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Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 27

Textus Latinus
p. 599

Quaestio IV. Utrum habitus caritatis possit esse informis, an semper sit formatus.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum habitus caritatis possit esse informis, an semper sit formatus. Et quod semper sit formatus, videtur:

1. Primo per Augustinum, in libro de Vera Innocentia1: « Dilectio Dei et proximi est propria et specialis virtus piorum atque Sanctorum, cum ceterae virtutes bonis possint esse communes et malis »; sed aliae virtutes non sunt communes bonis et malis, nisi quia possunt esse informes: si ergo caritas non potest isto modo esse communis, videtur, quod nullo modo possit esse informis.

2. Item, Hugo2: « Caritatem nullus malus habere potest »; sed si posset esse informis, aliquis malus posset eam habere: impossibile est igitur, habitum caritatis informem esse.

3. Item, impossibile est, formam fieri informem; sed caritas est forma virtutum, secundum quod dicitur super illud ad Romanos primo3: Iustitia Dei etc.; Glossa: « Haec est informis qualitas mentis, quia sociam non habet caritatem, quae est forma omnium virtutum »: ergo etc.

4. Item, virtutis caritatis est diligere Deum propter se et super omnia4; sed istum actum nullus habere potest, qui habet in se mortale peccatum, cum in omni mortali peccato aliquid diligatur contra Deum: si ergo sola illa virtus potest esse informis, cuius actus potest reperiri in peccatore, sicut patet de fide; videtur, quod caritas nullo modo possit esse informis.

5. Item, sicut infidelitas repugnat fidei, sic libido et amor libidinosus repugnat caritati; sed impossibile est, habitum fidei nec informem nec formatum simul stare cum errore et infidelitate: ergo impossibile est, habitum caritatis nec informem nec formatum simul stare cum libidine. Sed omne peccatum est libido, vel ex libidine, secundum quod dicit Augustinus5: ergo impossibile est, habitum caritatis nec informem nec formatum reperiri in peccatore; ergo non reperitur nisi in viro iusto. Sed in illo non habet esse informis, sed semper formatus: ergo etc.

Sed contra:

1. Cum aliquis peccat, qui in Deum credidit et amavit, sicut in eo remanet credulitas, sic remanet in eo quaedam dilectio; sed non est minus nobilis illa dilectio vel amor, quam sit illa credulitas: ergo si credulitas illa sortitur nomen virtutis, pari ratione videtur, quod et illa dilectio. Sed non sortitur rationem et nomen alterius virtutis quam caritatis: ergo caritas potest esse informis.

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2. Item, aut potest aliquis diligere Deum informiter, aut non. Si non: ergo cum homo sciat, se Deum diligere, homo sciet, se habere caritatem et esse in gratia, quod apud multos est inconveniens. Si potest; sed quales sunt actus, tales sunt habitus: ergo si actus diligendi potest esse informis, videtur, quod et habitus.

3. Item, ex fide formata oritur amor et timor, uterque formatus: ergo cum ex fide informi possit oriri timor servilis, qui est timor informis, qui etiam habet rationem doni; videtur, quod ex ipsa possit oriri amor, qui etiam habet rationem virtutis: redit ergo idem quod prius, videlicet quod amor caritatis informis possit esse.

4. Item, caritas est virtus gratuita; constans est, quod haec differentia gratuita addit supra virtutem: ergo si remanere potest prius sine posteriori, videtur, quod caritate desinente esse gratuita, adhuc possit remanere virtus: ergo potest esse informis.

5. Item, homini cadenti in peccatum aliquid relinquitur in potentia rationali et irascibili, quo fit habilis ad resurgendum, ut fides et spes: ergo pari ratione relinquitur aliquid in potentia concupiscibili, immo multo fortiori, cum ipsa magis indigeat; sed constat, quod illud non est minus nobile, quam illud quod est in aliis potentiis, cum ipsa habeat nobiliori virtute informari: si ergo aliae post lapsum in peccatum possident fidem et spem informem, videtur, quod et ipsa post peccatum habeat caritatem informem.

