Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 14, Part 2, Dubia

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 14

Textus Latinus

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DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc verbo Isaiae, quod est in littera: Lavamini, mundi estote; ubi dicit Isidorus: Lavatur, et non est mundus, qui plangit quae gessit etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia lavare non est aliud quam mundificare: ergo lavari, et non esse mundum, non est aliud quam mundificari, et non esse mundum, et ita sunt opposita. — Item, cum dicit: Lavatur qui plangit etc.; aut intelligit de planctu exteriori, aut de interiori. Si de exteriori, tunc ex hoc non lavatur. Si de interiori, tunc constans est, quod iustificatur¹; si ex corde hoc faciat: ergo est mundus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod differenter exponunt aliqui hunc locum. Quidam enim dicunt, quod differt lavari et esse mundum, sicut actus et habitus; et sic qui poenitet, sed statim recidit, lavatur quidem, quia habet actum poenitentiae, sed paulo post cadit, et ita non habet habitum, et ideo non dicitur mundus. — Aliter exponitur, quod differt lavari et esse mundum, sicut via et terminus, sive dispositio et praeparatio ad aliquid. Fletus enim et dolor attritionis disponit ad poenitentiam. Cum quis ergo dolet et atteritur, lavatur, quia ad munditiam disponitur; sed tamen, dum recidit, se iterum inquinat, et ideo non est mundus². Et est exemplum, si mulier pannum lavaret et statim post aliquantulam lotionem in lutum immergeret. Unde sermones sunt tropici et sunt secundum quandam metaphoram exponendi.

Quod quaeritur, cuiusmodi sit illa lotio; dico, quod est interior, et non est contritionis, sed attritionis; vel si est contritionis, non tamen denominat mundum, quia non perseverat, ut passio in tertia specie qualitatis³.

Dub. II

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Augustinus Nihil prosunt lamenta, cum replicantur peccata. — Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia prosunt ad remissionem praeteritorum peccatorum, quia saltem illa dimittuntur: aliquid ergo prosunt, non ergo nihil. — Item, si tu dicas, sicut Magister⁴ dicit, quod «nihil prosunt ad salutem»; ergo pari ratione deberet dicere, quod nihil prosit baptismus, cum replicantur peccata.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod intelligit de replicatione habituali, quia nihil prosunt lamenta, cum est voluntas replicandi, quia deest poenitentiae fundamentum, et ideo lacrymae illae sunt fictae. — Vel Aliter dicendum, sicut dicit Magister, quod «nihil prosunt ad salutem». Nec est simile de baptismo, quia, quamvis ad salutem non prosit, quando peccata replicantur, prodest tamen propter impressionem characteris, et quia confertur fundamentum omnium Sacramentorum; ideo non est simile. De poenitentia autem, cum homo peccat, nihil manet, et ideo iterari potest et debet⁵.

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Dub. III

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Gregorius: Qui commissa plangit, nec tamen deserit, poenae graviori se subiicit. Videtur enim male dicere, quia plangere commissa non est peccatum; sed homo non subiicit se poenae graviori nisi propter culpam: ergo etc. — Item, plangere bonum est et poenale: ergo potius disponit ad gratiam quam ad poenam.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hoc non dicit de quocumque fletu, sed hypocritarum, qui in lacrymis exterius praetendunt sanctitatem et in corde portant iniquitatem; et isti peccant dupliciter⁶, et quantum ad tales loquitur Gregorius. — Aliter potest dici, quod loquitur de eo qui flet ordinate et in detestationem culpae, quod poenae graviori se subiicit non propter fletum, sed propter contemptum. Fletus enim ille est ab aliquo dono Dei; et cum iterat peccatum, contemnit donum Dei. — Praeterea, in ipso fletu consideratur peccati enormitas; ideo, cum iteratur, augetur offensa propter actualem considerationem. Unde sicut habitus scientiae aggravat⁷, et tamen bonum est scire peccatum et cognoscere; ita considerare et plangere peccati enormitatem est bonum; et si quis post hoc peccat, aggravatur culpa per accidens.

Dub. IV

Item quaeritur de ista definitione Magistri: Poenitentia est virtus vel gratia, qua commissa mala etc. Videtur enim non esse conveniens: quia definitio totum esse rei debet indicare⁸; et partes poenitentiae sunt confessio et contritio et satisfactio: unde videtur, quod non solum per actum contritionis, qui est plangere et odire peccatum, sed etiam per actus alios deberet definiri. — Item, poenitentia est respectu praeteritorum et non respectu futurorum: ergo male definitur respectu futuri, cum dicit: Et plangenda iterum non committere.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod actus principalis poenitentiae est actus cordis et actus interior⁹; et ideo per illum magis definit, et ideo illum tangit explicite. Unde planctus non attenditur hic quantum ad effusionem lacrymarum exteriorum, sed interiorum, quia istae exteriores non sunt de esse sed de bene esse. Nihilominus tamen alios actus includit, cum dicit: «Cum emendationis proposito», quia emenda fit per confessionem et satisfactionem; et quoniam poenitentia, secundum quod virtus est, respicit emendam, et emenda non stat cum iteratione culpae: ideo ex consequenti respicit culpam non iterandam. Et ideo Magister definit per futurum, quia, quamvis poenitentia, ut est affectio¹⁰, sit respectu praeteriti; tamen poenitentia-virtus etiam futurum respicit. Unde in definitione poenitentiae tangit Magister triplicem actum. Unus est actus poenitentiae secundum quod poenitentia; et hic est dolere de culpa commissa. Alius est actus, secundum quod poenitentia est virtus; et iste actus est velle emendare, et hunc tangit, cum dicit: «Cum emendationis proposito» etc. Tertius est annexus utrique, scilicet nolle offendere vel committere; et iste perficit utrumque. Nullus enim vere poenitet de praeterito nec proponit emendam facere, nisi proponat ultra non offendere¹¹.

Dub. V

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Et, si de peccato succedenti poenitentia agatur, et poenitentia, quae praecessit, et alia ante acta bona reviviscunt. Videtur enim secundum hoc, quod vivificare sit actus poenitentiae. Sed contra: videtur, quod magis iustitiae, quia mortuum vivificare non est aliud quam iustificare; sed iustificatio est per generalem iustitiam: ergo et vivificatio; et hoc videtur Ezechielis decimo octavo¹²: In iustitia, quam operatus est, vivet et non morietur. — Item videtur, quod hoc sit fidei, Hebraeorum decimo¹³ et Habacuc secundo: Iustus ex fide sua vivit. — Item videtur, quod hoc sit caritatis, quia «caritas est vita animae», sicut dicit Augustinus¹⁴ et magister Hugo de sancto Victore. — Item videtur, multo magis esse gratiae¹⁵, quia vita dividitur in vitam naturae, gratiae et gloriae.

