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Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 27

Textus Latinus
p. 593

Quaestio II. Utrum habitus caritatis sit unus indivisus, an per species multiplicatus.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum habitus caritatis sit unus indivisus, an per species multiplicatus. Et quod habeat per species multiplicari, videtur:

1. Primo per obiecta: quoniam circa diversa volita et obiecta diversae sunt voluntates; sicut enim vult Augustinus3, voluntates diversificantur secundum volita; sed caritas est amor Dei et proximi: si ergo Deus et proximus distant distantia infinita, necesse est, habitum regulantem animum ad amandum Deum et amandum proximum esse alium et alium.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per praecepta: quia, ubi sunt diversa praecepta, diversi sunt habitus habilitantes animam ad illa praecepta implenda, maxime cum ipsis praeceptis praecipiuntur opera virtutum: si ergo circa actum caritatis duo consistunt mandata4, videtur, quod virtus caritatis non sit una.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per modos diligendi: alius enim est modus diligendi Deum quam diligendi proximum — Deum enim debet unusquisque diligere plus quam se et ex toto corde, sed proximum sicut se ipsum et ex parte5 — si ergo habitus virtutis datur ad modificandum actum, cum p. 594 alius et alius sit hinc et inde modus, alius et alius erit hinc et inde habitus.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per simile: quia sapientia, quae est de aeternis, alius est habitus et aliud donum quam scientia, quae est de temporalibus6: et similiter latria, quae est cultus Dei, est alia virtus quam dulia, quae est honor proximi: ergo pari ratione alia et alia virtus erit, qua diligitur proximus, et qua diligitur Deus.

5. Item, plus differt vita activa a contemplativa, quam differant operationes eiusdem vitae ad se invicem: ergo similiter plus differt virtus, quae dirigit hominem ad vitam contemplativam, ab ea quae dirigit ad vitam activam, quam duae virtutes, quae dirigunt ad vitam contemplativam. Sed caritas, secundum quod est amor Dei, dirigit ad vitam contemplativam, prout est amor proximi, ad vitam activam: cum ergo caritas, secundum quod est amor Dei, differat a fide7, licet utraque harum sit virtus dirigens ad vitam contemplativam; videtur multo fortius, quod amor Dei et proximi ab invicem distinguuntur.

6. Item, amor amicitiae et amor concupiscentiae sunt diversae species amoris8; sed caritas amat Deum amore concupiscentiae, quia facit Deum desiderare et appetere, proximum vero amore amicitiae: si ergo illae sunt diversae affectiones et diversae dilectiones, videtur, quod virtus caritatis habeat multiplicari per species.

Sed contra: 1. Sicut una est summa Veritas, sic una est summa Bonitas; et sicut fides omnino assentit summae Veritati et propter illam credit quidquid credit, sic caritas omnino adhaeret summae Bonitati et propter illam amat quidquid amat: ergo sicut fides est una virtus et unus habitus respectu credendorum9, ita et caritas respectu amandorum.

2. Item, sicut se habet rationalis ad verum, et irascibilis ad arduum, sic se habet concupiscibilis ad bonum10; et sicut aliae duae vires habent unitatem in se, sic et ipsa concupiscibilis; sed rationalis in credendo verum non habet perfici nisi una virtute, similiter et irascibilis in exspectando arduum: ergo similiter videtur, quod concupiscibilis in amando bonum non habeat nisi unam solam virtutem. Sed haec est caritas: ergo etc.

3. Item, quanto aliquid est magis unitivum, tanto magis habet in se unitatem; sed virtus caritatis inter ceteras virtutes est praecipue unitiva, cum ipsa sit vinculum perfectionis, sicut dicitur ad Colossenses tertio11: ergo videtur, quod caritas inter ceteras virtutes teneat unitatem: ergo non habet subdividi per alias species.

4. Item, in omni genere, in quo contingit reperire ordinem motorum, necesse est esse statum in uno12; sed caritas omnibus virtutibus animae imperat et omnes movet, tam theologicas quam cardinales: ergo necesse est, ipsam habere unitatem: non ergo multiplicatur per species.

