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Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 27

Textus Latinus
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Articulus I. De ipsa caritate quantum ad habitum.

Quaestio I. Utrum caritas sit habitus ab aliis virtutibus distinctus.

Circa primum de quatuor sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum caritas sit habitus ab aliis virtutibus distinctus, an omnibus virtutibus communis et generalis. Et quod sit habitus omnibus communis, videtur:

1. Et primo auctoritate Apostoli primae ad Corinthios decimo tertiop589-4, ubi Apostolus dicit: Caritas patiens est, benigna est etc., et enumerat ibi quindecim opera virtutum; sed quidquid habet in se actus omnium virtutum, est commune et universale ad omnes virtutes; habitus autem caritatis est huiusmodi, secundum quod in praecedenti auctoritate habetur: ergo omnibus virtutibus est communis.

2. Item, Hieronymusp589-5: « Ut breviter complectar omnem definitionem virtutis, virtus est caritas, qua diligitur omne diligendum »: ergo cum definitio et definitum sint aequalis ambitus, et virtus sit generalis ad omnes virtutes; videtur similiter, quod et caritas.

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3. Item, Augustinus de Civitate Deip590-1 et Bernardus de Diligendo Deo dicunt, quod « virtus non est aliud quam ordo amoris vel amor ordinatus »; ergo cum amor ordinatus nihil aliud sit quam caritas, et omnis virtus nihil aliud sit quam amor ordinatus; omnis virtus est caritas: ergo caritas non est ab aliis virtutibus distincta.

4. Item, sicut se habet praeceptum caritatis ad alia praecepta, sic se habet habitus caritatis ad alios habitus virtutum; sed praeceptum caritatis omnia alia praecepta comprehendit, sicut dicitur ad Romanos decimo tertiop590-2: Qui diligit proximum Legem implevit: ergo videtur, quod habitus caritatis contineat in se habitus omnium virtutum, et non sit ab aliis distinctus.

5. Item, sicut se habet obiectum caritatis ad obiecta aliarum virtutum, ita se habet habitus caritatis ad alios habitus; sed obiectum caritatis est bonum sub ratione boni simpliciter: si ergo hoc est commune obiectis omnium aliarum virtutump590-3, videtur, quod habitus caritatis sit communis omnibus aliis habitibus.

6. Item, qui habet dilectionem caritatis in via habet omne quod necessarium est ad meritum, quia dicit Augustinusp590-4: « Tene caritatem, et fac quidquid vis »; similiter, qui habet dotem fruitionis correspondentem caritati, in patria habet sufficientissimum praemium: « Frui enim, secundum quod dicit Augustinus, est amore inhaerere »: ergo si caritas inchoata sufficit ad meritum, et caritas consummata sufficit ad praemium; videtur, quod habita caritate, aut ceterae virtutes superfluant, aut ipsa non differat ab habitibus aliarum virtutum. Sed constans est, quod aliae virtutes non superfluant: restat ergo, quod ipsa ab aliis virtutibus non distinguitur.

Sed contra: 1. Primae ad Corinthios decimo tertiop590-5: Nunc manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec. Quod recte connumeratur et superponitur habilibus aliis virtutibus, distinguitur ab aliis virtutibus; sed caritas connumeratur et superponitur aliis virtutibus: ergo ab illis distinguitur.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ab obiecto: quia, sicut fides respicit Deum sub ratione veri, et spes sub ratione ardui, sic caritas sub ratione boni: si ergo bonum sub ratione boni et verum sub ratione veri dicunt diversas rationes movendi; et secundum diversitatem rationis movendi est distinctio in habitibus et actibusp590-6: videtur ergo, quod caritas differat ab aliis theologicis virtutibus: ergo multo fortius ab aliis, scilicet cardinalibus.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ab actu proprio: quia constans est, quod diligere et credere et sperare actus sunt diversi, loquendo formaliter: si ergo penes diversitatem actuum principalium necesse est esse diversitatem habituum; videtur, quod necesse sit ponere, habitum caritatis ab habitibus aliarum virtutum differre.

4. Item, penes diversitatem subiectorum est diversitas proprietatum; sed sicut fides est in rationali et spes in irascibilip590-7, sic caritas et amor est in concupiscibili: si ergo vis concupiscibilis distincta est ab aliis viribus, necesse est, quod habitus caritatis distinctus sit ab aliis habitibus.

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per comparationem ad suum oppositum: quia vitium directe oppositum caritati distinguiturp590-8 ab aliis vitiis, utpote odium ab infidelitate et desperatione: si ergo distinctio malorum et vitiorum est ratione bonorum, quibus opponuntur, cum sint privationes; videtur, quod si vitium caritati oppositum ab aliis vitiis distinguitur, consimiliter et habitus caritatis ab aliis habitibus.

6. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per comparationem ad praemium: quia quandocumque aliqui sic se habent, quod quando unus perficitur, alii evacuantur, necesse est, illos habitus per essentiam differre; sed habitus caritatis in patria perficitur et consummatur, habitus vero fidei et spei evacuantur, sicut dicit Magister, et habitum est in distinctione praecedentip590-9: ergo necesse est, caritatis habitum ab habitibus aliarum virtutum distingui.

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### Conclusio. Caritas est habitus virtutis ab aliis virtutibus distinctus.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc reperitur triplex modus dicendi.

Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod caritatis habitus est ab aliis virtutibus indistinctus, propter ipsorum habituum essentialem unitatem. Dixerunt enim, ipsos habitus virtutum ab invicem non differre per essentiam nisi sola relatione ad actus. Et hoc ipsum dixerunt de potentiis animaep591-1. Et quod sint unum per essentiam inter se invicem, hoc probare nituntur propter mutuam ipsorum habituum denominationem. Cum enim formae disparatae nullo modo possint se ipsas denominare; et una virtus aliam denominet, ut iustitia est prudens, et prudentia est iusta, fides amat, et caritas credit: impossibile est igitur, habitus virtutum essentialiter inter se differre. Ex hac eadem ratione concludere voluerunt, quod non differant a caritate, cum caritati attribuantur quasi omnium virtutum actus, sicut dicit Apostolus primae ad Corinthios decimo tertiop591-2. Et hoc ipsum dicunt sensisse Augustinum in libro de Moribus Ecclesiae, ubi sic definit virtutem: « Nihil omnino esse virtutem affirmaverim nisi summum amorem Dei. Nam illud quod quadripartita dicitur virtus, ex ipsius amoris quodam vario affectu, quantum intelligo, dicitur ».

