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Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 27

Textus Latinus
p. 596

Quaestio III. Utrum habitus caritatis sit mere gratuitus, an aliquid addat ultra gratiam, sicut habitus aliarum virtutum.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum habitus caritatis sit mere gratuitus, an aliquid addat ultra gratiam, sicut habitus aliarum virtutum. Et quod sit idem caritas omnino quod gratia, nihil addens ultra, videtur:

1. Per illud quod dicit Ambrosius2: « Caritas est mater omnium virtutum, quia omnes informat, sine qua nulla est vera virtus »; sed esse formam virtutum gratuitarum, secundum quod gratuitae sunt, est proprium ipsius gratiae gratum facientis: ergo si hoc competit ipsi caritati, videtur, quod in nullo differat a gratia.

2. Item, Augustinus decimo quinto de Trinitate3 dicit, quod « excellentissimum inter dona Dei est caritas »; sed gratia gratum faciens est excellentior quam gratia gratis data: ergo videtur, quod si caritas est excellentissima inter cetera dona, quod ipsa sit mere et pure gratia gratum faciens, nihil habens ultra.

3. Item, Hugo de sancto Victore, in libro de Arrha sponsae4: « Scio, anima mea, quod amor est vita tua »; sed animam vivificare quantum ad esse moris est proprium ipsius gratiae gratum facientis: ergo videtur, quod caritas sit ipsa gratia mere et pure.

4. Item, facere gratum et acceptum Deo est proprie proprium ipsius gratiae5; sed caritas, eo ipso quod caritas est, reddit hominem Deo carum et acceptum et opus facit meritorium: ergo videtur, quod nihil aliud in se habeat, quod super gratiam gratum facientem aliquam additionem faciat, vel per quod a gratia differat.

5. Item, omnis habitus virtutum, qui aliquid addit super gratiam gratum facientem, aliquo modo manet cum culpa nec tollitur totaliter per peccatum; sed caritas omnino tollitur per culpam6: ergo nihil omnino addit super gratiam.

Contra:

1. Bernardus, de Amore Dei, capitulo secundo7: « Voluntas crescit in amorem, amor in caritatem et caritas in sapientiam »; et paulo post: « Nihil enim aliud est amor quam vehemens in bono voluntas; per se enim bona voluntas simplex est affectus ». Si ergo affectus vehemens est de essentia caritatis; et affectus huiusmodi aliud est quam gratia: ergo habitus caritatis addit aliquid ultra.

2. Item, nihil generale fit speciale nisi per aliquam additionem8; sed gratia generalis et communis est ad omnem virtutem, caritas autem est specialis virtus: ergo necesse est, caritatem aliquid addere ultra gratiam.

3. Item, habitus, qui continue est in actu suo, differens est ab eo qui non est continue in suo actu; sed gratia est continue in actu gratificandi9, caritas autem non est continue in actu suo, qui est diligere: ergo caritas et gratia aliquo modo differunt: aliquid igitur habet in se caritas, quod est a gratia diversum. Cum ergo sit habitus gratuitus, videtur, quod aliquid addat super ipsam gratiam.

4. Item, habitus aliarum virtutum dantur ipsis potentiis ad ipsarum expeditionem ultra gratiam gratum facientem10; sed vis concupiscibilis adeo indiget expediri, sicut rationalis, cum sit corrupta et infecta: si ergo virtus perficiens rationalem, ut fides, continet aliquid gratiae gratis datae; videtur pari ratione, immo multo fortiori, caritatem aliquid addere super gratiam gratum facientem.

5. Item, omnis habitus, qui per assuefactionem et frequentiam reddit potentiam faciliorem ad actum sine augmento gratiae gratum facientis, aliquid continet in se praeter gratiam gratum facientem; sed caritas est huiusmodi, sicut patet11: ergo caritas aliquid addit super gratiam. Prima probatur per hoc, p. 597quod tanto habitus est perfectior, quanto potentiam reddit faciliorem et expeditiorem ad actum. Si ergo habitus caritatis aliquo modo potest proficere, non proficiente gratia gratum faciente, necessario oportet ponere, quod differat ab ea.

### Conclusio. Caritas ultra gratiam gratum facientem dicit aliquem habitum, quo mediante ipsa potentia diligendi apta fit ad actum proprium; licet opposita sententia non careat probabilitate.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc est duplex modus dicendi.