Conclusio. Habitus caritatis est unus atque indivisus secundum speciem, licet secundum numerum multiplicetur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod habitus caritatis est unus et indivisus secundum speciem, licet secundum numerum plurificetur in diversis. — In diversis enim animabus plures sunt caritates, cum habitus et accidentia numerentur penes subiecta13. In omnibus autem, in quibus est, est una caritas secundum speciem, propter hoc quod unitas habitus venit ab unitate obiecti et actus principalis; et hoc quidem est reperire in caritate, si quis diligenter velit attendere. — Actus enim caritatis est diligere, diligere autem idem est, quod velle bonum14. Cum ergo caritas diligit aliquem, bonum optat ei quem diligit; istud autem bonum, quod caritas optat, unum solum est, videlicet bonum aeternum et bonum summum. Istud autem summum bonum aliquando homo per caritatem optat Deo, aliquando sibi, aliquando proximo. Secundum quod optat ipsum ipsi Deo, dicitur diligere Deum, quia vult, quod ipse Deus sit summum bonum et quod habeat omne bonum per essentiam. Secundum quod optat illud proximo, sic dicitur diligere proximum, quia vult, quod habeat illud bonum per gratiam et gloriam. Secundum quod optat illud sibi, sic dicitur diligere se ipsum. — Generaliter ergo in actu dilectionis ipsius caritatis unum est bonum optatum, licet multa sint, quibus illud bonum optatur; et illud est obiectum15 prinp. 595cipale ipsius habitus diligendi, quoniam ipsum propter se optatur a caritate, ita quod habet rationem obiecti principaliter moventis et finis quietantis. Et quia illud est unum solum, sive comparetur ad se, sive comparetur ad eum qui habet caritatem, sive comparetur ad eius proximum; hinc est, quod caritatis habitus habet esse unus16. — Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod obiecta sunt diversa; iam patet responsio: quia, licet caritas diligat proximum, tamen proximus non est principale obiectum, sed est illud, ad quod principale obiectum caritatis comparatur. Quia enim proximus est imago Dei et capax ipsius Dei17; ideo virtus caritatis, quae desiderat, summum Bonum haberi ab omni eo qui potest ipsum habere et ipso frui, appetit, summum Bonum a proximo haberi, sicut et ab eo, in quo est; et hoc non est aliud quam amare proximum per caritatis affectum. Et si tu obiicias, quod caritas non tantum facit, quod homo velit proximo bonum, quod Deus est, sed etiam omne aliud bonum: dicendum, quod hoc non est principaliter et elicitive, sed quasi consequenter et imperative; et hoc manifestabitur infra18 magis aperte, cum agetur de his quae sunt diligenda ex caritate.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod duo sunt praecepta caritatis; dicendum, quod illa duo praecepta non sunt diversa formaliter, sed solum materialiter, quia « unum illorum clauditur in altero », secundum quod Magister dicit in littera19: et propter hoc non sequitur, quod habitus caritatis diversificetur secundum formam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de diversitate modorum, dicendum, quod diversitas illorum20 modorum est ex diversitate comparationum illius summi Boni, quod potest diligi vel optari sibi ipsi, et potest optari creaturae, quae nata est in ipso beatificari: unde diversitas illorum modorum non venit ex diversitate principalis obiecti, sed ex varia comparatione ipsius. Et propterea non sequitur, quod sit diversitas in virtute modificante, quia diversitas comparationis obiecti non sufficit ad faciendum habitum diversificari21.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de sapientia et scientia, latria et dulia; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia sapientia negotiatur de aeternis secundum rationes aeternas, et scientia de temporalibus secundum rationes temporales; et ideo diversas rationes habent, secundum quas diriguntur et in actibus suis regulantur22. Sed caritas unam solam habet rationem moventem, videlicet ipsam summam Bonitatem, quae cum sit summe amabilis, et prout est in se et prout participatur a creatura, utroque modo caritas eam amat, et sic habet unam rationem motivam; et propterea non debet sic diversificari sicut sapientia et scientia. — Eodem modo dicendum est de latria et de dulia, sicut in praecedentibus est ostensum distinctione nona23.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de differentia contemplativae et activae, dicendum, quod contemplativa et activa vita nominat statum sive virtutis exercitium; diversitas autem status vel exercitii non inducit diversitatem in habitu, sed diversitas principalis obiecti24. Unde eaedem virtutes secundum diversos status et diversum exercitium dirigunt hominem in utraque vita, sicut fides dirigit hominem in contemplationem et operationem. Propter hoc non sequitur, quod caritas, eo quod ad activam vitam et contemplativam dirigat et habilitet, sit virtus duplex.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de amore amicitiae et concupiscentiae, dicendum, quod sicut dictum est in praecedentibus25 de actu confidentiae et exspectationis, quod unus habet ex altero oriri, et unus alium quodam modo includit; sic amor amicitiae quodam modo includit amorem concupiscentiae. Qui enim est amicus alii, optat ei aliquod bonum: et dum optat ei illud bonum, et ipsum bonum optatum facit concupiscere et eidem facit adhaerere. Unde sicut spes innititur summae Immensitati sive Potestati, sic caritas adhaeret et adhaerere facit summae Bonitati; et iste est eius actus primus et unicus, ex quo oritur et in quo includitur amor concupiscentiae et amor amicitiae. Et propterea, sicut spes non diversificatur propter actum confidentiae et exspectationis, sic nec caritas propter actum amicitiae et concupiscentiae. — Quod autem adhaerere Deo sit actus caritatis principalis, Augustinus satis expresse dicit in libro de Moribus Ecclesiae26, et Apop. 596stolus primae ad Corinthios sexto: Qui adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus est; et Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus: « Amorem sive divinum, sive naturalem, sive intellectualem unitivam quandam dicimus virtutem ». Et quia unum est illud bonum, cui principaliter caritas unit; hinc est, quod habitus caritatis unitatem habet, sicut prius ostensum est1.