Sed quantumcumque hoc innuerent auctoritates, ponere tamen, omnes habitus virtutum a se invicemp591-3 non differre nisi sola relatione, non videtur consonum rationi nec etiam doctrinae communi. Quod enim diversitas sit in potentiis animae et ipsarum habitibus, manifestat ipsa diversitas actuum et obiectorum. Et propterea, cum una virtus denominat alteram, vel actus unius attribuitur alteri, hoc non est intelligendum fieri propter omnimodam ipsorum habituum indifferentiam, sed propter mutuam circumincessionem et concomitantiam; sicut dicimus de potentiis animae, quod se invicem circumincedunt, et supra se mutuo reflectuntur, non quia omnino idem sint, sed quia, cum sint in eodem et possint reflecti super illud, in quo sunt — quia anima intelligit se et amat se — per consequens et super se invicem reflectunturp591-4. Et propterea, quia reflexio non tantummodo fit propter omnimodam indivisionem convenientiae, verum etiam propter circumincessionem concomitantiae; ideo non cogimur ponere, nec potentias animae nec habitus, secundum id quod sunt, ab invicem non differrep591-5. — Nec Augustinus in libro de Moribus Ecclesiae vult illud dicere, sed omnes virtutes alias vult ad caritatem tanquam ad fundamentum reducere, sine qua aliae virtutes non sunt verae virtutes, quia ad veram beatitudinem non perducunt.

Est et hic alius modus dicendip591-6, videlicet quod caritas ab aliis virtutibus non distinguitur propter ipsius caritatis generalitatem. Voluerunt enim quidam dicere, quod ipsa vis concupiscibilis diffunditur per omnes alias vires, pro eo quod omnes vires animae appetunt sua obiecta. Undep591-7 amor reperitur in omnibus viribus, ut dicunt, et amor ordinatus in omnibus virtutibus; et quia caritas non est aliud quam ordo amoris: hinc est, quod dicere voluerunt, caritatem ob suam generalitatem non distingui ab aliis virtutibus.

Sed nec illud videtur rationabile usquequaque, nec convenienter dici, cum Apostolus eam distinguat ab aliis. Nec ratio, quam assignant, multum est efficax, pro eo quod concupiscibilis ita est vis in se distincta, secundum quodp591-8 rationalis et irascibilis: unde quod actus concupiscibilis ad actum aliarum virium concurrit, hoc non est propter identitatem et indivisionem in essendo, sed propter simultatem et ordinem in movendo. Unde et generale sive universale consuevit aliquid dici dupliciter: vel propter communitatem in praedicando, vel propter communitatem in causando; sicut sol dicitur causa universalis, non quia de aliis causis inferioribus praedicatur, sed quia alias adiuvat et movetp591-9. Et ideo, sicut possibile est, quod aliquid habeat rationem generalis motoris respectu aliorum, et tamen in se sit unum et ab eis distinctum in causis naturalibus; sic reperire contingit in animae potentiis et viribus. Et ideo, quamvis voluntas

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imperet aliis viribus animae, et caritas aliis virtutibus, non oportet propter hoc ponere, quod ab eis non distinguaturp592-1.

Tertius vero modus dicendi communis et usitatus rationi et auctoritatibus satis consonus est, quod caritatis habitus est ab habitibus aliarum virtutum distinctus, sicut innuit ipse Apostolus. — Et eius distinctio ab habitibus aliis potest colligi ex multiplici ipsius comparatione, sicut in opponendop592-2 fuit demonstratum, primo videlicet ex comparatione ad obiectum, quod sub ratione movendi ab aliis distinguitur; secundo per comparationem ad actum, qui differt ab actibus aliarump592-3; tertio per comparationem ad subiectum proprium; quarto per comparationem ad oppositum, quod ei determinate opponitur, ita quod non habitibus aliarum virtutum; quinto per comparationem ad praemium, in quo perficitur, cum habitus spei et fidei evacuetur; sexto vero et ultimo per comparationem ad suum principium, quod repraesentat. Consistit enim imago recreationis in tribus virtutibus theologicis et unitate gratiae, sicut imago creationis in tribus potentiis et unitate substantiae. Si ergo ipsae potentiae ad hoc, quod sint recte imago, a se invicem discernuntur, et una de altera non praedicatur; si in tribus virtutibus theologicis reperitur similiter ratio cuiusdam imaginisp592-4: opportunum est ponere, ipsas ab invicem distinctas esse. — Concedendum est igitur, habitum caritatis distinctum esse ab habitibus aliarum virtutum; concedendae sunt etiam rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritate Apostoli, patet responsio ex iam dictis: quoniam actus aliarum virtutum attribuuntur ipsi caritati non sicut elicienti, sed sicut imperanti et sicut motori primo, non sicut motori immediato. Et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod caritas ab aliis virtutibus non distinguatur, quia non habet generalitatem ad illas in praedicando, sed solum in movendo.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Hieronymi, quod virtus non est aliud quam caritas; dicendum, quod praedicatio illa est praedicatio causalis. Ideo enim omnes virtutes definiri possunt per caritatem, quia amor caritatis dat eis rationem merendi; qua ablata, non est, proprie loquendo, dicenda virtus esse in animap592-5.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur per auctoritatem Augustini, dicendum similiter, quod notificationes illae et consimiles per causam datae sunt. — Et si tu quaeras, per quod genus causae; responderi potest, quod caritas respectu aliarum in movendo quodam modo habet rationem efficientis, quodam modo formalis, quodam modo finalis. Amor autem caritatis aliis virtutibus, ut in actus suos exeant, imperat et imperando informat et facit eos meritorios et informando iungit fini et in ipso quietat, dum facit nos Deo adhaerere et ipso frui; et ideo merito virtus gratuita per caritatis amorem est definiendap592-6. — Posset etiam aliter dici, quod amor ille, qui cadit in definitione virtutis generaliter, non est amor caritatis, quae est una de virtutibus theologicis, sed est amor omnibus et ceteris virtutibus communis et generalis. Et ideo in processu illo est sophisma consequentis a superiori ad inferius affirmandop592-7.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praeceptum caritatis comprehendit omnia praecepta; dicendum, quod non comprehendit ea per omnimodam identitatem, sed per quandam reductionem; omnia enim praecepta reducuntur ad illam et in illa consummantur; et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod habitus caritatis sit aliis communis nisi solum per radicationem, secundum quod dicit Gregoriusp592-8, quod praecepta sunt multa per diversitatem operis et unum in radice dilectionis, « quia quidquid praecipitur, in sola caritate radicatur ». Hoc autem non est, quia solius caritatis sit exsequi praecepta iniuncta, sed quia aliae virtutes sine caritate non exsequuntur divina praecepta secundum acceptionem divinam.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod obiectum caritatis commune est obiectis aliarum virtutum; respondendum est per interemptionemp592-9, quia obiectum caritatis non est quodcumque bonum, sed bonum summum et bonum sub ratione boni; et ita obiectum caritatis distinguitur secundum substantiam ab obiectis virtutum cardinalium, quae habent obiectum creatum; ab obiecto vero aliarum virtutum