Conclusio.

Caritas nunquam potest esse informis; in afferendis tamen rationibus non consentiunt doctores.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum communem opinionem habitus caritatis semper est formatus et nunquam habet esse informis. — Et hoc indicat ipsum nomen ipsius; nominatur enim nomine gratiae1. Si ergo virtus informis dicitur esse illa virtus, quae est privata gratia, dicere caritatem informem nihil aliud est dicere, quam gratuitum esse gratia privatum; quod est falsum et non intelligibile, quia est ibi implicatio oppositorum. Et ideo communiter dicitur, quod caritas non potest esse informis.

— Licet autem doctores communiter in hoc consentiant, in ratione tamen, quare hoc dicunt, est inter eos differentia.

Nam quidam voluerunt dicere, quod ideo caritas non potest esse informis, quia est ipsum donum increatum, scilicet ipse Spiritus sanctus. Et huius opinionis fuit Magister Sententiarum. — Haec autem opinio communiter non tenetur nec est tenenda, sicut in primo libro2 fuit ostensum.

Alii vero dicere voluerunt, quod caritas non potest esse informis, quia est habitus mere gratuitus, nihil habens ultra gratiam gratum facientem nisi solam relationem et ordinem ad actum et finem. Aliae vero virtutes, quae habitus substratos habent, informes esse possunt; sola vero caritas est, quae nihil absolutum addit: et ideo ipsa sola est, quae non potest fieri8 informis. — Sed licet istud videatur satis probabile, est tamen non modicum calumniabile. Difficile enim est sustinere, pensatis auctoritatibus et rationibus, quod caritas non addat ultra gratiam aliquem habitum, qui concupiscibilem potentiam habilitet ad amandum, sicut in praecedenti problemate fuit ostensum.

Et ideo est adhuc tertius modus9 reddendi rationem, quare caritas non potest esse informis, sicut aliae virtutes; hoc enim est, quia caritas non solum in quantum gratuita, sed etiam in quantum affectio recta sive quantum ad habitum substratum repugnat omni peccato, sicut fides specialiter repugnat peccato sibi opposito. Unde sicut fides simpliciter tollitur per errorem et infidelitatem, et spes per desperationem, ita quod non remanet qualitas nec virtus informis, sic habitus caritatis per omnem culpam habet tolli; et ideo nunquam remanet informis.

Quod autem omne peccatum oppositionem habeat cum caritate ratione habitus substrati, manifestum est sic. Sicut enim habitus ipsius fidei habilitat animam ad credendum omnia credenda et ad assentiendum primae Veritati propter se et super