Opinio I. Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod caritas est omnino idem cum gratia per essentiam, differens sola relatione. Dicitur enim gratia, in quantum respicit totam animam, caritas vero, in quantum regit et dirigit voluntatem. Tres rationes. Et hoc videtur significare ipsum caritatis nomen, et Apostolus videtur innuere, et ratio approbare. Prima. Nomen ipsum significare videtur: quia caritas dicitur a charis1, quod apud Graecos idem est quod gratia. Unde cum haec virtus non habeat aliam nominationem a gratia, non videtur, quod aliquid addat secundum rem. — Secunda. Apostolus2 autem insinuare videtur, cum eam ceteris virtutibus anteponit et superponit. Hoc enim non faceret, nisi magis pure haberet rationem boni. Et hoc ipsum ipsemet innuit, quod aliae virtutes possunt esse infructuosae et recipere admixtionem mali, caritas vero minime; et propterea videtur caritas secundum testimonium apostolicum esse mera et pura gratia gratum faciens, cum sit bonum purissimum et excellentissimum. — Tertia. Ratio etiam approbare videtur: quia, cum ipsa voluntas sit supremum in anima3, a qua pendet tota rectitudo virium inferiorum, et quae immediate unitur ipsi Deo; ideo vindicat sibi totum principium rectitudinis; et hinc est, quod gratia, quae perficit alias potentias animae, specialiori modo perficit voluntatem. Et propterea, licet alias potentias perficiat cum habitu gratiae gratis datae, ipsam4 potentiam diligendi perficit per se; et secundum quod illam perficit, sic caritas appellatur. — Et sic videtur satis rationabile dicere, quod gratia et caritas idem sunt per essentiam, differentes sola relatione. Et ratione illius relationis connumeratur cum aliis virtutibus et ab eis distinguitur et quodam modo specificatur. — Ad argg. Et per hoc declinari satis faciliter videntur5 rationes ad oppositum, quae ostendunt, quod caritas aliquid addat super gratiam. Non enim concludere videntur necessario, quod addat aliquid absolutum. Unde ad omnia illa inconvenientia declinanda sufficiens videtur dicere, quod addat solum respectum ad opus determinatum.

Opinio II. Est et alius modus dicendi, quod caritas ultra gratiam gratum facientem dicit aliquem habitum, quo mediante assuescit ipsa potentia diligendi ad actum proprium. Duae rationes. Et hoc quidem dicunt esse necessarium, tum propter essentialem differentiam, quae est inter alias virtutes et caritatem, quae quidem non potest esse per diversitatem, quae sit in gratia gratum faciente, cum ipsa sit una, sicut in secundo libro6 ostensum est; tum etiam propter actus ipsius specialitatem et difficultatem, respectu cuius requiritur habitus specificans et determinans gratiam ad talem usum et habilitans potentiam, ut exeat in actum suum. — Et auctoritas Bernardi. Et huic modo dicendi satis concordat auctoritas Bernardi, qua dicit in secundo capitulo7 de Amore Dei, quod « libera voluntas data est homini, quae, cum adiuvanti concordat gratiae, virtutis accipit profectum et nomen et amor efficitur: cum vero sibi dimissa se ipsa frui vult, sui in se ipsa patitur defectum, et quot vitia, tot vitiorum sortitur nomina, ut cupiditatis, avaritiae, luxuriae ». Ex ipso innuitur, quod aliquid est ex parte voluntatis nostrae, quod adveniente gratia fit virtus; et non est nisi virtus caritatis, de qua loquitur ibi: ergo habitus caritatis ultra gratiam secundum ipsum aliquid dicit. — Alia ratio. Satis etiam videtur haec positio consona rationi: quia, sicut fides concernit assensum8, sic caritas concernit affectum; et sicut cognitio aliquid est differens a gratia gratum faciente, sic etiam et dilectio; et sicut fides concernit cognitionem, ita caritas affectionem, secundum illud quod dicit Augustinus9: « Caritas est rectissima animi affectio, qua diligitur Deus propter se et proximus p. 598propter Deum ». Et idem ipsum dicitur in libro de Spiritu et anima circa principium1: « Ordinandi sunt animi affectus ad illud quod debent, ut in virtutes proficere possint ». Et paulo post: « Amor per odium sui proficit in amorem Dei et proximi ». Conclusio. Satis igitur videtur rationi consonum dicere, quod sicut virtus fidei aliquem habitum concernit praeter gratiam gratum facientem, sic et habitus caritatis. Et hoc satis videntur rationabiliter ostendere rationes ad istam partem adductae. Si quis igitur velit hanc partem sustinere, satis potest faciliter ad rationes, quae adducuntur in contrarium, respondere.

