Dist. 17, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 17
Articulus Unicus. De augmento caritatis.
### Quaestio I. Utrum caritas secundum substantiam augeri possit.
Quantum ad primum ostenditur, quod caritas possit augeri secundum substantiam:
1. Per Augustinum ad Bonifacium1: «Caritas meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur perfici».
2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione: caritas viae secundum substantiam minor est caritate patriae; sed a caritate viae ad caritatem patriae contingit devenire, ipsa salvata in esse, quoniam caritas viae numquam excidit2; sed motus a minori ad maius, re salva, est augmentum3: ergo contingit caritatem augmentari.
3. Item, constat, quod diversis maiora et minora praemia tribuuntur; unde Apostolus, primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto4: Alia claritas solis, alia claritas lunae etc.; et constat, quod uni et eidem secundum diversos status debetur diversum praemium, scilicet maius et minus; sed magnitudo praemii substantialis respondet quantitati caritatis, non secundum fervorem, sed secundum substantiam: ergo si contingit, maius praemium alicui deberi, ergo et caritatem substantialiter augeri.
4. Item, contingit caritatem meliorari, cum non sit summum bonum; sed caritas est bona substantialiter: ergo contingit, caritatem secundum suam substantiam fieri meliorem. Sed ut dicit Augustinus in sexto de Trinitate, octavo capitulo5: «In spiritualibus idem est maius et melius»: ergo cum caritas sit quid spirituale, possibile est, secundum substantiam ipsam effici maiorem.
5. Item, constat quod in uno et eodem caritas potest in maiorem effectum et actum: ergo cum maioritas effectus veniat a magnitudine virtutis, possibile est, caritatem maiorem effici secundum virtutem. Tunc quaero: aut caritas est sua virtus, aut non: si sic: ergo augmentata virtute, necesse est, augeri essentiam caritatis; si non, tunc quaero de illa virtute: aut habet essentiam, aut non; si sic, similiter quaero de illa: ergo vel erit abire in infinitum, vel necesse est poni, quod aliquid augeatur secundum substantiam; sed qua ratione alia virtus, et caritas.
Sed contra: 1. Caritas est forma; sed omnis forma consistit in essentia invariabili6: ergo et caritas; sed nihil invariabile secundum essentiam augetur secundum essentiam: ergo nec caritas.
2. Item, ubi augmentum, ibi maius et minus7; sed ubi est simplicitas, ibi non est maius et minus: si ergo caritas est forma simplex et non extensa, in caritate non erit augmentum.
3. Item, augmentum in corporalibus est secundum accidens, et non secundum substantiam8: ergo pari ratione et in spiritualibus: ergo si caritas augetur, hoc est solum secundum accidens, non secundum substantiam.
4. Item, quod augetur mutatur9, et quod augetur secundum substantiam mutatur secundum substantiam; sed quod substantialiter mutatur est aliud nunc quam prius: ergo quod augetur secundum substantiam non manet: si ergo caritas numquam excidit10 nisi per peccatum, sed semper manet, ergo non augetur.
Conclusio. Caritas secundum substantiam sive secundum quantitatem virtutis augeri potest.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum communem opinionem verum est, caritatem substantialiter augeri.
Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum distinguunt quidam augmentum secundum duplicem differentiam. Augmentum enim est, quando minori succedit maius; hoc autem potest esse dupliciter: vel ita, quod illud idem, quod prius fuit minus, postea fiat maius, sicut homo dicitur augeri vel aliquod aliud quantum, et hoc modo11 caritas non augetur, ut dicunt; vel ideo, quod minori succedat maius, non idem numero, sed consimile in forma, sicut dies dicuntur augeri, non quia idem dies primo12 sit minor et postea maior, sed quia minori succedit maior; sic dicunt augeri caritatem, ac per hoc posse evadere oppositiones.
Sed positio ista, ut supra probatum est13, non potest stare. Ostensum est enim, quod caritate manente eadem, contingit, circa eandem fieri crementum et perfectionem.
Et ideo aliter dicendum, quod augmentum sequitur quantitatem. Quantitas autem dicitur dupliciter, scilicet proprie et metaphorice: proprie dicitur quantitas molis, et haec est in corporalibus; metaphorice quantitas virtutis, et haec est14 in spiritualibus. Sic et augmentum dicitur dupliciter: proprie, scilicet secundum magnitudinem molis, et metaphorice secundum quantitatem virtutis. Cum ergo in caritate sit quantitas virtutis, et non in summo, constans est, caritatem augeri posse. Rursus, cum virtus sit idem quod substantia caritatis, et sit15 quantitas virtutis, hinc est, quod de necessitate sequitur, caritatem augeri secundum substantiam; cum enim sit virtus, eius substantia non est alia a virtute.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod essentia formae est invariabilis; dicendum, quod verum est de forma universali; si autem dicatur de forma singulari, verum est in se considerata, sed non prout in alio16.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod simplicitas non admittit magnitudinem; dicendum, quod verum est, quod non admittit magnitudinem molis, admittit tamen magnitudinem virtutis.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod augmentum17 in corporalibus est motus secundum accidens, patet responsio. Nam quantitas molis est accidens, essentialiter differens a quanto; non autem sic est in quantis quantitate virtutis, immo quantitas virtutis essentialis est, ut in opponendo probatum est18.