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omnia: sic et habilitat1 habitus caritatis ad amandum omnia amanda et adhaerendum primae Bonitati propter se et super omnia. Et ideo, sicut error circa quemcumque articulum oppositionem habet cum fidei habitu, sic amor libidinosus circa ea quae amanda sunt, oppositionem habet cum ipsa caritate ratione habitus substrati. Quoniam ergo omne peccatum consistit in deordinata dilectione alicuius boni creati et in quadam libidine, quae oppositionem habet cum recto amore, sicut error cum recta credulitate; hinc est, quod omne peccatum simpliciter excludit caritatem. Et ideo, sicut fides informis non potest reperiri in infidelibus et haereticis; sic caritas informis non potest reperiri in aliquibus viris peccatoribus et iniquis; et2 in solis illis habet reperiri virtus informis: hinc est, quod caritas nullo modo potest esse informis, quia secundum se totam opponitur culpae generaliter, quod non est reperire in aliqua alia virtute. — Et si tu quaeras rationem huius, Augustinus docet in decimo quarto libro de Civitate Dei4, ubi dicit, quod « omnis affectio oritur ex amore »; ideo nihil potest obliquare aliquas affectiones animae, quin aliquo modo vel principaliter, vel ex consequenti opponatur ipsi amori et habitui affectum illum rectificanti5. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod caritas non potest esse informis.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur, quod in peccatore remanet credulitas et dilectio erga Deum; dicendum, quod quamvis utraque remaneat, non tamen uniformiter, quia credulitas habet rationem virtutis, dilectio vero non. Et ratio huius est: quia ad hoc, quod aliquis habitus sortiatur nomen et rationem virtutis, necesse est, quod habeat aliquam perfectionem et vigorem quendam respectu actus et obiecti; hoc autem habet credulitas in viro peccatore. Nam ipse peccator assentit primae Veritati propter se et super omnia et credit omnia credenda, secundum quod credenda sunt. Nullus autem peccator est, qui diligat Deum propter se et super omnia et diligat6 omnia diligenda, secundum quod diligenda sunt; et ideo dilectio illa, quae est in peccatore, non ita habet rationem virtutis nec sortitur nomen caritatis, secundum quod credulitas habet rationem virtutis et nomen fidei sortitur7.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod contingit diligere informiter; dicendum, quod verum est; sed sicut credere aliquem articulum informiter, quando alii articuli discreduntur, secundum quod faciunt aliqui haeretici, non est actus virtutis informis, quia fides non est in eis virtus; sic diligere Deum in peccatore non est actus virtutis; deest enim ibi perfectio virtutis, quia talis non diligit omnia diligenda: deest etiam et vigor, quia per illum actum non superat nec excludit amorem libidinosum sibi oppositum; sicut est de illo qui credit unum articulum sine alio, qui8 per illam credulitatem nec perfecte credit, quia non omnia credit, nec vigorose credit, quia errorem non convincit.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ex fide informi debet generari amor informis, sicut et timor; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod maioris perfectionis est amor quam timor, et magis rectificatur anima in recte amando quam in recte timendo: et hoc, quia amor est principium omnium affectionum, sicut dictum est superius. Et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quod quamvis fides generet timorem9 informem, quod possit generare caritatis amorem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas est virtus gratuita, et esse gratuitum coarctat hoc quod est esse virtutem; dicendum, quod quamvis sit minus esse gratuitum, quam esse virtutem; nihil tamen prohibet, aliquam differentiam ita adhaerere generi respectu speciei, quod eadem sublata, aufertur per consequens quod ad essentiam generis spectat; sicut patet, quod homo est animal rationale10 et si desinat esse rationalis, desinit esse animal. Per hunc modum potest intelligi et in caritate, quod ita adhaeret hoc quod est gratuitum virtuti, quod cum desinit esse gratuita, desinit esse virtus. Ratio autem, quare magis adhaeret in caritate quam in alia virtute, tacta est supra11.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homine cadente in peccatum, ita debet potentiae concupiscibili adiutorium remanere, sicut aliis viribus animae; dicendum, quod remanet sibi adiutorium aliquod se-

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cundum cursum communem. Multi enim peccant, qui habent affectionem dilectionis et pietatis erga Deum et homines bonos; verumtamen illud quod remanet eis, non sortitur nomen virtutis theologicae, secundum id quod remanet in aliis viribus. Et ratio huius est, quia ipsa1 facilius corrumpitur et deordinatur quam aliae vires. Unde quamdiu peccatum est in anima, virtus rectificans eius affectiones non potest esse in ea. Quamvis enim peccator, manens peccator, possit esse rectus in credendo, non tamen potest esse rectus in diligendo2.

English Translation

Question IV. Whether the habit of charity can be unformed, or is always formed.

Fourthly, it is asked whether the habit of charity can be unformed, or is always formed. And that it is always formed seems [to be the case]:

1. First, through Augustine, in the book On True Innocence1: « The love of God and of neighbor is the proper and special virtue of the pious and of the saints, since the other virtues can be common to the good and to the wicked »; but the other virtues are not common to the good and to the wicked except because they can be unformed: if therefore charity cannot in this way be common, it seems that it can in no way be unformed.