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Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut vivere in naturalibus aliquando dicitur actus primus¹⁶, aliquando dicitur signum vitae; sic etiam aliquando attribuitur vita ei, a quo est, aliquando ei, in quo manifestatur. Dicendum ergo, quod illud quod vivificat, proprie gratia est; illud autem, per quod manifestatur, virtus est¹⁷. Potest igitur manifestari vita ut in fieri, vel ut in facto esse. Si ut in fieri, sic attribuitur virtuti poenitentiae, per quam manifestatur ipsa vivificatio, quia in contritione percipiuntur signa expulsionis peccati. Si ut in facto esse, sic potest manifestari vita quantum ad intellectum, et sic per fidem captivantem; aut quantum ad affectum, et sic per caritatem vigorantem, aut quantum ad effectum, et sic per iustitiam regulantem. — Et ita patet responsio, quare his attribuitur, et responsio ad obiecta, quia non attribuitur his vita tanquam principio, sed tanquam manifestativo; et talia possunt esse plura.

Dub. VI

Item quaeritur de hac definitione Augustini quam ponit in littera: Poenitentia est quaedam dolentis vindicta etc. Videtur enim male dicere; quia nullus in eadem causa potest esse reus et iudex¹⁸: ergo si quis peccavit, non potest rationabiliter se punire. — Item, homo magis tenetur ex caritate se diligere quam alium¹⁹; sed homo debet alii parcere, non vindicare se: ergo non debet vindicare nec vindictam de se exigere. — Item, vindicta est solius Dei, sicut dicitur ad Romanos duodecimo²⁰: Mihi vindictam: ergo poenitentia est solius Dei sive vindicta in poenitentia.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ista ratio est conveniens: quia poenitentia virtus est ad destructionem veteris hominis ordinata²¹; et nemo potest vitam novam inchoare, nisi repudiet veterem; et nemo potest Deo amicus effici, nisi odiat quod Deus odit. Quia ergo Deus odit peccatum odio vindictae et ipsum peccatorem; ideo poenitens et peccatum debet odire et de se rationem²² et vindictam expetere.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod non pertinet; dicendum, quod non pertinet ad ipsum, in quantum reus est, iudicare; pertinet tamen iudicari, in quantum reus est, et iudicare, in quantum iustus. Unde ipsa ratio, conformata legibus aeternis, se ipsam punit, ut conformis fuit legi peccati; et sic accipit auctoritatem a Deo, et non ipsa punit, sed Deus. — Item, Deus inseruit homini naturale iudicatorium²³, cui commisit regnum animae iudicandum; et liberum arbitrium, illi conformatum, debet vindicare transgressionem et in se ipso, non auctoritate sua, sed Dei et naturalis iudicatorii, quod non errat. — Cum ergo dicitur, quod non est idem reus et iudex, verum est: idem secundum idem.

Quod obiicitur, quod debet parcere; dicendum, quod etsi homo debeat parcere iniuriam suam; tamen iniuria Dei vindicanda est ab eo cui commissa est cura; et quia homo iniuriatus est Deo, ideo debet esse minister Dei²⁴ in parte ista.

Ex hoc patet ultimum, quod vindicta est Dei; verum est de vindicta, qua aliquis vindicat se, quia nullus debet se vindicare, sed debet vindicare alium de se, vel de alio. — Vel dicendum, quod Dei est tanquam principalis auctoris, hominis tanquam ministri.

Dub. VII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Augustinus: Semper doleat et de dolore gaudeat. Videtur enim male dicere, quia gaudium et dolor sunt opposita; et «opposita non sunt nata simul inesse eidem»²⁵: ergo impossibile est, quod semper doleat et gaudeat. Si tu dicas, quod dolor de peccato et gaudium de dolore non habent oppositionem; contra: videtur, quod habent oppositionem, quia, sive de eodem, sive de diversis, impossibile est, quod eadem anima simul sit tristis et gaudens: ergo impossibile est, quod semper doleat et gaudeat²⁶. — Item, in dolore movetur cor secundum constrictionem, in gaudio secundum dilatationem; sed «non potest simul et semel moveri oppositis motibus»²⁷: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod gaudium est secundum quid, et dolor simpliciter; contra: nulla est virtus, in qua non sit delectatio, et si virtus simpliciter, est delectatio simpliciter; virtus enim delectat suum possessorem²⁸. — Item, gaudium est de praesentia rei amatae; ergo si poenitens multum desiderat dolere, videtur, quod si multum dolet, gaudet simpliciter.

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Respondeo: Dicendum, quod utrumque est in vere poenitente, scilicet dolor et gaudium; nec unum diminuit alterum, sed perficit; sicut velle dolere vel desiderium doloris dolorem non minuit, immo auget; sic et gaudium. Nam in poenitentia, cum sit virtus, non tantum est dolor, sed dolor voluntarius; et cum quis habet quod amat et desiderat, necessario gaudet: ideo poenitens, cum habet dolorem, quem desiderat, gaudet; nec gaudium removet dolorem, immo perficit, et simul est dolor et gaudium, sicut Augustinus de se dicit quarto Confessionum²⁹, quod «solus fletus erat sibi dulcis», loquens de amico mortuo, et hoc erat propter doloris vehementiam; sic et in proposito.

Quod ergo quaeritur: quomodo possibile est esse simul? dici potest, quod vel non sunt in eadem potentia, sed in diversis, ut dolor sit in sensualitate et gaudium in ratione; et tunc nullum est impossibile, quod una vis gaudeat de dolore existente in alia³⁰. — Vel dicendum, quod sunt in eadem vi secundum quod supra se convertitur; unde sicut non cum actu simplici, sed composito vis intellectiva convertitur supra peccatum et supra dolorem; sic nec affectus. Unde sicut in ratiocinatione dicimus, quod est actus unus, tamen intellectus convertit se supra plura, quae diversimode cognoscit; sic et affectus consequens sine aliqua repugnantia diversimode afficitur. Et sic patent obiecta³¹.

Dub. VIII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister, quod istud: Poenitentia est vindicta semper puniens etc., intelligitur de poenitentia perfectorum. Videtur enim male dicere, quia Augustinus³² dicit, quod «si poenitentia finitur, nihil relinquitur de venia»: ergo semper punire spectat ad omnes.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod perfectus dicitur dupliciter: aut quantum ad temporis durationem, aut quantum ad status sublimitatem. Prima perfectio est, quae condividitur contra incipientes et proficientes secundum profectum temporis³³. Alia perfectio consistit in operibus supererogationis. Magister autem intelligit de perfectione primo modo et vocat perfectorum poenitentiam, quae durat usque ad finem vitae; et de hac dicit intelligi illud Augustini, quod semper punit. — Notandum tamen, quod semper punire debet non simpliciter, sed quamdiu durat culpa. Et sic patet illud³⁴.

Dub. IX

Notandum super hoc quod dicit, quod solemnis poenitentia fit extra ecclesiam, ubi quatuor sunt notanda: primo, qualis sit sive quae sit eius forma; et dicendum, quod poenitentia solemnis est poenitentia addens super publicam, quia non tantum est in manifesto, sed quia fit cum solemnitate quadam. In capite enim Quadragesimae eiicitur poenitens extra ecclesiam nec admittitur usque ad diem Coenae, et tunc etiam non communicat. Eiicitur autem a persona authentica, sicut ab episcopo, praesentibus sacerdotibus, qui noverunt culpam.

