Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 17, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 17

Textus Latinus

p. 311

QUAESTIO II.

Quomodo caritas augeatur.

Secundo quaeritur de modo augmenti ipsius caritatis. Et quod augmentum eius sit aliunde, ostenditur:

1. Per Augustinum¹, qui dicit, quod «caritas meretur augeri»: sed quod aliquis meretur habet ab alio quam a se: ergo si caritas meretur augmentum, habet ipsum aliunde.

2. Item, quod augmentetur per appositionem, videtur per rationem augmenti²: «augmentum enim est praeexistentis quantitatis additamentum»: ergo ubi est augmentum, ibi est appositio alicuius eiusdem generis, et ubi appositio, ibi additio: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc videtur posse ostendi per simile, quia³ caritas est in anima, sicut lux in aere; sed lux in aere augetur per additionem novi luminis, ut patet, si uni candelae illuminanti supervenit alia: ergo et in caritate erit similiter respectu animae.

4. Item, hoc videtur per principium augmenti, quia ex eisdem est unumquodque et nutritur et augetur⁴: ergo per consimilem modum habet caritas generari, conservari et augeri; sed generatur in nobis per divinam influentiam: ergo et per eandem maiorem augetur; sed ubi maior influentia, aliquid plus influit⁵ quam prius; et ubi hoc, ibi est additio: ergo etc.

Contra: 1. Maioris virtutis est calor amoris spiritualis quam ignis materialis; sed ignis se ipso augetur⁶: ergo et caritas, quae est ignis spiritualis.

2. Item, quod non per appositionem, videtur, quia si simplex simplici addatur, nihil maius efficitur, nec mole nec virtute, ut si punctus puncto⁷: ergo nec si caritas addatur caritati, erit maior.

3. Item, si additur aliquid, cum additionem sequatur compositio, et ad maiorem compositionem virtutis diminutio⁸: ergo quanto maior fit additio, tanto efficitur caritas impotentior, et quanto impotentior, tanto minor: ergo cum augmentum caritatis sit quantum ad virtutem, caritas non augetur per additionem.

4. Item, si aliquid addatur priori caritati, aut additum est caritas, aut non; si non: ergo non auget caritatem; si vero est caritas; sed caritas non est materialis respectu caritatis: ergo cum ex aliquibus duobus non fiat unum, nisi unum sit materiale respectu alterius⁹, ex caritate praeexistente et superaddita non fit unum; sed ad augmentum necesse est fieri unum ex augente et aucto: ergo nullo modo per additionem augetur¹⁰.

Conclusio. Caritas augetur virtute divina per appositionem vel incrementum maioris influentiae.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam¹¹ notandum, quod circa hoc fuit duplex opinio. Una est, quod augmentum caritatis est per depurationem sive per impermixtionem cum contrario. Contrarium autem amoris casti¹² est amor concupiscentiae; unde quanto magis in nobis extinguitur concupiscentia, tanto magis depuratur caritas; et quanto magis depuratur, tanto magis assimilatur Deo et accedit ad terminum; et quanto magis accedit, tanto magis augetur. Et isti posuerunt, caritatem posse per se augeri per assuefactionem in bono et debilitationem concupiscentiae. Ratio autem, quae istos movit, fuit auctoritas Philosophi¹³, qui dicit, formas intendi per accessum ad terminum et impermixtionem cum contrario. Fuit etiam cum hoc auctoritas Augustini, qui dicit in libro octoginta trium Quaestionum¹⁴, quod sicut minuitur concupiscentia, sic crescit caritas; et tale augmentum per maiorem depurationem simplici non repugnat.

Sed ista positio non est conveniens, quoniam¹⁵ constans est, caritatem maiorem et minorem esse, omni sublata concupiscentia, sicut in primo homine et etiam in Angelis; ergo cum omnino sit ibi impermixta, in quolibet Angelo et etiam in statu innocentiae esset in summo, quod stultum est dicere. Unde non est dicendum, quantum ad remissionem concupiscentiae augeri¹⁶ secundum substantiam; concedendum est tamen, quantum ad remissionem concupiscentiae intendi per fervorem. Et hoc modo intelligit Augustinus; et hoc modo loquitur etiam Philosophus de formis quantum ad intensionem, non quantum ad augmentum.