English Translation

Question II. Whether the habit of charity is one and indivisible, or multiplied according to species.

Secondly it is asked whether the habit of charity is one and indivisible, or multiplied according to species. And that it is multiplied according to species, it seems:

1. First, from its objects: since with respect to diverse things-willed and objects the acts of will are diverse; for as Augustine holds3, acts of will are diversified according to the things willed; but charity is the love of God and of neighbor: if therefore God and neighbor are separated by an infinite distance, the habit regulating the mind to loving God and to loving neighbor must of necessity be one and another.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown from the precepts: for where there are diverse precepts, there are diverse habits fitting the soul to fulfill those precepts, especially since by the precepts themselves the works of the virtues are commanded: if therefore concerning the act of charity there stand two commandments4, it seems that the virtue of charity is not one.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown from the modes of loving: for the mode of loving God is one thing, and of loving neighbor another — for each one ought to love God more than himself and with his whole heart, but his neighbor as himself and in part5 — if therefore the habit of virtue is given for modifying the act, since the mode is one and another on this side and on that, the habit too will be one and another on this side and on that.

4. Likewise, this same thing is shown from a parallel: for wisdom, which is about eternal things, is one habit and one gift, and knowledge, which is about temporal things, is another6: and likewise latria, which is the worship of God, is one virtue, and dulia, which is the honor of neighbor, is another: therefore by parallel reasoning the virtue by which the neighbor is loved, and that by which God is loved, will be one and another.

5. Likewise, the active life differs from the contemplative more than the operations of the same life differ from one another: therefore likewise the virtue which directs a man to the contemplative life differs from that which directs to the active life more than two virtues which direct to the contemplative life. But charity, insofar as it is the love of God, directs to the contemplative life, and insofar as it is the love of neighbor, to the active life: since therefore charity, insofar as it is the love of God, differs from faith7, although each of these is a virtue directing to the contemplative life; it seems much more strongly that the love of God and of neighbor are distinguished from one another.