Secundo notanda est ratio huius solemnitatis triplex: una est ad terrorem aliorum, alia propter erubescentiam delinquentis, et tertia propter significationem eiectionis Adae de paradiso. Unde hoc debet cum crebris suspiriis denuntiare episcopus, et ita eiicitur, sicut Adam eiectus fuit de paradiso; et ideo non est iteranda. Et de hoc habetur quinquagesima distinctione, capitulo Poenitentes³⁵, et capitulo sequenti, et eadem distinctione capitulo Si quis post remissionem, paragrapho Potest et aliter.

Notandum est etiam, quod haec poenitentia non imponitur nisi pro gravi et enormi culpa, maxime pro culpa, quae totam urbem commovit, sicut ibidem³⁶ dicitur. Nec imponenda est sacerdotibus propter reverentiam Ordinis; potest quidem imponi publica poenitentia pro peccato manifesto.

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Quarto notandum, quod poenitens non reconciliatur solemniter nisi ab episcopo, vel sacerdote de mandato episcopi, praesertim in articulo necessitatis. Reconciliari autem potest in octava Paschae, si bene poenituerit, et habere ingressum ecclesiae; sin autem, manebit sic usque ad finem vitae: et de hoc dicitur Causa vigesima sexta, quaestione sexta³⁷.

Dub. X

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod hoc in quibusdam Ecclesiis non servatur. Videntur enim tales Ecclesiae peccare, cum faciant contra rationem Sacramenti et significationis solemnis poenitentiae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hoc non est de necessitate poenitentiae, sed solum de bene esse; tamen, ubi sunt gentes durae, haec poenitentia iteratur ex causa, ut duritia confringatur multiplici confusione, quae unica non confringebatur³⁸; et vix talibus posset imponi poenitentia occulta ita diuturna, quod susciperent vel servarent: ideo talis poenitentia iteratur ex causa.

Dub. XI

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quod vero poenitentia non semel tantum agatur, sed frequenter iteretur. Videtur enim male dicere, quia super illud Amos primo³⁹: Super tribus sceleribus Damasci et super quatuor non convertam eum; Glossa Hieronymi: «Quarto eadem peccata committenti nec poenitentiam nec indulgentiam se daturum denuntiat»: ergo non videtur, quod frequenter, sed tantum quater.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Hieronymus⁴⁰ intelligit, quod primum peccatum sit consentire in corde, secundum est facere in opere, tertium est vertere in consuetudinem, quartum est finaliter non poenitere; et de hoc nec poenitentiam dat nec veniam, quia post mortem non est locus poenitentiae. Ab aliis tribus liberat et dat poenitentiam et veniam simul, sicut probatur et innuitur in resuscitatione trium mortuorum, quorum unum suscitavit in domo, alium in porta et tertium in sepulcro⁴¹.

Dub. XII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Chrysostomus: Etiam si ad summum quis perveniat malorum. Videtur enim male dicere, quia nullus est ita malus, quin adhuc possit peccare: ergo nullus est ita malus, quin adhuc possit fieri deterior. — Item, in Psalmo⁴² dicitur: Superbia eorum qui te oderunt, ascendit semper: ergo si semper crescit, nunquam est status quantum ad actum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hoc potest intelligi secundum actum, ut ita sit malus, quod nullus peior⁴³: non intelligitur secundum potentiam. — Vel dicatur, quod hoc intelligitur secundum genus peccati, quod si aliquis peccet enormissimo peccato, adhuc Deus paratus est parcere, dum est in via; et hoc vocat summum malorum: quia est malum contra gratiam divinam, ut fornicatio; et est malum contra gratiam et rationem, ut periurium; et est malum contra gratiam, rationem et naturam, ut sodomia, et illud est pessimum; vel si quod aliud genus peccati sit peius, ut blasphemia in Deum sive spiritus blasphemiae⁴⁴.

Dub. XIII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Augustinus, quod David deliquit in populi enumeratione. Videtur illud verbum Augustini falsum, quia Moyses numeravit populum, Numerorum vigesimo sexto⁴⁵, et similiter Saul, primi Regum undecimo; et tamen neuter peccavit: ergo pari ratione nec David. — Item, David peccavit: ergo non debuit populus puniri, sed potius ipse qui peccaverat.

Respondeo: Ad primum dicendum, quod Moyses numeravit mandato Domini, et Saul propter expeditionem ad pugnam; sed David propter superbiam; volebat enim gloriari in multitudine populi numerosa⁴⁶.

Quod quaeritur: quare punitus est populus? respondetur, propter connexionem populi ad principem, propter quam etiam puniti sunt filii Israel in

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peccato Achor, Iosue septimo⁴⁷. — Vel potest dici, et melius, quod Dominus punivit principem in populo, ut in eodem puniretur, in quo gloriabatur, sicut aliquis punitur in sua possessione. — Aestimant tamen aliqui⁴⁸, quod iusto Dei iudicio permissum sit hoc, ut illi punirentur, qui adhaeserant Absalom. — Figura tamen et instructio in hoc magna fuit, ut sensus figurae ostendatur quantum malus praelatus et eius peccatum obest subditis, et quantum eius oratio prodest in ipsius poenitentia et sanctitate⁴⁹.

English Translation

DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I

In this section there are doubts concerning the text, and first about this word of Isaiah, which is in the text: Wash yourselves, be clean; where Isidore says: He is washed, and is not clean, who bewails the things he has done etc. For it seems to be said badly, because to wash is nothing other than to cleanse: therefore to be washed, and not to be clean, is nothing other than to be cleansed, and not to be clean, and so they are opposites. — Likewise, when he says: He is washed who bewails etc.; either he understands of outward weeping, or of inward. If of the outward, then by this he is not washed. If of the inward, then it is settled that he is justified¹; if he does this from the heart: therefore he is clean.

I respond: It must be said that some expound this passage differently. For some say that to be washed and to be clean differ as act and habit; and thus he who repents, but at once relapses, is indeed washed, because he has the act of penitence, but a little after he falls, and so does not have the habit, and therefore is not called clean. — Otherwise it is expounded that to be washed and to be clean differ as the way and the terminus, or as disposition and preparation toward something. For the weeping and the sorrow of attrition disposes toward penitence. When therefore anyone grieves and is contrite, he is washed, because he is disposed toward cleanness; but yet, while he relapses, he again defiles himself, and therefore is not clean². And there is an example, if a woman were to wash a cloth and at once after a little washing were to plunge it into the mud. Whence the sayings are tropical and are to be expounded according to a certain metaphor.

As to what is asked, of what kind that washing is; I say that it is inward, and is not of contrition, but of attrition; or if it is of contrition, yet it does not denominate [one] clean, because it does not persevere, like a passion in the third species of quality³.

Doubt II

Likewise it is asked about this, that Augustine says Lamentations profit nothing, when sins are repeated. — For it seems to be said falsely, because they profit toward the remission of past sins, because at least those are forgiven: therefore they profit something, therefore not nothing. — Likewise, if you should say, as the Master⁴ says, that «they profit nothing toward salvation»; then by parity of reasoning he ought to say that baptism profits nothing, when sins are repeated.

