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Dist. 17, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 17

Textus Latinus
p. 313

QUAESTIO III.

Utrum caritas possit diminui.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum caritas possit diminui. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per naturam sui oppositi sic: sicut dicit Augustinus1: «Venenum caritatis est cupiditas»; unde et dicit2, quod «ubi magna cupiditas, ibi parva caritas», et in libro Confessionum3: «Minus te amat, qui tecum aliquid amat, quod non propter te amat». Si ergo contingit cupiditatem non tantum remitti, sed etiam augeri, per contrarium contingit caritatem diminui.

2. Item, veniale est malum; sed non est malum, nisi quod adimit aliquid de bono4: ergo veniale adimit aliquid. Sed naturalis habilitas est multo maioris inhaerentiae quam caritas: ergo cum veniale adimat de bonitate naturali, ergo et de caritate, ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per naturam sui subiecti; quia sicut hominem contingit proficere, ita et5 retrocedere; sed per profectum liberi arbitrii contingit in nobis caritatem augeri, dum ascenditur ad perfectionem: ergo cum contingat eisdem gradibus redire ad imperfectionem, contingit caritatem diminui.

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4. Item, omne illud quod sui dehabilitatione6 in termino est causa corruptionis, per sui dehabilitationem citra terminum est causa diminutionis: sed liberum arbitrium dehabilitatum per aversionem est causa corruptionis caritatis: ergo dehabilitatio eius sub Deo est causa diminutionis7.

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per naturam ipsius caritatis sic: «opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem»8; sed augmentum et diminutio sunt opposita: ergo si contingit caritatem augeri, contingit et diminui.

6. Item, quod potest salvari in esse9 sine coniunctione sui ad aliquid, potest illud ab illo post coniunctionem separari; sed caritas ante additionem habet esse sine additamento: ergo potest10 separari: et si hoc, ergo et diminui: ergo etc.

Contra: 1. Caritas est forma simplex et uniformis per totum; ergo quod adimit de caritate, qua ratione adimit unam partem, adimit11 et totum: et si hoc, ergo nunquam diminuitur.

2. Item, magnitudo caritatis est secundum magnitudinem divinae influentiae, ergo diminutio eius est per diminutionem influentiae; sed Deus non subtrahit influentiam suam nisi offensus, et non offenditur nisi per aversionem ab ipso et contemptum: ergo non diminuitur caritas nisi per peccatum mortale; sed hoc non est aliud quam caritatem tolli: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne12 quod diminuit alterum, est illi oppositum; sed veniale vel cupiditas sive concupiscentia citra Deum non opponitur caritati, immo est omnino illi contingens: ergo non diminuitur.

4. Item, quod diminuit alterum habet posse super13 illud; sed veniale non habet posse super caritatem, quia plus diligit caritas Deum, quam cupiditas centum marcas auri et argenti14: ergo etc.

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per impossibile hoc modo: si veniale diminuit caritatem, ergo aliquid diminuit ab ipsa: si ergo caritas non est infinitae magnitudinis, ergo veniale aliquoties iteratum totam adimit caritatem, quod falsum est.

6. Item, si diminuit caritatem secundum substantiam, ergo minuit praemium substantiale ei debitum: sed praemium substantiale est bonum aeternum: ergo veniale aliquid aufert de bono aeterno; sed ablatio boni aeterni vel simpliciter vel secundum partem est poena aeterna: ergo veniale meretur poenam aeternam, quod est contra communem opinionem. Si ergo veniale non minuit unum, nec aliud.

CONCLUSIO.

Caritas, licet tollatur per peccatum mortale, tamen per peccatum veniale non minuitur secundum substantiam, sed tantum secundum fervorem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc duplex opinio est, fundata super duplicem opinionem praecedentem de modo augmentandi caritatem15. Quidam enim dicunt, caritatem augeri per impermixtionem; et cum impermixtio maior sit secundum maiorem liberi arbitrii habilitationem et secundum concupiscentiae diminutionem, et e contrario permixtio per dehabilitationem liberi arbitrii et16 augmentationem concupiscentiae: dicunt per consequens, eam diminui, secundum quod augetur cupiditas vel concupiscentia et dehabilitatur liberum arbitrium; et hoc est per veniale peccatum. Sed quoniam veniale peccatum, manens veniale, nunquam toties iteratur, quod concupiscentiam augeat17, ita quod aliquid diligat supra Deum: ideo caritas per venialia potest minui, sed non tolli; tollitur autem per mortale, quod auget concupiscentiam supra Deum.