6. Likewise, the love of friendship and the love of concupiscence are diverse species of love8; but charity loves God with the love of concupiscence, because it makes God desired and sought after, but the neighbor with the love of friendship: if therefore those are diverse affections and diverse acts of love, it seems that the virtue of charity is multiplied according to species.

On the contrary: 1. As there is one supreme Truth, so there is one supreme Goodness; and as faith wholly assents to the supreme Truth and on account of it believes whatever it believes, so charity wholly adheres to the supreme Goodness and on account of it loves whatever it loves: therefore as faith is one virtue and one habit with respect to things to be believed9, so also is charity with respect to things to be loved.

2. Likewise, as the rational [power] stands to the true, and the irascible to the arduous, so the concupiscible stands to the good10; and as the other two powers have unity in themselves, so too the concupiscible itself; but the rational in believing the true is perfected only by one virtue, and likewise the irascible in awaiting the arduous: therefore likewise it seems that the concupiscible in loving the good has only one single virtue. But this is charity: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the more unitive a thing is, the more it has unity in itself; but the virtue of charity among the other virtues is preeminently unitive, since it is the bond of perfection, as is said in the third chapter to the Colossians11: therefore it seems that charity among the other virtues holds unity: therefore it is not to be subdivided into other species.

4. Likewise, in every genus in which it happens to find an order of movers, there must of necessity be a stopping-point in one12; but charity commands all the virtues of the soul and moves them all, both theological and cardinal: therefore it is necessary that it have unity: it is not therefore multiplied according to species.

Conclusion. The habit of charity is one and indivisible according to species, although it is multiplied according to number.

I respond: It must be said that the habit of charity is one and indivisible according to species, although according to number it is multiplied in diverse [subjects]. — For in diverse souls there are several charities, since habits and accidents are numbered according to their subjects13. But in all in whom it exists, charity is one according to species, on account of this, that the unity of the habit comes from the unity of the object and of the principal act; and this indeed is to be found in charity, if one is willing to attend diligently. — For the act of charity is to love, and to love is the same as to will the good14. When therefore charity loves someone, it wishes the good for him whom it loves; but this good which charity wishes is one only, namely the eternal good and the supreme good. But this supreme good a man sometimes through charity wishes to God, sometimes to himself, sometimes to his neighbor. Insofar as he wishes it to God himself, he is said to love God, because he wills that God himself be the supreme good and that he have every good by essence. Insofar as he wishes it to his neighbor, he is so said to love his neighbor, because he wills that he have that good through grace and glory. Insofar as he wishes it to himself, he is so said to love himself. — Generally, therefore, in the act of love of charity itself the good wished is one, although there be many to whom that good is wished; and that is the principal object15 of the very habit of loving, since it is wished for its own sake by charity, so that it has the character of the object that principally moves and of the end that brings rest. And because that is one only, whether it be compared to itself, or compared to him who has charity, or compared to his neighbor; hence it is that the habit of charity is one16. — And the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that the objects are diverse; the answer is now clear: for although charity loves the neighbor, yet the neighbor is not the principal object, but is that to which the principal object of charity is compared. For because the neighbor is the image of God and capable of God himself17; therefore the virtue of charity, which desires that the supreme Good be had by everyone who can have it and enjoy it, seeks that the supreme Good be had by the neighbor, just as also by him in whom it is; and this is nothing other than to love the neighbor by the affection of charity. And if you object that charity does not only bring it about that a man wills for his neighbor the good which is God, but also every other good: it must be said that this is not principally and elicitively, but as it were consequently and imperatively; and this will be shown below18 more openly, when it shall be treated of those things which are to be loved out of charity.

2. To that which is objected, that there are two precepts of charity; it must be said that those two precepts are not diverse formally, but only materially, because « one of them is contained in the other », as the Master says in the text19: and on account of this it does not follow that the habit of charity is diversified according to form.

