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Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 26

Textus Latinus
p. 563

Quaestio IV. Utrum virtus spei aliquando sit informis, an semper sit formata.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum virtus spei aliquando sit informis, an semper sit formata. Et quod semper formata, videtur:

1. Primo per definitionem spei1: « Spes est certa exspectatio futurae beatitudinis proveniens ex gratia et meritis »; sed impossibile est, definitum separari a definientibus: ergo impossibile est, spem separari a meritis et gratia. Sed quando cum his est, semper est formata: ergo impossibile est, spem virtutem esse informem.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per illud quod dicit Magister in littera2: « Sine meritis aliquid sperare non spes, sed praesumtio dici potest »: sed praesumtio est vitium oppositum spei: ergo meritis absentibus, immediate subintrat vitium ipsi spei oppositum. Sed vitium oppositum virtuti non tantum excludit eam quantum ad eius formale, sed etiam quantum ad habitum substratum: ergo videtur, absentibus meritis, nihil remaneat de virtute spei: ergo non potest fieri informis.

3. Item, fides consistit partim in affectu, partim in intellectu, caritas autem consistit simpliciter in affectu3; sed facta deordinatione in affectu per peccatum, simpliciter tollitur caritas, quamvis non simpliciter tollatur fides, cum aliquid habeat ex parte intellectus — unde caritas non potest esse informis, quemadmodum fides potest esse informis — ergo si spes se totaliter tenet ex parte affectus, sicut et caritas, videtur etc.

4. Item, virtus fidei tunc est formata, quando non tantum credit Deo, sed etiam in Deum — quando enim credulitas iuncta est cum tendentia, tunc fides est virtus formata4 — sed impossibile est, quod aliquis speret, quin tendat in rem speratam — nam ipsum sperare tendere est — ergo videtur, quod spes semper sit virtus formata.

p. 564

Sed contra: 1. Augustinus in libro de Vera Innocentia5: « Cum ceterae virtutes sint bonis et malis communes, dilectio Dei et proximi proprie bonorum est atque piorum »: ergo virtus spei potest esse communis bonis et malis; sed mali non habent virtutem cum gratia, sed sine; et tales sunt virtutes informes: ergo etc.

2. Item, sicut se habet fides formata ad spem formatam, ita se habet fides informis ad spem informem; sed fides formata generat spem formatam: ergo fides informis generat spem informem6.

3. Item, sicut spes consurgit ex fide praemiorum, sic timor consurgit ex fide suppliciorum; sed timor potest esse informis et formatus7: ergo et spes.

4. Item, multi sunt peccatores, qui sperant, se adhuc acturos poenitentiam et assecuturos veniam et perventuros ad gloriam; constat, quod illud non est malum, immo potius ordinat ad bonum et excludit malum, videlicet desperationem; sed si hoc esset cum gratia, esset actus virtutis formatae: ergo cum sine gratia possit illud remanere, ut aliquis per merita speret se perventurum ad gloriam; videtur, quod ipsa virtus spei possit esse informis8.

Conclusio.

Virtus spei potest esse informis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio virtus spei potest esse informis. — Potest enim aliquis sperare vitam aeternam sine gratia gratum faciente, sicut manifeste apparet. Et iterum, ille actus sperandi ab aliquo habitu procedit, qui quidem habitus bonus est et tenet etiam quodam modo rationem virtutis, pro eo quod potentiam, quam perficit, quodam modo rectificat et vigorat. Rectificat quidem, dum aliquam inclinationem et ordinem9 tribuit ad gloriam tanquam ad finem ultimum, ubi standum et in quo quiescendum. Vigorat etiam in hoc, quod elevat potentiam ad aeterna bona exspectanda et quandam stabilitatem ei tribuit, ne per desperationem succumbat. Et ideo, sicut fides absque caritate virtus informis est, quia tribuit animae quandam rectitudinem et vigorem, qui compleri habet et perfici per gratiae infusionem; sic intelligendum est et circa ipsam spem. Unde et cetera, quae dicta sunt de fide informi10, possunt spei