Potest tamen dici, quod cum dicitur, quod19 motus augmenti in corporalibus est motus secundum accidens, dupliciter potest accipi hoc quod est secundum: aut quod dicat habitudinem termini per se sive termini formalis, et sic utique terminus augmenti est quantitas perfecta; aut ita, quod dicat terminum per accidens, et hoc modo augmentum per accidens20 respicit substantiam. Quod patet. Cum enim additur quantitas maior minori, nisi fiat per rarefactionem vel per protensionem21, oportet quod addatur substantia, in qua sit illa quantitas; et ita augmentum plus habet de substantia, et ita per consequens ad substantiam terminatur etiam in corporalibus.
4. Et per hoc patet quod obiicitur: quod mutatur secundum substantiam est aliud et aliud22; verum est, si dicat terminum formalem; sed non sic dicit.
Ad illud quod obiicitur: quod augmentatur secundum substantiam et mutatur secundum substantiam; dicendum, quia23 rei non tantum est esse substantiale, sed etiam perfectum esse. Mutari ergo secundum substantiam hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel respectu esse simpliciter, et sic mutatum est aliud et aliud; vel respectu esse perfecti, et sic est idem24, quia cum de imperfecto fit perfectum, non est aliud, sed idem. Hinc est, quod caritas, quamvis substantialiter augeatur, non est alia, sed eadem secundum substantiam; unde non valet obiectio.
I. Cum sententia communi quaestio resolvitur affirmative. Deinde circa modum huius augmenti S. Doctor affert opinionem aliquorum insufficientem; denique propriam suam sententiam proponit eamque probat adhibito isto axiomate, quod augmentum sequitur quantitatem. Quantitas autem communiter distinguitur in propriam sive molis, et metaphoricam sive virtutis; unde sequitur, quod etiam duplex augmentatio admitti debeat, et inde, quod caritas augeri possit, et quod augmentatio fiat secundum essentiam. — Ut rationes et difficultates ad philosophiam spectantes, quae in hac et seq. quaest. tanguntur, facilius intelligantur, iuvat aliqua excerpere circa varias in antiquis scholis vigentes opiniones de augmento et diminutione formarum. Teste Boethio (III. in Categorias seu Praedicamenta Aristotelis, c. de Qualitate) tres opiniones iam apud antiquos
philosophos extiterunt de intensione formarum seu de magis et minus. «Quidam namque dicebant, in omnibus secundum materiae habitudinem reperiri posse magis et minus. Proprium namque esse materiae corporumque intensione crescere et minui relaxatione, quae quorundam Platonicorum sententia fuit». Quae Boethii verba a B. Alberto, Comment. in libr. de Sex principiis Gilberti Porretani, tract. 8. c. 1. ita exponuntur: «Eorum quidem una (opinio), qui dicebant, quod in omni, in quo invenitur magis et minus, invenitur aliquo modo materia, cuius quantitas, ut dicunt, ex indivisibilibus consistit: ubi plura similia in uno conveniunt, id dicunt intendi, et ubi pauciora sunt, illud dicunt remitti, et ideo albissima sunt in quibus plura indivisibilia concurrunt albedinis; remitti autem, ubi conveniunt pauciora. Et haec quidem opinio, ut dicit Boethius, fuit Platonis. Videtur autem ab antiquo Anaxagora derivata, qui dixit, simile simili generari, et omnia esse in omnibus, sed latenter; et ideo etiam intendi et remitti quodcumque secundum plus et minus apparet de ipso simili». — «Alia vero, quae secundum certissimas verissimasque artes atque virtutes non liceret esse magis et minus, secundum autem medias dici posse, ut haec ipsa grammatica atque iustitia non dicitur magis grammatica neque magis iustitia. Esse autem quasdam alias mediocres artes, in quibus id ipsum posset evenire (sicut de dispositione fit habitus medius, ut B. Albertus adiungit). Tertia est, de qua Aristoteles loquitur, quod ipsas quidem habitudines nulla intensione crescere nec diminutione decrescere putat, sed eorum participantes (seu subiecta) posse sub examine compositionis venire, ut de his magis minusve dicatur. Sanitatem namque ipsam et iustitiam alteram altera magis minusve non esse; neque enim quisquam dicit, magis esse sanitatem alia sanitate. Sed hoc solum dicere possumus, magis habere sanitatem aliquem, i.e. esse saniorem, et magis