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theologicarum secundum substantiam non distinguitur, sed secundum rationem movendi, quae quidem ratio movendi facit diversitatem in actu et habitu et potentia substantiae motae, sicut patet: quia, quamvis unum et idem sit verum et bonum, tamen cognitio et affectio, et potentia cognitiva et affectiva, et habitus scientiae et virtutis habent ad invicem differentiam.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas sufficit ad praemium et meritum; dicendum, quod caritas dicitur sufficere ad meritum et ad praemium propter connexionem aliarum virtutum et dotum. Qui enim habet caritatem habet alias virtutes, et qui habet dotem sibi correspondentem habet alias dotes, et ita sufficientiam in merito et praemio, non ratione caritatis tantum, sedp593-1 ratione aliarum virtutum annexarum. Et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod aliae virtutes superfluant, vel quod caritas sola sit virtus ab aliis non distincta, pro eo quod non habet sufficientiam per se sola, sed prout est cum aliis coniunctap593-2. Et per hoc patet, quod non potest aliquis sufficienter mereri, nisi speret et credat; nunquam autem potest aliquis esse expeditus et habilitatus ad credendum et sperandum nisi mediante fide et spe; similiter circa dotes praemii intelligendum est.

Scholion

I. De nomine caritatis cfr. I. Sent. Prolog. dub. 4, d. 17. p. I. q. 3, et infra q. 3. in corp. — De differentia inter amorem, dilectionem et caritatem cfr. hic dub. 1, et I. Sent. d. 10. dub. 1. — De definitionibus caritatis hic dub. 1. — De amore amicitiae, concupiscentiae et complacentiae I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 2, et infra q. 2. ad 6, a. 2. q. 2. ad 2, d. 29. dub. 1. — De obiecto formali et materiali hic et infra a. 2. q. 2. 3. 4. et d. 28. per totam et alibi passim. — De caritate ut habitu creato I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 1. et seqq.

II. In conclusione omnes posteriores Scholastici conveniunt (cfr. infra d. 36. q. 6.); item, quod subiectum caritatis sit voluntas rationalis (cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 1. fundam. 1; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3.). Passim autem S. Bonav. secundum antiquum modum loquendi etiam dicit, eam esse in concupiscibili, quia, ut supra in scholio (d. 26. a. 2. q. 5.) dictum est, in ipsa voluntate distinguit vim concupiscibilem et irascibilem. Unde non nisi in modo loquendi a nostro auctore recedit S. Thom., qui docet (loc. cit.): « Quidam autem dicunt, caritatem in concupiscibili esse, quod esse non potest, quia concupiscibilis pars appetitus sensitivae est partis. Et si dicatur concupiscibilis humana, hoc non habet nisi per participationem rationis; nisi forte ipsam voluntatem aequivoce irascibilem et concupiscibilem vocare vellent ».

III. De hac (I.) quaestione: Scot. (hanc et seq. q. iungendo), hic q. unica n. 1-9. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; S. II. II. q. 23. a. 1; Qq. disp. de caritate a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 6. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

IV. Solutio sequentis (2.) quaestionis eruitur ex hoc principio communiter recepto, quod actus et habitus non specificantur nisi ex formali diversitate obiecti. De eadem specialiter agunt: S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1; S. loc. cit. a. 4; Qq. disp. de caritate a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 3.

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English Translation

Article I. On charity itself as to disposition.

Question I. Whether charity is a disposition distinct from the other virtues.

Concerning the first of the four [questions] one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether charity is a disposition distinct from the other virtues, or one common and general to all the virtues. And that it is a disposition common to all is shown:

1. And first by the authority of the Apostle in First Corinthians chapter thirteenp589-4, where the Apostle says: "Charity is patient, is kind" etc., and there he enumerates fifteen works of the virtues; but whatever has in itself the acts of all the virtues is common and universal to all the virtues; but the disposition of charity is of this kind, according to what is contained in the preceding authority: therefore it is common to all the virtues.

2. Likewise, Jeromep589-5: "To embrace briefly every definition of virtue, virtue is charity, by which everything that is to be loved is loved": therefore since the definition and the thing defined are of equal scope, and virtue is general to all the virtues, it seems likewise that charity also is.