2. Likewise, Hugh2: « No wicked person can have charity »; but if it could be unformed, some wicked person could have it: it is therefore impossible that the habit of charity be unformed.

3. Likewise, it is impossible that a form become unformed; but charity is the form of the virtues, according to what is said upon that passage in Romans 13: The justice of God etc.; the Gloss: « This is an unformed quality of the mind, because it does not have charity as its companion, which is the form of all the virtues »: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, it belongs to the virtue of charity to love God for his own sake and above all things4; but no one can have this act who has in himself mortal sin, since in every mortal sin something is loved against God: if therefore that virtue alone can be unformed whose act can be found in a sinner, as is clear concerning faith; it seems that charity can in no way be unformed.

5. Likewise, just as infidelity is repugnant to faith, so lust and lustful love is repugnant to charity; but it is impossible that the habit of faith, whether unformed or formed, stand together with error and infidelity: therefore it is impossible that the habit of charity, whether unformed or formed, stand together with lust. But every sin is lust, or is from lust, according to what Augustine says5: therefore it is impossible that the habit of charity, whether unformed or formed, be found in a sinner; therefore it is not found except in a just man. But in him it does not have being unformed, but is always formed: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. When someone sins, who has believed in God and loved [him], just as belief remains in him, so a certain love remains in him; but that love or affection is not less noble than that belief: therefore if that belief obtains the name of virtue, by parity of reasoning it seems that that love also [does]. But it does not obtain the account and name of any virtue other than charity: therefore charity can be unformed.

2. Likewise, either someone can love God unformedly, or [he can]not. If not: then since a man knows that he loves God, the man will know that he has charity and is in grace, which among many is unfitting. If he can; but as the acts are, so are the habits: therefore if the act of loving can be unformed, it seems that the habit also [can].

3. Likewise, from formed faith arise love and fear, both formed: therefore since from unformed faith servile fear can arise, which is unformed fear, which also has the account of a gift; it seems that from it can arise love, which also has the account of a virtue: there returns therefore the same as before, namely that the love of unformed charity can be.

4. Likewise, charity is a gratuitous virtue; it is established that this gratuitous difference adds above the virtue: therefore if the prior can remain without the posterior, it seems that, when charity ceases to be gratuitous, the virtue can still remain: therefore it can be unformed.

5. Likewise, to a man falling into sin something is left in the rational and irascible power, by which he is made apt to rise again, as faith and hope: therefore by parity of reasoning something is left in the concupiscible power, indeed by a much stronger [reasoning], since it has more need; but it is established that that is not less noble than that which is in the other powers, since it has being informed by a nobler virtue: if therefore the others after the fall into sin possess unformed faith and hope, it seems that it too after sin has unformed charity.

Conclusion.

Charity can never be unformed; yet in adducing reasons the doctors do not agree.

I respond: It must be said that according to the common opinion the habit of charity is always formed and never has being unformed. — And its very name indicates this; for it is named by the name of grace1. If therefore that virtue is said to be unformed which is deprived of grace, to call charity unformed is nothing other than to say that the gratuitous is deprived of grace; which is false and unintelligible, because there is in it an implication of opposites. And therefore it is commonly said that charity cannot be unformed.

— But although the doctors commonly agree in this, yet in the reason why they say it there is a difference among them.

For some wished to say that charity therefore cannot be unformed because it is the uncreated gift itself, namely the Holy Spirit himself. And of this opinion was the Master of the Sentences. — But this opinion is commonly not held nor is to be held, as was shown in the first book2.