sanum et minus sanum. Dicimus ergo, quod ipsae qualitates non suscipiunt magis et minus; qui vero secundum eas quales dicuntur, ipsi sub comparatione cadunt, ut iustior et sanior et grammaticior». — Gilbertus Porretanus (de Sex principiis, c. ult.), tres sententias hac de re affert, quae suo tempore a diversis defendebantur et triplici antiquorum opinioni [respondere] videntur. «Aiunt enim quidam secundum crementum vel diminutionem eorum quae suscipiunt subiectorum. Aliter autem et alii ipsa quidem quae suscipiuntur in suscipiente diminui et crescere annuntiant. Alii autem secundum utrumque amborum diminutionem et augmentationem». Pluribus rationibus contra triplicem hanc sententiam adductis, concludit: «Patet itaque nihil secundum magis et minus praedicari neque secundum subiecti solum augmentum vel diminutionem neque secundum accidentis; quare neque secundum utrumque. Oportet igitur ab alia ea25 invenire, quae cum magis et minus dicantur. Huiusmodi vero sunt ea, quae sunt in voce eorum quae adveniunt, et non secundum subiecti vel mobilis crementum vel diminutionem, sed quoniam eorum, quae sunt in voce, impositioni propinquiora sunt, sive ab eadem remotiora. De his etenim cum magis dicuntur quae proximiora sunt ei quae in ipsa voce est impositioni, cum minus autem de his quae remotiora consistunt, ut album dicitur illud, in quo pura albedo est; quanto igitur ad vocis impositionem accedens puriori inficitur albedine, tanto et candidior assignabitur... Dubitabit autem aliquis, quare haec quidem cum magis et minus dicantur, substantiae vero minime? Hoc autem contingit, quoniam substantiarum impositio quidem in termino est, ultra quem transgredi impossibile est. Additur autem et de accidentibus quibusdam, quae sine magis et minus dicuntur, ut quadrangulus et triangulus et similia; non enim triangulus magis unus altero dicitur».
II. In solut. ad 1. tangitur quaestio inter Scholasticos in utramque partem disputata, utrum ipsae formae substantiales eiusdem speciei, praesertim animae intellectuales, recipiant magis et minus, sive esse possint inaequalis perfectionis. Quod intelligendum est non de perfectione specifica, quae certo est eadem in individuis eiusdem speciei, sed de perfectione individuali, nec de perfectione accidentali, quae rursus diversa est in diversis, sed de substantiali, secundum gradum perfectionis consequentem naturam individui. Utraque sententia, i.e. affirmativa et negativa, est probabilis. Fautores sententiae, quod sint inaequales, pro se citant decretum aliquod doctorum Parisiensium, ab Henrico Gandav. (Quodl. 3. q. 3.) et a Durando (II. Sent. d. 32. q. 3.) relatum: «Si quis dicat, omnes animas ab origine esse aequales, errat, quoniam alias anima Christi non esset perfectior anima Iudae». Durand. hoc decretum ad perfectionem potentiarum sensitivarum et vegetivarum restringere conatur, licet parum probabiliter; alii id non habere irrefragabilem auctoritatem dicunt. De sententia S. Thom. disputatur, licet Caietan. (ad S. I. q. 83. a. 7.) dicat, caecos esse, qui dubitent, ipsum stare pro inaequalitate. Sotus autem cum aliis pluribus ex talibus caecis unum se esse profitetur. Interpretationi Caietani favent multa testimonia S. Thom., ut S. I, q. 50. a. 4. q. 85. a. 7; II. Sent. d. 32. q. 2. a. 3; I. Sent. d. 8. q. 5. a. 2. ad 6. — Sententiae neganti paritatem perfectionis adhaeret etiam S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. dub. 2, et d. 32. dub. 6. — Sententia autem Scoti dubia est, licet magis favere videtur huic ultimae sententiae, ut patet ex eius testimoniis collectis in Summ. Hieronymi a Montefortino t. II. p. 1. q. 85. a. 7. incident.
In solut. ad 3. duplex datur responsio. Prima est: etiamsi concedatur, quod in rebus corporalibus augmentum sit solummodo secundum accidens non secundum substantiam, tamen hoc non valet in augmento virtutum. Secunda vero responsio negat, quod motus augmenti in corporalibus sit tantum secundum accidens, quod est quantitas, quin addatur ipsi substantiae. Ad hoc probandum distinguitur duplex terminus augmenti: formalis sive per se, et hic est ipsa quantitas, et accidentalis, et hic est ipsa substantia.