Solutio oppositorum:

Ad 1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur, quod caritas informat ceteras virtutes, quod est proprium ipsius gratiae; dicendum, quod est loqui de virtutibus quantum ad esse, et quantum ad bene esse, et quantum ad bene operari. Notandum. Si loquamur de virtutibus quantum ad esse, sic quaelibet virtus habet in se ipsa propriam formam, per quam distinguitur ab alia, ut fides a spe. Si autem loquamur de ipsis quantum ad bene esse, sic informantur a gratia, quae facit ipsas gratuitas et Deo acceptas. Si loquamur de virtutibus quantum ad bene operari, sic informantur a caritate, quae est pondus inclinans et faciens tendere operationes omnium virtutum ad bonum finem2. Et sic alio modo informat gratia, alio modo caritas; et propterea non sequitur, quod inter caritatem et gratiam nulla sit essentialis differentia.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas est donum excellentissimum; dicendum, quod quia caritas non separatur a gratia, quamvis aliquid addat ultra ipsam; ideo excellentia gratiae gratum facientis attribuitur caritati; et hinc est, quod sortitur etiam nomen gratiae et praeponitur omnibus virtutibus ab Apostolo quantum ad eius excellentiam et dignitatem. Et propterea non sequitur, quod ipsa nihil addat ultra gratiam, quia in illa comparatione non comparatur ad dona gratuita, secundum quod gratuita sunt, sed secundum quod sunt gratiae gratis datae; et in hoc illis praeponitur, quia nunquam caritas separatur a gratia, quamvis ab ea possint separari alia dona gratuita3; et ideo dicitur donum excellentissimum esse inter cetera.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amor est vita animi; dicendum, quod sicut in vita naturae vivere dicitur dupliciter: uno modo, prout est actus primus, alio modo, prout est actus secundus; et primo modo est ab animae essentia, et secundo modo ab animae potentia: sic intelligendum est in esse moris, quod vivere, prout est actus primus, est ab ipsa gratia vivificante ipsam animam totam; sed prout est actus secundus, est ab ipsa virtute. Et quamvis possit attribui omni virtuti gratuitae, utpote ipsi fidei, secundum illud quod dicitur ad Romanos primo4: Iustus ex fide vivit; potissime tamen attribuitur ipsi caritati propter magnam affinitatem, quam habet ad gratiam.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas reddit Deo acceptum et gratum; dicendum, quod hoc facit ratione gratiae; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod praecise sit gratia, quia caritas non tantummodo habet Deo acceptum reddere, sed etiam aliquam potentiam expedire et ad aliquem actum specialem et determinatum habilitare, ratione cuius aliquid addit ipsi gratiae, quod est ipsi gratiae substratum et materiale, sicut in praecedentibus5 ostensum fuit de fide.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas omnino destruitur per peccatum; dicendum, quod hoc non est, quia caritas nihil addat super gratiam gratum facientem, sed quia omne peccatum repugnat ipsi habitui substrato caritati. Notandum. Et ideo sicut fides totaliter tollitur per infidelitatem, quia non solum repugnat ei quantum ad id quod est in ea gratiae gratum facientis, sed etiam quantum ad habitum substratum6; per hunc modum intelligendum est, quod caritas tollitur per omne peccatum; illud autem in sequenti problemate clarius manifestabitur.

Scholion

I. De duplici opinione hic relata iam actum est II. Sent. d. 27. a. I. q. 2, ubi in scholio antiqui magistri pro utraque sententia stantes recensiti sunt (cfr. etiam ibid. d. 26. q. 5.). Licet in hac quaestione s. Doctor utramque opinionem exhibeat tanquam probabilem; ipse tamen revera sequitur secundam. Hinc explicite hic solvit argumenta ei opposita et in sequenti p. 599quaestione de prima opinione dicit, difficile esse eam sustinere, et loco II. libri cit. clare propriam opinionem manifestat. Notandum etiam, quod ibid. ad 6. asserit, in primo homine ante lapsum reapse amorem, quo Deus propter se et super omnia diligebatur, sine gratia habituali fuisse.

II. In solutione sequentis (4.) quaestionis supponitur, praeter habitum supernaturalem caritatis esse etiam amorem naturalem (sive acquisitum) in Deum, ut est auctor naturae, de quo cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 3, et praecipue II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. I. in corp. et ad 3.

III. Haec doctrina confirmatur reprobatione plurium erronearum propositionum, quas Baius ex fontibus novatorum saeculi XVI. hausit, inter quas est prop. 34: « Distinctio illa duplicis amoris, naturalis videlicet, quo Deus amatur ut auctor naturae, et gratuiti, quo Deus amatur ut beatificator, vana est et commentitia et ad illudendum sacris Litteris et plurimis veterum testimoniis excogitata » (cfr. prop. 36.). — Hinc idem Baius incidit in alium errorem reprobatum et ad hanc nostram quaestionem spectantem, scilicet prop. 32: « Caritas illa, quae est plenitudo Legis, non est semper coniuncta cum remissione peccatorum »; et prop. 31: « Caritas perfecta et sincera, quae est ex corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta, tam in catechumenis quam in poenitentibus, potest esse sine remissione peccatorum » (cfr. prop. 33. 70. 71.).

IV. De hac 4. quaestione praeter S. Thomam: B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med. rem tangit hic n. 9. q. 2.

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English Translation
p. 596

Question III. Whether the habit of charity is merely gratuitous, or adds something beyond grace, as the habit of the other virtues does.

