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Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 5

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 26

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio V. Utrum spes in suo actu sit certitudinalis, an dubia.

Quinto quaeritur, utrum spes in actu suo sit certitudinalis, an dubia. Et quod sit certitudinalis, videtur:

1. Primo per illud quod dicitur ad Romanos octavo1: Certus sum, quia neque mors neque vita neque creatura alia poterit nos separare a caritate Dei; sed Apostolus non erat de hoc certus certitudine comprehensionis: ergo certus erat certitudine exspectationis sive confidentiae ipsius spei; ergo spes in actu suo reddit hominem certum.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per definitionem spei, quam Magister ponit in littera2: « Spes est certa exspectatio futurae beatitudinis »: si ergo exspectatio est circa actum ipsius spei, spes in suo actu est certitudinalis.

3. Item, quod removet haesitationem sive vacillationem tribuit certitudinem; sed haesitatio, quae facit hominem vacillare, removetur per confidentiam spei3: igitur spes dat certitudinem ipsi speranti: ergo in actu suo est certitudinalis.

4. Item, sicut impossibile est, summam Veritatem fallere et decipere sibi credentem, sic impossibile est, ipsam deserere quemquam in se confidentem: ergo sicut credens in Deum certus est de veritate credita, sic sperans in ipsum certus est de salute exspectata4: ergo videtur, quod circa actum ipsius spei certitudo consistat.

5. Item, si « virtus est certior omni arte5 », ancora omnium virtutum debet esse certissima: cum ergo spes ipsa ad ipsas virtutes se habeat quasi quaedam ancora, videtur ergo, quod ipsa spes in actu suo sit valde certa.

Sed contra: 1. Spes secundum suum actum6 procedit ex habitu, vel consideratione gratiae et meritorum: sed nullus certus est, utrum habeat gratiam, an non: ergo videtur, quod spes in actu suo nullam habeat certitudinem.

2. Item, nihil pendens a vertibilitate voluntatis habet certitudinem; sed spes est in libero arbitrio, et actus eius et meritum pendet a vertibilitate voluntatis; similiter et praemium, quod exspectat: ergo videtur, quod nullam habeat certitudinem.

3. Item, nullus est certus de assecutione illius rei, ad quam nunquam perveniet; sed multi sunt, qui habent fidem, spem et caritatem, qui finaliter reprobi efficiuntur: ergo in talibus virtus spei non habet certitudinem. Sed qua ratione in talibus non habet, nec in aliis, cum in omnibus sit conformiter et uniformiter: igitur in nullo certitudinem habet.

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4. Item, quia fides certa est, impossibile est, quod aliquis in actu vel motu fidei fallatur vel decipiatur7: ergo si spes habet certitudinem in actu suo, impossibile est, quod aliquis fallatur et frustretur ab eo quod sperat; sed hoc est manifeste falsum: ergo spes non habet certitudinem circa suum actum. Si tu dicas, quod nullus sperans fallitur, pro eo quod spes non facit simpliciter exspectare, sed sub conditione, videlicet si perseveraverit usque in finem8; contra: spes pertinet ad actum potentiae irascibilis, cuius non est conditionem apponere; et iterum, esto quod conditio illa apponatur, cum illa conditio sit valde dubia, totum reddit dubium: ergo sive absolute, sive cum conditione speret quis: videtur, quod circa actum spei nulla sit certitudo.

5. Item, certitudo opponitur dubitationi: ergo cum dubitatio pertineat ad potentiam cognitivam, et « opposita nata sint fieri circa idem »9; certitudo solum spectat ad potentiam cognitivam. Sed spes non est in cognitiva, sed in affectiva: ergo videtur, quod in actu suo non habeat certitudinem aliquam.

Conclusio.

Virtus spei in suo actu habet certitudinem distinctam a certitudine fidei.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod absque dubio, secundum quod auctoritates et rationes ostendunt, virtus spei in suo actu habet certitudinem. Cuiusmodi autem sit illa certitudo, difficile est definire.

Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod certitudo spei non est sibi ipsi propria neque diversa a certitudine fidei, immo spes omnem certitudinem suam trahit a fide, sicut scientia in particulari trahit certitudinem a scientia in universali. Ideo enim quis novit, quod haec mula est sterilis, quia novit de omni mula in universali10. Et sic dicunt se habere spem ad fidem, sicut se habet scientia in particulari ad scientiam in universali. Sicut enim dicit Augustinus, et Magister recitat in littera11, per fidem credit homo, omnes finaliter bonos esse salvandos, et de hoc habet quandam certitudinem; per spem autem confidit, se esse salvandum; unde quod credens generaliter credebat, sperans per spem sibi appropriat. Et quoniam non est certitudo circa singularia, nisi in quantum referuntur ad universale: ideo spes non appropriat certitudinem fidei sibi absolute, sed sub conditione. Unde recte sperans non sperat, se omnino esse salvandum, sed sub hac conditione, videlicet si perseveraverit usque in finem. Dicunt igitur, quod certitudo fidei non differt a certitudine spei, nisi quia illa est in universali, ista in particulari; illa autem absoluta, et ista conditionata. Unde certitudo fidei dicitur esse certitudo fidelitatis, certitudo autem spei est certitudo confidentiae. Confidentia autem non est aliud, ut dicunt, quam quaedam fidelitas ad se conversa. Ille enim confidit de aliquo, qui credit aliquid obtinere. — Sed iste modus dicendi, licet videatur esse probabilis, non sufficit, pro eo quod — sicut dicitur in Glossa, ad Romanos quinto12 super illud: Probatio operatur spem, id est certitudinem spei — spes, ut ibi innuit Glossa, habet propriam certitudinem; et aliter certificatur homo de salute obtinenda per ipsam fidem, aliter certificatur per ipsam spem. Alioquin, si solum differret sicut scientia in particulari a scientia in universali certitudo spei a certitudine fidei, iam13 non esset habitus distinctus contra ipsam fidem, immo eidem deberet subalternari tanquam particulare sub universali, vel speciale sub generali.

Et propterea est alius modus dicendi, quod ipsa spes certitudinem habet, non solum eam, quam mendicat14 a fide, sed etiam propriam, quae distinguitur a certitudine fidei. Et illa distinctio cognosci potest per duplicem differentiam, videlicet ratione obiecti, circa quod habet illa certitudo versari, et ratione oppositi, cui habet contrariari. Ratione obiecti, quia fides et eius certitudo fertur supra ipsam complexionem ratione totalis compositionis. Est enim circa verum et falsum, et verum est circa compositionem, ut dicit Philosophus15. Unde et in praecedentibus ostensum fuit, quod enuntiabile complexum

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est articulus. Spes autem et eius certitudo non est circa complexionem ratione totius, sed ratione rei attributae. Unde cum dicitur: spero, me habiturum vitam aeternam, non speratur ibi hoc dictum totale, sed speratur vita aeterna; et ita certitudo spei respicit ipsam attributionem vel rem attributam, sed certitudo fidei ipsam complexionem. — Ratione etiam oppositi, cui habet contrariari, cadit ibi distinctio. Nam certitudo fidei repugnat errori et dubitationi; certitudo autem spei repugnat diffidentiae et haesitationi. Licet autem istae duae certitudines sint diversae, tamen in hoc communicant, quod utraque est firmitas quaedam. Fides enim firmat16 intellectum, ne discredat; spes autem firmat affectum, ne diffidat. — Et ex hoc colligitur tertia diversitas, qua differt certitudo fidei a certitudine spei, quia non solum differt ratione obiecti et ratione oppositi, sed etiam ratione subiecti, quoniam una est circa intellectum, altera vero circa affectum17. — Sed attendendum est, quod certitudo circa intellectum habet esse duobus modis. Quaedam enim est, quae facit intellectum potentem ad vincendum errorem et excludendum dubitationem; et talis certitudo est certitudo viae. Quaedam autem est certitudo, quae reddit intellectum impossibilem ad errorem; et haec est certitudo patriae. — Per hunc etiam modum intelligendum est et in certitudine affectus. Nam quaedam sic firmat affectum, ut possit diffidentiam superare; quaedam sic firmat, ut non possit ullatenus commoveri18 vel haesitare. Prima est spei in via, secunda est tentionis in patria.