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 9. m. 3. a. 2. § 1. — Scot., de hac et seq. hic q. 4. et seqq.; Report., hic q. 3. et seqq. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. II. II. q. 24. a. 4. — B. Albert., de hac et duabus seqq. hic a. 10, et III. Sent. d. 29. a. 10; et IV. Sent. d. 7. a. 5. quaestiunc. 3; S. I. p. II. tr. 16. q. 101. m. 2, et q. 102. m. 1. — Gulielmus Paris., de Virtut. c. 22. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., Quodlib. 5. q. 19. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6. — Biel, hic q. 4.
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Article Unique. On the augmentation of charity.
### Question I. Whether charity can be augmented according to substance.
As to the first [question], it is shown that charity can be augmented according to substance:
1. By Augustine to Boniface1: «Charity merits to be augmented, that, having been augmented, it may merit to be perfected».
2. Likewise, this same thing is seen by reason: the charity of the way is according to substance lesser than the charity of the homeland; but from the charity of the way it happens that one comes to the charity of the homeland, the same being preserved in being, since the charity of the way never falls away2; but motion from a lesser to a greater, with the thing preserved, is augmentation3: therefore it happens that charity is augmented.
3. Likewise, it is established that to different [persons] greater and lesser rewards are given; whence the Apostle, in 1 Corinthians 154: One is the brightness of the sun, another the brightness of the moon etc.; and it is established that to one and the same [person] according to different states a different reward — namely greater and lesser — is owed; but the magnitude of the substantial reward corresponds to the quantity of charity, not according to fervor, but according to substance: therefore if it happens that a greater reward is owed to someone, then also that charity is augmented substantially.
4. Likewise, it happens that charity is bettered, since it is not the highest good; but charity is good substantially: therefore it happens that charity becomes better according to its own substance. But, as Augustine says in the sixth book On the Trinity, chapter eight5: «In spiritual things the same thing is greater and better»: therefore, since charity is something spiritual, it is possible that it itself be made greater according to substance.
5. Likewise, it is established that in one and the same [subject] charity can [tend] to a greater effect and act: therefore, since the greaterness of the effect comes from the magnitude of the virtue [or power], it is possible that charity be made greater according to virtue. Then I ask: either charity is its own virtue, or not: if so, then with the virtue augmented, it is necessary that the essence of charity be augmented; if not, then I ask about that virtue: either it has an essence, or not; if so, similarly I ask about it: therefore there will either be a regress to infinity, or it is necessary to posit that something is augmented according to substance; but for whatever reason another virtue [is so augmented], so also is charity.
On the contrary: 1. Charity is a form; but every form consists in an invariable essence6: therefore so does charity also; but nothing invariable according to essence is augmented according to essence: therefore neither is charity.
2. Likewise, where there is augmentation, there is greater and lesser7; but where there is simplicity, there is no greater and lesser: if therefore charity is a simple form and not extended, in charity there will be no augmentation.
3. Likewise, augmentation in bodily things is according to accident, and not according to substance8: therefore by parity of reasoning so also in spiritual things: therefore if charity is augmented, this is only according to accident, not according to substance.
4. Likewise, what is augmented is changed9, and what is augmented according to substance is changed according to substance; but what is substantially changed is other now than before: therefore what is augmented according to substance does not remain: if then charity never falls away10 except through sin, but always remains, therefore it is not augmented.
Conclusio. Charity can be augmented according to substance, that is, according to the quantity of virtue.
Respondeo: It must be said that according to the common opinion it is true that charity is augmented substantially.
For the understanding of the objections, however, certain people distinguish augmentation according to a twofold difference. For augmentation occurs when greater succeeds lesser; this, however, can be in two ways: either thus, that the very same thing which earlier was lesser, afterward becomes greater, as a man is said to be augmented, or any other quantum, and in this mode11 charity is not augmented, as they say; or in the sense that greater succeeds lesser, not the same in number, but similar in form, as the days are said to be augmented — not because the same day is first12 lesser and afterward greater, but because greater succeeds lesser; and thus they say charity is augmented, and through this they can evade the objections.
But this position, as has been proved above13, cannot stand. For it has been shown that, with charity remaining the same, it happens that increase and perfection occur with respect to the same.