Thirdly it is asked whether the habit of charity is merely gratuitous, or adds something beyond grace, as the habit of the other virtues does. And that charity is altogether the same as grace, adding nothing beyond, seems [to be the case]:

1. From what Ambrose says2: « Charity is the mother of all the virtues, because it informs them all, and without it there is no true virtue »; but to be the form of the gratuitous virtues, insofar as they are gratuitous, is proper to grace-making-pleasing [gratia gratum faciens] itself: therefore if this belongs to charity itself, it seems that it differs in nothing from grace.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the fifteenth book On the Trinity3 says that « the most excellent among the gifts of God is charity »; but grace-making-pleasing is more excellent than grace freely given [gratia gratis data]: therefore it seems that, if charity is the most excellent among the rest of the gifts, then it is merely and purely grace-making-pleasing, having nothing beyond.

3. Likewise, Hugh of St. Victor, in the book On the Betrothal-gift of the Bride4: « I know, my soul, that love is your life »; but to vivify the soul as to its moral being [esse moris] is proper to grace-making-pleasing itself: therefore it seems that charity is grace itself, merely and purely.

4. Likewise, to make pleasing and acceptable to God is properly proper to grace itself5; but charity, by the very fact that it is charity, renders a man dear and acceptable to God and makes his work meritorious: therefore it seems that it has nothing else in itself by which it makes any addition over grace-making-pleasing, or by which it differs from grace.

5. Likewise, every habit of the virtues that adds something over grace-making-pleasing in some way remains together with fault and is not totally taken away by sin; but charity is altogether taken away by fault6: therefore it adds nothing whatever over grace.

On the contrary:

1. Bernard, On the Love of God, chapter two7: « The will grows into love, love into charity, and charity into wisdom »; and a little after: « For love is nothing else than a will vehement for the good; for of itself a good will is a simple affection ». If, then, vehement affection is of the essence of charity; and an affection of this kind is something other than grace: therefore the habit of charity adds something beyond.

2. Likewise, nothing general becomes special except through some addition8; but grace is general and common to every virtue, whereas charity is a special virtue: therefore it is necessary that charity add something beyond grace.

3. Likewise, a habit that is continuously in its act is different from one that is not continuously in its act; but grace is continuously in the act of making-gracious9, whereas charity is not continuously in its own act, which is to love: therefore charity and grace differ in some way: charity therefore has something in itself that is diverse from grace. Since, then, it is a gratuitous habit, it seems that it adds something over grace itself.

4. Likewise, the habits of the other virtues are given to the powers themselves for their expediting, beyond grace-making-pleasing10; but the concupiscible power is as much in need of being expedited as the rational, since it is corrupted and infected: if, then, the virtue perfecting the rational power, such as faith, contains something of grace-freely-given; it seems by parity of reasoning, indeed by a much stronger one, that charity adds something over grace-making-pleasing.

5. Likewise, every habit that by habituation and frequency renders a power more ready for its act without an increase of grace-making-pleasing contains something in itself beside grace-making-pleasing; but charity is of this kind, as is plain11: therefore charity adds something over grace. The first [premise] is proved by this, p. 597that a habit is the more perfect the more it renders a power readier and more expedited for its act. If, then, the habit of charity can in some way advance while grace-making-pleasing does not advance, it is necessary to posit that it differs from it.

### Conclusion. Charity, beyond grace-making-pleasing, denotes a certain habit by whose mediation the power of loving itself is made apt for its proper act; although the opposite opinion is not without probability.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that concerning this there is a twofold manner of speaking.

Opinion I. For some have wished to say that charity is altogether the same as grace by essence, differing by relation alone. For it is called grace inasmuch as it regards the whole soul, but charity inasmuch as it governs and directs the will. Three reasons. And this seems to be signified by the very name of charity, and the Apostle seems to hint at it, and reason to approve it. First. The name itself seems to signify it: because charity is called from charis1, which among the Greeks is the same as grace. Hence, since this virtue has no other designation than from grace, it does not seem that it adds anything in reality. — Second. But the Apostle2 seems to imply it, when he sets it before and above the other virtues. For he would not do this unless it had more purely the character of the good. And he himself hints at this very thing, that the other virtues can be fruitless and receive an admixture of evil, but charity by no means; and therefore charity, according to the apostolic testimony, seems to be mere and pure grace-making-pleasing, since it is the purest and most excellent good. — Third. Reason also seems to approve it: because, since the will itself is the supreme [power] in the soul3, on which depends all the rectitude of the lower powers, and which is immediately united to God himself; therefore it claims for itself the whole principle of rectitude; and hence it is that grace, which perfects the other powers of the soul, perfects the will in a more special way. And therefore, although it perfects the other powers together with the habit of grace-freely-given, it perfects the power of loving itself4 through itself; and according as it perfects that [power], so it is called charity. — And thus it seems quite reasonable to say that grace and charity are the same by essence, differing by relation alone. And by reason of that relation it is numbered with the other virtues and is distinguished from them and is in a certain way specified. — To the arguments. And by this the reasons to the opposite, which show that charity adds something over grace, seem rather easily to be turned aside5. For they do not seem necessarily to conclude that it adds anything absolute. Hence, to turn aside all those incongruities, it seems sufficient to say that it adds only a respect [relation] to a determinate work.

