Bonaventure

Quaestio VI. Utrum virtutes cardinales in patria maneant, an evacuentur.

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur de virtutibus cardinalibus quantum ad durationem, et est quaestio, utrum in patria maneant, an evacuentur. Et quod maneant, videtur.

1. Sapientiae primo¹: Iustitia est perpetua et immortalis: si ergo iustitia manet, quae ordinat ad alterum, multo fortius manent virtutes cardinales, quae ordinant ad se ipsum.

2. Item, hae virtutes cardinales plenissime fuerunt in Christo²: si ergo Christus habuit caritatem comprehensoris, videtur, quod huiusmodi virtutes in statu gloriae habeant salvari.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur auctoritate Bedae, quam Magister inducit in littera³, quae dicit, quod «potestates caeli quatuor eximiis virtutibus sunt praeclarae: fortitudine, prudentia, temperantia, iustitia».

4. Item, secundum Macrobium⁴ istae quatuor virtutes cardinales respiciunt «quadrifariam distinctionem: quia quaedam sunt exemplares, quaedam politicae, quaedam purgatoriae, quaedam animi iam purgati»: si ergo virtutes exemplares sunt in Deo, et mens ad perfectionem purgationis non habet perduci in statu miseriae praesentis; videtur, quod istae virtutes cardinales potissime in Beatis habent reperiri, cum et ipsi Beati per gloriam fuerunt deiformes effecti.

Sed contra: 1. Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera⁵, quod «prudentia est in praecavendis insidiis, iustitia in subveniendo miseris, fortitudo in perferendis molestiis, et temperantia in coercendis delectationibus pravis»; sed nullum istorum in patria invenitur: ergo habitus virtutum cardinalium in patria non manebunt.

2. Item, virtutes cardinales minus nobiles sunt quam theologicae: si ergo virtutes theologicae evacuantur, utpote fides et spes⁶; videtur, quod et virtutes cardinales similiter.

3. Item, virtutes cardinales habent pro obiecto ea quae ordinant se ad finem, et per quae pervenitur ad finem⁷; sed cum perventum est ad finem iam non oportet versari in his quae ad finem perducunt: ergo videtur, quod iam amplius non maneant virtutes cardinales in suis actibus. Sed habitus sine actu est incompletus; in patria autem nihil est incompletum: ergo necesse est, ibi evacuari habitus virtutum cardinalium.

4. Item, secundum quod dicit Apostolus, scientia destruetur⁸: si ergo maioris perfectionis est scientia quam prudentia, ergo in patria non stabit prudentia. Sed prudentia est prima inter omnes virtutes cardinales: si ergo ipsa non manebit, nec aliae.

Conclusio. Virtutes cardinales excellentiori modo remanebunt in patria, quam sunt modo in via.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in patria aliqua virtus dicitur manere multipliciter. Quaedam namque virtus manet in patria quantum ad praemium, ita quod ipsa sibi ipsi est praemium secundum perfe-

ctiorem statum; sicut caritas, quae, prout erat imperfecta in via, meriti erat principium; sed prout ipsa eadem est consummata in patria, est praemii complementum⁹. — Quaedam autem virtus manet quantum ad praemium; verumtamen nec ipsa sibi ipsi est praemium, nec cum praemio suo se ipsam compatitur, sicut fides et spes, quae in patria praemiantur, et ideo non pereunt; non sunt tamen praemium propter suam imperfectionem, nec secum praemium compatiuntur propter quandam oppositionem. Nam praemium ipsum est videre et tenere Deum; et primum repugnat fidei, quae est de non viso; secundum repugnat spei, quae est de futuro et non habito¹⁰. — Quaedam vero virtus manet medio modo, quia manet quantum ad praemium et cum praemio; ipsa tamen non est sibi praemium, sed dispositio ad praemium; et sic manet virtus cardinalis.

Nam praemium essentiale ipsarum virtutum est ipsum bonum summum, quod Deus est, secundum quod videtur, diligitur et tenetur, ita quod penes istos tres actus tres dotes animae accipiuntur¹¹. Nullus autem istorum actuum est actus virtutum cardinalium, quia cardinales virtutes nunquam tantum elevantur, quod Deum habeant pro obiecto, alioquin transirent in theologicas virtutes et desinerent esse cardinales. — Respectu tamen horum actuum gloriosorum virtutes cardinales erunt¹² sicut dispositiones; ut, sicut in via, licet per virtutes cardinales non fruamur, tamen per eas disponimur, ut fruamur; sic et in patria. Unde omnes actus nostri gloriosi erunt fortes et iusti, prudentes et casti, ita quod iustitia excludit omnem obliquitatem, prudentia excludit omnem errorem, fortitudo omnem molestiam, temperantia omnem libidinum repugnantiam, secundum quod dicit Augustinus, et Magister tangit in littera¹³. — Et sic patet, quod virtutes cardinales excellentiori modo manebunt in patria, quam sunt in via. Unde et rationes concedendae sunt, quae sunt ad partem istam.