p. 565

informi applicari. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, spei virtutem posse fieri informem.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod spes procedit ex meritis; dicendum, quod quadrupliciter potest aliquis exire in actum sperandi. Aut enim sperat habendo merita in proposito et in radice et in effectu, sicut homo iustus, qui diu Deo servivit. Aut sperat habendo merita in proposito et in radice, non tamen in effectu, sicut ille qui ante bonum usum virtutum, postquam suscepit gratiam, exspectat aeternam beatitudinem. Aut sperat habendo merita in proposito tantum, non in radice nec in effectu, sicut ille qui peccator est, qui proponit multa bona facere et per illa salvari. Aut sperat non habendo merita nec in effectu nec in radice nec in proposito, sicut ille qui faciendo mala et in malis proponens perseverare, per solam Dei misericordiam credit, se assecuturum gloriam, neglecta divina iustitia. Primus actus est spei formatae et iam exercitatae; secundus actus est spei formatae et primo infusae; tertius actus est spei informis; et quartus est ipsius praesumtionis11. Cum ergo dicitur, quod spes procedit ex gratia et meritis; dicendum, quod aut definitur ibi spes, prout est virtus formata, et sic nulla est obiectio de spe informi; aut si definitur ibi spes generaliter, secundum quod est virtus, dicitur procedere ex gratia et meritis, quae quidem vel habentur in re, vel habentur in proposito; et sic non est instantia de spe informi.

2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, iam patet responsio per illud quod nunc dictum est. Quod enim dicit Magister, quod sperare sine meritis est praesumere; hoc intelligit, quando aliquis sperat sine meritis non solum in re, sed etiam in proposito; et hoc modo sperare non pertinet ad spem informem, sed ad praesumtionem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides ideo potest fieri informis, quia habet aliquid ex parte intellectus et aliquid ex parte affectus; dicendum, quod ista non est tota ratio, sed haec est ratio, quia habitus fidei habet aliquam rectitudinem et vigorem in hoc, quod facit credere omnia credibilia et excludit errorem et infidelitatem, qui quidem vigor potest esse absque gratia gratum faciente: et hoc est reperire in spe, quae facit vitare praesumtionem et desperationem et exspectare omnia exspectanda. Et quia ista ratio reperitur communis utrobique, ideo potest spes esse informis, sicut et ipsa fides; secus autem est de caritate, sicut infra12 videbitur suo loco. Ideo ratio non concludebat, quia non-causam accipiebat pro causa.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spes semper habet secum adiunctam tendentiam; dicendum, quod tendentia duplex est. Quaedam enim est tendentia plena; et ista est a gratia operante et cooperante13, et haec facit, virtutem esse formatam. Quaedam autem est tendentia exilis et semiplena, sicut dicitur de pigro, quod vult et non vult piger14. Et ista quidem tendentia potest dare aliquam rectitudinem et vigorem ipsi voluntati et sortitur nomen virtutis generaliter acceptae, non virtutis gratuitae; et ideo tenet rationem virtutis informis, non rationem virtutis formatae. Cum autem dicitur, quod tendentia in Deum facit credulitatem esse formatam; hoc intelligitur de tendentia, quae est a voluntate plenaria. Haec autem non potest esse nec in spe nec in fide sine gratia.

English Translation

Question IV. Whether the virtue of hope is sometimes unformed, or is always formed.

Fourthly it is asked, whether the virtue of hope is sometimes unformed, or is always formed. And that it is always formed, it seems:

1. First, through the definition of hope1: « Hope is the certain expectation of future beatitude proceeding from grace and merits »; but it is impossible for the thing defined to be separated from the defining terms: therefore it is impossible for hope to be separated from merits and grace. But when it is with these, it is always formed: therefore it is impossible for the virtue of hope to be unformed.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown through that which the Master says in the text2: « To hope for anything without merits cannot be called hope, but presumption »: but presumption is a vice opposed to hope: therefore, with merits absent, the vice opposed to hope itself immediately enters in. But a vice opposed to a virtue excludes it not only as to its formal element, but also as to the underlying habit: therefore it seems that, with merits absent, nothing remains of the virtue of hope: therefore it cannot become unformed.

3. Likewise, faith consists partly in the affection, partly in the intellect, but charity consists simply in the affection3; but when disorder is brought about in the affection through sin, charity is simply taken away, although faith is not simply taken away, since it has something on the side of the intellect — whence charity cannot be unformed, just as faith can be unformed — therefore if hope holds itself wholly on the side of the affection, just as charity does, it seems, etc.