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Alia positio est, quod caritas augetur per appositionem; et huius simile habetur in lumine¹⁷, quod expresse caritati assimilatur. Unde sicut maius lumen, additum minori, ipsum auget, sic caritas superaddita auget minorem. Et haec positio ponit, caritatem non augeri virtute propria, sed divina. Idem enim est principium augendi et generandi¹⁸. Unde sicut a solo Deo habet ortum, ita et augmentum.

1. Ex hoc patet illud quod obiicitur per simile in igne. Ignis enim habet potestatem faciendi se in alio et augendi, non sic caritas.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod caritas est simplex¹⁹; dicendum, quod quamvis caritas sit simplex, quia non habet partes quantitativas quantitate molis, habet tamen quantitate virtutis, et quantum ad illam²⁰ potest augeri. Si obiiciatur de puncto, quod habet quantitatem virtutis et tamen non augetur; dicendum, quod ad hoc, quod aliquid sit natum augeri per appositionem consimilis quantitatis, duo sunt necessaria, scilicet quantitas et unibilitas. Unibilitas autem venit ex imperfectione; perfecto enim in quantum huiusmodi non est possibilis additio²¹: ideo puncto non potest fieri additio. Licet igitur punctus habeat quantitatem virtutis, non tamen habet unibilitatem, quia quoddam perfectum est in suo genere.

Aliter potest dici, quod punctus est simplicissimum in genere quanti molis²², et ideo est infinitum virtute; caritas autem nulla est simplicissima in genere quanti virtualis nisi divina, et ideo illa est infinita; et quoniam illa non potest augeri per additionem, ita nec virtus puncti. Et si obiicias mihi, quod virtus puncti est creata, ergo non est infinita; dicendum, quod quia punctus est²³ simplicissimum in genere, non simpliciter, ideo non habet infinitam virtutem simpliciter, sed in genere respectu linearum. Praeterea, punctus non est omnino actus, sed terminus respectu linearum; ideo non habet potentiam activam infinitam, sed passivam, quia non proprie dicitur punctus posse lineas producere, sed potest statui terminus lineae; et hoc non est inconveniens ponere in creatura: ideo virtus puncti non est augmentabilis, ut virtus caritatis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quanto aliquid est magis compositum, tanto est impotentius²⁴; dicendum, quod illud, generaliter intellectum, est falsum. Propter hoc distinguendum, quod sunt partes materiales, et sunt partes formales, quae dant actum et virtutem toti. Simplex igitur magis potest dici per privationem partium materialium; et tunc habet propositio veritatem, quia tales partes potius dant pati quam agere; unde quanto aliquid magis elongatur a materia, tanto potentius. Si autem dicatur magis simplex, quia pauciores habet partes formales sive activas, falsum est, quia tunc ignis minor potentior esset quam maior. Tunc etiam²⁵ sirupus, compositus ex paucis, virtuosior esset quam ille qui constat ex multis; quorum utrumque falsum est: et ideo et praedicta propositio²⁶, quoniam tam caritas praeexistens quam adveniens, utraque habet rationem activi.

Potest tamen et aliter responderi secundum veritatem, quod caritas augmentata non est magis composita, immo magis simplex; et hoc patet sic: quia contrario modo est in quanto molis et²⁷ quanto virtutis. In quanto molis simplicissimum est minimum, ut punctus; et ideo in hoc genere quanti accessus ad simplicitatem est per diminutionem, recessus²⁸ e contrario per additionem. In quanto vero virtutis simplicissimum est maximum; et ideo accessus ad simplicitatem est per additionem; et hinc est, quod caritas augmentata est purior et simplicior et Deo similior. Nec videatur²⁹ hoc inconveniens, quia addere puritatem et simplicitatem et spiritualitatem alicui non facit recessum a simplicitate, sed magis accessum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, utrum ex eis³⁰ fiat unum; dicunt quidam, quod — sicut diversa lumina sunt in aere distincta et inconfusa, attamen unum maius lumen reddunt propter concursum in unum susceptibile, sic in lumine spirituali, quod est gratia vel caritas — quod³¹ distincta sunt essentialiter tamen unum maius efficiunt movendo virtutem liberi arbitrii.