Others indeed wished to say that charity cannot be unformed because it is a merely gratuitous habit, having nothing beyond grace that makes [one] pleasing except only a relation and ordering to the act and the end. The other virtues, however, which have substrate habits, can be unformed; but charity alone is the one which adds nothing absolute: and therefore it alone is the one which cannot become8 unformed. — But although this seems sufficiently probable, it is nevertheless not a little open to objection. For it is difficult to maintain, when the authorities and reasons are weighed, that charity does not add beyond grace some habit which makes the concupiscible power apt to love, as was shown in the preceding problem.

And therefore there is yet a third way9 of rendering the reason why charity cannot be unformed, as the other virtues [can]; for this is because charity, not only insofar as it is gratuitous, but also insofar as it is right affection or with respect to the substrate habit, is repugnant to every sin, just as faith is specially repugnant to the sin opposed to it. Hence just as faith is simply taken away by error and infidelity, and hope by despair, so that no quality nor unformed virtue remains, so the habit of charity is to be taken away by every fault; and therefore it never remains unformed.

That, moreover, every sin has opposition with charity by reason of the substrate habit is manifest thus. For just as the habit of faith itself makes the soul apt to believe all that is to be believed and to assent to the First Truth for its own sake and above

omnia: so also the habit of charity makes [it] apt1 to love all that is to be loved and to cleave to the First Goodness for its own sake and above all things. And therefore, just as error concerning any article has opposition with the habit of faith, so lustful love concerning the things that are to be loved has opposition with charity itself by reason of the substrate habit. Since therefore every sin consists in a disordered love of some created good and in a certain lust, which has opposition with right love, just as error with right belief; hence it is that every sin simply excludes charity. And therefore, just as unformed faith cannot be found in the unbelieving and in heretics; so unformed charity cannot be found in any men who are sinners and wicked; and2 in those alone can unformed virtue be found: hence it is that charity can in no way be unformed, because according to its whole self it is opposed to fault generally, which is not to be found in any other virtue. — And if you ask the reason for this, Augustine teaches in the fourteenth book On the City of God4, where he says that « every affection arises from love »; therefore nothing can make crooked any affections of the soul without its being in some way, either principally or by consequence, opposed to love itself and to the habit rectifying that affection5. — The reasons showing that charity cannot be unformed are therefore to be conceded.

1. To that indeed which is first objected, that in a sinner belief and love toward God remain; it must be said that although both remain, yet not uniformly, because belief has the account of a virtue, but love does not. And the reason for this is: that for some habit to obtain the name and account of a virtue, it is necessary that it have some perfection and a certain vigor with respect to the act and the object; this, however, belief has in the sinful man. For the sinner himself assents to the First Truth for its own sake and above all things and believes all that is to be believed, according as they are to be believed. But there is no sinner who loves God for his own sake and above all things and loves6 all that is to be loved, according as they are to be loved; and therefore that love which is in the sinner does not so have the account of a virtue nor obtain the name of charity, according as belief has the account of a virtue and obtains the name of faith7.

2. To that which is objected, that it happens to love unformedly; it must be said that it is true; but just as to believe some article unformedly, when the other articles are disbelieved, according as some heretics do, is not an act of unformed virtue, because faith is not a virtue in them; so to love God in a sinner is not an act of virtue; for there is lacking there the perfection of virtue, because such a one does not love all that is to be loved: there is also lacking vigor, because by that act he does not overcome nor exclude the lustful love opposed to it; just as it is concerning him who believes one article without another, who8 through that belief neither believes perfectly, because he does not believe all things, nor believes vigorously, because he does not overcome the error.

3. To that which is objected, that from unformed faith unformed love ought to be generated, as also [unformed] fear; it must be said that it is not similar, for the reason that love is of greater perfection than fear, and the soul is more rectified in loving rightly than in fearing rightly: and this, because love is the principle of all the affections, as was said above. And therefore from this it does not follow that, although faith generates unformed fear9, it can generate the love of charity.