4. Likewise, the virtue of faith is then formed, when it not only believes God, but also believes into God — for when belief is joined with a tending, then faith is a formed virtue4 — but it is impossible that anyone should hope without tending toward the thing hoped for — for to hope itself is to tend — therefore it seems that hope is always a formed virtue.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine in the book On True Innocence5: « Since the other virtues are common to the good and the evil, the love of God and of neighbor properly belongs to the good and the pious »: therefore the virtue of hope can be common to the good and the evil; but the evil do not have virtue with grace, but without; and such are unformed virtues: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, as formed faith stands to formed hope, so unformed faith stands to unformed hope; but formed faith generates formed hope: therefore unformed faith generates unformed hope6.

3. Likewise, as hope arises from faith in rewards, so fear arises from faith in punishments; but fear can be unformed and formed7: therefore hope also.

4. Likewise, there are many sinners who hope that they will yet do penance and obtain pardon and arrive at glory; it is evident that this is not evil, but rather is ordered toward the good and excludes evil, namely despair; but if this were with grace, it would be an act of a formed virtue: therefore, since without grace it can remain that someone, through merits, should hope to arrive at glory; it seems that the virtue of hope itself can be unformed8.

Conclusion.

The virtue of hope can be unformed.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt the virtue of hope can be unformed. — For someone can hope for eternal life without grace that makes pleasing, as manifestly appears. And again, that act of hoping proceeds from some habit, which habit indeed is good and also holds in some way the character of a virtue, for the reason that it in some way rectifies and invigorates the power which it perfects. It rectifies indeed, while it bestows some inclination and order9 toward glory as toward the ultimate end, where one must stand and in which one must rest. It also invigorates in this, that it elevates the power for the expecting of eternal goods and bestows on it a certain stability, lest it succumb through despair. And therefore, just as faith without charity is an unformed virtue, because it bestows on the soul a certain rectitude and vigor which has to be completed and perfected through the infusion of grace; so it must be understood also concerning hope itself. Whence also the other things which have been said of unformed faith10 can

be applied to unformed hope. — The reasons therefore showing that the virtue of hope can become unformed must be conceded.

1. But to that which is objected to the contrary, that hope proceeds from merits; it must be said that in four ways someone can go forth into the act of hoping. For either he hopes having merits in purpose and in root and in effect, like the just man who has long served God. Or he hopes having merits in purpose and in root, but not in effect, like the one who, before the good use of the virtues, after he has received grace, awaits eternal beatitude. Or he hopes having merits in purpose only, not in root nor in effect, like the one who is a sinner, who purposes to do many good things and to be saved through them. Or he hopes having merits neither in effect nor in root nor in purpose, like the one who, doing evil things and purposing to persevere in evils, believes through God's mercy alone that he will obtain glory, with divine justice disregarded. The first act is of hope formed and already exercised; the second act is of hope formed and first infused; the third act is of unformed hope; and the fourth is of presumption itself11. When therefore it is said that hope proceeds from grace and merits; it must be said that either hope is there defined insofar as it is a formed virtue, and thus there is no objection concerning unformed hope; or if hope is there defined generally, insofar as it is a virtue, it is said to proceed from grace and merits, which indeed are had either in reality or are had in purpose; and thus there is no counter-instance concerning unformed hope.

2. To that which is objected in the second place, the response is now clear through that which has just been said. For as to what the Master says, that to hope without merits is to presume; he understands this when someone hopes without merits not only in reality, but also in purpose; and to hope in this way does not pertain to unformed hope, but to presumption.

3. To that which is objected, that faith can therefore become unformed because it has something on the side of the intellect and something on the side of the affection; it must be said that this is not the whole ground, but this is the ground, that the habit of faith has some rectitude and vigor in this, that it makes one believe all things believable and excludes error and unbelief, which vigor indeed can be without grace that makes pleasing: and this is to be found in hope, which makes one avoid presumption and despair and await all things to be awaited. And because this ground is found common on both sides, therefore hope can be unformed, just as faith itself; but it is otherwise concerning charity, as will be seen below12 in its proper place. Therefore the argument did not conclude, because it took a non-cause for a cause.