And therefore it must rather be said that augmentation follows quantity. But quantity is said in two ways, namely properly and metaphorically: properly the quantity of mass is so called, and this is in bodily things; metaphorically the quantity of virtue, and this is14 in spiritual things. Likewise also augmentation is said in two ways: properly, namely according to magnitude of mass, and metaphorically according to quantity of virtue. Since therefore in charity there is quantity of virtue, and not at the highest [degree], it is constant that charity can be augmented. Again, since virtue is the same as the substance of charity, and the15 quantity of virtue is [there], hence it is that of necessity it follows that charity is augmented according to substance; for since it is a virtue, its substance is not other than the virtue.
1. To that which therefore is objected to the contrary, that the essence of a form is invariable; it must be said that this is true of a universal form; but if it be said of a singular form, it is true considered in itself, but not as it is in another16.
2. To that which is objected, that simplicity does not admit magnitude; it must be said that this is true: it does not admit magnitude of mass, but it does admit magnitude of virtue.
3. To that which is objected, that augmentation17 in bodily things is motion according to accident, the response is plain. For quantity of mass is an accident, essentially differing from the [thing] quantified; but it is not so in things quantified by quantity of virtue — rather, the quantity of virtue is essential, as has been proved in the objection18.
It can however be said that when it is said that19 the motion of augmentation in bodily things is motion according to accident, this [word] according to can be taken in two ways: either as expressing the relation of the term per se, or of the formal term — and thus indeed the term of augmentation is the perfected quantity; or in such a way that it expresses the term per accidens, and in this mode augmentation per accidens20 regards substance. Which is plain. For when a greater quantity is added to a lesser, unless this happens through rarefaction or through extension21, it is necessary that substance be added, in which that quantity may be; and so augmentation has more of substance, and so consequently it terminates at substance even in bodily things.
4. And through this is plain what is objected: that what is changed according to substance is one thing and another22; this is true, if it expresses the formal term; but it does not so express it.
To that which is objected: that what is augmented according to substance is also changed according to substance; it must be said, since23 for a thing there is not only substantial being, but also perfect being. To be changed therefore according to substance can be in two ways: either with respect to being simply, and thus the changed thing is one thing and another; or with respect to perfect being, and thus it is the same24, because when from imperfect there comes-to-be perfect, it is not another, but the same. Hence it is that charity, although it is substantially augmented, is not other, but the same according to substance; whence the objection has no force.
I. With the common opinion the question is resolved affirmatively. Then concerning the mode of this augmentation the holy Doctor brings forward the insufficient opinion of certain ones; finally he proposes his own opinion and proves it by employing this axiom, that augmentation follows quantity. Quantity, however, is commonly distinguished into the proper, or [quantity] of mass, and the metaphorical, or [quantity] of virtue; whence it follows that a twofold augmentation also must be admitted, and from that, that charity can be augmented, and that the augmentation occurs according to essence. — That the reasonings and difficulties pertaining to philosophy which are touched in this and the following question may be more easily understood, it is helpful to excerpt some things concerning various opinions which were current in the ancient schools concerning the augmentation and diminution of forms. According to Boethius (III. in Categorias seu Praedicamenta Aristotelis, ch. de Qualitate) three opinions already existed among the ancient
philosophers concerning the intension of forms, or concerning more and less. «For some said that in all things, according to the disposition of matter, more and less can be found. For it is proper to matter, and to bodies, to grow by intension and to be diminished by relaxation — which was the view of certain Platonists». These words of Boethius are expounded by Bl. Albert, Commentary on the Book of the Six Principles of Gilbert of Poitiers, tract. 8, ch. 1, thus: «One of these (opinions), namely those who said that in everything in which more and less is found, matter is found in some way, whose quantity, as they say, consists of indivisibles: where many similars come together in one [subject], they say it is intended; and where there are fewer, they say it is remitted; and so the whitest things are those in which more indivisibles of whiteness concur; but it is remitted where fewer come together. And this opinion, as Boethius says, was Plato's. It seems, however, to have been derived from the ancient Anaxagoras, who said that like is generated from like, and that all things are in all things, but latently; and so also that intension and remission of any [quality] appears according to more and less of the like itself». — «Another [opinion was], that according to the most certain and most true arts and virtues there is no more and less; but according to those that are middle ones it can be said — as this very grammar and justice is not said to be more grammar nor more justice. But there are certain other middle arts, in which this very thing could happen (just as from a disposition there comes-to-be a middle habit, as Bl. Albert adds). The third [opinion] is the one of which Aristotle speaks, namely that he reckons that the dispositions themselves grow by no intension