ei sit par omnino et aequale atque identidem, quia neque inferioris essentiae notitia est, sicut corporis, neque superioris, sicut Dei. Et cum habeat notitia similitudinem ad eam rem, quam novit, hoc est, cuius notitia est, haec habet perfectam» etc.

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I. Having drawn the distinction of the twofold knowledge, namely of experience (intuitive) and of speculation (abstractive), he resolves the question itself — which is indeed of great moment for the theory of human cognition — by a twofold conclusion. Then he explains the mode of this speculative knowledge in seven propositions. By way of confirmation of the response, we add here what Peter of Tarentaise and Alexander of Hales say on this matter. Peter (here q. 1, a. 5, quaestiuncula 2): «By the knowledge of experience, charity cannot be known except by one having it, but by speculative knowledge it can — not through its essence or through a species which is the same thing as it (so it seems to be seen only by one having it) but through a species or likeness which is not the same as it; and this in two ways: either through an acquired species, which is its likeness, or rather an act of it, left in the memory at its presence, and so it is seen by one who at some time had it, unless oblivion has erased that species (and thus in the homeland the saint will see that he had had faith and hope, namely through a certain vestige of faith, as Augustine says in XIV On the Trinity, c. 3); or through a species seen [intuited], and thus it can be seen by anyone — not one which is species only, like the species of a stone in the soul, since the soul does not have such a co-created species of charity, but through an innate species, which is a thing in itself, and yet has likeness with charity. For the soul has within it certain seeds of all the virtues, and through them it has a certain universal desire and knowledge of the virtues, just as through principles it comes into the knowledge of conclusions». The same author, to the objection the soul is created as a blank tablet, responds thus: «This is to be understood with respect to species which are intentions only, not things; but innate habits of this sort are indeed things in themselves, but inasmuch as through them other things (others?) are known as in something similar, they are as it were species». All these things agree almost word for word with the doctrine of the Seraphic [Doctor]. Alexander of Hales, in Summa p. III, q. 61, m. 7, a. 1, has these things: «Anyone, whether good or wicked, has from creation an imparted account of the good and the true, according to what Augustine and Boethius say. Just as therefore in the notion of the principles of the true there is the notion of the conclusions in general, so in the notion of the good impressed upon us in general there is the notion of grace in general; and from that notion of the good we can know what grace is in general, namely that it is itself a certain quality in the soul. For since grace is good, and we have the notion of the good in general impressed upon us, from it we can argue that grace exists; but this will be a notion in general, not in its own proper account». Cf. in the same place q. 28, m. 1, a. 2. Besides these, cf. Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 4. From these things it is plain that the intellect, from the innate light of truth, can form an intelligible species informing the gaze of the intellect, which together has «the character of likeness, insofar as it is received by the intellect, and yet the character of truth, insofar as it is in the soul», as is found here in the body [of the question].