3. Likewise, Augustine in On the City of Godp590-1 and Bernard in On Loving God say that "virtue is nothing other than the order of love, or ordered love"; therefore since ordered love is nothing other than charity, and every virtue is nothing other than ordered love; every virtue is charity: therefore charity is not distinct from the other virtues.

4. Likewise, as the precept of charity stands to the other precepts, so the disposition of charity stands to the other dispositions of the virtues; but the precept of charity comprehends all the other precepts, as is said in Romans chapter thirteenp590-2: "He who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law": therefore it seems that the disposition of charity contains in itself the dispositions of all the virtues, and is not distinct from the others.

5. Likewise, as the object of charity stands to the objects of the other virtues, so the disposition of charity stands to the other dispositions; but the object of charity is the good under the aspect of good without qualification: if therefore this is common to the objects of all the other virtuesp590-3, it seems that the disposition of charity is common to all the other dispositions.

6. Likewise, he who has the love of charity on the way has everything that is necessary for merit, because Augustine saysp590-4: "Hold to charity, and do whatever you will"; likewise, he who has the dowry of fruition corresponding to charity has in the fatherland the most sufficient reward: "For to enjoy, according to what Augustine says, is to cleave by love": therefore if inchoate charity suffices for merit, and consummated charity suffices for reward; it seems that, charity being had, either the remaining virtues are superfluous, or charity itself does not differ from the dispositions of the other virtues. But it is established that the other virtues are not superfluous: it remains, therefore, that charity is not distinguished from the other virtues.

On the contrary: 1. First Corinthians chapter thirteenp590-5: "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three." That which is rightly enumerated with and set above the other dispositions of the virtues is distinguished from the other virtues; but charity is enumerated with and set above the other virtues: therefore it is distinguished from them.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown from the object: for, just as faith regards God under the aspect of the true, and hope under the aspect of the arduous, so charity under the aspect of the good: if therefore the good under the aspect of good and the true under the aspect of the true express diverse aspects of moving; and according to the diversity of the aspect of moving there is a distinction in the dispositions and actsp590-6: it seems therefore that charity differs from the other theological virtues: therefore much more strongly from the others, namely the cardinal ones.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown from the proper act: for it is established that to love and to believe and to hope are diverse acts, speaking formally: if therefore in accordance with the diversity of the principal acts there must be a diversity of dispositions; it seems that it is necessary to posit that the disposition of charity differs from the dispositions of the other virtues.

4. Likewise, in accordance with the diversity of subjects there is a diversity of properties; but just as faith is in the rational [power] and hope in the irasciblep590-7, so charity and love is in the concupiscible: if therefore the concupiscible power is distinct from the other powers, it is necessary that the disposition of charity be distinct from the other dispositions.

5. Likewise, this same thing is shown by comparison to its opposite: for the vice directly opposed to charity is distinguishedp590-8 from the other vices, as hatred [is distinguished] from unbelief and despair: if therefore the distinction of evils and vices is by reason of the goods to which they are opposed, since they are privations; it seems that if the vice opposed to charity is distinguished from the other vices, likewise also the disposition of charity [is distinguished] from the other dispositions.

6. Likewise, this same thing is shown by comparison to the reward: for whenever some things are so disposed that when one is perfected, the others are emptied out, it is necessary that those dispositions differ essentially; but the disposition of charity in the fatherland is perfected and consummated, while the dispositions of faith and hope are emptied out, as the Master says, and as was held in the preceding distinctionp590-9: therefore it is necessary that the disposition of charity be distinguished from the dispositions of the other virtues.

### Conclusion. Charity is a disposition of virtue distinct from the other virtues.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that concerning this there is found a threefold manner of speaking.

For some wished to say that the disposition of charity is undistinguished from the other virtues, on account of the essential unity of the dispositions themselves. For they said that the dispositions of the virtues do not differ from one another by essence but only by relation to acts. And this same thing they said of the powers of the soulp591-1. And that they are one by essence among themselves, this they strive to prove on account of the mutual denomination of the dispositions themselves. For since disparate forms can in no way denominate themselves; and one virtue denominates another, as justice is prudent, and prudence is just, faith loves, and charity believes: it is therefore impossible that the dispositions of the virtues differ essentially among themselves. From this same reasoning they wished to conclude that they do not differ from charity, since the acts of, as it were, all the virtues are attributed to charity, as the Apostle says in First Corinthians chapter thirteenp591-2. And this same thing they say Augustine held in the book On the Morals of the Church, where he so defines virtue: "I would affirm that virtue is nothing at all except the highest love of God. For that which is called fourfold virtue is so called, as far as I understand, from a certain varied affection of love itself."

But however much the authorities might suggest this, nevertheless to posit that all the dispositions of the virtues do not differ from one anotherp591-3 except by relation alone does not seem consonant with reason nor even with the common teaching. For that there is diversity in the powers of the soul and in their dispositions, the very diversity of acts and objects makes manifest. And therefore, when one virtue denominates another, or the act of one is attributed to another, this is not to be understood to come about on account of a total indifference of the dispositions themselves, but on account of the mutual circumincession and concomitance; just as we say of the powers of the soul that they circumincede one another, and mutually reflect upon one another, not because they are altogether the same, but because, since they are in the same [soul] and can be reflected upon that in which they are — because the soul understands itself and loves itself — consequently they are also reflected upon one another in turnp591-4. And therefore, since reflection comes about not only on account of the total indivision of agreement, but also on account of the circumincession of concomitance; therefore we are not compelled to posit either that the powers of the soul or that the dispositions, according to that which they are, do not differ from one anotherp591-5. — Nor does Augustine in the book On the Morals of the Church wish to say that, but he wishes to reduce all the other virtues to charity as to a foundation, without which the other virtues are not true virtues, because they do not lead through to true beatitude.