Sic igitur patet, quod virtus spei habet certitudinem in actu suo; patet etiam, quae et qualis est illa certitudo; quoniam est differens a certitudine fidei et minor est quam certitudo gloriae; non enim est certitudo perpetuae confirmationis19, sed cuiusdam virilis adhaesionis. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod spes in suo actu habet certitudinem.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod nulla certitudo habetur de meritis et gratia, ex qua procedit spes; dicendum, quod quamvis de meritis non habeatur certitudo per scientiam necessariam, haberi tamen potest certitudo per probabilem coniecturam et per quandam ipsius bonae voluntatis confidentiam, quae consurgit ex conscientia bona20. Puritas enim conscientiae, quae introducitur per expulsionem culpae, dat ipsi animae quandam securitatem et certitudinem de merito iam inchoato, et per consequens certitudinem de praemio assequendo.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil pendens ex vertibilitate voluntatis habet certitudinem; dicendum, quod verum est, si consistat in ipsa voluntate, secundum quod voluntas innititur sibi; sed si consistat in ipsa voluntate, in quantum voluntas innititur Deo, qui est firmitas nostra, secundum quod dicit Augustinus in libro Confessionum21; hoc modo potest habere robur et certitudinem; et tali modo habet spes consistere in nostra voluntate. Facit enim nos summae firmitati innitendo in ipsa et de ipsa confidere, ac per hoc nobis quandam certitudinem tribuit de assequenda salute.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullus est certus de assecutione illius rei, ad quam nunquam perveniet; dicendum, quod est certitudo ordinis et certitudo eventus22. Cum ergo dicitur, quod spes habet certitudinem in suo actu; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de certitudine ordinis, quia efficaciter et infallibiliter vera spes ordinat ad salutem. Sed cum ipse obiicit, quod nullus est certus de eo quod non assequitur; obiectio currit de certitudine secundum aliam differentiam, quae quidem est certitudo eventus. Et ideo non cogit illa ratio.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si spes certa esset, non posset falli, sicut nec fides; dicendum, quod sicut duplex est necessitas, scilicet absoluta et conditionata23, sic duplex est certitudo. Si loquamur de certitudine conditionata, sic est in spe certitudo necessitatis et infallibilitatis; certus est enim unusquisque infallibiliter, quod si perseveraverit usque in finem in gratia et bonis meritis, ad salutem perveniet. Si autem loquamur de certitudine absoluta, sic est in ipsa spe certitudo probabilitatis; qui enim bonam habet conscientiam atque propositum, probabiliter potest esse certus, quod opera ex tali voluntate procedentia sint apud Deum meritoria, et per hoc confidere, se assecuturum vitam aeternam. Unde quod ipse ostendit24 de illa conditione, quod est dubia, et quod eam non apponit spes: dicendum, quod etsi spes non apponat eam per se, apponit eam tamen per regulam fidei dirigentis. Et licet etiam non sit omnino certa illa conditio certitudine manifestae scientiae, est tamen

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certa certitudine cuiusdam confidentiae, sicut praedictum est.

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod certitudo spectat ad cognitivam; iam patet responsio per ea quae sunt praedicta; nam certitudo non solum respicit intellectum, verum etiam affectum.

Scholion

I. Responsio ad hanc quaestionem confirmatur doctrina Concilii Trident. (Sess. VI. c. 13; cfr. c. 9.), ubi primo dicitur de perseverantia, quod « nemo sibi certi aliquid absoluta certitudine polliceatur »; deinde additur: « tametsi in Dei auxilio firmissimam spem collocare et reponere omnes debent ». Porro in can. 13. 14. 15. 16. reprobatur praesumtio eorum qui docent, vel « omni homini ad remissionem peccatorum assequendam necessarium esse, ut credat certo et absque ulla haesitatione propriae infirmitatis et indispositionis, peccata sibi esse remissa »; vel « hominem a peccatis absolvi ac iustificari ex eo, quod se absolvi et iustificari certo credat »; vel « iustificatum teneri ex fide ad credendum, se certo esse in numero praedestinatorum »; vel talem certitudinem perseverantiae « quoquam haberi posse, « nisi hoc ex speciali revelatione didicerit ». Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 3, d. 40. a. 2. q. 2, d. 41. a. 1. q. 2.

II. Opinio prima in corp. relata reiicitur etiam a S. Thoma aliisque communiter, qui simul docent, spem habere suam propriam certitudinem, distinctam ab ea quae est in fide. Certitudo enim in genere sumta, primo et essentialiter est in intellectu, secundario et participative etiam in affectu. — De differentia, quae est inter certitudinem fidei et spei, idem docet S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 4. in fine, cfr. S. II. II. q. 18. a. 4.) dicens: « Certitudo spei et fidei in quatuor differunt: primo in hoc quod certitudo fidei est intellectus, certitudo autem spei est affectus. Secundo, quia certitudo fidei non potest deficere, sed certitudo spei per accidens deficit. Tertio, quia certitudo fidei est de complexo, certitudo autem spei est de incomplexo, quod est appetitus obiectum. Quarto, quia certitudini fidei opponitur dubitatio, certitudini autem spei opponitur diffidentia vel haesitatio ».