3. To that which is objected concerning the diversity of modes, it must be said that the diversity of those20 modes is from the diversity of the comparisons of that supreme Good, which can be loved or wished for itself, and can be wished for the creature, which is born to be beatified in it: hence the diversity of those modes does not come from the diversity of the principal object, but from the varied comparison of it. And therefore it does not follow that there is diversity in the modifying virtue, because diversity of the comparison of the object does not suffice to make the habit be diversified21.

4. To that which is objected concerning wisdom and knowledge, latria and dulia; it must be said that it is not the same case: for wisdom deals with eternal things according to eternal accounts, and knowledge with temporal things according to temporal accounts; and therefore they have diverse accounts, according to which they are directed and in their acts regulated22. But charity has one single moving account, namely the supreme Goodness itself, which, since it is supremely lovable, both as it is in itself and as it is participated by the creature, in both ways charity loves it, and thus has one motive account; and therefore it ought not to be diversified as wisdom and knowledge are. — In the same manner it must be said of latria and of dulia, as was shown in what preceded, in the ninth distinction23.

5. To that which is objected concerning the difference of the contemplative and the active, it must be said that the contemplative and the active life name a state or exercise of virtue; but diversity of state or of exercise does not induce diversity in the habit, but [only] diversity of the principal object24. Hence the same virtues according to diverse states and diverse exercise direct a man in either life, just as faith directs a man in contemplation and in operation. On account of this it does not follow that charity, because it directs and fits one to the active and to the contemplative life, is a twofold virtue.

6. To that which is last objected concerning the love of friendship and of concupiscence, it must be said that, as was said in what preceded25 concerning the act of confidence and of expectation, that one has to arise from the other, and one in some way includes the other; so the love of friendship in some way includes the love of concupiscence. For he who is a friend to another wishes him some good: and while he wishes him that good, he also makes the good itself wished for to be desired and makes him cling to it. Hence as hope rests upon the supreme Immensity or Power, so charity adheres and makes one adhere to the supreme Goodness; and this is its first and only act, from which arises and in which is included the love of concupiscence and the love of friendship. And therefore, as hope is not diversified on account of the act of confidence and of expectation, so neither is charity on account of the act of friendship and of concupiscence. — But that to adhere to God is the principal act of charity, Augustine says quite expressly in the book On the Morals of the Church26, and the Apostle in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, the sixth [chapter]: He who adheres to God is one spirit; and Dionysius in On the Divine Names: « Love, whether divine, or natural, or intellectual, we call a certain unitive power ». And because that good is one, to which charity principally unites; hence it is that the habit of charity has unity, as was shown before1.