nor decrease by [any] diminution, but that the [things] participating in them (or the subjects) can come under the examination of comparison, so that of these it may be said more or less. For he holds that health itself, and justice — the one is not more or less than the other; nor does anyone say that one health is greater than another health. But this only can we say: that someone has health more, that is, that he is more healthy, and more sound and less sound. We say therefore that the qualities themselves do not admit more and less; but those who are called qualified according to them, they themselves fall under comparison, as more just and more healthy and more grammatical». — Gilbert of Poitiers (On the Six Principles, last chapter) brings forward three opinions on this matter, which in his time were defended by various [authors] and seem to [correspond to] the threefold opinion of the ancients. «For some say [that] more and less [is to be predicated] according to the increase or diminution of the subjects which receive [the qualities]. Others, however, otherwise: they declare that the very things which are received in the receiving [subject] are diminished and grow. Others again [say it is to be predicated] according to both — both diminution and augmentation». Many reasons being adduced against this threefold view, he concludes: «It is plain therefore that nothing is predicated according to more and less either according to the increase or diminution of the subject alone, nor according to that of the accident; therefore neither according to both. We must therefore find from elsewhere those things25 which are said with more and less. But of this kind are those things which are in the [meaning of the] word of the things which come up, and not according to the increase or diminution of the subject or movable thing, but because they are nearer to the imposition of those [terms] which are in the word, or further from the same. For of these, those are said more which are nearer to that [meaning] which is in the imposition of the word itself, and less of those which stand further off, as that is called white in which there is pure whiteness; the more, therefore, that approaches in attaining to the imposition of the word, [and] the more it is dyed with a purer whiteness, so much the more white-shining will it be assigned... Someone, however, will doubt: why are these said with more and less, but substances not at all? This happens because the imposition of substances is in a fixed term, beyond which it is impossible to pass over. It is added also of certain accidents, which are said without more and less, as quadrangle and triangle and the like; for one triangle is not said to be more [a triangle] than another».
II. In the solution to the 1st [objection] there is touched the question disputed by the Scholastics on either side, whether substantial forms themselves of the same species — especially intellectual souls — admit more and less, or can be of unequal perfection. Which is to be understood not of specific perfection, which is certainly the same in individuals of the same species, but of individual perfection; nor of accidental perfection, which again is diverse in diverse [individuals], but of substantial [perfection], according to the degree of perfection following the nature of the individual. Each opinion — the affirmative and the negative — is probable. The supporters of the opinion that they are unequal cite for themselves a certain decree of the doctors of Paris, reported by Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 3, q. 3) and by Durandus (II Sent., d. 32, q. 3): «If anyone say that all souls are from origin equal, he errs, since otherwise the soul of Christ would not be more perfect than the soul of Judas». Durandus tries to restrict this decree to the perfection of the sensitive and vegetative powers, though scarcely probably; others say that it does not have irrefragable authority. Concerning the opinion of St. Thomas there is dispute — although Cajetan (on Summa I, q. 83, a. 7) says that those are blind who doubt that he stands for inequality. Soto, however, with several others, professes himself to be one of such blind ones. Many testimonies of St. Thomas favor the interpretation of Cajetan, as Summa I, q. 50, a. 4; q. 85, a. 7; II Sent. d. 32, q. 2, a. 3; I Sent. d. 8, q. 5, a. 2 ad 6. — To the opinion denying the parity of perfection St. Bonaventure also adheres, II Sent. d. 3, p. I, dub. 2, and d. 32, dub. 6. — But the opinion of Scotus is doubtful, although he seems rather to favor this last view, as is plain from his testimonies collected in the Summa of Hieronymus of Montefortino, t. II, p. 1, q. 85, a. 7, incident.
In the solution to the 3rd [objection] a twofold response is given. The first is: even if it be conceded that in bodily things augmentation is only according to accident not according to substance, nevertheless this does not hold in the augmentation of virtues. But the second response denies that the motion of augmentation in bodily things is only according to accident, which is quantity, without something being added to substance itself. To prove this is distinguished a twofold term of augmentation: the formal or per se, and this is quantity itself, and the accidental, and this is substance itself.
III. Alex. of Hales, Summa p. IV, q. 9, m. 3, a. 2, § 1. — Scotus, on this and the following [question], here q. 4 ff.; Reportata, here q. 3 ff. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1; Summa II–II, q. 24, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, on this and the two following, here a. 10, and III Sent., d. 29, a. 10; and IV Sent., d. 7, a. 5, quaestiuncula 3; Summa I, p. II, tr. 16, q. 101, m. 2, and q. 102, m. 1. — William of Paris, On the Virtues c. 22. — Petrus a Tar[antasia], here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Aegidius R[omanus], here, 1st principium, q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Quodlib. 5, q. 19. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 6. — Biel, here q. 4.