Opinion II. There is also another manner of speaking, that charity, beyond grace-making-pleasing, denotes a certain habit by whose mediation the power of loving itself becomes habituated to its proper act. Two reasons. And this indeed they say to be necessary, both on account of the essential difference which is between the other virtues and charity—a difference which cannot indeed exist through a diversity that is in grace-making-pleasing, since it is one, as was shown in the second book6—and also on account of the specialness and difficulty of its act, with respect to which a habit is required specifying and determining grace to such a use and enabling the power to go forth into its act. — And the authority of Bernard. And to this manner of speaking the authority of Bernard sufficiently accords, where he says in the second chapter7 On the Love of God that « free will was given to man, which, when it accords with assisting grace, receives the advance and the name of virtue and becomes love: but when, left to itself, it wishes to enjoy itself, it suffers a defect in itself, and as many vices as there are, it obtains the names of so many vices, as of cupidity, avarice, luxury ». From this it is hinted that there is something on the part of our will which, with grace coming, becomes virtue; and it is none other than the virtue of charity, of which he speaks there: therefore the habit of charity, according to him, denotes something beyond grace. — Another reason. This position also seems sufficiently consonant with reason: because, just as faith concerns assent8, so charity concerns the affect; and just as cognition is something differing from grace-making-pleasing, so also is love; and as faith concerns cognition, so charity concerns affection, according to what Augustine says9: « Charity is the most upright affection of the soul, by which God is loved for his own sake and the neighbor p. 598for God's sake ». And the same is said in the book On the Spirit and the Soul near the beginning1: « The affections of the soul are to be ordered to that to which they ought, so that they may be able to advance into virtues ». And a little after: « Love, through hatred of self, advances into the love of God and of neighbor ». Conclusion. It seems therefore sufficiently consonant with reason to say that, just as the virtue of faith concerns a certain habit beside grace-making-pleasing, so also does the habit of charity. And this the reasons brought forward to this side seem reasonably enough to show. If anyone, then, wishes to maintain this side, he can quite easily reply to the reasons which are brought forward to the contrary.

Solution of the objections:

To 1. For to that which is objected first, that charity informs the other virtues, which is proper to grace; it must be said that one may speak of the virtues as to being [esse], and as to well-being [bene esse], and as to operating well [bene operari]. Note. If we speak of the virtues as to being, then each virtue has in itself its own form, by which it is distinguished from another, as faith from hope. But if we speak of them as to well-being, then they are informed by grace, which makes them gratuitous and acceptable to God. If we speak of the virtues as to operating well, then they are informed by charity, which is the weight inclining and making the operations of all the virtues tend to a good end2. And thus grace informs in one way, charity in another; and therefore it does not follow that there is no essential difference between charity and grace.

To 2. To that which is objected, that charity is the most excellent gift; it must be said that, because charity is not separated from grace, although it adds something beyond it; therefore the excellence of grace-making-pleasing is attributed to charity; and hence it is that it obtains also the name of grace and is set before all the virtues by the Apostle as to its excellence and dignity. And therefore it does not follow that it adds nothing beyond grace, because in that comparison it is not compared to the gratuitous gifts insofar as they are gratuitous, but insofar as they are gifts of grace-freely-given; and in this it is set before them, because charity is never separated from grace, although the other gratuitous gifts can be separated from it3; and therefore it is said to be the most excellent gift among the rest.

To 3. To that which is objected, that love is the life of the soul; it must be said that, just as in the life of nature "to live" is said in two ways: in one way, insofar as it is the first act, in another way, insofar as it is the second act; and in the first way it is from the essence of the soul, and in the second way from the power of the soul: so it is to be understood in moral being [esse moris] that to live, insofar as it is the first act, is from grace itself vivifying the whole soul; but insofar as it is the second act, it is from the virtue itself. And although it can be attributed to every gratuitous virtue, such as to faith itself, according to what is said to the Romans first4: The just man lives by faith; nevertheless it is most especially attributed to charity itself on account of the great affinity which it has to grace.

To 4. To that which is objected, that charity renders one acceptable and pleasing to God; it must be said that it does this by reason of grace; but from this it does not follow that it is precisely grace, because charity not only has [the function] of rendering one acceptable to God, but also of expediting some power and enabling it for some special and determinate act, by reason of which it adds something to grace itself, which is, as it were, the substrate and material to grace itself, as was shown in the preceding [questions]5 concerning faith.