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vide supra pag. 368, nota 1, et l. de Lib. Arb. c. 12. n. 25. — De minore cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. et infra dub. 1. — In hoc arg. Vat. bis voci voluntates adiungit vel virtutes. (P. 593, n. 3.)
    See above p. 368, note 1, and the book On Free Choice c. 12, n. 25. — On the minor [premise] cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2, and below dub. 1. — In this argument the Vatican [edition] twice adds to the word voluntates the words vel virtutes. (P. 593, n. 3.)
  2. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. et Comment. hic dub. 2. — Circa initium arg. Vat. cum nonnullis codd. ante diversi inserit ibi. Deinde pro cum ipsis codd. G H V Z exhibent cum illis, cod. A cum illis ipsis. (P. 593, n. 4.)
    See here the text of the Master, c. 2, and the Commentary here, dub. 2. — Near the beginning of the argument the Vatican [edition], with some codices, inserts ibi before diversi. Then for cum ipsis codices G H V Z give cum illis, codex A cum illis ipsis. (P. 593, n. 4.)
  3. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. et 5, et Comment. infra d. 29. passim. — Paulo inferius pro modificandum [cfr. supra pag. 388, nota 2.] edd. 1, 2 et Supplementum Sum. Alex. Hal., collat. 57. a. 5. movendum. (P. 593, n. 5.)
    Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2 and 5, and the Commentary below at d. 29, throughout. — A little below, for modificandum [cf. above p. 388, note 2] editions 1 and 2 and the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 57 a. 5, read movendum. (P. 593, n. 5.)
  4. Vide infra d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. I. et d. 35. q. I. seq. De latria et dulia cfr. supra d. 9. a. 2. q. 4. — Mox pro honor proximi multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 amor proximi; peram. (P. 594, n. 1.)
    See below d. 34 p. 1 a. 2 q. 1, and d. 35 q. 1 and following. On latria and dulia cf. above d. 9 a. 2 q. 4. — Presently, for honor proximi many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] amor proximi; wrongly. (P. 594, n. 1.)
  5. Vide quaest. praeced. (P. 594, n. 2.)
    See the preceding question. (P. 594, n. 2.)
  6. Cfr. Aristot., II. Prior. c. 22. (c. 24.), ubi docetur, quod amor amicitiae et concupiscentiae se habeant sicut finis et ea quae sunt ad finem. (P. 594, n. 3.)
    Cf. Aristotle, Prior [Analytics] II c. 22 (c. 24), where it is taught that the love of friendship and of concupiscence are related as the end and the things which are toward the end. (P. 594, n. 3.)
  7. Ut dictum est supra d. 23. a. I. q. 3. — Superius pro et sicut fides edd. quia sicut fides. (P. 594, n. 4.)
    As was said above d. 23 a. 1 q. 3. — Higher up, for et sicut fides the editions [read] quia sicut fides. (P. 594, n. 4.)
  8. Cfr. pag. 579, nota 9. (P. 594, n. 5.)
    Cf. p. 579, note 9. (P. 594, n. 5.)
  9. Vers. 14. — Idem insinuat auctor libri de Causis in proposit. 17, ubi docet, quod « quanto plus [virtus] approximat uni puro et vero, fit vehementior eius unitas ». — Paulo post pro per alias cod. A in alias. (P. 594, n. 6.)
    Verse 14. — The same is hinted by the author of the Book of Causes in proposition 17, where he teaches that « the more [a power] approaches the one, pure, and true, the more vehement its unity becomes ». — A little after, for per alias codex A [reads] in alias. (P. 594, n. 6.)
  10. Vide Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 3. seqq. (c. 1.), et II. Metaph. text. 5. seqq. (l. brevior, c. 2.); cfr. etiam supra pag. 307, nota 3. — De minori vide supra pag. 592, nota 1. (P. 594, n. 7.)
    See Aristotle, Physics VII text 3 ff. (c. 1), and Metaphysics II text 5 ff. (the shorter book, c. 2); cf. also above p. 307, note 3. — On the minor [premise] see above p. 592, note 1. (P. 594, n. 7.)
  11. Cfr. supra pag. 192, nota 2, et tom. II. pag. 119, nota 8. Cfr. etiam quae supra in lit. Magistri, d. XXIII. c. 6. de fide dicuntur. — Paulo superius edd. omittunt in diversis post plurificetur. (P. 594, n. 8.)
    Cf. above p. 192, note 2, and tome II p. 119, note 8. Cf. also what is said above in the text of the Master, d. XXIII c. 6, concerning faith. — A little higher up the editions omit in diversis after plurificetur. (P. 594, n. 8.)