There is also here another manner of speakingp591-6, namely that charity is not distinguished from the other virtues on account of the generality of charity itself. For some wished to say that the concupiscible power itself is diffused through all the other powers, for this reason, that all the powers of the soul seek their objects. Hencep591-7 love is found in all the powers, as they say, and ordered love in all the virtues; and because charity is nothing other than the order of love: hence it is that they wished to say that charity, on account of its generality, is not distinguished from the other virtues.

But neither does that seem reasonable in every respect, nor fittingly said, since the Apostle distinguishes it from the others. Nor is the reason which they assign very effective, for this reason, that the concupiscible is a power so distinct in itself, according as [is]p591-8 the rational and the irascible: hence the fact that the act of the concupiscible concurs with the act of the other powers, this is not on account of identity and indivision in being, but on account of simultaneity and order in moving. Hence also something is wont to be called general or universal in two ways: either on account of community in predicating, or on account of community in causing; just as the sun is called a universal cause, not because it is predicated of the other lower causes, but because it aids and moves the othersp591-9. And therefore, just as it is possible that something have the character of a general mover with respect to others, and yet in itself be one and distinct from them in natural causes; so it happens to be found in the powers and forces of the soul. And therefore, although the will

commands the other powers of the soul, and charity the other virtues, it is not necessary on account of this to posit that it is not distinguished from themp592-1.

But the third manner of speaking, which is common and customary and sufficiently consonant with reason and with the authorities, is that the disposition of charity is distinct from the dispositions of the other virtues, as the Apostle himself suggests. — And its distinction from the other dispositions can be gathered from its manifold comparison, as was demonstrated in the opposing argumentsp592-2, namely first from comparison to the object, which under the aspect of moving is distinguished from the others; second by comparison to the act, which differs from the acts of the othersp592-3; third by comparison to its proper subject; fourth by comparison to the opposite, which is determinately opposed to it, so that [it is] not [opposed] to the dispositions of the other virtues; fifth by comparison to the reward, in which it is perfected, while the dispositions of hope and faith are emptied out; sixth and last by comparison to its principle, which it represents. For the image of recreation consists in the three theological virtues and the unity of grace, just as the image of creation [consists] in the three powers and the unity of substance. If therefore the powers themselves, in order that they may rightly be an image, are discerned from one another, and one is not predicated of the other; if in the three theological virtues there is found likewise the character of a certain imagep592-4: it is fitting to posit that they are distinct from one another. — It must therefore be conceded that the disposition of charity is distinct from the dispositions of the other virtues; and the reasons which show this are also to be conceded.

1. To that which is first objected on the contrary side concerning the authority of the Apostle, the response is clear from what has already been said: since the acts of the other virtues are attributed to charity itself not as to one eliciting, but as to one commanding and as to the first mover, not as to an immediate mover. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that charity is not distinguished from the other virtues, because it does not have generality with respect to them in predicating, but only in moving.

2. To that which is objected from the authority of Jerome, that virtue is nothing other than charity; it must be said that that predication is a causal predication. For all the virtues can be defined by charity for this reason, that the love of charity gives them the character of meriting; which being taken away, virtue is not, properly speaking, to be said to be in the soulp592-5.

3. To that which is objected through the authority of Augustine, it must be said likewise that those notifications and the like are given through a cause. — And if you ask, through what genus of cause; it can be answered that charity with respect to the others in moving has in a certain manner the character of an efficient [cause], in a certain manner of a formal [cause], in a certain manner of a final [cause]. For the love of charity commands the other virtues, that they go out into their acts, and by commanding informs [them] and makes them meritorious, and by informing joins [them] to the end and quiets [them] in it, while it makes us cleave to God and enjoy him; and therefore gratuitous virtue is rightly to be defined by the love of charityp592-6. — It could also be said otherwise, that the love which falls in the definition of virtue generally is not the love of charity, which is one of the theological virtues, but is a love common and general to all the other virtues. And therefore in that process there is the sophism of the consequent, from the superior to the inferior by affirmingp592-7.

4. To that which is objected, that the precept of charity comprehends all the precepts; it must be said that it does not comprehend them through a total identity, but through a certain reduction; for all the precepts are reduced to it and consummated in it; and therefore from this it cannot be concluded that the disposition of charity is common to the others except only through radication, according as Gregory saysp592-8, that the precepts are many through diversity of work and one in the root of love, "because whatever is commanded is rooted in charity alone." This, however, is not because it belongs to charity alone to carry out the enjoined precepts, but because the other virtues without charity do not carry out the divine precepts according to the divine acceptation.

5. To that which is objected, that the object of charity is common to the objects of the other virtues; it must be answered by interemptionp592-9, because the object of charity is not just any good, but the highest good and the good under the aspect of good; and so the object of charity is distinguished according to substance from the objects of the cardinal virtues, which have a created object; but from the object of the other

theological virtues it is not distinguished according to substance, but according to the aspect of moving, which aspect of moving indeed makes the diversity in the act and disposition and power of the substance moved, as is clear: for, although the true and the good are one and the same, nevertheless cognition and affection, and the cognitive and affective power, and the disposition of knowledge and of virtue have a difference among one another.

6. To that which is objected, that charity suffices for reward and merit; it must be said that charity is said to suffice for merit and for reward on account of the connection of the other virtues and dowries. For he who has charity has the other virtues, and he who has the dowry corresponding to it has the other dowries, and thus sufficiency in merit and reward, not by reason of charity alone, butp593-1 by reason of the other annexed virtues. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that the other virtues are superfluous, or that charity alone is a virtue not distinct from the others, for this reason, that it does not have sufficiency by itself alone, but as it is joined with the othersp593-2. And through this it is clear that no one can sufficiently merit unless he hope and believe; but no one can ever be made ready and enabled to believe and to hope except by the mediation of faith and hope; likewise it is to be understood concerning the dowries of reward.