Sed haec opinio, ut supra probatum est18, non habet stabile fundamentum, quoniam substantiale augmentum caritatis non venit a libero arbitrio nec a concupiscentia19, ideo nec diminutio.

Et propter hoc ponitur alia opinio probabilior, quod caritas non minuitur substantialiter; et haec opinio fundatur super hoc, quod augmentum caritatis fieri habet per additionem20 vel incrementum maioris influentiae. Quo supposito dicendum, quod caritas secundum substantiam non minuitur, sed augetur.

Et ratio huius sumitur a parte oppositi sive agentis. Nam caritas non habet oppositum nisi mortale peccatum; per illud autem non minuitur, sed

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tollitur; concupiscentia autem sive cupiditas et veniale peccatum opponuntur caritati secundum fervorem solum, quia simul stant et substantialiter sunt sese incontingentia21.

Ad 1, 2. Et ideo solvendum ad duo prima, quod illud Augustini de cupiditate et minori amore, similiter22 illud de veniali diminutione locum habet solum quantum ad fervorem caritatis; et sic patent duo prima.

Sumitur etiam ratio, quare caritas non minuitur a parte ipsius subiecti, quod est liberum arbitrium secundum conversionem ad Deum. Liberum autem23 arbitrium ad augmentum caritatis se disponit per habilitatem, similiter ad diminutionem per dehabilitatem citra mortale. Sed haec dispositio est de congruo, non de condigno; et quoniam Deus est pronior ad miserendum quam ad condemnandum, et ad donandum quam ad subtrahendum24: hinc est, quod caritatem tribuit, cum se liberum arbitrium disponit de congruo, sed non subtrahit, nisi quando necessario se disponit ad subtractionem gratiae. Hoc autem solum est per aversionem, et tunc totum tollit. Et hinc est, quod caritas nunquam minuitur, sed augetur, quia solum de congruo potest se praeparare subiectum ad diminutionem.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut homo proficit, ita descendit25 frequenter; dicendum, quod non sic diminuitur per descensum substantialiter caritas, sicut augetur per ascensum.

Ad 4. Quod etiam26 obiicit, quod liberum arbitrium potest totum privare per dehabilitationem etc.; dicendum, quod istud falsum est, quia forma substantialis omnino privatur per dispositionem ad oppositum in termino, non tamen minuitur per dispositionem citra27 terminum. Praeterea, illud habet locum, quando dispositio in termino et citra terminum sunt eiusdem generis; non sic autem est in proposito, quia una est mortale peccatum, alia veniale.

Sumitur etiam ratio, quare28 non potest minui a parte naturae suae. Ipsa enim est influentia secundum divinam acceptationem; sed quod Deus acceptet29, hoc est ab ipso et ita, quod magis et magis acceptet, et ita de sui natura potest augeri; quod autem minus acceptet, hoc non est ex se: ergo oportet quod veniat a nobis: ergo caritas de se habet augeri, minui vero non habet nisi a nobis, ut supra ostensum est30. Per nos autem non potest minui, et ideo caritati solum debetur augmentum naturaliter.

Ad 5. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod opposita nata sunt etc., dicendum, quod verum est, nisi alterum insit per naturam.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur: potest esse sine additione, ergo separari; dicendum, quod istud verum est, si esset aliquid separans; sed nihil est quod separet.

Scholion

Ex antiquis Antissiodorensis et etiam, quod mirum est, Dionys. Carth. affirmarunt, caritatem secundum habitum minui posse, quod nunc communissime negatur. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 108. m. 8. § 3. — Scot., Report. hic q. 7. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 5.; S. II. II. q. 24. a. 10. — Gulielmus Par., de Virtut. c. 11. ante med. — B. Albert., hic n. 10. — Petr. Tar., hic q. 2. a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. unica. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. q. 23. — Durand., hic q. 10. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 9. — Biel, hic q. 4.