To 5. To that which is objected, that charity is altogether destroyed by sin; it must be said that this is not because charity adds nothing over grace-making-pleasing, but because every sin is repugnant to the very habit substrate to charity. Note. And therefore, just as faith is totally taken away by unbelief, because it is repugnant to it not only as to that which is in it of grace-making-pleasing, but also as to the substrate habit6; in this manner it is to be understood that charity is taken away by every sin; but that will be more clearly manifested in the following problem.

Scholion

I. Concerning the twofold opinion related here it has already been treated in II Sent. d. 27, a. I, q. 2, where in the scholion the ancient masters standing for either view are reviewed (cf. also ibid. d. 26, q. 5). Although in this question the holy Doctor presents both opinions as probable; he himself nevertheless really follows the second. Hence he here explicitly resolves the arguments opposed to it, and in the following p. 599question says, concerning the first opinion, that it is difficult to maintain, and in the cited passage of the second book clearly manifests his own opinion. It is also to be noted that there [II Sent. d. 27, a. I, q. 2] ad 6 he asserts that in the first man before the fall there was really a love by which God was loved for his own sake and above all things, without habitual grace.

II. In the solution of the following (4th) question it is supposed that, besides the supernatural habit of charity, there is also a natural (or acquired) love toward God as he is the author of nature, concerning which cf. I Sent. d. 17, p. I, q. 3, and especially II Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. I, in the body and ad 3.

III. This doctrine is confirmed by the reprobation of several erroneous propositions which Baius drew from the sources of the innovators of the sixteenth century, among which is prop. 34: « That distinction of a twofold love, namely the natural, by which God is loved as the author of nature, and the gratuitous, by which God is loved as beatifier, is vain and fictitious and devised to delude the Sacred Scriptures and very many testimonies of the ancients » (cf. prop. 36). — Hence the same Baius fell into another reprobated error pertaining to this our question, namely prop. 32: « That charity which is the fullness of the Law is not always joined with the remission of sins »; and prop. 31: « Perfect and sincere charity, which is from a pure heart and a good conscience and unfeigned faith, can exist in catechumens as well as in penitents without the remission of sins » (cf. prop. 33, 70, 71).