4. To that which is objected, that hope always has joined with it a tending; it must be said that tending is twofold. For one kind is full tending; and this is from operating and cooperating grace13, and this makes the virtue to be formed. But another kind is slight and half-full tending, as is said of the sluggard, that the sluggard wills and wills not14. And this tending indeed can give some rectitude and vigor to the will itself and obtains the name of virtue generally taken, not of gratuitous virtue; and therefore it holds the character of an unformed virtue, not the character of a formed virtue. But when it is said that the tending into God makes belief to be formed; this is understood of the tending which is from a full will. But this can be neither in hope nor in faith without grace.

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1, et in IV. dist. 2. — Subinde in minori pro definientibus [scil. partibus] codd. A B V et edd. 1, 2 definitionibus, cod. N definitione [in Supplemento Summae Alex. Hal. collat. 56. a. 1: impossibile est, definitionem separari a definito]. De ipsa minori cfr. Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 1. — Paulo superius post Et quod edd. cum paucis codd. interserunt sit. — (P. 563, n. 3.)
    Here in the text of the Master, c. 1, and in IV Sent., dist. 2. — Then in the minor, for definientibus [namely the parts] codd. A B V and edd. 1, 2 read definitionibus, cod. N definitione [in the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 56, a. 1: it is impossible for the definition to be separated from the thing defined]. On the minor itself cf. Aristotle, Topics VI, c. 1. — A little above, after Et quod the editions, with a few codices, insert sit. — (P. 563, n. 3.)
  2. Hic c. 1. — Inferius pro eius formale edd. eius formam. — (P. 563, n. 4.)
    Here, c. 1. — Below, for eius formale ("its formal element") the editions read eius formam ("its form"). — (P. 563, n. 4.)
  3. Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. et infra d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. circa finem corp. Ibid. q. 4. ostenditur, caritatem non posse esse informem. De fide informi vide supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Quod spes se teneat ex parte affectus, docetur hic a. 2. q. 5. — (P. 563, n. 5.)
    Cf. above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 2, and below, d. 27, a. 1, q. 3, near the end of the body. There, q. 4, it is shown that charity cannot be unformed. On unformed faith see above, d. 23, a. 2, q. 1 ff. — That hope holds itself on the side of the affection is taught here, a. 2, q. 5. — (P. 563, n. 5.)
  4. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIII. c. 4, et Comment. dub. 3. — (P. 563, n. 6.)
    See above, the text of the Master, d. XXIII, c. 4, and the Commentary, dub. 3. — (P. 563, n. 6.) Footnote markers continue with a new per-page sequence on p. 564 (Sed contra onward). The body markers `5`–`11` resolve to p.564 footers n.1–7.
  5. Num. 7. Cfr. supra pag. 487, nota 1. — Circa finem arg. post sed sine codd. F T supplent gratia. — (P. 564, n. 1.)
    N. 7. Cf. above, p. 487, note 1. — Near the end of the argument, after sed sine codd. F T supply gratia. — (P. 564, n. 1.)
  6. Vide verba Bernardi, supra pag. 561, nota 6. — (P. 564, n. 2.)
    See the words of Bernard, above, p. 561, note 6. — (P. 564, n. 2.)
  7. Cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. 1. seqq., et Comment. p. II. per totam. — (P. 564, n. 3.)
    Cf. below, the text of the Master, d. XXXIV, c. 1 ff., and the Commentary, pars II, throughout. — (P. 564, n. 3.)
  8. Vide August., Enchirid. c. 117. n. 31. — (P. 564, n. 4.)
    See Augustine, Enchiridion c. 117, n. 31. — (P. 564, n. 4.)
  9. Edd. ordinationem et inclinationem; sed codd. H K inclinationem et ordinationem. — (P. 564, n. 5.)
    The editions read ordinationem et inclinationem ("ordering and inclination"); but codd. H K read inclinationem et ordinationem ("inclination and ordering"). — (P. 564, n. 5.)
  10. Supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Paulo superius pro rectitudinem codd. Z bb rectificationem, et subinde pro qui edd. quae. — (P. 564, n. 6.)
    Above, d. 23, a. 2, q. 1 ff. — A little above, for rectitudinem ("rectitude") codd. Z bb read rectificationem ("rectification"), and then for qui the editions read quae. — (P. 564, n. 6.)