I respond: It must be said that he understands of habitual repetition, because lamentations profit nothing when there is a will of repeating, because the foundation of penitence is lacking, and therefore those tears are feigned. — Or Otherwise it must be said, as the Master says, that «they profit nothing toward salvation». Nor is it similar with baptism, because, although it does not profit toward salvation, when sins are repeated, yet it profits on account of the impression of the character, and because the foundation of all the Sacraments is conferred; therefore it is not similar. But concerning penitence, when a man sins, nothing remains, and therefore it can and ought to be repeated⁵.

Doubt III

Likewise it is asked about this, that Gregory says: He who bewails the things committed, yet does not forsake [them], subjects himself to a graver penalty. For it seems to be said badly, because to bewail the things committed is not a sin; but a man does not subject himself to a graver penalty except on account of fault: therefore etc. — Likewise, to bewail is good and penal: therefore it rather disposes toward grace than toward penalty.

I respond: It must be said that he does not say this of any weeping whatever, but of that of hypocrites, who in tears outwardly pretend sanctity and in the heart carry iniquity; and these sin doubly⁶, and with respect to such Gregory speaks. — Otherwise it can be said that he speaks of him who weeps in an orderly way and in detestation of fault, that he subjects himself to a graver penalty not on account of the weeping, but on account of the contempt. For that weeping is from some gift of God; and when he repeats the sin, he despises the gift of God. — Furthermore, in the weeping itself the enormity of the sin is considered; therefore, when it is repeated, the offense is increased on account of the actual consideration. Whence, just as the habit of knowledge aggravates⁷, and yet it is good to know and to recognize the sin; so to consider and bewail the enormity of the sin is good; and if anyone sins after this, the fault is aggravated per accidens [accidentally].

Doubt IV

Likewise it is asked about this definition of the Master: Penitence is a virtue or grace, by which the evils committed etc. For it seems not to be fitting: because a definition ought to indicate the whole being of a thing⁸; and the parts of penitence are confession and contrition and satisfaction: whence it seems that it ought to be defined not only by the act of contrition, which is to bewail and to hate sin, but also by the other acts. — Likewise, penitence is with respect to past [things] and not with respect to future [things]: therefore it is defined badly with respect to the future, when he says: And not to commit again the things to be bewailed.

I respond: It must be said that the principal act of penitence is the act of the heart and the inward act⁹; and therefore by it he rather defines, and therefore he touches it explicitly. Whence weeping is here regarded not as to the effusion of outward tears, but of inward ones, because those outward [tears] are not of the being but of the well-being. Nevertheless it includes the other acts, when he says: «With a purpose of amendment», because amendment is made through confession and satisfaction; and since penitence, insofar as it is a virtue, regards amendment, and amendment does not stand with the repetition of fault: therefore consequently it regards the fault not to be repeated. And therefore the Master defines through the future, because, although penitence, as it is an affection¹⁰, is with respect to the past; yet penitence-as-virtue also regards the future. Whence in the definition of penitence the Master touches a threefold act. One is the act of penitence insofar as it is penitence; and this is to grieve over the fault committed. Another is the act, insofar as penitence is a virtue; and this act is to will to amend, and he touches this, when he says: «With a purpose of amendment» etc. The third is annexed to both, namely to be unwilling to offend or to commit; and this perfects both. For no one truly repents of the past nor proposes to make amendment, unless he proposes no longer to offend¹¹.

Doubt V

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: And, if penitence be done for a succeeding sin, both the penitence which preceded, and the other good [works] done before, revive. For according to this it seems that to vivify is an act of penitence. But on the contrary: it seems that [it is] rather of justice, because to vivify the dead is nothing other than to justify; but justification is through general justice: therefore also vivification; and this seems [to be the case] from Ezekiel eighteen¹²: In the justice which he has wrought, he shall live and not die. — Likewise it seems that this is of faith, [from] Hebrews ten¹³ and Habakkuk two: The just lives by his faith. — Likewise it seems that this is of charity, because «charity is the life of the soul», as Augustine¹⁴ and master Hugh of Saint Victor say. — Likewise it seems much rather to be of grace¹⁵, because life is divided into the life of nature, of grace, and of glory.

I respond: It must be said that, just as to live in natural things is sometimes called the first act¹⁶, sometimes called a sign of life; so also sometimes life is attributed to that from which it is, sometimes to that in which it is manifested. It must be said therefore that that which vivifies is properly grace; but that through which it is manifested is virtue¹⁷. Life can therefore be manifested as in becoming, or as in accomplished being. If as in becoming, thus it is attributed to the virtue of penitence, through which the vivification itself is manifested, because in contrition are perceived the signs of the expulsion of sin. If as in accomplished being, thus life can be manifested as to the intellect, and thus through captivating faith; or as to the affect, and thus through invigorating charity, or as to the effect, and thus through regulating justice. — And so the response is plain, why it is attributed to these, and the response to the objections, because life is not attributed to these as to a principle, but as to a manifestative; and such [things] can be several.

Doubt VI

Likewise it is asked about this definition of Augustine which he places in the text: Penitence is a certain vengeance of one grieving etc. For it seems to be said badly; because no one in the same case can be both defendant and judge¹⁸: therefore if anyone has sinned, he cannot reasonably punish himself. — Likewise, a man is more bound out of charity to love himself than another¹⁹; but a man ought to spare another, not to take vengeance on himself: therefore he ought not to take vengeance nor to exact vengeance of himself. — Likewise, vengeance is of God alone, as is said to the Romans twelve²⁰: Vengeance to me: therefore penitence is of God alone, or vengeance in penitence.

I respond: It must be said that this account is fitting: because penitence is a virtue ordered to the destruction of the old man²¹; and no one can begin a new life unless he repudiates the old; and no one can be made a friend of God unless he hates what God hates. Since therefore God hates sin with the hatred of vengeance, and [hates] the sinner himself; therefore the penitent ought to hate both the sin and to demand a reckoning²² of himself and vengeance.

To that, then, which is objected, that it does not pertain [to him]; it must be said that it does not pertain to him, insofar as he is the defendant, to judge; yet it pertains to him to be judged, insofar as he is the defendant, and to judge, insofar as he is just. Whence the reason itself, conformed to the eternal laws, punishes itself, inasmuch as it was conformed to the law of sin; and thus it receives authority from God, and it does not itself punish, but God. — Likewise, God has implanted in man a natural tribunal²³, to which he committed the kingdom of the soul to be judged; and free choice, conformed to it, ought to avenge transgression even in itself, not by its own authority, but by that of God and of the natural tribunal, which does not err. — When therefore it is said that the defendant and the judge are not the same, it is true: the same in the same respect.

What is objected, that he ought to spare; it must be said that although a man ought to spare his own injury; yet the injury of God is to be avenged by him to whom the care has been committed; and because the man has done injury to God, therefore he ought to be the minister of God²⁴ in this part.