Scholion

I. Concerning the name of charity cf. I Sent. Prologue dub. 4, d. 17. p. I. q. 3, and below q. 3. in the body. — Concerning the difference between love (amor), love (dilectio) and charity cf. here dub. 1, and I Sent. d. 10. dub. 1. — Concerning the definitions of charity here dub. 1. — Concerning the love of friendship, of concupiscence, and of complacency I Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 2, and below q. 2. ad 6, a. 2. q. 2. ad 2, d. 29. dub. 1. — Concerning the formal and material object here and below a. 2. q. 2. 3. 4. and d. 28. throughout and elsewhere passim. — Concerning charity as a created disposition I Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 1. and following.

II. In the conclusion all the later Scholastics agree (cf. below d. 36. q. 6.); likewise, that the subject of charity is the rational will (cf. I Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 1. fundam. 1; St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 3.). But frequently St. Bonaventure, according to the ancient manner of speaking, also says that it is in the concupiscible, because, as was said above in the scholion (d. 26. a. 2. q. 5.), in the will itself he distinguishes the concupiscible and irascible power. Hence St. Thomas departs from our author only in the manner of speaking, who teaches (loc. cit.): "But some say that charity is in the concupiscible, which it cannot be, because the concupiscible is a part of the sensitive appetite. And if the concupiscible be called human, this it has only through participation in reason; unless perhaps they should wish to call the will itself equivocally irascible and concupiscible."

III. On this (the first) question: Scotus (joining this and the following question), here q. unica n. 1-9. — St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1. subquestion 2; S. II. II. q. 23. a. 1; Disputed Questions on Charity a. 5. — B. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, on this and the following question here q. 2. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, on this and the following question here a. 6. q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following questions here q. unica.