4. To that which is objected, that charity is a gratuitous virtue, and being gratuitous constrains that which is being a virtue; it must be said that although being gratuitous be less than being a virtue; nothing nevertheless prevents some difference from so adhering to the genus with respect to the species, that, this being removed, there is removed by consequence what pertains to the essence of the genus; just as it is clear that man is a rational animal10, and if he ceases to be rational, he ceases to be an animal. In this way it can be understood also in charity, that the gratuitous so adheres to the virtue that, when it ceases to be gratuitous, it ceases to be a virtue. But the reason why it adheres more in charity than in another virtue has been touched on above11.

5. To that which is objected, that, a man falling into sin, help ought to remain to the concupiscible power just as to the other powers of the soul; it must be said that some help remains to it ac-

cording to the common course. For many sin who have an affection of love and piety toward God and good men; nevertheless that which remains to them does not obtain the name of a theological virtue, according to that which remains in the other powers. And the reason for this is that it1 is more easily corrupted and disordered than the other powers. Hence as long as sin is in the soul, the virtue rectifying its affections cannot be in it. For although a sinner, remaining a sinner, can be right in believing, yet he cannot be right in loving2.

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Num. 7. Vide supra pag. 487, nota I. (P. 599, n. 1.)
    Number 7. See above, p. 487, note I. (P. 599, n. 1.)
  2. Lib. II. de Sacram. p. XIII. c. 11: Caritatem malos habere non potest... quia caritatem habere et simul malus esse nemo potest. Cfr. opusc. de Laude caritatis, post medium. (P. 599, n. 2.)
    Book II On the Sacraments, p. XIII, c. 11: He cannot have charity [together with] the wicked... because to have charity and at the same time be wicked no one can. Cf. the little work On the Praise of Charity, after the middle. (P. 599, n. 2.)
  3. Vers. 17. — Integra Glossae verba habes supra pag. 592, nota 7. (P. 599, n. 3.)
    Verse 17. — The complete words of the Gloss you have above, p. 592, note 7. (P. 599, n. 3.)
  4. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. et 5. — De fide informi vide supra d. 23. a. 2. q. I. seqq. — Paulo inferius pro diligatur edd. cum paucis codd. rectigat, et subinde pro contra cod. M supra, cod. bb super. (P. 599, n. 4.)
    Cf. here the Master's text, c. 2 and 5. — On unformed faith see above, d. 23, a. 2, q. I ff. — A little below, for diligatur the editions with a few codices [read] rectigat, and thereupon for contra codex M [reads] supra, codex bb super. (P. 599, n. 4.)
  5. Libr. I. de Lib. Arb. c. 3. n. 8. seqq., ubi inter alia: « Nihil aliud quam libidinem in toto male faciendi genere dominari ». Ibidem (c. 4. n. 10.) etiam docet, « malefacta non ob aliud mala esse, nisi quod libidine, id est improbanda cupiditate, fiunt ». Et in libro de Mendacio, c. 7. n. 10. Idem August. dicit: Libido quoque ipsa recte definitur appetitus animi, quo aeternis bonis quaelibet temporalia praeponuntur. Cfr. XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. n. 2. — Aliquanto inferius pro vero iusto eod. iusto. (P. 599, n. 5.)
    Book I On Free Will, c. 3, n. 8 ff., where among other things: « Nothing other than lust holds dominion in the whole class of doing evil ». In the same place (c. 4, n. 10) he also teaches that « misdeeds are evil for no other reason than that they are done from lust, that is, from blameworthy desire ». And in the book On Lying, c. 7, n. 10, the same Augustine says: Lust itself also is rightly defined as the appetite of the mind by which any temporal things whatever are preferred to eternal goods. Cf. XIV On the City of God, c. 15, n. 2. — Somewhat below, for vero iusto the same [reads] iusto. (P. 599, n. 5.) <!-- p. 600 -->