IV. On this 4th question, besides St. Thomas: Bl. Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 5, a. 2, quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Mediavilla touches the matter here n. 9, q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIII. c. 3. — In fine arg. pro in nullo codd. A K nullo modo. (P. 596, n. 2.)
    See above, the Master's text, d. XXIII, c. 3. — At the end of the argument, for in nullo codices A K [read] nullo modo. (P. 596, n. 2.)
  2. Cap. 18. n. 32: Nullum est isto Dei dono excellentius. Ibid. c. 19. n. 37: In donis Dei nihil maius est caritate. (P. 596, n. 3.)
    Chapter 18, n. 32: Nothing is more excellent than this gift of God. Ibid., c. 19, n. 37: Among the gifts of God nothing is greater than charity. (P. 596, n. 3.)
  3. Sive de Arrha animae, in principio: Scio, quod vita tua dilectio est. (P. 596, n. 4.)
    Or On the Betrothal-gift of the Soul, at the beginning: I know that your life is love. (P. 596, n. 4.)
  4. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. q. I. seq. et d. 29. a. I. q. I. (P. 596, n. 5.)
    Cf. II Sent. d. 26, q. I and following, and d. 29, a. I, q. I. (P. 596, n. 5.)
  5. Vide quaest. seq. — Codd. L Z bb: omnes habitus... aliquid addunt... manent... nec tolluntur. Pro per culpam codd. Z bb per peccatum. (P. 596, n. 6.)
    See the following question. — Codices L Z bb [read]: all habits... add something... remain... and are not taken away. For per culpam codices Z bb [read] per peccatum. (P. 596, n. 6.)
  6. Sive de Natura et dignitate amoris (inter opera Bernardi, sed auctor est Guliel., abbas S. Theodorici), c. 2. n. 3. — Seq. testimonium ibidem n. 4. invenitur; textus origin. ibi omittit bonum. — Codd. et edd. 1, 2 allegant cap. II. (P. 596, n. 7.)
    Or On the Nature and Dignity of Love (among the works of Bernard, but the author is William, abbot of St. Thierry), c. 2, n. 3. — The following testimony is found in the same place, n. 4; the original text there omits bonum. — Codices and editions 1, 2 cite chapter II. (P. 596, n. 7.)
  7. Sive, ut Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.) docet, differentia apposita generi sive cum genere speciem facit. — Quod caritas sit virtus specialis, ostensum est quaest. I. — Mox pro omnem virtutem cod. K omnes virtutes. (P. 596, n. 8.)
    Or, as Aristotle teaches, Topics VI, c. 3 (c. 6), a difference added to a genus, or together with the genus, makes a species. — That charity is a special virtue was shown in question I. — Soon, for omnem virtutem codex K [reads] omnes virtutes. (P. 596, n. 8.)
  8. Continue enim, ut II. Sent. d. 27. a. I. q. 2. fundam. 3. dicitur, vivificat et animam Deo reddit acceptam. (P. 596, n. 9.)
    For continuously, as is said in II Sent. d. 27, a. I, q. 2, fundamentum 3, it vivifies and renders the soul acceptable to God. (P. 596, n. 9.)
  9. Cfr. supra pag. 474, nota 5. — De vi concupiscibili et rationali vide supra pag. 579, nota 9, et scholion ad d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. (P. 596, n. 10.)
    Cf. above, p. 474, note 5. — On the concupiscible and rational power see above, p. 579, note 9, and the scholion to d. 26, a. 2, q. 5. (P. 596, n. 10.)
  10. Cfr. hic corp. quaest. Cfr. etiam seq. quaestionem, ubi agitur de amore Dei ut auctoris naturae. (P. 596, n. 11.)
    Cf. here the body of the question. Cf. also the following question, where there is treatment of the love of God as the author of nature. (P. 596, n. 11.)
  11. χάρις. — Sed Isidor., VIII. Etymolog. c. 2. n. 6: Caritas graece, latine dilectio interpretatur, quod duos illiget. (P. 597, n. 1.)
    charis. — But Isidore, Etymologies VIII, c. 2, n. 6: Caritas in Greek is interpreted in Latin as dilectio [love], because it binds two together. (P. 597, n. 1.)
  12. Epist. I. Cor. 13, 13: Nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec; maior autem horum est caritas. — In seqq. respicitur illud I. Cor. 13, 1: Si linguis hominum loquar... caritatem autem non habuero, nihil sum etc. — Pro Apostolus insinuare, quod ex cod. A restauravimus, cod. T Apostolus vero, codd. K L bb Apostolus etiam, alii codd. cum edd. Apostolus enim, cod. X Apostolus tantum. (P. 597, n. 2.)
    Epistle, 1 Cor. 13:13: But now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greater of these is charity. — In what follows there is reference to 1 Cor. 13:1: If I should speak with the tongues of men... but have not charity, I am nothing, etc. — For Apostolus insinuare, which we have restored from codex A, codex T [reads] Apostolus vero, codices K L bb Apostolus etiam, other codices with the editions Apostolus enim, codex X Apostolus tantum. (P. 597, n. 2.)
  13. Cfr. supra pag. 364, nota 7. — Tanto superius pro purissimum cod. G initissimum. Paulo inferius post virium inferiorum cod. aa repetit in anima. Post pauca pro perficit voluntatem cod. Z perficit ipsam voluntatem. (P. 597, n. 3.)
    Cf. above, p. 364, note 7. — A little above, for purissimum codex G [reads] initissimum. A little below, after virium inferiorum codex aa repeats in anima. After a few [words], for perficit voluntatem codex Z [reads] perficit ipsam voluntatem. (P. 597, n. 3.)
  14. Vat. post ipsam subdit tamen. (P. 597, n. 4.)
    The Vatican [edition], after ipsam, adds tamen. (P. 597, n. 4.)
  15. Codd. A F K videntur posse. Inferius pro sufficiens codd. A K O X sufficienter. Deinde pro videtur dicere, quod Vat. videtur hoc esse dicendum, scilicet quod, codd. B D N T aa et edit. 1, 2 videtur esse, quod, cod. G videtur, quod. (P. 597, n. 5.)