IV. The solution of the following (the second) question is drawn from this commonly received principle, that acts and dispositions are specified only from the formal diversity of the object. On this same [point] specially treat: St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1. subquestion 1; St. [Thomas] loc. cit. a. 4; Disputed Questions on Charity a. 4. — B. Albert, here a. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 4 seqq. (P. 589, n. 4.)
    Verses 4 and following. (P. 589, n. 4.)
  2. Rectius August., Epist. 167 (alias 29). — Hieronym. (vide opera Hieronymi, Epist. 132.) n. 18: Et ut perfectiore brevitateque complectar, qui de virtute habeam notionem, quod ad recte vivendum attinet, virtus est caritas, qua id quod diligendum est, diligitur. Cfr. infra III. Magistri, d. XXXVI. c. 5. De ratione definiti et definitionis cfr. Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 1. — Paulo inferius pro ambitus codd. A H K Z habitus. (P. 589, n. 5.)
    More correctly Augustine, Letter 167 (alias 29). — Jerome (see the works of Jerome, Letter 132) n. 18: "And to embrace it more fully and briefly, the notion which I have of virtue, as far as pertains to living rightly, is that virtue is charity, by which that which is to be loved is loved." Cf. below III [Sent.], the Master's [text], d. XXXVI, c. 5. On the account of the thing defined and of the definition cf. Aristotle, Topics VI, c. 1. — A little below, for ambitus ["scope"] codices A H K Z [read] habitus ["disposition"]. (P. 589, n. 5.)
  3. Libr. XV. c. 22. Vide supra pag. 173, nota 1. — Bernard., de Diligendo Deo, c. 2. n. 5, virtutem definit dignitatis in homine [i. e. liberi arbitrii] et scientiae fructum, « per quam ille inquiritur ac tenetur, qui omnium auctor et dator merito glorificetur de omnibus ». Ex qua definitione deinde (n. 6.) cogit, Deum diligendum esse ex toto corde etc., et in seqq. capitulis motiva et ordinem (c. 8. seqq.) amoris exponit. Cfr. infra dub. 4. et supra pag. 500, nota 6. — Seq. propos. illustratur verbis his, quae habentur in Tract. de caritate (inter opera Bernard.) c. 9: Ab hac [caritate] omnis amor legitimus ordinem formamque sortitur, nec ordinata esse potest aliqua mentis affectio, nisi ab ea causam, modum et ordinem sumat. Cfr. infra d. 36. q. 6. (P. 590, n. 1.)
    Book XV, c. 22. See above p. 173, note 1. — Bernard, On Loving God, c. 2. n. 5, defines virtue as the fruit of dignity in man [i.e. of free choice] and of knowledge, "by which he is sought and held who, the author and giver of all things, may deservedly be glorified for all things." From which definition he then (n. 6) concludes that God is to be loved with the whole heart etc., and in the following chapters (c. 8 ff.) sets forth the motives and order of love. Cf. below dub. 4. and above p. 500, note 6. — The following proposition is illustrated by these words, which are found in the Treatise on Charity (among the works of Bernard) c. 9: "From this [charity] every legitimate love receives its order and form, nor can any affection of the mind be ordered unless it takes from it its cause, mode, and order." Cf. below d. 36. q. 6. (P. 590, n. 1.)
  4. Vers. 8. — In fine arg. pro ab aliis codd. F G I L (N primitus) T V aa de aliis. (P. 590, n. 2.)
    Verse 8. — At the end of the argument, for ab aliis ["from the others"] codices F G I L (N originally) T V aa [read] de aliis. (P. 590, n. 2.)
  5. Cfr. supra pag. 470, nota 8. — Paulo ante edd. voci obiectis praefigunt omnibus. (P. 590, n. 3.)
    Cf. above p. 470, note 8. — A little before, the editions prefix omnibus ["all"] to the word obiectis ["objects"]. (P. 590, n. 3.)
  6. Bernard., Epist. 229. n. 13: Audi et patrem Augustinum: Habe caritatem et fac quidquid vis. Verba Augustini vide supra pag. 509, nota 3. — Seq. testimonium August. habetur I. de Doctr. christ. c. 4. n. 4. Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. 1., c. 2, et Comment. a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo inferius pro differat codd. et edd. 1, 2 differt. Mox pro constans est cod. A constat et dein in fine arg. distinguatur pro distinguitur. (P. 590, n. 4.)
    Bernard, Letter 229. n. 13: "Hear also father Augustine: Have charity and do whatever you will." See the words of Augustine above p. 509, note 3. — The following testimony of Augustine is found in On Christian Doctrine I, c. 4. n. 4. Cf. I Sent., the Master's text, d. 1, c. 2, and the Commentary a. 2. q. 1. — A little below, for differat codices and editions 1, 2 [read] differt. Soon, for constans est codex A [reads] constat, and then at the end of the argument distinguatur for distinguitur. (P. 590, n. 4.)
  7. Vers. 13. — Subinde pro superponitur edd. bis exhibent supponitur eliamque omittunt habitis post primum superponitur. In fine arg. pro ab illis codd. A K L Z ab aliis. (P. 590, n. 5.)
    Verse 13. — Thereupon, for superponitur ["is set above"] the editions twice exhibit supponitur ["is set under"] and also omit habitis after the first superponitur. At the end of the argument, for ab illis codices A K L Z [read] ab aliis. (P. 590, n. 5.)
  8. Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. et 3, d. 26. a. 1. q. 2. et a. 2. q. 4, ubi etiam principia argg. seqq. tanguntur. — Paulo superius pro et secundum edd. quia secundum, et pro diversitatem rationis cod. bb diversas rationes. (P. 590, n. 6.)
    Cf. above d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. and 3, d. 26. a. 1. q. 2. and a. 2. q. 4, where also the principles of the following arguments are touched on. — A little above, for et secundum the editions [read] quia secundum, and for diversitatem rationis codex bb [reads] diversas rationes. (P. 590, n. 6.)
  9. Vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. — De distinctione concupiscibilis ab aliis viribus cfr. scholion supra ad d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. (P. 590, n. 7.)
    See above d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. and d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. — On the distinction of the concupiscible from the other powers cf. the scholion above on d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. (P. 590, n. 7.)
  10. Edd. distinguit. (P. 590, n. 8.)
    The editions [read] distinguit. (P. 590, n. 8.)
  11. Lit. Magistri, c. 4. Vide infra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. seq. et a. 3. q. 1. — Superius post quandocumque aliqui cod. U supplet habitus. (P. 590, n. 9.)
    The Master's text, c. 4. See below d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. and following, and a. 3. q. 1. — Above, after quandocumque aliqui codex U supplies habitus. (P. 590, n. 9.)
  12. Vide II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo superius pro virtutibus edd. habitibus; et dein sed pro nisi. Paulo inferius pro propter edd. per. Post igitur pro igitur, quod codd. A V exhibent, sed uti edd. abest, alii codd. sibi. (P. 591, n. 1.)
    See II Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. — A little above, for virtutibus the editions [read] habitibus; and then sed for nisi. A little below, for propter the editions [read] per. After igitur, for igitur, which codices A V exhibit but which is absent as in the editions, other codices [read] sibi. (P. 591, n. 1.)
  13. Vers. 4 seqq. — Augustini sententia, in qua pro affirmaverim primum codd., edd. 1, 2 et Supplement. Sum. III. collat. 57. a. 1. exhibent affirmaverint, et pro quodam vario affectu Vat. et edd. 1, 2 substituerunt quaternario affectu, habetur I. de Morib. Eccles. cathol. c. 18. n. 15. (P. 591, n. 2.)
    Verses 4 and following. — Augustine's sentence, in which for affirmaverim first the codices, editions 1, 2 and the Supplement to the Summa III, collation 57. a. 1. exhibit affirmaverint, and for quodam vario affectu the Vatican [edition] and editions 1, 2 substituted quaternario affectu, is found in On the Morals of the Catholic Church I, c. 18. n. 15. (P. 591, n. 2.)