  6. Vide supra d. 23. a. 2. q. I. — Mox in conclus. post ergo cod. A subdit et. (P. 600, n. 1.)
    See above, d. 23, a. 2, q. I. — Presently in the conclusion, after ergo codex A adds et. (P. 600, n. 1.)
  7. Vide supra d. 23. dub. 4. — Quae connexio sit inter actum et habitum, videsis supra pag. 470, nota 8; cfr. etiam tom. II. pag. 760, nota 6. (P. 600, n. 2.)
    See above, d. 23, dub. 4. — What connection there is between act and habit, see above, p. 470, note 8; cf. also tom. II, p. 760, note 6. (P. 600, n. 2.)
  8. Ut ostenditur infra in lit. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. 4. seqq., et in Comment. p. II. q. I. seqq. (P. 600, n. 3.)
    As is shown below in the Master's text, d. XXXIV, c. 4 ff., and in the Commentary, p. II, q. I ff. (P. 600, n. 3.)
  9. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 16. (IV. c. 11.): Quaedam vero [priora dicuntur] secundum naturam et substantiam, quaecumque contingunt absque aliis [posterioribus] esse, ista vero sine illis minime; qua divisione usus est Plato. Cfr. supra pag. 575, nota 1. (P. 600, n. 4.)
    Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 16 (IV, c. 11): But certain things [are said to be prior] according to nature and substance, namely whatever can be without others [posterior to them], but these [posterior things] not at all without those; by which division Plato made use. Cf. above, p. 575, note 1. (P. 600, n. 4.)
  10. Vide supra d. 23. a. 2. q. I. et d. 26. a. I. q. 4. — Pro quo fit non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 quo sit. Paulo inferius pro multo fortiori Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. multo fortius, et pro constat codd. A K constans est. (P. 600, n. 5.)
    See above, d. 23, a. 2, q. I, and d. 26, a. I, q. 4. — For quo fit not a few codices with editions 1, 2 [read] quo sit. A little below, for multo fortiori the Vatican [edition] with one or another codex [reads] multo fortius, and for constat codices A K [read] constans est. (P. 600, n. 5.)
  11. De quo vide auctorem in principio quaest. praeced., nec non scholion supra ad q. I. (P. 600, n. 6.)
    Concerning which see the author at the beginning of the preceding question, and also the scholion above to q. I. (P. 600, n. 6.)
  12. Codd. U Z addunt dist. 17. [p. I. q. I.], ubi illa opinio erronea Magistri multis argumentis refutatur. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. q. 2. (P. 600, n. 7.)
    Codices U Z add dist. 17 [p. I, q. I], where that erroneous opinion of the Master is refuted by many arguments. Cf. II Sent. d. 26, q. 2. (P. 600, n. 7.)
  13. Edd. esse. (P. 600, n. 8.)
    The editions [read] esse. (P. 600, n. 8.)
  14. Cod. W hic interiicit respondendi et. (P. 600, n. 9.)
    Codex W here inserts respondendi et. (P. 600, n. 9.) <!-- p. 601 -->
  15. In codd. et edd. 1, 2 nec non in Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 37. a. 6. deest habilitat, quod Vat., quam secuti sumus, bene supplevit. Subinde pro habitus caritatis non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 et laudato Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal. habilitatio. (P. 601, n. 1.)
    In the codices and editions 1, 2, and also in the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 37, a. 6, habilitat is lacking, which the Vatican [edition], which we have followed, well supplied. Thereupon for habitus caritatis not a few codices with editions 1, 2 and the cited Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales [read] habilitatio. (P. 601, n. 1.)
  16. Edd. substrati boni. Paulo inferius pro recto amore cod. Z vero amore. (P. 601, n. 2.)
    The editions [read] substrati boni. A little below, for recto amore codex Z [reads] vero amore. (P. 601, n. 2.)
  17. Cod. K et quoniam. (P. 601, n. 3.)
    Codex K [reads] et quoniam. (P. 601, n. 3.)