From this the last point is plain, that vengeance is God's; it is true of the vengeance by which someone avenges himself, because no one ought to avenge himself, but he ought to avenge another of himself, or of another. — Or it must be said that it is God's as of the principal author, man's as of the minister.

Doubt VII

Likewise it is asked about this, that Augustine says: Let him always grieve and rejoice over the grief. For it seems to be said badly, because joy and grief are opposites; and «opposites are not naturally to be in the same [subject] at once»²⁵: therefore it is impossible that he always grieve and rejoice. If you should say that grief over sin and joy over grief do not have opposition; on the contrary: it seems that they do have opposition, because, whether of the same or of diverse [objects], it is impossible that the same soul be at once sorrowful and rejoicing: therefore it is impossible that he always grieve and rejoice²⁶. — Likewise, in grief the heart is moved according to constriction, in joy according to dilation; but «it cannot be moved by opposite motions at one and the same time»²⁷: therefore etc. If you should say that the joy is in a certain respect, and the grief absolutely; on the contrary: there is no virtue in which there is not delight, and if [it is] a virtue absolutely, there is delight absolutely; for virtue delights its possessor²⁸. — Likewise, joy is of the presence of a loved thing; therefore if the penitent greatly desires to grieve, it seems that if he greatly grieves, he rejoices absolutely.

I respond: It must be said that both are in the truly penitent, namely grief and joy; nor does the one diminish the other, but perfects [it]; just as to will to grieve or the desire of grief does not lessen the grief, but rather increases [it]; so also the joy. For in penitence, since it is a virtue, there is not only grief, but voluntary grief; and when anyone has what he loves and desires, he necessarily rejoices: therefore the penitent, when he has the grief which he desires, rejoices; nor does the joy remove the grief, but rather perfects [it], and there is grief and joy at once, just as Augustine says of himself in the fourth [book] of the Confessions²⁹, that «weeping alone was sweet to him», speaking of the dead friend, and this was on account of the vehemence of the grief; so also in the matter at hand.

As to what then is asked: how is it possible to be at once? it can be said that either they are not in the same power, but in diverse [powers], so that the grief be in the sensuality and the joy in the reason; and then there is nothing impossible, that one power rejoice over a grief existing in another³⁰. — Or it must be said that they are in the same power insofar as it turns upon itself; whence just as the intellective power turns upon the sin and upon the grief not with a simple act, but a composite one; so also the affect. Whence just as in reasoning we say that there is one act, yet the intellect turns itself upon several [things], which it knows in diverse ways; so also the consequent affect, without any repugnance, is affected in diverse ways. And thus the objections are plain³¹.

Doubt VIII

Likewise it is asked about this, that the Master says, that this: Penitence is a vengeance always punishing etc., is understood of the penitence of the perfect. For it seems to be said badly, because Augustine³² says that «if penitence is ended, nothing of pardon is left»: therefore to punish always pertains to all.

I respond: It must be said that one is called perfect in two ways: either as to duration of time, or as to sublimity of state. The first perfection is that which is co-divided against the beginners and the proficient according to advance in time³³. The other perfection consists in works of supererogation. But the Master understands of perfection in the first way and calls the penitence of the perfect that which lasts until the end of life; and of this he says that that [saying] of Augustine is understood, that it always punishes. — It must be noted, however, that it ought to punish always not absolutely, but so long as the fault lasts. And so that [saying] is plain³⁴.

Doubt IX

It must be noted upon this, that he says that solemn penitence is done outside the church, where four [things] are to be noted: first, of what kind it is, or what its form is; and it must be said that solemn penitence is penitence adding upon public [penitence], because it is not only in the open, but because it is done with a certain solemnity. For at the head of Lent the penitent is cast out of the church, nor is he admitted until the day of the [Lord's] Supper, and then too he does not communicate. He is cast out, moreover, by an authoritative person, such as by the bishop, the priests being present, who have known the fault.

Secondly there is to be noted a threefold reason of this solemnity: one is for the terror of others, another on account of the shame of the offender, and the third on account of the signification of the casting-out of Adam from paradise. Whence the bishop ought to announce this with frequent sighs, and so [the penitent] is cast out, just as Adam was cast out from paradise; and therefore it is not to be repeated. And concerning this it is had in the fiftieth distinction, in the chapter Poenitentes³⁵, and in the following chapter, and in the same distinction in the chapter Si quis post remissionem, in the paragraph Potest et aliter.

It must also be noted that this penitence is not imposed except for a grave and enormous fault, especially for a fault which has moved the whole city, as is said there³⁶. Nor is it to be imposed for priests on account of the reverence of the Order; public penitence may indeed be imposed for a manifest sin.

Fourthly it must be noted that the penitent is not solemnly reconciled except by the bishop, or by a priest by mandate of the bishop, especially in the article of necessity. He can, moreover, be reconciled on the octave of Easter, if he has repented well, and have entrance to the church; but if not, he will remain thus until the end of life: and concerning this it is said in Cause twenty-six, question six³⁷.

Doubt X

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says that this is not observed in certain Churches. For such Churches seem to sin, since they act against the rationale of the Sacrament and of the signification of solemn penitence.

I respond: It must be said that this is not of the necessity of penitence, but only of its well-being; yet, where there are hard peoples, this penitence is repeated for a cause, that the hardness may be broken by manifold confusion, which was not broken by a single one³⁸; and hardly could so prolonged a hidden penitence be imposed on such [people], that they would undertake or keep it: therefore such penitence is repeated for a cause.

Doubt XI

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: But that penitence be not done only once, but be frequently repeated. For it seems to be said badly, because upon that [text] of Amos one³⁹: For three crimes of Damascus and for four I will not convert him; the Gloss of Jerome: «To one committing the same sins a fourth time he declares that he will give neither penitence nor indulgence»: therefore it does not seem [to be] frequently, but only four times.

I respond: It must be said that Jerome⁴⁰ understands that the first sin is to consent in the heart, the second is to do [it] in deed, the third is to turn [it] into a custom, the fourth is finally not to repent; and of this he gives neither penitence nor pardon, because after death there is no place of penitence. From the other three he frees [him] and gives penitence and pardon at once, as is proven and intimated in the raising of the three dead, of whom one he raised in the house, another at the gate, and the third in the sepulcher⁴¹.

Doubt XII

Likewise it is asked about this, that Chrysostom says: Even if anyone arrives at the summit of evils. For it seems to be said badly, because no one is so evil but that he can still sin: therefore no one is so evil but that he can still become worse. — Likewise, in the Psalm⁴² it is said: The pride of those who hate you ascends always: therefore if it always grows, there is never a state as to the act.

I respond: It must be said that this can be understood according to the act, so that he be so evil that none [be] worse⁴³: it is not understood according to the potency. — Or let it be said that this is understood according to the genus of sin, that if anyone sins with a most enormous sin, still God is ready to spare, while [the man] is on the way; and this he calls the summit of evils: because it is an evil against divine grace, like fornication; and there is an evil against grace and reason, like perjury; and there is an evil against grace, reason, and nature, like sodomy, and that is the worst; or if any other genus of sin be worse, like blasphemy against God or the spirit of blasphemy⁴⁴.