III. Praeter S. Thomam: Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

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English Translation

Question V. Whether hope in its act is characterized by certitude, or by doubt.

Fifth it is asked, whether hope in its act is characterized by certitude, or by doubt. And that it is characterized by certitude, it seems:

1. First, through that which is said in Romans 81: I am certain that neither death nor life nor any other creature will be able to separate us from the charity of God; but the Apostle was not certain of this with the certitude of comprehension: therefore he was certain with the certitude of expectation or of the confidence of hope itself; therefore hope in its act renders a man certain.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown through the definition of hope which the Master sets down in the text2: « Hope is a certain expectation of future beatitude »: if therefore the expectation regards the act of hope itself, hope in its act is characterized by certitude.

3. Likewise, that which removes hesitation or wavering bestows certitude; but hesitation, which makes a man waver, is removed through the confidence of hope3: therefore hope gives certitude to the one hoping: therefore in its act it is characterized by certitude.

4. Likewise, just as it is impossible that the highest Truth should deceive and beguile one who believes in it, so it is impossible that it should desert anyone confiding in it: therefore just as one believing in God is certain of the truth believed, so one hoping in him is certain of the salvation expected4: therefore it seems that certitude consists in the act of hope itself.

5. Likewise, if « virtue is more certain than any art5 », the anchor of all virtues ought to be most certain: since therefore hope itself stands to the virtues themselves as a kind of anchor, it seems therefore that hope itself in its act is exceedingly certain.

On the contrary: 1. Hope according to its act6 proceeds from the habit, or from the consideration of grace and of merits: but no one is certain whether he has grace, or not: therefore it seems that hope in its act has no certitude.

2. Likewise, nothing depending on the changeableness of the will has certitude; but hope is in free choice, and its act and merit depend on the changeableness of the will; likewise also the reward which it expects: therefore it seems that it has no certitude.

3. Likewise, no one is certain of the attainment of that thing to which he will never come; but there are many who have faith, hope, and charity, who are finally made reprobate: therefore in such persons the virtue of hope has no certitude. But for the same reason that it does not have it in such persons, neither does it in others, since it is in all conformably and uniformly: therefore in none does it have certitude.

4. Likewise, because faith is certain, it is impossible that anyone in the act or motion of faith should be deceived or beguiled7: therefore if hope has certitude in its act, it is impossible that anyone should be deceived and frustrated of that which he hopes; but this is manifestly false: therefore hope does not have certitude regarding its act. If you should say that no one hoping is deceived, for the reason that hope does not make one expect simply, but under a condition, namely if he perseveres unto the end8; on the contrary: hope pertains to an act of the irascible power, whose part it is not to attach a condition; and again, granted that that condition be attached, since that condition is exceedingly doubtful, it renders the whole doubtful: therefore whether one hopes absolutely, or with a condition: it seems that there is no certitude regarding the act of hope.

5. Likewise, certitude is opposed to doubt: therefore since doubt pertains to the cognitive power, and « opposites are of a nature to come to be about the same thing »9; certitude regards only the cognitive power. But hope is not in the cognitive, but in the affective: therefore it seems that in its act it has no certitude.

Conclusion.

The virtue of hope in its act has a certitude distinct from the certitude of faith.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, without doubt, according to what the authorities and reasons show, the virtue of hope in its act has certitude. But of what kind that certitude is, it is difficult to define.