    Codices A F K [read] videntur posse. Below, for sufficiens codices A K O X [read] sufficienter. Then, for videtur dicere, quod, the Vatican [edition reads] videtur hoc esse dicendum, scilicet quod, codices B D N T aa and editions 1, 2 videtur esse, quod, codex G videtur, quod. (P. 597, n. 5.)
  16. Dist. 27. a. I. q. I. — Quomodo caritas diversa sit ab aliis virtutibus, supra expositum est q. I. (P. 597, n. 6.)
    Dist. 27, a. I, q. I. — In what way charity is diverse from the other virtues was expounded above in q. I. (P. 597, n. 6.)
  17. Nam. 4, in quo Bernardi testimonio textus origin. ante frui praemittit secundum se ipsam et post et quot inserit habet. — Codd. et edd. allegant II. cap. (P. 597, n. 7.)
    N. 4, in which testimony of Bernard the original text, before frui, prefixes secundum se ipsam, and after et quot inserts habet. — Codices and editions cite chapter II. (P. 597, n. 7.)
  18. Cfr. supra pag. 174, nota I. (P. 597, n. 8.)
    Cf. above, p. 174, note I. (P. 597, n. 8.)
  19. Liber I. de Moribus Eccles. cathol. c. 11, n. 19. seqq., exponens Rom. 8, 38, ait: « Non separat virtus; nam si virtus hic illa nominata est, quae aliquam potestatem in hoc mundo habet, toto mundo est omnino sublimior mens inhaerens Deo. Sed virtus illa dicta est, quae ipsius animi nostri rectissima illa ratio est, et in alio est, favet, ut coniungamur Deo, si in nobis est, ipsa coniungit ». Deinde (c. 12. n. 20.) ostendit, quod animus noster, qui Deo caritate coniungendus est, per illam Deo coniungitur, cum Deo subiicitur; et tum, postquam docuit, omnem virtutem reduci ad amorem Dei, c. 26. n. 48. seqq. probat, amatorem Dei et se amare et proximum. Libr. XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. n. 1. ait: Nam cuius propositum est amare Deum, et non secundum hominem, sed secundum Deum amare proximum sicut etiam se ipsum, procul dubio propter hunc amorem dicitur voluntatis bonae, quae usitatius in Scripturis sacris caritas appellatur. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Edd. post Augustinus subiiciunt in Soliloquiis. (P. 597, n. 9.)
    Book I On the Morals of the Catholic Church, c. 11, n. 19 ff., expounding Rom. 8:38, says: « Virtue does not separate; for if that is here named virtue which has some power in this world, the mind cleaving to God is altogether more sublime than the whole world. But that is called virtue which is the most upright reason of our soul itself, and [which], when it is in another, gives favor that we be joined to God, [and] when it is in us, itself joins us ». Then (c. 12, n. 20) he shows that our soul, which is to be joined to God by charity, is joined to God through it, when it is subjected to God; and then, after he has taught that every virtue is reduced to the love of God, c. 26, n. 48 ff., he proves that the lover of God loves both himself and his neighbor. Book XIV On the City of God, c. 7, n. 1, says: For he whose purpose is to love God, and to love his neighbor not according to man but according to God, just as also himself, is without doubt said to be of good will, which more usually in the Sacred Scriptures is called charity. Cf. here the Master's text, c. 2. — The editions, after Augustinus, add in Soliloquiis. (P. 597, n. 9.)
  20. Cap. 4. Textus origin. post quod debent addit et quomodo debent. Subinde pro in virtutes Vat. in virtutibus, edd. 1, 2 solum virtutibus. In altero testimonio, sumto ex eodem cap. 4, textus origin. pro odium sui habet odium mundi et sui. — Inferius pro ostendere cod. Z substituit dicere. (P. 598, n. 1.)
    Chapter 4. The original text, after quod debent, adds et quomodo debent. Thereupon, for in virtutes the Vatican [edition reads] in virtutibus, editions 1, 2 only virtutibus. In the other testimony, taken from the same chapter 4, the original text, for odium sui, has odium mundi et sui. — Below, for ostendere codex Z substitutes dicere. (P. 598, n. 1.)
  21. Cfr. infra d. 36. q. 6. (P. 598, n. 2.)
    Cf. below, d. 36, q. 6. (P. 598, n. 2.)
  22. Vide quaest. seq. et I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. dub. 4. — Superius non pauci codd. et edd. 1, 2, verbis male transpositis, et hoc in illis. Pro praeponitur cod. Z est prior. (P. 598, n. 3.)
    See the following question and I Sent. d. 17, p. I, dub. 4. — Above, not a few codices and editions 1, 2, with the words badly transposed, [read] et hoc in illis. For praeponitur codex Z [reads] est prior. (P. 598, n. 3.)
  23. Vers. 17: Iustus autem ex fide vivit. — De duplici vi verbi vivere, prout significat actum primum vel actum secundum, cfr. supra pag. 444, nota 6. et 7. nec non pag. 431, nota 2. atque infra dub. 2. circa finem. — Pro ipsi fidei cod. O iustorum fidei. In initio solut. pro animi edd. et complures codd. animae. Circa finem solut. codd. omittunt tamen. (P. 598, n. 4.)
    Verse 17: But the just man lives by faith. — On the twofold force of the word vivere, insofar as it signifies the first act or the second act, cf. above, p. 444, notes 6 and 7, and also p. 431, note 2, and below, dub. 2, near the end. — For ipsi fidei codex O [reads] iustorum fidei. At the beginning of the solution, for animi the editions and several codices [read] animae. Near the end of the solution, the codices omit tamen. (P. 598, n. 4.)
  24. Dist. 23. a. I. q. 2; a. 2. q. I. 4. et 5. — Quoad solutionem cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. I. q. 2. ad 4. (P. 598, n. 5.)
    Dist. 23, a. I, q. 2; a. 2, q. I, 4, and 5. — As to the solution cf. II Sent. d. 27, a. I, q. 2, ad 4. (P. 598, n. 5.)
  25. Vide supra d. 23. a. 2. q. I. ad 4. et q. 2. ad 4. (P. 598, n. 6.)
    See above, d. 23, a. 2, q. I, ad 4, and q. 2, ad 4. (P. 598, n. 6.)
← Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 4→