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Sed tamen illud non est simile, quia distinctio luminarium in aere venit a parte originum diversarum, ut puta quando plura sunt lucentia; non sic est in gratia. Et ideo dicendum, quod ex eis³² fit unum.

Quod quaeritur³³, quod se habet in ratione materialis; dicendum, quod augmentum contingit dupliciter fieri: aut per virtutem ipsius augmentabilis, ut patet in animali; et tunc augmentabile habet se in ratione formalis et activi, augmentans in ratione materialis et passivi. Contingit et³⁴ augmentum fieri per virtutem extrinsecam, possibilitate sola et unibilitate existente in augmentabili; et tunc augmentabile, quia imperfectum, se habet in ratione passivi³⁵, augmentans, quia perficiens, in ratione formalis et completivi, quia dat quantitatem perfectam.

Quod ergo obiicitur, quod unum non est in potentia ad aliud; dicendum, quod non est in potentia ad conversionem, sed est in potentia ad unionem; et potentia ista est in caritate ratione suae imperfectionis; quia enim imperfecta est, ideo possibilis perfici et ideo unibilis rei perficienti. Unde non habet possibilitatem ad illud quod additur in quantum caritas, sed in quantum imperfecta; et sic patet illud.

Scholion

I. Circa quaestionem de modo speciali, quo caritas augeatur, observamus, quod praeter duas opiniones in textu positas S. Thom. (S. II. II. q. 24. a. 5; I. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 2.) defendit tertiam sententiam, scil. caritatem augeri non per additionem, sed per maiorem radicationem in subiecto, cui consentiunt Durand. (hic q. 6. 7.) et Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 6.). — S. Bonav. suam sententiam magis explicat II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2., ubi praeter tres improbabiles modos tres alios probabiles affert et sapienter concludit: «Quocumque horum modorum trium sequentium dicatur, non est magna vis facienda, sed pro certo habentes, gratiam Dei in nobis augeri posse, laborare debemus taliter, ut in nobis augeatur per bona opera». Sententiam, cui Seraphicus plus favet, defendunt etiam Alex. Hal., B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Henr. Gand., et prae ceteris Scot. et posteriorum doctorum plurimi. Videsis de hac controversia Rada, Contr. 18., et Franc. Macedo, Collationes, coll. 7. different. 3. Hic sufficiat dicere, S. Bonav. additionem novorum graduum minime intelligere in eo sensu, quod nova qualitas differat numero ab ea cui advenit, et quod ipsa retineat distinctionem numericam, sed ita, ut omnes gradus eandem numero caritatem contineant.

II. Distinctio partium materialium et formalium in solut. ad 3. sumta est ex libro Aristotelis I. de Gener. text. 33. seq. (ed. Paris. c. 3.). Vocantur autem hic partes materiales, non quod sint sine forma, sed quia potius passivae quam activae sunt; aliae vero dicuntur formales, quia sunt maxime activae.

III. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 4. a. 2. § 1. 2; et IV. q. 9. m. 3. a. 2. § 1. — S. Thom., locis citt. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., Quodlib. 5. q. 19; 4. q. 13. — Biel, hic q. 3. et seq.

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English Translation

QUESTION II.

How charity is augmented.

Secondly, it is asked concerning the mode of the augmentation of charity itself. And that its augmentation is from elsewhere is shown:

1. Through Augustine¹, who says that "charity merits to be augmented": but what someone merits, he has from another rather than from himself: therefore if charity merits augmentation, it has it from elsewhere.

2. Likewise, that it is augmented through apposition is seen through the definition of augmentation²: "for augmentation is the addition to a pre-existing quantity": therefore where there is augmentation, there is the apposition of something of the same kind, and where there is apposition, there is addition: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this is seen to be demonstrable through a likeness, since³ charity is in the soul as light is in the air; but light in the air is augmented by the addition of new light, as is evident if to one illuminating candle another supervenes: therefore likewise it will be in charity with respect to the soul.