Ad argumenta in contrarium: 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de actibus istarum quatuor virtutum¹⁴, dicendum, quod illi actus non sunt actus earum generales, sed solum secundum statum viae; alios vero actus habebunt in patria multo excellentiores, quos etiam in via aliquo modo habent, licet semiplene: et ideo virtutes istae non tollentur, sed perficientur.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtutes theologicae perfectiores sunt cardinalibus; dicendum, quod illud verum est, quantum est ex parte obiecti; verumtamen quantum ad modum movendi et habilitandi non habet veritatem generaliter, quia fides et spes de sua primaria ratione important imperfectionem, quae repugnat statui gloriae, pro eo quod habilitant respectu absentis et non respectu praesentis. Et hinc est, quod magis evacuantur theologicae quam cardinales, sicut satis apparet ex his quae dicta sunt distinctione trigesima prima¹⁵.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtutes cardinales ordinant in ea quae tendunt in finem; dicendum, quod verum est, quia ordinant¹⁶ ad se et ad proximum; sed ista, ad quae ordinat virtus cardinalis, non cessabunt in patria, immo manebunt multo melius ordinata. Ad hoc enim, quod homo recte ordinetur in Deum, necesse est, quod etiam ad se ipsum et ad proximum ordinetur; et ideo, licet in patria perveniatur usque in finem, non tamen oportebit, habitus istarum virtutum non remanere.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod scientia cessabit in patria; dicendum, sicut in praecedentibus¹⁷ dictum fuit, quod non cessabit quantum ad habitum, sed quantum ad modum, qui attenditur per collationem et decursum. Praeterea, scientia illa, de qua loquitur Apostolus¹⁸, non est nobilior, quam sit habitus virtutum cardinalium. Et iterum, scientia, quantum est de ratione sui nominis, in via imponitur a collatione praemissarum ad conclusionem — secundum quod dicitur, quod scientia est conclusionum, et intellectus est habitus principiorum¹⁹ — nomen autem virtutis cardinalis non sic imponitur: et ideo non sic dicuntur destrui in patria, secundum quod scientia.

---

Question VI. Whether the cardinal virtues remain in the fatherland, or are done away with.

Sixth and last, inquiry is made concerning the cardinal virtues with respect to their duration, and the question is whether in the fatherland they remain, or are done away with. And that they remain, it seems.

1. Wisdom, chapter one¹: Justice is perpetual and immortal: if therefore justice, which orders to another, remains, much more strongly do the cardinal virtues remain, which order to oneself.

2. Likewise, these cardinal virtues were most fully in Christ²: if therefore Christ had the charity of one who comprehends, it seems that virtues of this kind are to be preserved in the state of glory.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [established] by the authority of Bede, which the Master adduces in the text³, who says that «the powers of heaven are made illustrious by four outstanding virtues: fortitude, prudence, temperance, justice».

4. Likewise, according to Macrobius⁴, these four cardinal virtues regard a «fourfold distinction: for some are exemplary, some political, some purgatorial, some [proper to] a soul now purged»: if therefore the exemplary virtues are in God, and the mind cannot be led to the perfection of purgation in the state of present misery; it seems that these cardinal virtues are most of all to be found in the Blessed, since the Blessed themselves were made deiform through glory.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine says, and it is held in the text⁵, that «prudence consists in guarding against snares, justice in coming to the aid of the wretched, fortitude in enduring troubles, and temperance in restraining base delights»; but none of these is found in the fatherland: therefore the habits of the cardinal virtues will not remain in the fatherland.

2. Likewise, the cardinal virtues are less noble than the theological: if therefore the theological virtues are done away with, such as faith and hope⁶; it seems that the cardinal virtues likewise [are].