  18. Cap. 7. n. 2, ex quo iam supra pag. 338, nota 3. quaedam attulimus. — Paulo post pro opponatur complures codd. opponitur, Vat. oppositum sit. Deinde pro affectum illum cod. Z affectionem illam. (P. 601, n. 4.)
    Chapter 7, n. 2, from which already above, p. 338, note 3, we adduced certain things. — A little after, for opponatur several codices [read] opponitur, the Vatican [edition] oppositum sit. Then for affectum illum codex Z [reads] affectionem illam. (P. 601, n. 4.)
  19. Guliel. Antissiod., Sum. p. III. tr. 19. q. 2: Notandum est, quod omne peccatum habet oppositionem ad caritatem propter tres causas. Prima est, quia peccatum est offensa Dei; offendere autem Deum est contra amicitiam, quae est caritas; vera autem amicitia est idem velle, idem nolle. Secunda, quia peccatum separat a Deo; caritas vero unit Deo et coniungit; amor enim est coniunctio diligentis cum dilecto; qui enim adhaeret Domino per caritatem, unus spiritus efficitur cum ipso. Tertia causa est, quia peccatum mortale interficit proprium subiectum, et eo ipso quod homo interficit se, est inimicus sui, et ita non diligit se debito modo, et ita est caritas informis. (P. 601, n. 5.)
    William of Auxerre, Summa p. III, tr. 19, q. 2: It must be noted that every sin has opposition to charity for three reasons. The first is because sin is an offense against God; but to offend God is against friendship, which is charity; and true friendship is to will the same, to refuse the same. The second, because sin separates from God; but charity unites and joins to God; for love is the conjunction of the lover with the beloved; for he who cleaves to the Lord through charity is made one spirit with him. The third reason is because mortal sin slays its own subject, and by the very fact that a man slays himself, he is an enemy of himself, and thus does not love himself in the due manner, and thus is charity unformed. (P. 601, n. 5.)
  20. Complures codd. habent his diligat; alii tantum secundo loco; edd. 1, 2 cum Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal. bis diligit, Vat. secundo loco et qui diligit. (P. 601, n. 6.)
    Several codices have diligat twice; others only in the second place; editions 1, 2 with the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales [have] diligit twice, the Vatican [edition] in the second place et qui diligit. (P. 601, n. 6.)
  21. Vide supra d. 23. a. 2. q. I. (P. 601, n. 7.)
    See above, d. 23, a. 2, q. I. (P. 601, n. 7.)
  22. Cod. A qui aut. (P. 601, n. 8.)
    Codex A [reads] qui aut. (P. 601, n. 8.)
  23. Plurimi codd. nec non edd. 1, 2 et Supplementum Sum. Alex. Hal. perperam amorem, et mox cod. A pro amorem aeque perperam timorem. (P. 601, n. 9.)
    Very many codices and also editions 1, 2 and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales wrongly [read] amorem, and presently codex A for amorem equally wrongly [reads] timorem. (P. 601, n. 9.)
  24. Edd. rationale mortale. Paulo inferius pro cum desinit codd. F G H N T V cum desinat. (P. 601, n. 10.)
    The editions [read] rationale mortale. A little below, for cum desinit codices F G H N T V [read] cum desinat. (P. 601, n. 10.)
  25. Quaest. praeced. (P. 601, n. 11.)
    The preceding question. (P. 601, n. 11.) <!-- p. 602 -->
  26. Scil. vis concupiscibilis. — Post pauca pro aliae vires edd. 1, 2 substituerunt aliae virtutes. Paulo superius pro remanet eis multi codd. incongrue remanet ei. Paulo inferius pro manens peccator cod. aa manens in peccato. (P. 602, n. 1.)
    Namely, the concupiscible power. — After a few [words], for aliae vires editions 1, 2 substituted aliae virtutes. A little above, for remanet eis many codices incongruously [read] remanet ei. A little below, for manens peccator codex aa [reads] manens in peccato. (P. 602, n. 1.)
  27. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. (P. 602, n. 2.)
    See the scholion to the preceding question. (P. 602, n. 2.)
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