4. Likewise, this is seen through the principle of augmentation, since each thing both is, is nourished, and is augmented from the same things⁴: therefore in like manner charity has its being generated, conserved, and augmented; but it is generated in us by divine influence: therefore also by the same, when greater, it is augmented; but where there is greater influence, something more flows in⁵ than before; and where this is the case, there is addition: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. The heat of spiritual love is of greater power than material fire; but fire is augmented by itself⁶: therefore so also is charity, which is spiritual fire.

2. Likewise, that it is not by apposition is seen, because if a simple is added to a simple, nothing greater is produced, neither in mass nor in power, as if a point [were added] to a point⁷: therefore neither, if charity be added to charity, will it be greater.

3. Likewise, if something is added, since composition follows upon addition, and upon greater composition the diminution of power⁸: therefore the greater the addition becomes, the more impotent charity is made, and the more impotent, the less: therefore since the augmentation of charity is in respect to power, charity is not augmented through addition.

4. Likewise, if something is added to a prior charity, either what is added is charity, or it is not; if not: therefore it does not augment charity; but if it is charity; charity, however, is not material with respect to charity: therefore since from any two things one is not made, unless one be material with respect to the other⁹, from a pre-existing charity and a superadded one no one is made; but for augmentation it is necessary that one be made from the augmenting and the augmented: therefore in no way is it augmented through addition¹⁰.

Conclusion. Charity is augmented by divine power through apposition or the increase of greater influence.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted¹¹ that on this matter there were two opinions. One is, that the augmentation of charity is through purification or through the lack of admixture with its contrary. Now the contrary of chaste love¹² is the love of concupiscence; whence the more concupiscence is extinguished in us, the more charity is purified; and the more it is purified, the more it is assimilated to God and approaches its term; and the more it approaches, the more it is augmented. And these have posited that charity can be augmented of itself through habituation in the good and the weakening of concupiscence. The reason that moved them was the authority of the Philosopher¹³, who says that forms are intensified through approach to their term and lack of admixture with the contrary. There was also together with this the authority of Augustine, who says in the book of the Eighty-three Questions¹⁴, that as concupiscence is diminished, so charity grows; and such an augmentation through greater purification is not repugnant to a simple thing.

But this position is not fitting, since¹⁵ it is constant that charity is greater and lesser, with all concupiscence removed, as in the first man and also in the Angels; therefore since it is wholly without admixture there, in any Angel and even in the state of innocence it would be at its highest, which it is foolish to say. Hence it is not to be said that according to the remission of concupiscence it is augmented¹⁶ according to substance; it must be conceded, however, that according to the remission of concupiscence it is intensified through fervor. And in this way Augustine understands [it]; and in this way the Philosopher also speaks of forms with respect to intensification, not with respect to augmentation.

Another position is, that charity is augmented through apposition; and a likeness of this is had in light¹⁷, which is expressly assimilated to charity. Hence as a greater light, added to a lesser, augments it, so charity superadded augments a lesser one. And this position holds that charity is not augmented by its own power, but by divine [power]. For the principle of augmenting and of generating is the same¹⁸. Hence as it has its origin from God alone, so also its augmentation.

1. From this is evident what is objected through the likeness in fire. For fire has the power of producing itself in another and of augmenting; not so charity.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that charity is simple¹⁹; it must be said that although charity is simple, since it does not have quantitative parts in the quantity of mass, yet it has [parts] in the quantity of power, and with respect to that²⁰ it can be augmented. If it be objected concerning a point, that it has quantity of power and yet is not augmented; it must be said that for something to be apt to be augmented through the apposition of a similar quantity, two things are necessary, namely quantity and unibility. Now unibility comes from imperfection; for to a perfect [thing] as such no addition²¹ is possible: therefore no addition can be made to a point. Although, then, a point may have quantity of power, yet it does not have unibility, since it is something perfect in its kind.