3. Likewise, the cardinal virtues have for their object those things which order [one] toward the end, and through which one arrives at the end⁷; but when the end has been reached it is no longer needful to be occupied with those things which lead to the end: therefore it seems that the cardinal virtues no longer remain in their acts. But a habit without act is incomplete; and in the fatherland nothing is incomplete: therefore it is necessary that the habits of the cardinal virtues be done away with there.

4. Likewise, according to what the Apostle says, knowledge shall be destroyed⁸: if therefore knowledge is of greater perfection than prudence, then prudence will not stand in the fatherland. But prudence is first among all the cardinal virtues: if therefore it will not remain, neither will the others.

Conclusion. The cardinal virtues will remain in the fatherland in a more excellent mode than they are now in the way.

I respond: It must be said that in the fatherland some virtue is said to remain in many ways. For a certain virtue remains in the fatherland with respect to reward, in such a way that it is itself a reward to itself according to a more perfect state; just as charity, which, insofar as it was imperfect in the way, was the principle of merit; but insofar as the same charity is consummated in the fatherland, it is the completion of reward⁹. — But a certain virtue remains with respect to reward; yet it is not itself a reward to itself, nor is it compatible with its own reward, as faith and hope, which are rewarded in the fatherland, and therefore do not perish; they are not however a reward on account of their imperfection, nor are they compatible with reward on account of a certain opposition. For the reward itself is to see and to hold God; and the first is repugnant to faith, which is of the unseen; the second is repugnant to hope, which is of the future and not-yet-possessed¹⁰. — But a certain virtue remains in a middle mode, because it remains with respect to reward and with reward; yet it is not itself a reward, but a disposition to reward; and thus the cardinal virtue remains.

For the essential reward of those virtues themselves is the highest good itself, which is God, according as he is seen, loved, and held, so that in respect of these three acts three endowments of the soul are received¹¹. But none of these acts is an act of the cardinal virtues, because the cardinal virtues are never so elevated that they have God for their object, otherwise they would pass over into the theological virtues and cease to be cardinal. — Yet with respect to these glorious acts the cardinal virtues will be¹² as dispositions; so that, just as in the way, although we do not enjoy [God] through the cardinal virtues, nonetheless through them we are disposed to enjoy [him]; so also in the fatherland. Hence all our glorious acts will be brave and just, prudent and chaste, in such a way that justice excludes every crookedness, prudence excludes every error, fortitude every trouble, temperance every resistance of lusts, according to what Augustine says, and the Master touches in the text¹³. — And thus it is clear that the cardinal virtues will remain in the fatherland in a more excellent mode than they are in the way. Hence also the reasons which are for this part are to be granted.

To the arguments to the contrary: 1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary concerning the acts of those four virtues¹⁴, it must be said that those acts are not their general acts, but only [those] according to the state of the way; but they will have in the fatherland other acts far more excellent, which they also have in some way in the way, though semi-fully: and therefore these virtues will not be taken away, but perfected.

2. To that which is objected, that the theological virtues are more perfect than the cardinal; it must be said that this is true insofar as it is on the part of the object; yet with respect to the mode of moving and enabling it does not hold true in general, because faith and hope by their primary character imply an imperfection, which is repugnant to the state of glory, in that they enable [the soul] in respect of what is absent and not in respect of what is present. And hence it is that the theological [virtues] are done away with more than the cardinal, as appears sufficiently from what was said in the thirty-first distinction¹⁵.

3. To that which is objected, that the cardinal virtues order [one] in those things which tend toward the end; it must be said that it is true, because they order¹⁶ toward oneself and toward one's neighbor; but those things, toward which the cardinal virtue orders, will not cease in the fatherland, but rather will remain much better ordered. For unto this, that a man be rightly ordered toward God, it is necessary that he be ordered also toward himself and toward his neighbor; and therefore, although in the fatherland the end is reached, nonetheless it will not be needful that the habits of these virtues not remain.

4. To that which is objected, that knowledge will cease in the fatherland; it must be said, as was said in the preceding¹⁷, that it will not cease with respect to habit, but with respect to mode, which is attended to through collation and discursive reasoning. Moreover, the knowledge of which the Apostle speaks¹⁸ is not nobler than is the habit of the cardinal virtues. And again, knowledge, as far as is of the account of its name, in the way is named from the collation of premises to a conclusion — according to what is said, that knowledge is of conclusions, and understanding is the habit of principles¹⁹ — but the name of cardinal virtue is not so imposed: and therefore they are not said to be destroyed in the fatherland in the way that knowledge [is].

---