  11. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 65. m. 1. ad 4. sic distinguit: Spe igitur formata confidit quis ex meritis existentibus actu vel habitu; spe informi confidit quis sine meritis existentibus actu vel habitu, existentibus tamen in potentia; quamvis enim non habeat merita actu vel habitu, tamen confidit, quia potest habere; praesumtio vero confidit sine meritis omnino vel actu, vel habitu, vel in potentia existentibus. — Paulo superius Vat. omittit et primo infusae, quae verba habentur in codd. A K M U Z, dum in aliis codd. et in edd. 1, 2 legitur et post infusae, quibus verbis cod. C addit et non exercitatae. — (P. 564, n. 7.)
    Alexander of Hales, Summa, pars III, q. 65, m. 1, ad 4, distinguishes thus: By formed hope, then, one trusts from merits existing in act or in habit; by unformed hope one trusts without merits existing in act or in habit, yet existing in potency; for although he may not have merits in act or in habit, nevertheless he trusts, because he can have them; but presumption trusts without merits existing at all, whether in act, or in habit, or in potency. — A little above, the Vatican edition omits et primo infusae ("and first infused"), which words are had in codd. A K M U Z, while in other codices and in edd. 1, 2 et is read after infusae, to which words cod. C adds et non exercitatae ("and not exercised"). — (P. 564, n. 7.) Footnote markers continue with a new per-page sequence on p. 565 (the Respondeo's Ad-replies tail). The body markers `12`–`14` resolve to p.565 footers n.1–3. Hand-off forwarded to q5: q4 takes p.565 footers n.1–3; q5 begins at p.565 n.4 (Vers. 38).
  12. Dist. 27. a. 1. q. 4. — De fallacia non-causa ut causa cfr. Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.). — Paulo ante pro et hoc est edd. et hunc est. In initio solut. pro fides ideo potest codd. A U fides non potest. — (P. 565, n. 1.)
    Dist. 27, a. 1, q. 4. — On the fallacy of non-cause as cause cf. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations I, c. 4 (c. 5). — A little before, for et hoc est the editions read et hunc est. At the beginning of the solution, for fides ideo potest codd. A U read fides non potest. — (P. 565, n. 1.)
  13. Prov. 13, 4. — De gratia operante et cooperante cfr. II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXVII. c. 4, et Comment. ibid. a. 1. q. 1. atque dub. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 65. m. 1. ad 3: Respondendum, quod est voluntas plena et voluntas semiplena sive imperfecta. Voluntas imperfecta designatur per optativum modum, ut cum dicitur vellem; voluntas perfecta per indicativum, ut cum dicitur volo, desidero. Voluntas imperfecta sive semiplena concomitatur spem informem, voluntas vero perfecta spem formatam. Inde est, quod proprie non potest dici de existenti in peccato mortali, quod vult tendere in beatitudinem, sed quod vellet; secundum quem modum dicitur Prov. 13. de pigro: Vult et non vult piger; anima autem operantium etc. — Circa finem solut. cod. Y verbo formatam praemittit perfectam et, cod. W perfectam, sine et. — (P. 565, n. 2.)
    Prov. 13:4. — On operating and cooperating grace cf. II Sent., the text of the Master, d. XXVII, c. 4, and the Commentary there, a. 1, q. 1, and dub. 1. — Alexander of Hales, Summa, pars III, q. 65, m. 1, ad 3: It must be answered that there is a full will and a half-full or imperfect will. The imperfect will is designated by the optative mood, as when one says I would will; the perfect will by the indicative, as when one says I will, I desire. The imperfect or half-full will accompanies unformed hope, but the perfect will formed hope. Hence it is that, properly, it cannot be said of one existing in mortal sin that he wills to tend toward beatitude, but that he would will; according to which manner it is said in Prov. 13 of the sluggard: The sluggard wills and wills not; but the soul of them that work etc. — Near the end of the solution cod. Y prefixes to the word formatam the words perfectam et, cod. W perfectam, without et. — (P. 565, n. 2.)
  14. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. — (P. 565, n. 3.)
    See the scholion to the preceding question [q. 3]. — (P. 565, n. 3.)
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