For some have wished to say that the certitude of hope is not proper to itself nor diverse from the certitude of faith, but rather that hope draws all its certitude from faith, just as knowledge in the particular draws its certitude from knowledge in the universal. For thus one knows that this mule is sterile, because he knows of every mule in the universal10. And thus they say that hope stands to faith as knowledge in the particular stands to knowledge in the universal. For as Augustine says, and the Master recites in the text11, through faith a man believes that all who are finally good will be saved, and of this he has a certain certitude; through hope, however, he is confident that he himself will be saved; whence what the believer believed in general, the one hoping appropriates to himself through hope. And since there is no certitude regarding singulars, except insofar as they are referred to the universal: therefore hope does not appropriate the certitude of faith to itself absolutely, but under a condition. Whence the one rightly hoping does not hope that he will altogether be saved, but under this condition, namely if he perseveres unto the end. They say therefore that the certitude of faith does not differ from the certitude of hope, except that the former is in the universal, the latter in the particular; the former, moreover, absolute, and the latter conditioned. Whence the certitude of faith is said to be the certitude of fidelity, while the certitude of hope is the certitude of confidence. Confidence, moreover, is nothing else, as they say, than a kind of fidelity turned back upon itself. For he confides in something who believes that he will obtain something. — But this manner of speaking, although it may seem probable, does not suffice, for the reason that — as is said in the Gloss on Romans 512 upon that text: Proof works hope, that is, the certitude of hope — hope, as the Gloss there suggests, has its own proper certitude; and a man is certified one way of the salvation to be obtained through faith itself, certified another way through hope itself. Otherwise, if the certitude of hope differed from the certitude of faith only as knowledge in the particular from knowledge in the universal, then13 it would not be a habit distinct against faith itself, but rather it ought to be subalternated to it as the particular under the universal, or the special under the general.

And therefore there is another manner of speaking, namely that hope itself has certitude, not only that which it begs14 from faith, but also a proper one, which is distinguished from the certitude of faith. And that distinction can be known through a twofold difference, namely by reason of the object, about which that certitude is concerned, and by reason of the opposite, to which it is contrary. By reason of the object, because faith and its certitude is borne upon the complexion itself by reason of the total composition. For it is about the true and the false, and the true is about composition, as the Philosopher says15. Whence also in what precedes it was shown that the complex enunciable

is the article. But hope and its certitude is not about the complexion by reason of the whole, but by reason of the thing attributed. Whence when it is said: I hope that I shall have eternal life, there is not hoped there this total saying, but there is hoped eternal life; and thus the certitude of hope regards the attribution itself or the thing attributed, but the certitude of faith the complexion itself. — Also by reason of the opposite, to which it is contrary, the distinction falls there. For the certitude of faith is repugnant to error and doubt; the certitude of hope, however, is repugnant to diffidence and hesitation. But although these two certitudes are diverse, nevertheless in this they share in common, that each is a kind of firmness. For faith firms16 the intellect, lest it disbelieve; hope, however, firms the affect, lest it lose confidence. — And from this is gathered a third diversity, by which the certitude of faith differs from the certitude of hope, because it differs not only by reason of object and by reason of opposite, but also by reason of subject, since the one is about the intellect, the other about the affect17. — But it must be attended to, that certitude about the intellect has being in two modes. For one is that which makes the intellect able to overcome error and exclude doubt; and such certitude is the certitude of the wayfaring state. But another is the certitude which renders the intellect incapable of error; and this is the certitude of the fatherland. — In this same mode it must be understood also in the certitude of the affect. For one so firms the affect that it can overcome diffidence; another so firms it that it can in no way be moved18 or hesitate. The first is of hope in the way, the second of holding-fast in the fatherland.

Thus therefore it is clear that the virtue of hope has certitude in its act; it is also clear what and of what kind that certitude is; since it is differing from the certitude of faith and is less than the certitude of glory; for it is not the certitude of perpetual confirmation19, but of a certain manly adherence. — Therefore the reasons showing that hope in its act has certitude are to be conceded.

1. But to that which is first objected to the contrary, that no certitude is had of the merits and grace from which hope proceeds; it must be said that, although certitude of merits is not had through necessary knowledge, nevertheless certitude can be had through probable conjecture and through a certain confidence of the good will itself, which rises up from a good conscience20. For purity of conscience, which is introduced through the expulsion of fault, gives to the soul itself a certain security and certitude concerning the merit already begun, and consequently certitude concerning the reward to be attained.

2. To that which is objected, that nothing depending on the changeableness of the will has certitude; it must be said that this is true, if it rests in the will itself, according as the will leans upon itself; but if it rests in the will itself, insofar as the will leans upon God, who is our firmness, according as Augustine says in the book of Confessions21; in this mode it can have strength and certitude; and in such a mode hope has to consist in our will. For it makes us, by leaning upon the highest firmness and confiding of it, and through this it bestows on us a certain certitude of attaining salvation.