Doubt XIII

Likewise it is asked about this, that Augustine says, that David sinned in the numbering of the people. That word of Augustine seems false, because Moses numbered the people, Numbers twenty-six⁴⁵, and likewise Saul, first [book] of Kings eleven; and yet neither sinned: therefore by parity of reasoning neither [did] David. — Likewise, David sinned: therefore the people ought not to have been punished, but rather he himself who had sinned.

I respond: To the first it must be said that Moses numbered by mandate of the Lord, and Saul on account of the expedition to battle; but David on account of pride; for he wished to glory in the numerous multitude of the people⁴⁶.

As to what is asked: why was the people punished? it is answered, on account of the connection of the people to the prince, on account of which also the children of Israel were punished in

peccato Achor [the sin of Achan], Joshua seven⁴⁷. — Or it can be said, and better, that the Lord punished the prince in the people, that he might be punished in the very [thing] in which he gloried, just as someone is punished in his own possession. — Some, however, judge⁴⁸ that by the just judgment of God it was permitted that those should be punished who had adhered to Absalom. — Yet there was a great figure and instruction in this, that by the sense of the figure it might be shown how much an evil prelate and his sin harms his subjects, and how much his prayer profits in [the prelate's] own penitence and sanctity⁴⁹.

Apparatus Criticus

1
Secundum Aristot., V. Phys. text. 10. (c. 2.). Vide tom. II. pag. 831, nota 7. — Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.
According to Aristotle, Physics V, text 10 (c. 2). See vol. II, p. 831, note 7. — See the scholion on the 1[st objection] of this article's question.
2
Edd. vivificatur. Superius pro sunt opposita cod. F sibi opposita.
The editions [read] vivificatur ("is vivified"). Above, for sunt opposita ("are opposites") codex F [reads] sibi opposita ("opposites to one another").
3
Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.
See here the text of the Master, c. 2.
4
Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quali, ubi recenset quatuor species qualitatum. Tertia complectitur passibiles qualitates et passiones (cfr. supra pag. 136, nota 3.). De passionibus ipse ait: Quaecumque vero ex iis quae facile solvuntur et cito transeunt, fiunt, passiones dicuntur, qualitates vero etc.
Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On Quality, where he reviews the four species of qualities. The third comprises passible qualities and passions (cf. above, p. 136, note 3). Concerning passions he himself says: But whatever come from those things which are easily dissolved and quickly pass, are called passions, but [stable] qualities etc.
5
Hic in lit. c. 2.
Here in the text, c. 2.
6
Cfr. infra d. 17. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. seq. — Superius pro et non est codd. sed non est, et pro non tamen edd. cum pluribus codd. non tantum.
Cf. below, d. 17, p. I, a. 2, q. 2 ff. — Above, for et non est ("and is not") codices [read] sed non est ("but is not"), and for non tamen ("yet not") the editions with several codices [read] non tantum ("not only").
7
Mox voci quod fere omnes codd. praemittunt ita, cod. aa in littera ita.
Soon, before the word quod nearly all the codices prefix ita, codex aa in the text [reads] ita.
8
Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2. — Superius post confertur cod. X. addit ut. — Idem dub. solvit B. Albert., hic a. 13; S. Thom., hic circa lit.
Cf. above, a. 1, q. 2. — Above, after confertur ("is conferred") codex X adds ut. — The same doubt is resolved by Blessed Albert, here a. 13; St. Thomas, here on the text.
9
August., Enarrat. in Ps. 63, 7. n. 11: Simulata innocentia non est innocentia, simulata aequitas non est aequitas, sed duplex iniquitas; quia et iniquitas est et simulatio.
Augustine, Enarration on Psalm 63, 7, n. 11: Feigned innocence is not innocence, feigned equity is not equity, but a double iniquity; because it is both iniquity and feigning.
10
Edd. qui.
The editions [read] qui.
11
Vide infra d. 16. p. I. dub. 9. De verbis seqq. cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. dub. 1, et Augustini, de Utilitate credendi, c. 11. n. 25.
See below, d. 16, p. I, dub. 9. On the following words cf. II Sentences, d. 39, dub. 1, and Augustine, On the Usefulness of Believing, c. 11, n. 25.
12
Idem dub. solvit B. Albert., hic a. 16; S. Thom., hic circa lit.
The same doubt is resolved by Blessed Albert, here a. 16; St. Thomas, here on the text.
13
Cfr. Aristot., II. Poster. c. 10. (c. 9.); I. Topic. c. 5; VII. Metaph. text. 33. et 43. (VI. c. 10. seq.). — Vers. 22: In iustitia sua, quam... vivet. Verba et non morietur habentur v. 28. — Hebr. 10, vers. 38: Iustus autem meus ex fide vivit; Habac. 2, 4: Iustus autem in fide sua vivet.
Cf. Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] II, c. 10 (c. 9); Topics I, c. 5; Metaphysics VII, text 33 and 43 (VI, c. 10 f.). — [Ezekiel 18] verse 22: In his justice, which... he shall live. The words and shall not die are had in v. 28. — Hebrews 10, verse 38: But my just one lives by faith; Habakkuk 2:4: But the just one shall live in his faith.
14
Epist. 140; (alias 120.) c. 24. n. 61; in Ioan. Evang. tr. 9. n. 8, et de Substantia dilectionis (inter opera August.), c. 6. Verba Hug. vide tom. III. pag. 596, nota 4.
[Augustine] Epistle 140 (alias 120) c. 24, n. 61; on John's Gospel, tract. 9, n. 8, and On the Substance of Love (among the works of Augustine), c. 6. For the words of Hugh see vol. III, p. 596, note 4.
15
Cfr. tom. II. pag. 641, nota 7, et Bernard., Serm. 16. de Diversis, n. 1. seqq.
Cf. vol. II, p. 641, note 7, and Bernard, Sermon 16 On Various [Subjects], n. 1 ff.
16
Secundum quod Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 37. (c. 4.) dicit: Ipsum autem vivere viventibus esse est. Cfr. ibid. text. 16. 13. et 24. (c. 1. et 2.).
According as Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 37 (c. 4) says: But to live itself is to be for living things. Cf. ibid., text 16, 13, and 24 (c. 1 and 2).
17
Vide III. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. ad 3.
See III Sentences, d. 27, a. 1, q. 3, ad 3.
18
Cfr. L. 1. ff. Ne quis in sua causa, ex quo hoc axioma: Iudex in causa propria quis minime esse potest.
Cf. Law 1, Digest, That no one [be judge] in his own case, whence this axiom: No one can in the least be a judge in his own case.
19
Cfr. III. Sent. d. 29. q. 3. — De minori, in qua non vindicare ex cod. H supplevimus se, cfr. Levit. 19, 18.
Cf. III Sentences, d. 29, q. 3. — Concerning the minor, in which to non vindicare ("not to avenge") we have supplied se ("himself") from codex H, cf. Leviticus 19:18.
20
Vers. 19. In recentioribus edd. Vulgatae vindicta.
Verse 19. In the more recent editions of the Vulgate, vindicta ("vengeance").
21
Vide supra p. I. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 1.