  12. Ut docet Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 574, nota 5. (P. 594, n. 9.)
    As Aristotle teaches, on whom see above p. 574, note 5. (P. 594, n. 9.)
  13. Pro obiectum codd. A K et Supplementum Sum. Alex. Hal., collat. 57. a. 5, exhibent bonum. In enuntiato seq. post est unum cod. G supplet obiectum. (P. 594, n. 10.)
    For obiectum codices A K and the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 57 a. 5, give bonum. In the following statement, after est unum codex G supplies obiectum. (P. 594, n. 10.)
  14. Cfr. supra d. 23. a. I. q. 3. et d. 26. a. I. q. 2. — Vat. unius. (P. 595, n. 1.)
    Cf. above d. 23 a. 1 q. 3 and d. 26 a. 1 q. 2. — The Vatican [edition reads] unius. (P. 595, n. 1.)
  15. August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11: Eo quippe ipso [mens] imago eius est, quo eius capax est eiusque particeps esse potest. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 80, nota 4, II. Sent. d. 16. per totam. (P. 595, n. 2.)
    Augustine, On the Trinity XIV c. 8 n. 11: « By this very thing [the mind] is his image, that it is capable of him and can be a partaker of him ». Cf. tome I p. 80, note 4; II Sent. d. 16, throughout. (P. 595, n. 2.)
  16. Dist. 28. q. I. seqq. Cfr. etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. (P. 595, n. 3.)
    Distinction 28, q. 1 and following. Cf. also here the text of the Master, c. 3. (P. 595, n. 3.)
  17. Hic c. 7. Cfr. infra dub. 2. (P. 595, n. 4.)
    Here c. 7. Cf. below, dub. 2. (P. 595, n. 4.)
  18. Codd. A K illa. (P. 595, n. 5.)
    Codices A K [read] illa. (P. 595, n. 5.)
  19. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. (P. 595, n. 6.)
    See here the text of the Master, c. 5. (P. 595, n. 6.)
  20. Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. ad 2. et 3. — Pro diriguntur cod. G distinguuntur. (P. 595, n. 7.)
    Cf. above d. 23, a. 1, q. 3, ad 2 and 3. — For diriguntur ("are directed") cod. G [reads] distinguuntur ("are distinguished"). (P. 595, n. 7.)
  21. Art. 2. q. 4. — Superius pro a creatura edd. in creatura. (P. 595, n. 8.)
    Art. 2, q. 4. — Above, for a creatura ("by the creature") the editions [read] in creatura ("in the creature"). (P. 595, n. 8.)
  22. Ex eodem principio S. Doctor, II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. deducit, distinctionem intellectus in speculativum et practicum non esse nisi secundum diversitatem status. (P. 595, n. 9.)
    From the same principle the Holy Doctor, II Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, deduces that the distinction of the intellect into speculative and practical is only according to the diversity of state. (P. 595, n. 9.)
  23. Dist. 26. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1. et a. 2. q. 3. ad 3. — Paulo inferius post et dum optat codd. G H I L T V Z aa (bb a secunda manu) nec non edd. 1, 2 et Supplementum Sum. Alex. Hal. non repetunt ei. (P. 595, n. 10.)
    Dist. 26, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1 and a. 2, q. 3, ad 3. — A little below, after et dum optat the codices G H I L T V Z aa (bb by a second hand), as well as editions 1, 2 and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, do not repeat ei. (P. 595, n. 10.)
  24. Libr. I. c. 14. n. 24: Nam quid erit aliud optimum hominis, nisi cui adhaerere est beatissimum? Id autem est solus Deus, cui haerere certe non valemus nisi dilectione, amore, caritate. Ibid. c. 16. n. 26: Nam enim Paulus tantum dicit, Deo nos esse debere subunctos, ita ut in medio quod separet nihil sit [Rom. 8, 35.]? Nonne et Propheta commodissime hoc et brevissime significat, cum dicit: Mihi autem adhaerere Deo bonum est [Ps. 72, 28.]. (P. 595, n. 11.)
    Book I, c. 14, n. 24: For what else will be the best of man, save that to which to adhere is most blessed? But that is God alone, to whom indeed we cannot cling save by love, by affection, by charity. Ibid., c. 16, n. 26: For does not Paul say only that we ought to be joined to God, so that there be nothing in between to separate us [Rom. 8:35]? Does not the Prophet too most aptly and most briefly signify this when he says: But for me to adhere to God is good [Ps. 72:28]. (P. 595, n. 11.)
  25. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. (P. 596, n. 1.)
    See the scholion to the preceding question. (P. 596, n. 1.)
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