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English Translation

QUESTION III.

Whether charity can be diminished.

Thirdly it is asked, whether charity can be diminished. And that it can, it seems:

1. Through the nature of its opposite, thus: as Augustine says1: "The poison of charity is cupidity"; whence he also says2, that "where there is great cupidity, there is little charity," and in the book of the Confessions3: "He loves you less who loves anything together with you, that he does not love on account of you." If therefore it happens that cupidity is not only remitted but also augmented, by the contrary it happens that charity is diminished.

2. Likewise, the venial [sin] is an evil; but nothing is an evil, except what takes away something from a good4: therefore the venial takes away something. But natural aptitude is of much greater inherence than charity: therefore since the venial takes away from natural goodness, therefore it takes also from charity, therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this same is shown through the nature of its subject; because just as it happens that a human being makes progress, so also5 retreats; but through the progress of free choice it happens that in us charity is augmented, while there is ascent toward perfection: therefore since it happens by the same steps to return to imperfection, it happens that charity is diminished.

4. Likewise, every thing which by its disabling6 at the term is the cause of corruption, by its disabling on this side of the term is the cause of diminution: but free choice disabled through aversion is the cause of corruption of charity: therefore its disabling under God is the cause of diminution7.

5. Likewise, this same is shown through the nature of charity itself, thus: "opposites are by nature produced about the same thing"8; but augmentation and diminution are opposites: therefore if it happens that charity is augmented, it happens also that it is diminished.

6. Likewise, what can be preserved in being9 without the conjunction of itself to something can, after conjunction, be separated from it; but charity, before addition, has being without an additional element: therefore it can be10 separated: and if so, then also diminished: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. Charity is a simple form and uniform throughout; therefore what takes away from charity, by the same reason by which it takes away one part, takes away11 also the whole: and if so, therefore it is never diminished.

2. Likewise, the magnitude of charity is according to the magnitude of the divine influence, therefore its diminution is through the diminution of the influence; but God does not withdraw his influence except when offended, and he is not offended except through aversion from him and contempt: therefore charity is not diminished except through mortal sin; but this is nothing other than for charity to be removed: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything12 which diminishes another is opposite to it; but the venial [sin] or cupidity or concupiscence on this side of God is not opposed to charity, but rather is altogether contingent to it: therefore it is not diminished.

4. Likewise, what diminishes another has power over13 it; but the venial does not have power over charity, because charity loves God more than cupidity loves a hundred marks of gold and silver14: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, this same is shown through impossibility in this way: if the venial diminishes charity, then it diminishes something from it: if therefore charity is not of infinite magnitude, then the venial, repeated several times, takes away the whole charity, which is false.

6. Likewise, if it diminishes charity according to substance, then it diminishes the substantial reward owed to it: but the substantial reward is the eternal good: therefore the venial takes away something from the eternal good; but the taking away of the eternal good either simply or in part is the eternal punishment: therefore the venial merits eternal punishment, which is against the common opinion. If therefore the venial does not diminish the one, neither [does it diminish] the other.

CONCLUSION.

Charity, although it is removed through mortal sin, nevertheless through venial sin is not diminished according to substance, but only according to fervor.

I respond: It must be said that concerning this there is a twofold opinion, founded on the twofold preceding opinion concerning the mode of augmenting charity15. For some say that charity is augmented through unmixedness; and since the unmixedness is greater according to the greater enabling of free choice and according to the diminution of concupiscence, and conversely the mixedness [is greater] through the disabling of free choice and16 the augmentation of concupiscence: they say consequently that it is diminished, according as cupidity or concupiscence is augmented and free choice is disabled; and this is through venial sin. But since venial sin, remaining venial, is never repeated so many times as to augment17 concupiscence so that one loves something above God: therefore charity through venial [sins] can be diminished, but not removed; it is removed however through the mortal [sin], which augments concupiscence above God.

But this opinion, as has been proven above18, does not have a stable foundation, since the substantial augmentation of charity does not come from free choice nor from concupiscence19, therefore neither does the diminution.

And on account of this another more probable opinion is set down, namely that charity is not diminished substantially; and this opinion is founded on this, that the augmentation of charity has to come about through addition20 or increase of greater influence. Granted which, it must be said that charity according to substance is not diminished, but augmented.