It can be said otherwise, that a point is the most simple in the kind of quantity of mass²², and therefore it is infinite in power; but no charity is most simple in the kind of virtual quantity except the divine, and therefore that is infinite; and since that cannot be augmented through addition, neither can the power of a point. And if you object to me that the power of a point is created, therefore it is not infinite; it must be said that since a point is²³ most simple in its kind, not absolutely, therefore it does not have infinite power absolutely, but in [its] kind in respect of lines. Moreover, a point is not wholly act, but a terminus in respect of lines; therefore it does not have infinite active power, but passive, since a point is not properly said to be able to produce lines, but it can be set as the terminus of a line; and this is not unfitting to posit in a creature: therefore the power of a point is not augmentable, as the power of charity is.

3. To that which is objected, that the more something is composed, the more impotent it is²⁴; it must be said that this, taken generally, is false. On account of this it must be distinguished, that there are material parts, and there are formal parts, which give act and power to the whole. "Simple" therefore can rather be said by the privation of material parts; and then the proposition has its truth, since such parts give being-acted-upon rather than acting; whence the more something is removed from matter, the more powerful. But if it is called more simple because it has fewer formal or active parts, it is false, since then a smaller fire would be more powerful than a greater one. Then likewise²⁵ a syrup composed of few [ingredients] would be more potent than one which consists of many; both of which are false: and therefore also the aforesaid proposition²⁶ [is false], since both pre-existing charity and the supervening one each have the character of an active [principle].

It can however be answered otherwise according to truth, that augmented charity is not more composite, but rather more simple; and this is evident thus: because it is in a contrary mode in the quantity of mass and²⁷ [in] the quantity of power. In the quantity of mass the most simple is the least, as a point; and therefore in this kind of quantity the approach to simplicity is through diminution, and recession²⁸ on the contrary through addition. In the quantity of power, however, the most simple is the greatest; and therefore the approach to simplicity is through addition; and hence it is, that augmented charity is purer and simpler and more like to God. Nor let it seem²⁹ that this is unfitting, since to add purity and simplicity and spirituality to something does not cause recession from simplicity, but rather approach.

4. To that which is objected, whether one³⁰ is made from them; some say that — as different lights in the air are distinct and unconfused, and yet render one greater light on account of their concurrence in one receptacle, so in spiritual light, which is grace or charity — that³¹ they are essentially distinct yet make one greater [light] by moving the power of free choice.

But yet that is not similar, since the distinction of luminaries in the air comes from the part of diverse origins, as for instance when there are several luminous bodies; not so is it in grace. And therefore it must be said, that from them³² one is made.

To what is asked³³, [namely] that which has the character of a material; it must be said that augmentation occurs to be made in two ways: either through the power of the augmentable itself, as is evident in an animal; and then the augmentable has itself in the character of formal and active, the augmenter in the character of material and passive. It also occurs³⁴ that augmentation is made through an extrinsic power, with mere possibility and unibility existing in the augmentable; and then the augmentable, since imperfect, has itself in the character of passive³⁵, the augmenter, since perfecting, in the character of formal and completive, since it gives the perfect quantity.

To that, then, which is objected, that one is not in potency to another; it must be said, that it is not in potency to conversion, but is in potency to union; and this potency is in charity by reason of its imperfection; for since it is imperfect, therefore it is capable of being perfected and therefore unible to the thing perfecting [it]. Hence it does not have a possibility for that which is added insofar as it is charity, but insofar as it is imperfect; and thus that is evident.

Scholion

I. Concerning the question on the special mode by which charity is augmented, we observe that, besides the two opinions placed in the text, St. Thomas (S. II. II. q. 24. a. 5; I. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 2.) defends a third opinion, namely that charity is augmented not through addition, but through a greater rooting in the subject, with which Durandus (here q. 6. 7.) and Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 6.) agree. — St. Bonaventure explains his own opinion more in II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2., where, besides three improbable modes, he advances three other probable ones and wisely concludes: "By whichever of the three following modes it be said, no great force is to be made [of the choice]; but, holding it for certain that the grace of God can be augmented in us, we ought to labor in such a way that it be augmented in us through good works." The opinion which the Seraphic Doctor more favors is defended also by Alex. of Hales, B. Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, Henry of Ghent, and above all by Scotus and very many of the later doctors. See on this controversy Rada, Contr. 18, and Franciscus Macedo, Collationes, coll. 7. different. 3. Here let it suffice to say that St. Bonaventure does not at all understand the addition of new degrees in that sense, that the new quality differs in number from that to which it accedes, and that it [the new quality] retains numerical distinction, but rather thus, that all the degrees contain the same charity in number.