See above, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, fundamentum 1.
22
Codd. FGHLOUV ultionem, cod. R rationem rei. Mox post non pertinet codd. E L supplent ad ipsum. Aliquanto inferius pro se ipsum et non ipsa codd. se ipsum et non ipse.
Codices FGHLOUV [read] ultionem ("retribution"), codex R rationem rei ("a reckoning of the matter"). Soon after non pertinet codices E L supply ad ipsum. Somewhat below, for se ipsum and non ipsa codices [read] se ipsum and non ipse.
23
Vide tom. II. pag. 901, nota 2.
See vol. II, p. 901, note 2.
24
Respicitur Rom. 13, 4. — Superius pro cura, quod edd. omittunt, cod. aa causa. — De accusativo iniuriam cfr. Forcellini, Lexicon etc.
Reference is to Romans 13:4. — Above, for cura ("care"), which the editions omit, codex aa [reads] causa ("cause"). — On the accusative iniuriam cf. Forcellini, Lexicon etc.
25
Secundum Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 4. (c. 14.).
According to Aristotle, On Interpretation II, c. 4 (c. 14).
26
Idem dub. solvit Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 12. m. 1. a. 2. § 2. in fine; B. Albert., hic a. 25.
The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. IV, q. 12, m. 1, a. 2, § 2, at the end; Blessed Albert, here a. 25.
27
Secundum Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 4. (c. 14.). — Aristot., IX. Ethic. c. 4. dicit, quod «fieri nequeat, ut simul doleat et laetetur quispiam».
According to Aristotle, On Interpretation II, c. 4 (c. 14). — Aristotle, Ethics IX, c. 4, says that «it cannot happen that anyone should at once grieve and be glad».
28
Arist., VIII. Phys. text. 71. (c. 8.), et II. de Anima, text. 147. (III. c. 2.). — De maiori cfr. Avicenna, de Viribus cordis, tr. 1. c. 7, ubi dicit: Tristitia, quam quidam vocant constrictionem [Graece συστολήν] pectoris sive cordis... laetitia, quam quidam appellant dilatationem [Graece διαστολήν] pectoris sive cordis.
Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 71 (c. 8), and On the Soul II, text 147 (III, c. 2). — On the major cf. Avicenna, On the Powers of the Heart, tr. 1, c. 7, where he says: Sorrow, which some call the constriction [Greek systolē] of the breast or heart... gladness, which some name the dilation [Greek diastolē] of the breast or heart.
29
Hug. a S. Vict., Qq. in Epist. ad Gal. 5, 22, q. 56: Virtutes petendae sunt propter se, quia possessores suos sincera delectatione delectant [S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. haec verba tribuit Glossae interlineari in hunc loc.]. Cfr. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 8; II. c. 3, et II. Magnor. Moral. c. 8. (c. 7.).
Hugh of St. Victor, Questions on the Epistle to the Galatians 5:22, q. 56: Virtues are to be sought for their own sake, because they delight their possessors with a sincere delight [St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2, attributes these words to the interlinear Gloss on this passage]. Cf. Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 8; II, c. 3, and the Greater Morals II, c. 8 (c. 7).
30
Cap. 4. n. 9: Solus fletus erat dulcis mihi et successerat amico meo in deliciis animi mei. Cfr. c. 7. n. 12.
[Confessions IV] c. 4, n. 9: Weeping alone was sweet to me and had succeeded my friend in the delights of my mind. Cf. c. 7, n. 12.
31
Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 2. a. 2. § 2. in fine affert quandam Glossam (cfr. Glossa ordinaria in Levit. 1, 1, sumta ex Origene, Homil. 2. n. 2, in qua distinctio ponitur inter animam et spiritum): Anima dolet, spiritus gaudet. Vide etiam III. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 2, ubi similis de dolore Christi quaestio solvitur. — Mox pro se convertitur multi codd. se convertit [se].
Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. IV, q. 17, m. 2, a. 2, § 2, at the end, adduces a certain Gloss (cf. the ordinary Gloss on Leviticus 1:1, taken from Origen, Homily 2, n. 2, in which a distinction is set between soul and spirit): The soul grieves, the spirit rejoices. See also III Sentences, d. 16, a. 2, q. 2, where a similar question concerning the grief of Christ is resolved. — Soon, for se convertitur many codices [read] se convertit [se].
32
Praeter Alex. Hal. et S. Thom., locc. citt., idem dub. solvit B. Albert., hic a. 26; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.
Besides Alexander of Hales and St. Thomas, at the cited places, the same doubt is resolved by Blessed Albert, here a. 26; Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text.
33
Libr. de Vera et falsa Poenitentia (inter opera August.), c. 13. n. 28. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. circa finem.
The book On True and False Penitence (among the works of Augustine), c. 13, n. 28. See here the text of the Master, c. 2, near the end.
34
Cfr. Gregor., XXIV. Moral. c. 11. n. 28; et Epist. ad Fratres de Monte Dei (inter opera Bernard.) c. 5. n. 12. Post incipientes cod. Y addit et.
Cf. Gregory, Morals XXIV, c. 11, n. 28; and the Epistle to the Brethren of Mont-Dieu (among the works of Bernard) c. 5, n. 12. After incipientes codex Y adds et.
35
Idem dub. solvit B. Albert., hic a. 27; S. Thom., hic circa lit. — Cap. 63. — Seq. cap. incipit In capite Quadragesimae, in quo exponuntur, quae observanda sint in solemni poenitentia (scil. ea quae paulo superius a S. Bonav. allata sunt). Tertio cap. Si quis post remissionem (61.) Gratianus haec adiunxit: Potest et aliter intelligi. Est quaedam poenitentia, quae solemnis appellatur, quae semel tantum in Ecclesia conceditur, de qua Ambrosius ait: Sicut unum baptisma etc. (cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.).
The same doubt is resolved by Blessed Albert, here a. 27; St. Thomas, here on the text. — Chapter 63. — The following chapter begins In capite Quadragesimae, in which are expounded the things to be observed in solemn penitence (namely those things which were adduced a little above by St. Bonaventure). To the third chapter Si quis post remissionem (61) Gratian added these words: It can also be understood otherwise. There is a certain penitence which is called solemn, which is granted only once in the Church, of which Ambrose says: Just as [there is] one baptism etc. (cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3).
36
A codd. allegatur 26. Causa, quaest. 6. c. ultimo, in quo solum dicitur, quod presbyter, inconsulto episcopo, non reconciliet poenitentem, nisi ultima necessitas cogat; et quod ei, cuius crimen publicum et vulgatissimum est, ita ut universam commoverit Ecclesiam (alias: urbem), ante absidam manus imponatur (cfr. paulo inferius).
By the codices is alleged Cause 26, q. 6, the last chapter, in which it is only said that a presbyter, without consulting the bishop, should not reconcile a penitent, unless extreme necessity compel; and that for him whose crime is public and most notorious, so that it has moved the whole Church (alternatively: city), let the hand be imposed before the apse (cf. a little below).
37