And the reason for this is taken from the side of the opposite or of the agent. For charity has no opposite except mortal sin; through that, however, it is not diminished but

removed; concupiscence, however, or cupidity, and venial sin are opposed to charity according to fervor only, because they stand together and substantially are mutually non-contingent21.

To 1 and 2. And so it is to be resolved as to the first two, that that [saying] of Augustine concerning cupidity and lesser love, likewise22 that concerning venial diminution, has place only as to the fervor of charity; and thus the first two are clear.

There is also taken a reason why charity is not diminished from the side of its subject, which is free choice according to conversion to God. Free choice, however23, disposes itself for the augmentation of charity through enabling, likewise for diminution through disabling on this side of the mortal. But this disposition is of congruity, not of condignity; and since God is more inclined to mercy than to condemnation, and to giving than to withdrawing24: hence it is that he confers charity, when free choice disposes itself by congruity, but he does not withdraw, except when [free choice] necessarily disposes itself for the withdrawal of grace. This, however, is only through aversion, and then he removes the whole. And hence it is, that charity is never diminished, but augmented, because [the will] can prepare the subject for diminution only by congruity.

To 3. To that which is objected, that just as a human being makes progress, so also descends25 frequently; it must be said, that charity is not diminished by descent substantially in the same way as it is augmented by ascent.

To 4. What [the objector] also26 objects, that free choice can wholly deprive [of charity] through disabling, etc.; it must be said, that this is false, because a substantial form is wholly deprived through disposition to the opposite at the term, but is not however diminished through disposition on this side of27 the term. Furthermore, that has place when the disposition at the term and on this side of the term are of the same genus; but it is not so in the case proposed, because one is mortal sin, the other venial.

There is also taken a reason why28 [charity] cannot be diminished from the side of its own nature. For [charity] itself is an influence according to divine acceptation; but that God should accept29, this is from him, and so, that he should accept more and more, and so by its own nature [charity] can be augmented; but that he should accept less, this is not from itself: therefore it must come from us: therefore charity from itself is to be augmented, but it has no diminution except from us, as has been shown above30. By us, however, it cannot be diminished, and therefore to charity only augmentation is owed naturally.

To 5. To that therefore which is objected, that opposites are by nature [produced] etc., it must be said, that it is true, unless one of them is in [the subject] by nature.

To 6. To that which is objected: it can be without addition, therefore [it can be] separated; it must be said, that this is true, if there were something separating; but there is nothing which separates.