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- Epist. 189. n. 2. secundum sensum, sed verbotenus Epist. 186. ad Paulinum c. 3. n. 10. In hoc textu ed. 1 cum uno alterove codice ut I post mereatur addit et.Letter 189, n. 2, according to the sense; but verbatim in Letter 186 to Paulinus, c. 3, n. 10. In this text ed. 1, with one or two codices such as I, after mereatur adds et.
- I. Cor. 13, 8.1 Corinthians 13:8.
- Aristot., I. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 33. (c. 5.).Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I, text 33 (ch. 5).
- Vers. 41.Verse 41.
- Num. 9: In his enim, quae non mole magna sunt, hoc est maius esse, quod est melius esse. — Mox cod. I unde pro ergo.Number 9: For in those things which are not great by mass, this is to-be-greater, which is to-be-better. — Next cod. I reads unde for ergo.
- Libr. de Sex princip., qui est Gilberti Porretani: Ratio sive forma est id quod superveniens composito, simplici constans et invariabili essentia. Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 28. et VIII. text. 10. (VI. c. 8. in fine, et VII. c. 3.). In primo loco cit. ait: «Indivisibilis namque forma est»; in secundo comparat substantiam (essentiam) numeris, in quibus quaelibet additio vel diminutio inducit mutationem specificam. — Mox post invariabile codd. K V omittunt secundum essentiam, dein nomini essentiam praemittunt substantiam vel.Book of the Six Principles, by Gilbert of Poitiers: The account or form is that which, supervening upon the composite, consists of simple and invariable essence. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 28, and VIII, text 10 (VI, c. 8, at the end, and VII, c. 3). In the first place cited he says: «For the form is indivisible»; in the second he compares substance (essence) to numbers, in which any addition or diminution introduces specific change. — Next, after invariabile, codices K V omit secundum essentiam, then prefix substantiam vel to the noun essentiam.
- Aristot., I. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 31. seqq. (c. 5.).Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I, text 31 ff. (ch. 5).
- Cfr. Aristot., I. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 30. seqq. (c. 5.) et V. Phys. text. 7–20. (c. 2. et 3.) — Mox in Vat. et cod. cc minus apte, et aliis codd. cum ed. 1 obnitentibus, omittitur solum.Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I, text 30 ff. (ch. 5) and Physics V, text 7–20 (chs. 2 and 3). — Next, in the Vatican and cod. cc, less aptly, and with other codices and ed. 1 resisting, solum is omitted.
- Vide Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.) et VIII. Phys. text. 55. (c. 7.).See Aristotle, Physics IV, text 32 (ch. 4), and Physics VIII, text 55 (ch. 7).
- I. Cor. 13, 8.1 Corinthians 13:8.
- Cod. X, variata interpunctione et positione, vel aliquod, aliud, et quantum ad hoc caritas, cum quo concordat cod. R, qui tamen omittit particulam et ac ponit ad hunc modum pro ad hoc. Paulo infra codd. P Q ita loco ideo; ac dein fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus voci numero praefixam particulam in.Cod. X, with altered punctuation and position, [reads] vel aliquod, aliud, et quantum ad hoc caritas; with which cod. R agrees, which however omits the particle et and puts ad hunc modum for ad hoc. A little below, codices P Q [read] ita in place of ideo; and then on the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we struck out the particle in prefixed to the word numero.
- Cod. T prius loco primo, et cod. K possit esse pro sit.Cod. T reads prius in place of primo, and cod. K possit esse for sit.
- Hic, in fundamentis, praesertim in ultimo.Here, in the fundamenta, especially in the last [one].
- E vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus est.From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied est.
- Plures codd. ut A G I S T W X Y ee ff omittunt id, quod alii ut H cc cum ed. 1 transponunt post quantitas. Codd. L O Z paulo ante post virtus addunt caritatis, quod vel supplendum est, vel nomen virtus referendum ad sequens caritatis; dein codd. L O et quantitas virtutis, quod quantitas substantiae substituunt loco et sit quantitas virtutis. Quomodo hoc argumentum intelligendum, accipe ex fundam. 5. supra posito, et infra ex resp. ad 3. Mox aliqui codd. ut D V X bb minus apte omittunt enim, loco cuius cod. G habet ipsa; cod. T deinde post virtus adiungit necessario sequitur, quod.Several codices (A G I S T W X Y ee ff) omit id, which others (H cc) with ed. 1 transpose after quantitas. Codices L O Z, a little before, after virtus add caritatis — which either must be supplied, or the noun virtus must be referred to the following caritatis; then codices L O substitute et quantitas virtutis, which is quantitas substantiae, in place of et sit quantitas virtutis. How this argument is to be understood, take from fundamentum 5 set above, and below from the response to [obj.] 3. Next, some codices (D V X bb), less aptly, omit enim, in place of which cod. G has ipsa; cod. T then after virtus adds necessario sequitur, quod.