II. What is said in this question by the Seraphic [Doctor] is of no small moment, in order that his opinion concerning the mode of human cognition be rightly understood. What it is to know in the eternal truth has already been explained above at d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, in the Scholion. — What according to St. Bonaventure an innate species is, and in what sense it can be called innate to the human soul, is here manifestly taught, namely that this is to be understood in the sense of a habit or light of the soul co-created [with it], which is called natural judicatory, not in the sense of actual species or innate ideas. This is further confirmed and explained by the Seraphic Doctor himself in II Sentences, d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, where it is asked whether conscience is an innate or acquired habit. Having rejected the opinion of Plato — that the cognitive habits of the soul are innate without qualification, but given over to oblivion for a time — he himself asserts that there are three opinions on this matter, agreeing in this, that the cognitive habits are neither wholly innate nor wholly acquired, but in a certain way innate, in a certain way acquired; yet that these differ in assigning the mode by which these habits are acquired or innate. Having rejected the first two opinions as insufficient, he concludes that «cognitive habits are in a certain way innate to us by reason of the light imparted to the soul, and they are also in a certain way acquired by reason of the species. And this indeed agrees with the words of the Philosopher and of Augustine. For all agree in this, that there is a light imparted to the cognitive power, which is called natural judicatory; but the species and likenesses of things are acquired by us by means of sense, as the Philosopher expressly says in many places; and experience also teaches this». Then he says that one must attend to the distinction between first principles which are highly evident, of which «the knowledge by reason of that light is said to be innate to us, since that light is sufficient for knowing them, after the reception of the species, without any added persuasion, on account of their evidence», and the knowledge of particular conclusions, the knowledge of which is acquired, since the light innate to us does not fully suffice for knowing them, but requires some new persuasion and habituation, etc. — Finally, in answering the question whether all knowledge is from sense, he concludes thus: «It must be said that not [all is]. For it is necessary to posit that the soul knows God and itself and the things that are in itself without the aid of the external senses. Whence if at any time the Philosopher says that there is nothing in the intellect which was not first in sense, and that all knowledge takes its origin from sense, this is to be understood of those things which indeed have being in the soul through an abstracted likeness; and these are said to be in the soul after the manner of writing. And on this account the Philosopher very notably says that in the soul nothing is written — not because there is no notice in it, but because there is in it no picture or abstracted likeness. And this is what Augustine says in his book On the City of God: God has implanted in us a noble judicatory, where what is light, what is darkness, is known in the book of light, which is truth, since truth is naturally impressed upon the heart of men». — This sentence verbatim either in this or in another book of St. Augustine we have not found. Yet it briefly sums up what St. Augustine in a longer discourse repeatedly proves clearly, especially XI On the City of God, c. 27, n. 2, where among other things he says: «But that incorporeal light (animals) cannot reach, by which our mind is in some way irradiated, that we may rightly judge of all these things. For insofar as we grasp it, so far we are able [to do this]. Yet there is in the senses of irrational animals, even if no knowledge at all, certainly a certain likeness of knowledge... But we so grasp them (corporeal things) by the sense of the body that we judge of these things not by the sense of the body. For we have another sense, of the inner man, far more excellent than that, by which we sense just and unjust things: just things by an intelligible species, unjust things by the privation of it. To the office of this sense neither the keenness of the pupil, nor the opening of the ear, nor the breathing-passage of the nostrils, nor the taste of the throat, nor any bodily touch reaches. There I am certain that I am, and that I know this, and I love these things, and I am likewise certain that I love».

III. St. Bonaventure shows himself to be a most faithful disciple of St. Augustine, as in other questions, so in his whole doctrine concerning human cognition. Whence what he disputes concerning this matter in this question presents nothing but a summary of what St. Augustine in his usual manner discusses at length in many books, e.g., II On Free Will; On True Religion, c. 29 ff.; XII On Genesis Literally. We have judged it worth the trouble to prove this by an example, by setting forth from books VIII and IX On the Trinity those foundations of St. Augustine concerning human cognition which St. Bonaventure here either presupposes or explicitly asserts.

1. Most openly there St. Augustine distinguishes between the cognition of the senses (of the phantasy) and that of the intellect: «And when I wish to speak of Carthage, I seek within myself, that I may speak it, and within myself I find the phantasm of Carthage, but I have received it through the body, that is, through the sense of the body... But I do not so seek what just is, nor so find, nor so behold, when I speak of it» etc. (VIII, c. 6, n. 9).

2. He distinguishes within intellectual cognition concepts formed by abstraction from sensible things and those not formed by abstraction: «For we do not, by seeing many minds with the bodily eyes, gather through likeness a general or special notion of the human mind, but we behold the inviolable truth» (IX, c. 6, n. 9).

3. He asserts that some intellectual concepts which we have presuppose either external or internal experience: «But what it is to die, and what it is to live, we surely know; for we live, and we have at some time seen and experienced the dead and the dying» (VIII, c. 5, n. 8).

4. He says that the notice of certain things has been impressed upon the human soul: «For neither in all those goods, whether those which I have mentioned or whatever others are perceived or thought, would we say that one is better than another, when we judge truly, unless the notion of the good itself were impressed upon us, according to which we both approve something and prefer one thing to another» (VIII, c. 3, n. 4). For we have the notice of human nature as it were regularly fixed in us... According to the species and genera of things, either by an inborn nature or by experience gathered, we think about facts of this kind (the miracles and resurrection of Christ), so that our faith may not be feigned (ibid., c. 4, 5, n. 7). «What therefore do we know, whether specifically or generally, of that excellence of the Trinity, as if there were many such trinities, of some of which we have had experience, that by the rule of the impressed likeness, of either special or general notice, we should believe that one too to be such?» etc. (ibid., c. 5, n. 8).