  14. Multi codd. hic et pluries infra ad se invicem, superius pro innuerent cod. A invenirentur et sequitur auctoritates ponere. (P. 591, n. 3.)
    Many codices here and frequently below [read] ad se invicem; above, for innuerent codex A [reads] invenirentur, and there follows auctoritates ponere. (P. 591, n. 3.)
  15. Cfr. I Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 2. ad 1. — Paulo ante pro quod habent codd. A H U Z bb, in aliis et edd. abest. (P. 591, n. 4.)
    Cf. I Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 2. ad 1. — A little before, for quod [thus read] codices A H U Z bb; in the others and in the editions it is absent. (P. 591, n. 4.)
  16. Cfr. infra d. 33. q. 1. seq. et II. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. — Quod deinde dicitur de Augustino confirmatur his verbis, quae sententiae eius supra laudatae praecedunt: Quae virtus ad beatam vitam nos ducit. Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. in corp., ubi etiam, quid vera virtus sit, explicatur. (P. 591, n. 5.)
    Cf. below d. 33. q. 1. and following, and II Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. in the body. — What is then said of Augustine is confirmed by these words, which precede his sentence praised above: "Which virtue leads us to the blessed life." Cf. above d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. in the body, where also what true virtue is, is explained. (P. 591, n. 5.)
  17. Pro Est et hic cod. A Est etenim, cod. F Et secundum hoc est, cod. V Et propterea est, cod. bb (a secunda manu) Est adhuc. (P. 591, n. 6.)
    For Est et hic codex A [reads] Est etenim, codex F Et secundum hoc est, codex V Et propterea est, codex bb (by a second hand) Est adhuc. (P. 591, n. 6.)
  18. Post Unde Vat. interiicit quia, et mox omittit et ante quia caritas. (P. 591, n. 7.)
    After Unde the Vatican [edition] inserts quia, and soon omits et before quia caritas. (P. 591, n. 7.)
  19. Vat. sicut. Paulo post pro virium codd. A K U virtutum, cod. V habituum. (P. 591, n. 8.)
    The Vatican [edition reads] sicut. A little after, for virium codices A K U [read] virtutum, codex V habituum. (P. 591, n. 8.)
  20. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 171, nota 3. — Paulo ante pro et movet cod. V verbo dicendo. (P. 591, n. 9.)
    Cf. vol. II, p. 171, note 3. — A little before, for et movet codex V [reads] verbo dicendo. (P. 591, n. 9.)
  21. Vide infra d. 36. q. 6. — Quae hic proponuntur, Guliel. Mara, hic q. 1. explicat, exemplum adducens de metaphysica, quae licet scientia sit distincta ab aliis, tamen propter communitatem sui obiecti influit in alias scientias ipsisque impertit perfectionem. « Ita est, inquit Mara, et in virtutibus, quod illa virtus, quae maxime habet rationem finis, est virtus per se, et tamen imperat et ponit motivum et formam in omnibus; haec est caritas, cuius obiectum est bonum divinum... Ratio autem, quare imperat omnibus [est], quia voluntas, quae est subiectum caritatis, imperat omnibus potentiis; ita et eius habitus. item, sicut est in artibus, quod quanto magis ars appropinquat fini, imperat artibus [aliis], sicut ars militaris, quae est propinqua victoriae, imperat arti... sellariae et huiusmodi; sic est de caritate, quae, [quia] est fini propinquior, omnibus virtutibus imperat ». (P. 592, n. 1.)
    See below d. 36. q. 6. — What is here proposed, William of Mare here q. 1. explains, adducing the example of metaphysics, which though it be a science distinct from the others, nevertheless on account of the community of its object flows into the other sciences and imparts perfection to them. "So it is also," says Mare, "in the virtues, that that virtue which most has the character of an end is virtue per se, and yet commands and places the motive and form in all; this is charity, whose object is the divine good... But the reason why it commands all [is], because the will, which is the subject of charity, commands all the powers; so also its disposition. Likewise, as it is in the arts, that the more an art approaches the end, it commands [the other] arts, as the military art, which is near to victory, commands the art of saddlery and the like; so it is concerning charity, which, [because] it is nearer to the end, commands all the virtues." (P. 592, n. 1.)
  22. Intellige: in fundamentis. (P. 592, n. 2.)
    Understand: in the fundamenta [the Sed contra arguments]. (P. 592, n. 2.)
  23. Cod. Z supplet virtutum. Aliquanto inferius pro perficitur Vat. et nonnulli codd. perficit. (P. 592, n. 3.)
    Codex Z supplies virtutum. Somewhat below, for perficitur the Vatican [edition] and some codices [read] perficit. (P. 592, n. 3.)
  24. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3. — Paulo ante pro si in tribus, quod habent codd. N aa, codd. U Z et in tribus, codd. K O sic in tribus, alii cum edd. sed in tribus. Paulo inferius pro ab invicem, quod habent codd. T bb, in aliis ad invicem. (P. 592, n. 4.)
    Cf. II Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3. — A little before, for si in tribus, which codices N aa have, codices U Z [read] et in tribus, codices K O sic in tribus, the others with the editions sed in tribus. A little below, for ab invicem, which codices T bb have, in the others ad invicem. (P. 592, n. 4.)
  25. Cfr. infra a. 2. q. 1, ubi et triplex genus causae exponitur, quod in seq. solut. memoratur. De praedicatione causali vide supra pag. 328, nota 5. — Paulo superius pro dat eis edd. cum non paucis codd. perperam dat ei. (P. 592, n. 5.)
    Cf. below a. 2. q. 1, where also the threefold genus of cause is set forth, which is recalled in the following solution. On causal predication see above p. 328, note 5. — A little above, for dat eis the editions with not a few codices wrongly [read] dat ei. (P. 592, n. 5.)
  26. Vide infra q. 3. seq. et dub. 1. — Post pauca pro quae est una edd. qui est una. (P. 592, n. 6.)
    See below q. 3. and following, and dub. 1. — After a little, for quae est una the editions [read] qui est una. (P. 592, n. 6.)
  27. Cfr. supra pag. 18, nota 5 et pag. 171, nota 7. (P. 592, n. 7.)
    Cf. above p. 18, note 5 and p. 171, note 7. (P. 592, n. 7.)
  28. Libr. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 27. n. 1. — Paulo superius pro ad illam et in illa, ut etiam in Vat. legitur, aliae edd. cum codd. exhibent ad illa et in illis, quae lectio, etsi minus congrua, intelligi posset de duobus mandatis unius caritatis. In fine solut. pro acceptionem edd. acceptationem. (P. 592, n. 8.)
    Book II of the Homilies on the Gospel, homily 27. n. 1. — A little above, for ad illam et in illa, as is also read in the Vatican [edition], the other editions with the codices exhibit ad illa et in illis, which reading, though less fitting, could be understood of the two commandments of the one charity. At the end of the solution, for acceptionem the editions [read] acceptationem. (P. 592, n. 8.)
  29. Sive per negationem. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 87, nota 4. — De virtute cardinali vide infra d. 33. q. 1. seqq. — Proxime ante multi codd. omittunt virtutum. (P. 592, n. 9.)
    That is, by negation. Cf. vol. I, p. 87, note 4. — On cardinal virtue see below d. 33. q. 1. and following. — Immediately before, many codices omit virtutum. (P. 592, n. 9.)
  30. Codd. A K T sed etiam. Paulo superius ante praemio codd. U V Z repetunt in. Aliquanto inferius pro per se sola codd. A Z bb habent per se solam, et subinde cod. A voculae sed subiicit etiam. (P. 593, n. 1.)
    Codices A K T [read] sed etiam. A little above, before praemio codices U V Z repeat in. Somewhat below, for per se sola codices A Z bb have per se solam, and thereupon codex A adds etiam to the little word sed. (P. 593, n. 1.)
  31. Cfr. infra d. 33. q. 1. ad 1. et d. 36. q. 1. (P. 593, n. 2.)
    Cf. below d. 33. q. 1. ad 1. and d. 36. q. 1. (P. 593, n. 2.)
← Dist. 27, Divisio TextusDist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 2→