Scholion

From among the ancients, [William of] Auxerre and even — what is remarkable — Dionysius the Carthusian affirmed that charity according to habit can be diminished, which is now most commonly denied. — Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 108, m. 8, § 3. — Scotus, Reportata here q. 7. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 5; Summa II–II, q. 24, a. 10. — William of Paris, De Virtutibus c. 11, before the middle. — Bl. Albert, here n. 10. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here 2nd princ., q. unica. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. q. 23. — Durandus, here q. 10. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 9. — Biel, here q. 4.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. 83. Qq. q. 36. n. 1. «Caritatis autem venenum est spes adipiscendorum aut retinendorum temporalium». Quae spes ab ipso paulo post nominatur cupiditas.
    Book of 83 Questions, q. 36, n. 1. "But the poison of charity is the hope of obtaining or retaining temporal things." Which hope is by him a little later named cupidity.
  2. Ibid. et Enchirid. c. 121. n. 32; vide supra q. praeced. corp. quaest. — Vat. post unde contra plurimos mss. et quinque primas edd. omittit et.
    Ibid. and Enchiridion c. 121, n. 32; see above in the body of the preceding question. — The Vatican edition, after unde, against most manuscripts and the first five editions, omits et.
  3. Libr. X. c. 29. n. 40.
    Book X, c. 29, n. 40.
  4. August., Enchir. c. 12. n. 4: Nocet autem (malum), adimit igitur bonum. — Paulo ante cod. Z incongrue quia loco quod.
    Augustine, Enchiridion c. 12, n. 4: "But [evil] harms; therefore it takes away a good." — A little before, codex Z incongruously [reads] quia in place of quod.
  5. Vat., plurimis mss. et ed. 1 refragantibus, omittit et.
    The Vatican edition, against the resistance of most manuscripts and edition 1, omits et.
  6. Aliqui codd. ut XZ per sui dehabilitationem.
    Some codices such as XZ [read] per sui dehabilitationem.
  7. Supple cum cod. F caritatis.
    Supply with codex F caritatis.
  8. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis et 11. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). — Paulo ante plures codd. ut ASTWZ omittunt caritatis.
    Aristotle, Categories, ch. on Opposites, and Topics XI, c. 3 (c. 7). — A little before, several codices such as ASTWZ omit caritatis.
  9. Fide mss. et sex primarum edd. adiecimus in esse. Mox cod. V aliud loco aliquid.
    On the testimony of the manuscripts and of the first six editions we have added in esse. Soon after, codex V [reads] aliud in place of aliquid.
  10. Unus alterque cod. ut V H' cum ed. 1 addunt ab illo.
    One or two codices such as V, H' with edition 1 add ab illo.
  11. In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 deest adimit.
    In most manuscripts and edition 1 adimit is missing.
  12. Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 addit illud. Paulo post plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 habent opponuntur loco opponitur, sed non cohaerenter cum subnexis.
    The Vatican edition, against most codices and edition 1, adds illud. A little later, most codices with edition 1 have opponuntur in place of opponitur, but not coherently with what follows.
  13. Multi codd. hic et paulo infra supra.
    Many codices, here and a little below, [read] supra.
  14. Fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1 exhibent hanc abbreviationem: c. m. a. ar.; cod. O integre lectionem in textum receptam praebet, dum cod. V (H et cc ab altera manu) ponit aurum et argentum; Vat. vero creaturam.
    Almost all codices with edition 1 give this abbreviation: c. m. a. ar.; codex O presents in full the reading received into the text, while codex V (H and cc by a second hand) puts aurum et argentum; the Vatican edition, however, [reads] creaturam.
  15. Vide. q. praeced.
    See the preceding question.
  16. Cod. Z addit per.
    Codex Z adds per.
  17. Cod. V concupiscentia augeatur. Paulo post plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 minui loco diminui, et dein cod. X quia pro quod.
    Codex V [reads] concupiscentia augeatur. A little later, most codices with edition 1 [read] minui in place of diminui, and then codex X [reads] quia for quod.
  18. In corp. praeced. n. [?]
    In the body of the preceding [question], n. [?]
  19. Intellige iuxta praedicta: non venit a liberi arbitrii habitatione in bono nec a concupiscentiae diminutione. Mendum Vat., quae post arbitrio ponit ideo et mox ideo nec omittit, correximus ex mss. et edd. 1, 4, 5, 6.
    Understand according to what has been said above: it does not come from the dwelling of free choice in the good, nor from the diminution of concupiscence. The error of the Vatican edition, which after arbitrio puts ideo and soon after omits ideo nec, we have corrected from the manuscripts and editions 1, 4, 5, 6.
  20. Aliqui codd. ut ILO cum ed. 1 superadditionem, quae lectio corroboratur lectione mutila plurium codd. ponentium super loco per. Mox ed. 1 sive pro vel.
    Some codices such as ILO with edition 1 [read] superadditionem, which reading is corroborated by the mutilated reading of several codices putting super in place of per. Soon after, edition 1 [reads] sive for vel.