3. To that which is objected, that no one is certain of the attainment of that thing to which he will never come; it must be said that there is a certitude of order and a certitude of event22. When therefore it is said that hope has certitude in its act; it must be said that this is true of the certitude of order, because efficaciously and infallibly true hope orders toward salvation. But when he objects that no one is certain of that which he does not attain; the objection runs concerning certitude according to the other difference, which indeed is the certitude of event. And therefore that reason does not compel.

4. To that which is objected, that if hope were certain, it could not be deceived, just as neither can faith; it must be said that just as necessity is twofold, namely absolute and conditioned23, so certitude is twofold. If we speak of conditioned certitude, thus there is in hope a certitude of necessity and of infallibility; for each one is infallibly certain that, if he perseveres unto the end in grace and in good merits, he will come to salvation. But if we speak of absolute certitude, thus there is in hope itself a certitude of probability; for he who has a good conscience and purpose can probably be certain that works proceeding from such a will are meritorious before God, and through this be confident that he will attain eternal life. Whence as to what he shows24 concerning that condition, that it is doubtful, and that hope does not attach it: it must be said that even if hope does not attach it of itself, it nevertheless attaches it through the rule of directing faith. And although also that condition is not altogether certain with the certitude of manifest knowledge, it is nevertheless

certain with the certitude of a certain confidence, as has been said before.

5. To that which is finally objected, that certitude regards the cognitive power; the response is now clear through the things that have been said before; for certitude not only regards the intellect, but also the affect.

Scholion

I. The response to this question is confirmed by the doctrine of the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, c. 13; cf. c. 9), where first it is said concerning perseverance, that « let no one promise himself anything certain with absolute certitude »; then it is added: « although all ought to place and repose a most firm hope in the help of God ». Further, in can. 13, 14, 15, 16 there is reproved the presumption of those who teach, either that « it is necessary for every man, in order to obtain the remission of sins, that he believe certainly and without any hesitation of his own infirmity and indisposition, that his sins have been remitted to him »; or that « a man is absolved from sins and justified from the fact that he certainly believes himself to be absolved and justified »; or that « the justified is bound by faith to believe that he is certainly in the number of the predestined »; or that such a certitude of perseverance « can be had by anyone, « unless he has learned this by a special revelation ». Cf. I Sent. d. 17, p. I, q. 3; d. 40, a. 2, q. 2; d. 41, a. 1, q. 2.

II. The first opinion related in the body is rejected also by St. Thomas and commonly by others, who together teach that hope has its own proper certitude, distinct from that which is in faith. For certitude taken in general is first and essentially in the intellect, secondarily and participatively also in the affect. — Concerning the difference which is between the certitude of faith and of hope, the same is taught by St. Thomas (here q. 2, a. 4, at the end; cf. S. II–II, q. 18, a. 4) saying: « The certitude of hope and of faith differ in four ways: first in this, that the certitude of faith is of the intellect, but the certitude of hope is of the affect. Secondly, because the certitude of faith cannot fail, but the certitude of hope fails per accidens. Thirdly, because the certitude of faith is of the complex, but the certitude of hope is of the incomplex, which is the object of appetite. Fourthly, because to the certitude of faith doubt is opposed, but to the certitude of hope diffidence or hesitation is opposed ».