Cap. Placuit ut poenitentes (68.), § 2. d. 50. et C. Presbyter, inconsulto episcopo (14.). C. 26. q. 6. (Cfr. nota praeced.). — De seq. propos. cfr. C. Confirmandum est (63.). seqq. d. 50. — Cfr. etiam ibid. q. 7. et C. In capite Quadragesimae (64.). d. 50. — Codd. et edd. 18. (edd. 28.) quaest. 2. — Idem dub. solvit Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 14. m. 6. a. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 28; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 5; Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica a. 6. quaestiunc. 2; Richard. a Med., hic n. 11.
The chapter Placuit ut poenitentes (68), § 2, d. 50, and the chapter Presbyter, inconsulto episcopo (14). Cause 26, q. 6 (cf. the preceding note). — On the following proposition cf. the chapter Confirmandum est (63) ff., d. 50. — Cf. also ibid. q. 7 and the chapter In capite Quadragesimae (64), d. 50. — Codices and editions [read] 18 (editions 28), q. 2. — The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. IV, q. 14, m. 6, a. 3; Blessed Albert, here a. 28; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 5; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 6, quaestiuncula 2; Richard of Mediavilla, here n. 11.
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Ita cod. K, alii et edd. confundebatur. In fine simul. pro ex causa codd. IK in Ecclesia. — Idem dub. solvit Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 14. m. 6. a. 2; S. Thom., hic circa lit.
Thus codex K; the others and the editions [read] confundebatur. At the end likewise, for ex causa codices IK [read] in Ecclesia. — The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. IV, q. 14, m. 6, a. 2; St. Thomas, here on the text.
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Vers. 3. — Glossa sumta est ex primo Prologo super Amos, qui incipit Ozias rex, et apud Lyranum tribuitur Hieronymo, ubi pro committenti ponitur admittentibus [cod. G committentibus] et annuntiat pro denuntiat.
Verse 3. — The Gloss is taken from the first Prologue on Amos, which begins Ozias rex, and in Lyra is attributed to Jerome, where for committenti is put admittentibus [codex G committentibus] and annuntiat for denuntiat.
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In Amos 1, 3; iuxta tropologiam vero hoc possumus dicere: primum peccatum est cogitasse quae mala sunt; secundum, cogitationibus acquievisse perversis; tertium, quod mente decreveris, opere complesse; quartum, post peccatum non agere poenitentiam et in suo sibi complacere delicto. Cfr. nota seq.
On Amos 1:3; but according to the tropology we can say this: the first sin is to have thought the things that are evil; the second, to have acquiesced in the perverse thoughts; the third, to have completed in deed what you have decreed in mind; the fourth, after the sin not to do penitence and to take complacency in one's own offense. Cf. the following note.
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Cfr. Matth. 9, 23. seqq.; Luc. 7, 12. seqq.; Ioan. 11, 38. seqq. Vide August., in Ioan. Evang. tr. 49. n. 3; Serm. 98. (alias 44. de Verbis Domini) c. 4. n. 4. seqq., et Serm. 128. (alias 43. de Verbis Domini) c. 12. n. 14, ubi tres mortuos (a Christo resuscitatos) comparat cum tribus generibus peccatorum, scil. qui peccant cogitatione, opere et consuetudine. Cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XVI. c. 1. — Idem dub. solvit Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 14. m. 5. a. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 29.
Cf. Matthew 9:23 ff.; Luke 7:12 ff.; John 11:38 ff. See Augustine, On John's Gospel, tract. 49, n. 3; Sermon 98 (alias 44, On the Words of the Lord) c. 4, n. 4 ff., and Sermon 128 (alias 43, On the Words of the Lord) c. 12, n. 14, where he compares the three dead (raised by Christ) with the three kinds of sinners, namely those who sin in thought, in deed, and in custom. Cf. below the text of the Master, d. XVI, c. 1. — The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. IV, q. 14, m. 5, a. 3; Blessed Albert, here a. 29.
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Psalm. 73, 23.
Psalm 73:23.
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Cfr. II. Sent. d. 34. a. 2. q. 1. in fine corp. Vide ibid. a. 1. q. 1. — Cod. bb addit secundum actum.
Cf. II Sentences, d. 34, a. 2, q. 1, at the end of the body. See ibid. a. 1, q. 1. — Codex bb adds secundum actum ("according to act").
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Vide II. Sent. d. 43. a. 2. q. 1. seq. de peccatis in Spiritum S. — Idem dub. solvit B. Albert., hic a. 31; S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.
See II Sentences, d. 43, a. 2, q. 1 ff., on sins against the Holy Spirit. — The same doubt is resolved by Blessed Albert, here a. 31; St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text.
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Vers. 2. — Seq. locus est I. Reg. 11, 8. — Inferius post Item cod. R addit si.
Verse 2. — The following passage is I Kings [1 Samuel] 11:8. — Below, after Item codex R adds si.
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Cfr. II. Reg. 24, 1. seqq. et I. Paralip. 21, 1. seqq.
Cf. II Kings [2 Samuel] 24:1 ff. and I Chronicles 21:1 ff.
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Vers. 1. Cfr. ibid. 22, 20, et I. Paralip. 2, 7. Vide August., Qq. in Iosue 9, 8. Cum codd. scribimus Achor, quod secundum Hieron., de Hebr. Nominib. ex libr. Iosue, significat turbationem vel tumultum. Cfr. Petr. Comestor, Hist. scholast. libri Iosue, c. 6: Porro Achor vel Achar [alias Achim], filius Charmi etc.
Verse 1. Cf. ibid. 22:20, and I Chronicles 2:7. See Augustine, Questions on Joshua 9, 8. With the codices we write Achor, which according to Jerome, On Hebrew Names from the book of Joshua, signifies disturbance or tumult. Cf. Peter Comestor, Scholastic History of the book of Joshua, c. 6: Now Achor or Achar [alias Achim], son of Charmi etc.
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Petr. Comestor, Hist. scholast. II. Reg. c. 23. in additione 1. ait: Hebraeus dicit sic: Iam Dominus sumsit vindictam de David propter mortem Uriae in persecutione filii sui Absalom, sed nondum de populo et principibus, qui ei non contradixerant; unde modo voluit vindicare contra Israel, id est contra populum etc.
Peter Comestor, Scholastic History on II Kings [2 Samuel], c. 23, in addition 1, says: The Hebrew says thus: Already the Lord had taken vengeance on David for the death of Uriah in the persecution by his son Absalom, but not yet on the people and the princes, who had not contradicted him; whence now he wished to take vengeance against Israel, that is, against the people etc.
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Cfr. Gregor., XXV. Moral. c. 16. n. 35. — Edd. et severitate. — Idem dub. solvit B. Albert., hic a. 34; S. Thom., hic circa lit.
Cf. Gregory, Morals XXV, c. 16, n. 35. — The editions [read] et severitate ("and severity"). — The same doubt is resolved by Blessed Albert, here a. 34; St. Thomas, here on the text.