  21. Licet lectio Vat. et aliquorum mss., in qua ponitur contingentia loco incontingentia, possit aliquo sub respectu explicari, praeferimus tamen lectionem plurimorum mss. et ed. 1, quia ipsa veritati et praedictis magis consonat. — Paulo ante cod. Z tantum loco solum.
    Although the reading of the Vatican edition and of some manuscripts, in which contingentia is put in place of incontingentia, can be explained under some respect, nevertheless we prefer the reading of most manuscripts and of edition 1, because it agrees more with the truth and with what has been said above. — A little before, codex Z [reads] tantum in place of solum.
  22. Fide antiquiorum codd. et ed. 1 expunximus hic male additum ad. Mox codd. Y bb bene venialii pro veniali.
    On the testimony of the older codices and edition 1 we have struck out ad, here wrongly added. Soon after, codices Y, bb rightly [read] venialii for veniali.
  23. Plures codd. ut A T V Y omittunt autem; cod. X quia liberum arbitrium; cod. Z vero, mutata interpunctione, Secundum enim conversionem ad Deum liberum arbitrium, quod non respondet subnexis. Mox cod. W habilitationem pro habilitatem, sicut et paulo infra dehabilitationem loco dehabilitatem.
    Several codices such as A, T, V, Y omit autem; codex X [reads] quia liberum arbitrium; codex Z, however, with the punctuation changed, [reads] Secundum enim conversionem ad Deum liberum arbitrium, which does not correspond to what follows. Soon after, codex W [reads] habilitationem in place of habilitatem, just as a little below also dehabilitationem in place of dehabilitatem.
  24. Vat. cum cod. cc abstrahendum et mox abstrahit pro subtrahit, deinde nomini subtractionem praemittit abstractionem vel, sed obstat usus loquendi, sicut et auctoritas antiquiorum mss. cum ed. 1. Mox cod. W non ad gratiam pro gratiae.
    The Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] abstrahendum and soon after abstrahit for subtrahit, then prefixes to the noun subtractionem the words abstractionem vel, but the usage of speech opposes [this], as does the authority of the older manuscripts together with edition 1. Soon after, codex W [reads] non ad gratiam in place of gratiae.
  25. Ex mss. et quinque primis edd. pro retrocedit substituimus descendit, quod subnexis conformius est.
    From the manuscripts and the first five editions, in place of retrocedit we have substituted descendit, which is more conformable to what follows.
  26. Vat. cum nonnullis codd. autem, et obiicitur pro obiicit.
    The Vatican edition with several codices [reads] autem, and obiicitur for obiicit.
  27. Multi codd. ut ABCDFGIPQSUWZ modo, sed non bene nec cohaerenter cum subnexis. Quid sit dispositio in termino et citra terminum, satis apparet ex his verbis S. Thomae (IV. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. a. 3. solutio ad quaestiunc. 2.): «Expulsio formae dicit terminum motus illius, qui est ad corruptionem ordinatus; et introductio formae dicit similiter terminum motus illius, qui praecedit generationem; quia tam generatio quam corruptio sunt termini motus. Omne autem quod movetur, quando est in termino motus, disponitur secundum illud, ad quod motus ordinatur; et ideo cum motus corruptionis tendat in non esse, generationis vero ad esse, quando forma introducitur, factum est; quando autem expellitur, non est».
    Many codices such as ABCDFGIPQSUWZ [read] modo, but not well, nor coherently with what follows. What disposition at the term and on this side of the term is, sufficiently appears from these words of St. Thomas (IV Sent. d. 17, q. 1, a. 3, solution to the second little question): "The expulsion of a form expresses the term of that motion which is ordered to corruption; and the introduction of a form expresses likewise the term of that motion which precedes generation; because both generation and corruption are termini of motion. But everything which is moved, when it is at the term of motion, is disposed according to that to which the motion is ordered; and so, since the motion of corruption tends to non-being, but [the motion] of generation to being, when the form is introduced, it has been made; when, however, it is expelled, it is not."
  28. Supple: caritas.
    Supply: caritas.
  29. Plures codd. ut AFGHITY bb cum ed. 1 hanc propositionem ita exhibent secundum quod Deus acceptat, cui codd. VX praefigunt id est; cod. T vero mox post hoc addit autem. Paulo infra antiquiorum mss. et edd. 1, 3 fide substituimus sui pro sua.
    Several codices such as AFGHITY, bb with edition 1 give this proposition thus: secundum quod Deus acceptat, to which codices VX prefix id est; codex T, however, soon after hoc adds autem. A little below, on the testimony of older manuscripts and editions 1, 3 we have substituted sui for sua.
  30. Hic, in corp. quaest. — Mox ope antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus solum, pro quo cod. Z habet soli et quod Vat. cum cod. cc male omittit.
    Here, in the body of the question. — Soon after, by the help of the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied solum, in place of which codex Z has soli and which the Vatican edition with codex cc wrongly omits.
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