III. Besides St. Thomas: Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, here a single question.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 38. seq., ubi Vulgata post neque vita addit neque Angeli neque Principatus neque Virtutes neque instantia neque futura neque fortitudo neque altitudo neque profundum neque creatura alia etc. — (P. 565, n. 4.)
    Verse 38 ff., where the Vulgate after neque vita adds neque Angeli neque Principatus neque Virtutes neque instantia neque futura neque fortitudo neque altitudo neque profundum neque creatura alia (nor angels nor principalities nor powers nor things present nor things to come nor strength nor height nor depth nor any other creature) etc. — (P. 565, n. 4.)
  2. Hic c. 1. In definitione spei hic allata multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 omittunt vocem certa. — Subinde pro si ergo exspectatio Vat. Si ergo certitudo. — (P. 565, n. 5.)
    Here c. 1. In the definition of hope here adduced, many codices and editions 1, 2 omit the word certa. — Then for si ergo exspectatio the Vatican edition reads Si ergo certitudo. — (P. 565, n. 5.)
  3. Cfr. supra pag. 561, nota 8. — (P. 565, n. 6.)
    Cf. above, p. 561, note 8. — (P. 565, n. 6.)
  4. Psalm. 30, 1. et 70, 1: In te, Domine, speravi, non confundar in aeternum. — (P. 565, n. 7.)
    Psalm 30:1 and 70:1: In thee, O Lord, have I hoped; let me not be confounded forever. — (P. 565, n. 7.)
  5. De hac sententia Aristot. vide supra pag. 480, nota 4. et pag. 482, nota 5. In seqq. respicitur illud Hebr. 6, 19: Quam [spem] sicut ancoram habemus animae tutam ac firmam etc. — (P. 565, n. 8.)
    On this sentence of Aristotle see above, p. 480, note 4, and p. 482, note 5. In what follows there is regard to that text of Hebrews 6:19: Which [hope] we have as an anchor of the soul, sure and firm etc. — (P. 565, n. 8.)
  6. Respicitur definitio spei, hic in lit. c. 1. a Magistro proposita. — Minor innititur verbis illis Eccle. 9, 1: Nescit homo, utrum amore, an odio dignus sit. — (P. 565, n. 9.)
    There is regard to the definition of hope, here proposed in the text, c. 1, by the Master. — The minor leans upon those words of Ecclesiastes 9:1: Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred. — (P. 565, n. 9.)
  7. Vide supra d. 24. a. 1. q. 1. — (P. 566, n. 1.)
    See above, d. 24, a. 1, q. 1. — (P. 566, n. 1.)
  8. Matth. 10, 22: Qui autem perseveraverit usque in finem, hic salvus erit. — De formula: « potentiae irascibilis non est conditionem apponere », cfr. supra pag. 375, nota 1. 2. et 4. — (P. 566, n. 2.)
    Matthew 10:22: But he that shall persevere unto the end, he shall be saved. — On the formula « it is not the part of the irascible power to attach a condition », cf. above, p. 375, notes 1, 2, and 4. — (P. 566, n. 2.)
  9. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). Idem Philosophus dicit VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.): Dubitationis videbitur effectivum esse contrariarum aequalitas ratiocinationum; quandocumque enim ad utraque ratiocinantibus nobis similiter videntur omnia secundum utrumque fieri, dubitabimus, utrum agamus. — De minori vide infra a. 2. q. 5. — Pro ad potentiam cognitivam, quam lectionem optimam exhibent codd. A K N bb, alii codd. et edd. ad ipsam cognitivam [codd. G H cognitionem]. — (P. 566, n. 3.)
    Aristotle, Categories, c. on Opposites, and Topics II, c. 3 (c. 7). The same Philosopher says, Topics VI, c. 3 (c. 6): An equality of ratiocinations of contraries will seem to be productive of doubt; for whenever, as we reason toward both sides, all things seem to us alike to come to be according to either, we shall doubt which we should do. — On the minor see below, a. 2, q. 5. — For ad potentiam cognitivam, which best reading codd. A K N bb exhibit, other codices and editions read ad ipsam cognitivam [codd. G H cognitionem]. — (P. 566, n. 3.)
  10. Aristot., II. Prior. c. 21. (c. 23.) eodem exemplo utitur ad ostendendam relationem, quae est inter cognitionem particularem et universalem, his verbis: Quoniam omnis mula sterilis, et haec mula. — (P. 566, n. 4.)
    Aristotle, Prior Analytics II, c. 21 (c. 23), uses the same example to show the relation which is between particular and universal cognition, in these words: Since every mule is sterile, and this is a mule. — (P. 566, n. 4.)
  11. Supra d. XXIII. c. 3. — (P. 566, n. 5.)
    Above, d. XXIII, c. 3. — (P. 566, n. 5.)
  12. Vers. 4. — Apud Strabum et Petr. Lombard. haec Glossa, quae est ordinaria, sonat sic: Spem, id est certitudinem gloriae futurae [Petr. Lombard. addit: Spes enim est certa exspectatio futurae gloriae], quae humanae rationi vana videtur, sed testimonio virtutis, id est patientiae vel miraculorum, firmatur. — Pro non sufficit edd. non tamen sufficit. — (P. 566, n. 6.)