5. He asserts that some things are known by man in the truth, and even in the eternal truth. Yet he by no means says that this happens through an immediate gaze upon the eternal reasons, as the Ontologists wish; but it must be understood according to that interpretation which the better Scholastics offer; cf. above d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, Scholion. In bk. VIII, c. 6, n. 9, he proposes a question which agrees most with the one here treated by St. Bonaventure, namely how the unjust man knows the just mind which he loves, and resolves it thus: «What mind is, as has been said, we know from ourselves, for there is mind in us. But what just is, whence do we know, if we are not just?... Or do certain signs flash forth through the motion of the body, by which this man or that appears to be just? But whence does one know that those signs are of a just mind, not knowing what just is at all? Therefore he does know. But whence do we know what just is, even when we are not yet just? If we know it outside ourselves, we know it in some body. But this thing is not of a body. Therefore in ourselves we know what just is. For I do not find this elsewhere when I seek, that I may speak it, except within myself... And when I wish to speak of Carthage, I seek within myself, that I may speak it, and within myself I find the phantasm of Carthage, but I have received it through the body, i.e., through the sense of the body... But I do not so seek what just is, nor so find nor so behold, when I speak it... It is wonderful that the mind sees within itself what it has seen nowhere else, and sees it as true, and sees the true just mind, and is itself a mind, and is not a just mind, which it sees within itself. Is there another just mind in a mind not yet just?... Or is what it sees an inner truth, present to the mind which is able to behold it? Not all are able; and those who are able to behold, even what they behold they themselves are not all, that is, they themselves are not just minds either, [though] they can see and say what a just mind is. Whence could they have done this, except by adhering to that very form which they behold, that thence they may be formed and may be just minds, not only beholding... And whence does one adhere to that form, except by loving?... The man therefore who is believed to be just, is loved out of that form and truth which he who loves discerns and understands within himself; but the form and truth itself does not exist in such a way that it could be loved from elsewhere. For we do not find anything such besides itself, that, when it is unknown, we should love it by believing, from the fact that we already know something such. For whatever such you behold, it is itself; and there is not anything such, since it alone is such as it itself is». Ibid., c. 9, n. 13: «That however God's ministers must so live we do not believe by hearsay from anyone, but inwardly within ourselves, or rather above ourselves, we behold in the truth itself. Him therefore whom we believe to have so lived, we love from this, that we see [him]. And unless we especially loved this form, which we always behold as stable and unchangeable, we should not therefore love him, since we hold by faith that his life, while he was living in the flesh, was fitted and conformed to this form». Bk. IX, c. 6, n. 9: «We behold the inviolable truth from which we may, as perfectly as we can, define not what each man's mind is, but what it ought to be by the eternal reasons». Ibid., n. 11: «That very form of unshaken and stable truth, both in which I might enjoy the man, believing him good, and in which I take counsel that he be good, with the same light of incorruptible and most sincere reason floods both the gaze of my mind and that cloud of phantasy which I see from above, when I think of the same man whom I had seen, with imperturbable eternity». Ibid., c. 7, n. 12: «In that eternal truth therefore, from which all temporal things have been made, we behold with the gaze of the mind the form according to which we are and according to which by true and right reason we do anything either in ourselves or in bodies, and from there we have within us as it were a word, the truthful notice of things conceived, and by speaking we beget [it] within, nor in being born does it depart from us».

6. These last words indicate another part of the Augustinian opinion, which St. Bonaventure touches on at the end of this question, namely that the habits of the soul which are known in the truth itself and through likenesses which are the same as those things themselves (i.e., the habits), are not known without some species formed in the intellect of the knower. In bk. IX, c. 3, n. 3, he says: «The mind itself therefore, just as it gathers the notices of corporeal things through the senses of the body, so [gathers] those of incorporeal things through itself. Therefore it knows itself also through itself, since it is incorporeal». — Ibid., c. 11, n. 16, speaking of the cognition of God, he shows that in it «that notice becomes some likeness of God; yet it is inferior, because it is in an inferior nature; for the mind is a creature, but God is the Creator. From which it is gathered that, when the mind itself knows and approves itself, that very notice is its word, so as to be altogether equal and on a par and identical with it, since the notice is neither of an inferior essence, like that of a body, nor of a superior, like that of God. And since the notice has a likeness to that thing which it knows, that is, of which it is the notice, this [notice] has the perfect [likeness]» etc.

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