II. The distinction of material and formal parts in the solution to [obj.] 3 is taken from Aristotle's book I. de Gener. text. 33 ff. (Paris ed. c. 3). Now they are here called "material" parts, not because they are without form, but because they are passive rather than active; the others are called "formal" because they are most active.

III. Alex. of Hales, S. p. III. q. 61. m. 4. a. 2. § 1. 2; and IV. q. 9. m. 3. a. 2. § 1. — St. Thomas, in the places cited. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1. princ. q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Quodlib. 5. q. 19; 4. q. 13. — Biel, here q. 3. et seq.

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Apparatus Criticus

Epist. ad Bonifacium, CIV, q. praeced. fundam. 1.
Letter to Boniface, [Epist.] 104; [cited in] the preceding question, fundamentum 1.
Fide plurium mss. ut F G H I O ff adiecimus augmenti, loco cuius in multis mss. et sex primis edd. falso habetur Augustini. Ratio seu definitio augmenti allegata invenitur in Aristot., I. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 31. (c. 5.): Augmentatio enim est existentis magnitudinis additamentum.
On the testimony of several manuscripts such as F G H I O ff we have inserted augmenti, in place of which in many manuscripts and the first six editions Augustini is falsely found. The reason or definition of augmentation alleged is found in Aristotle, I. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 31 (c. 5): For augmentation is the addition to an existing magnitude.
Vat. minus distincte et contra plurimos mss. quod loco quia, et mox perperam et contra codd. ac ed. 1 non augetur pro augetur, et illuminatae loco illuminanti.
The Vatican edition, less distinctly and against most manuscripts, [reads] quod in place of quia, and shortly after, wrongly and against the codices and edition 1, [reads] non augetur in place of augetur, and illuminatae in place of illuminanti.
Aristot., II. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 50. (c. 8.): Omnia enim nutriuntur ex eisdem, ex quibus sunt. In illa propositione Vat. perperam et contra mss. ac ed. 1 omittit est.
Aristotle, II. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 50 (c. 8): For all things are nourished from the same things from which they are. In that proposition the Vatican edition wrongly and against the manuscripts and edition 1 omits est.
Cod. O usitatiore modo influitur.
Codex O, in a more usual mode, [reads] influitur.
Cfr. Aristot., 1. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 39. (c. 8): Nam ignem ad hunc facere modum contingit, videlicet iniectis in eum qui iam est lignis. Verum ita quidem accretio (augmentatio) est; at cum ligna ipsa accenduntur, generatio (ed. Firmin-Didot.).
Cf. Aristotle, I. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 39 (c. 8): For fire happens to act in this way, namely when wood is thrown into that which already is. Truly thus indeed there is accretion (augmentation); but when the wood itself is kindled, [there is] generation (Firmin-Didot ed.).
Est Aristotelis, I. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 8. (c. 2.), ubi ostendit, quod puncta addita punctis non faciant magnitudinem sive neque maius neque minus. — Mox cod. T est loco erit.
It is from Aristotle, I. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 8 (c. 2), where he shows that points added to points do not make a magnitude nor anything either greater or less. — Shortly after, codex T [reads] est in place of erit.
Auctor libr. de Causis, propos. 17: Omnis vis unita plus est infinita, quam virtus multiplicata. Cfr. etiam Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 5.
The author of the book de Causis, proposition 17: Every united power is more infinite than a multiplied power. Cf. also Dionysius, de Div. Nom. c. 5.
Vide Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 49. (VI. c. 13.): Impossibile enim est, substantiam ex substantiis esse, quae sic insunt ut actu; quae enim duo sic actu sunt, nunquam unum actu sunt; sed si potentia duo sunt, erunt unum, ut duplum ex duobus dimidiis potentia; actus namque separat.
See Aristotle, VII. Metaph. text. 49 (VI. c. 13): For it is impossible that a substance be from substances which are present thus as in act; for whichever two are thus in act, are never one in act; but if they are two in potency, they will be one, as the double from two halves [is] in potency; for act separates.
Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 potest augeri. Paulo ante plures codd. ut A G H R T U V Z ee ff cum ed. 1 augmentato, aliqui autem perperam augmento pro aucto.
The Vatican edition, against the older codices and edition 1, [reads] potest augeri. A little before, several codices such as A G H R T U V Z ee ff with edition 1 [read] augmentato, while some wrongly [read] augmento in place of aucto.
Aliqui codd. ut T X addunt est.
Some codices such as T X add est.
Vat. cum cod. cc Christi pro casti, sed obstat auctoritas antiquiorum codd. cum ed. 1 et contextus nec non usus loquendi S. Doctoris, de quo vide supra d. 1. a. 2. q. 1. in fine corp. quaest.
The Vatican edition, with codex cc, [reads] Christi in place of casti, but the authority of the older codices together with edition 1, and the context and the manner of speaking of the Holy Doctor, oppose this; concerning which see above, d. 1, a. 2, q. 1, at the end of the body of the question.
Libr. V. Phys. text. 19. (c. 2.): Magis autem et minus est ex eo, quia plus aut minus contrarii inest, et non. Et III. Top. c. 4. circa medium (c. 5.): Et quae contrariis sunt impermixtiora, magis talia; ut albius quidem nigro impermixtius.
Book V Phys. text. 19 (c. 2): Now the more and the less is from this, that more or less of the contrary is present, or not. And III. Top. c. 4, near the middle (c. 5): And those things which are less mixed with their contraries are more such; as the whiter [is] less mixed with black.
Quaest. 36: Nutrimentum eius (caritatis) est imminutio cupiditatis: perfectio, nulla cupiditas. — Et paulo post: Quisquis igitur eam nutrire vult, instet minuendis cupiditatibus. Cfr. etiam Enchirid. c. 121. n. 32, ubi dicit: Minuitur autem cupiditas, caritate crescente.
Question 36: Its (charity's) nourishment is the diminution of cupidity: its perfection, no cupidity at all. — And shortly after: Whoever therefore wishes to nourish it, let him press on by diminishing his cupidities. Cf. also Enchirid. c. 121, n. 32, where he says: Now cupidity is diminished as charity grows.
Plurimis mss. cum ed. 1 postulantibus, posuimus quoniam loco quia.
With most manuscripts together with edition 1 demanding [it], we have placed quoniam in place of quia.
Supple cum cod. V veritatem.
Supply, with codex V, veritatem.
August., Epist. 140. seu libr. de Gratia Novi Testam. c. 22. n. 54: Qualis enim lux est ipsa caritas, quis verbis explicet?... An forte lux non est caritas? Audi Apostolum Ioannem; ipse quippe dixit quod modo commemoravi: Quoniam Deus lux est... Deus caritas est. Ac per hoc, si Deus lux est, et Deus caritas est, profecto caritas lux ipsa est, quae diffunditur in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum etc.
Augustine, Letter 140, or the book On the Grace of the New Testament c. 22, n. 54: For of what kind a light charity itself is, who could explain in words?... Or perhaps light is not charity? Listen to the Apostle John; for he himself said what I have just recalled: Since God is light... God is charity. And by this, if God is light, and God is charity, surely charity is itself the light which is poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit, etc.
Vide supra fundam. 4. Cfr. etiam Aristot., II. de Anima text. 34–50. (c. 4.).
See above, fundamentum 4. Cf. also Aristotle, II. de Anima text. 34–50 (c. 4).
Vat. omittit praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 indebite verba caritas est simplex; dicendum, quod quamvis.
The Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1, unduly omits the words caritas est simplex; dicendum, quod quamvis.
Scil. quantitatem virtutis, pro quo plures codd. ut A C L O P Q R S T Y bb cum ed. 1 minus apte hic addunt partem, sicut et aliqui codd. ut A C R S mox minus bene omittunt potest; codd. L O augetur loco potest augeri, cod. Y augeri dicitur.
Namely quantitatem virtutis, in place of which several codices such as A C L O P Q R S T Y bb with edition 1 less aptly here add partem, just as some codices like A C R S shortly after less well omit potest; codices L O [read] augetur in place of potest augeri, codex Y [reads] augeri dicitur.
Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21, et X. text. 13. (IV. c. 16. et IX. c. 4.), ac II. de Caelo text. 23. (c. 4.), ubi perfectum definitur id, extra quod nihil eorum quae ipsius sunt, possibile est accipere. — Paulo ante ed. 1 cum uno alteroque cod. ut I perfectioni pro perfecto.
Cf. Aristotle, V. Metaph. text. 21, and X. text. 13 (IV. c. 16 and IX. c. 4), and II. de Caelo text. 23 (c. 4), where the perfect is defined as that, outside of which it is not possible to receive anything of the things which are its own. — A little before, edition 1 together with one or another codex such as I [reads] perfectioni in place of perfecto.
Nonnulli codd. ut B V X Z aa bb quantitatis molis. Mox post virtute in cod. O explicative additur quanti et in cod. Z in genere quanti. Paulo infra aliqui codd. ut B X quantitatis virtualis loco quanti virtualis.
Some codices such as B V X Z aa bb [read] quantitatis molis. Shortly after, after virtute, codex O explicatively adds quanti, and codex Z adds in genere quanti. A little below, some codices such as B X [read] quantitatis virtualis in place of quanti virtualis.
Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd. adiungit quid. Mox in pluribus codd. ut A H I S T X Y Z bb ee ff et edd. 1, 2, 3 minus bene deest adiectivum infinitam. Paulo infra post sed in genere in cod. B bene additur scilicet.
The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, adds quid. Shortly after, in several codices such as A H I S T X Y Z bb ee ff and editions 1, 2, 3, the adjective infinitam is less well missing. A little below, after sed in genere, codex B well adds scilicet.
In pluribus codd. ut S cc deest quanto est et dein tanto; in ed. 1 omittuntur primum est et tanto.
In several codices such as S cc, quanto est and then tanto are missing; in edition 1 the first est and tanto are omitted.
Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus Tunc etiam.
From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied Tunc etiam.
Ita codd. cum ed. 1; Vat. et ideo praedicta propositio est similiter falsa.
Thus the codices with edition 1; the Vatican edition [reads] et ideo praedicta propositio est similiter falsa.
In cod. T hic repetitur in.
In codex T, in is here repeated.
Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additum est.
On the testimony of most manuscripts and edition 1, we have expunged est added here.
Aliqui codd. ut V Y cum ed. 1 videtur.
Some codices such as V Y with edition 1 [read] videtur.
Cod. T his.
Codex T [reads] his.
Supple: lumina spiritualia, scil. gratia gratiae addita. — Vat. praeomittit dicendum contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1. Mox pauci codd. ut V X efficitur loco efficiunt.
Supply: lumina spiritualia, namely grace added to grace. — The Vatican edition pre-omits dicendum against most codices and edition 1. Shortly after, a few codices such as V X [read] efficitur in place of efficiunt.
Cod. T his.
Codex T [reads] his.
Vat. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quae et mox post se addit non, sed obstat auctoritas mss. et ed. 1. Notetur insuper, quod Vat. praefigendo numerum 5 exhibeat ea quae sequuntur tanquam responsionem ad quintam obiectionem, cum revera sint responsio ad aliquam propositionem quartae obiectionis. — Paulo infra ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus augmentum pro augmentationem.
The Vatican edition [reads] Ad illud quod obiicitur, quae and shortly after se it adds non, but the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 opposes [this]. Note moreover that the Vatican edition, by prefixing the number 5, presents what follows as the response to a fifth objection, when in reality it is the response to some proposition of the fourth objection. — A little below, from the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted augmentum for augmentationem.
Nonnulli codd. ut K V X ee non male aut contingit.
Some codices such as K V X ee not badly [read] aut contingit.
In cod. M additur et. Mox post formalis in codd. M Y (in H ir in margine) adiungitur activi, proprie tamen loquendo, illud quod augmentat finaliter quantum ad terminum ipsius augmentationis se habet in ratione formalis.
In codex M, et is added. Shortly after, after formalis, in codices M Y (in H ir [a hand] in the margin) activi is added; properly speaking, however, that which augments finally with respect to the term of the augmentation itself stands in the character of formal.

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