    Verse 4. — In Strabo and Peter Lombard this Gloss, which is the ordinary one, runs thus: Hope, that is, the certitude of future glory [Peter Lombard adds: For hope is a certain expectation of future glory], which seems vain to human reason, but is firmed by the testimony of virtue, that is, of patience or of miracles. — For non sufficit the editions read non tamen sufficit. — (P. 566, n. 6.)
  13. Edd. supplent spes. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — (P. 566, n. 9.)
    The editions supply spes. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3. — (P. 566, n. 9.)
  14. Pro mendicat, sicut scriptum invenimus in codd. A F H N T V, alii codd. vindicat, edd. 1, 2 accipit, Vat. accepit. — (P. 566, n. 10.)
    For mendicat (begs), as we find written in codd. A F H N T V, other codices read vindicat (claims), editions 1, 2 accipit (receives), the Vatican edition accepit (received). — (P. 566, n. 10.)
  15. Cfr. supra pag. 514, nota 3. — Quod fides sit circa complexum, et in complexo consistat articulus, ostensum est supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. Cfr. ibid. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo ante Vat. nihil falsum, et subinde pro et verum est cod. A habet et falsum est. — (P. 566, n. 11.)
    Cf. above, p. 514, note 3. — That faith is about the complex, and that the article consists in the complex, was shown above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3. Cf. ibid., a. 2, q. 2. — A little before, the Vatican edition reads nihil falsum, and then for et verum est cod. A has et falsum est. — (P. 566, n. 11.)
  16. Cod. V hic et paulo post confirmat. Mox edd. verba sic transposuerunt: qua differt certitudo spei a certitudine fidei. — (P. 567, n. 1.)
    Cod. V here and a little after reads confirmat. Soon the editions transposed the words thus: qua differt certitudo spei a certitudine fidei (by which the certitude of hope differs from the certitude of faith). — (P. 567, n. 1.)
  17. Cfr. infra a. 2. q. 5. et supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo inferius pro ad vincendum errorem cod. O ad vitandum errorem. — (P. 567, n. 2.)
    Cf. below, a. 2, q. 5, and above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 2. — A little lower, for ad vincendum errorem cod. O reads ad vitandum errorem. — (P. 567, n. 2.)
  18. Cod. H moveri, edd. amoveri, quae etiam subinde pro haesitare cum multis codd. haesitari. Superius cod. Z bis confirmat pro firmat. — (P. 567, n. 3.)
    Cod. H reads moveri, the editions amoveri, which also then for haesitare read, with many codices, haesitari. Above, cod. Z twice reads confirmat for firmat. — (P. 567, n. 3.)
  19. Pro confirmationis cod. M affectionis, edd. consummationis. Subinde pro virilis cod. Z particularis. — (P. 567, n. 4.)
    For confirmationis cod. M reads affectionis, the editions consummationis. Then for virilis cod. Z reads particularis. — (P. 567, n. 4.)
  20. Epist. II. Cor. 1, 12: Nam gloria nostra haec est, testimonium conscientiae nostrae etc. Cfr. supra d. 23. dub. 1. — Paulo superius codd. B D verbo haberi praefigunt bene. — (P. 567, n. 5.)
    2 Corinthians 1:12: For our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience etc. Cf. above, d. 23, dub. 1. — A little higher, codd. B D prefix to the word haberi the word bene. — (P. 567, n. 5.)
  21. Libr. XI. c. 30. n. 40: Et stabo atque solidabor in te, in forma mea, veritate tua. — Mox post certitudinem cod. S addit et fortitudinem. — (P. 567, n. 6.)
    Book XI, c. 30, n. 40: And I shall stand and be made solid in thee, in my form, thy truth. — Soon after certitudinem cod. S adds et fortitudinem. — (P. 567, n. 6.)
  22. Cfr. supra d. 24. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3. — Inferius pro obiectio currit cod. Z oppositio est. — (P. 567, n. 7.)
    Cf. above, d. 24, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3. — Lower, for obiectio currit cod. Z reads oppositio est. — (P. 567, n. 7.)
  23. Vide supra pag. 510, nota 1, et 1. Sent. d. 38. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. et d. 40. a. 2. q. 2. ad 5, ubi distinguitur certitudo necessitatis et infallibilitatis. — (P. 567, n. 8.)
    See above, p. 510, note 1, and I Sent. d. 38, a. 2, q. 1, in the body, and d. 40, a. 2, q. 2, ad 5, where the certitude of necessity and of infallibility is distinguished. — (P. 567, n. 8.)
  24. Edd. obiicit. — (P. 567, n. 9.)
    The editions read obiicit. — (P. 567, n. 9.)
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