- De hac solutione cfr. supra d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1. Idem dicit Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 8. a. 2. q. 2. ad 2: «Quamvis forma non sit variabilis secundum suum esse absolutum, proprie loquendo de variabilitate, tamen quia naturalem habet aptitudinem, ut sit in materia, in qua potest recipere variabilitatem, simpliciter invariabilis dici non debet.»On this solution cf. above, d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1. Richard of Mediavilla says the same, I Sent. d. 8, a. 2, q. 2, ad 2: «Although a form is not variable according to its absolute being, properly speaking of variability, nevertheless because it has a natural aptitude to be in matter, in which it can receive variability, it ought not be called simply invariable.»
- Ex aliquibus mss. ut I T supplevimus augmentum, pro quo Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. et ed. 1 renitentibus, mox post motus ponit augmenti.From some manuscripts (I T) we supplied augmentum, in place of which the Vatican with cod. cc — though other codices and ed. 1 resist — places augmenti a little after motus.
- In fundamentis, praecipue in ultimo et in corp. quaest. circa finem. — Paulo supra post essentialis cod. M habet caritati.In the fundamenta, especially in the last, and in the body of the question near the end. — A little above, after essentialis, cod. M has caritati.
- Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 omittit quod. Mox in plurimis mss. et ed. 1 deest augmenti, certe tamen supplendum.The Vatican, against nearly all the codices and ed. 1, omits quod. Next, in very many manuscripts and ed. 1 augmenti is missing, but it is certainly to be supplied.
- Sequimur antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 addendo per accidens.We follow the older codices and ed. 1 in adding per accidens.
- Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Qualitate, et IV. Phys. text. 79. seqq. (c. 9.) ac III. de Caelo text. 10, ubi definitio rarefactionis indicatur, scil. quod sit motus, quo corpus, manente eadem entitate et quantitate, maiorem acquirit localem extensionem. Quodsi rarefactio et protensio ad invicem conferuntur, secundum mentem S. Doctoris infra d. 18. dub. 4. dici potest, quod rarefactio sit processus naturalis, protensio vero processus artificialis; priori opponeretur condensatio, posteriori compressio.Cf. Aristotle, Categories ch. On Quality, and Physics IV, text 79 ff. (c. 9), and On the Heavens III, text 10, where the definition of rarefaction is indicated — namely that it is a motion by which a body, the same entity and quantity remaining, acquires a greater local extension. And if rarefaction and extension be compared with one another, according to the mind of the holy Doctor below, d. 18, dub. 4, it can be said that rarefaction is a natural process, but extension an artificial process; to the former condensation would be opposed, to the latter compression.
- Vat. male omittit hic est aliud et aliud; paulo supra minus distincte ponit non augetur loco mutatur, deinde in fine responsionis si dicit terminum per accidens pro sic dicit, sed obstat auctoritas mss. et sex primarum edd. — Nota insuper, quod Vat. cum multis codd. praemissam propositionem Et per hoc patet etc. coniungit cum responsione ad tertiam obiectionem; sed non bene, quia revera pertinet cum sequenti responsione ad quartum obiectum. Pauci codd. ad connexionem harum responsionum stabiliendam post non sic dicit addunt tamen potest aliter dici.The Vatican wrongly omits hic est aliud et aliud; a little above, less distinctly, it puts non augetur in place of mutatur; then at the end of the response si dicit terminum per accidens for sic dicit — but the authority of the manuscripts and the first six editions stands against [this]. Note, moreover, that the Vatican with many codices joins the foregoing proposition Et per hoc patet etc. with the response to the third objection; but not well, since it really belongs with the following response to the fourth objection. A few codices, to establish the connection of these responses, after non sic dicit add tamen potest aliter dici.
- Unus alterque codex ut I Q quod loco quia.One or another codex (I Q) reads quod in place of quia.
- Contextu exigente, supplevimus et sic est idem, licet haec verba in paucis mss. ut I T et quidem in margine (a manu suppari) inveniantur. Mox fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 Hinc est, quod substituimus loco Et hinc est, quia.As the context required, we supplied et sic est idem, although these words are found in a few manuscripts (I T) and indeed in the margin (by a contemporary hand). Next, on the authority of very many manuscripts and ed. 1, we substituted Hinc est, quod in place of Et hinc est, quia.
- Lectio Gilberti in scholion-textu paulo corrupta; legendum vid. ab alia ea invenire. (Cfr. Liber de Sex principiis c. ult.)The reading of Gilbert in the scholion text is slightly corrupt; one should read ab alia ea invenire. (Cf. Liber de Sex principiis, last chapter.)